The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the only approved symmetric encryption algorithm by security agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The algo-rithm is designed to be fast and robust against cryptanalysis attacks. However, the original design lacks of any countermeasure against a novel class of attacks: side-channel attacks. This vulnerability necessitates the implementation of supplementary security measures to guarantee AES security in a deployment scenario. This paper explores a solution that targets the AES Substitution Box (S-Box) structure. The original S-Box is replaced with novel structures inherently more resistant to power-based side channel attacks. This concept is demonstrated by testing six different novel S-Box implementations. Each is subjected to real exp erimentsviaacorrelationpoweranalysisattackonanAEShardwareimplementation.AcompletecomprehensionoftheireffectivenessisgainedbycomparingtheresultsfoundtothosederivedfromtheAESSWimplementation.Thesolutioninvestigatedleveragestheinherentmathematicalproper-tiesoftheS-Boxtoprovidealightweightcountermeasureagainstpoweranalysisside-channelattackswithzeroimplementationcost.

Performance Comparison: Software vs. Hardware Implementation of Novel S-Box Designed to Resist Power Analysis Attack / Mirigaldi, Mattia; Martina, Maurizio; Masera, Guido. - ELETTRONICO. - (2025), pp. 19-27. (Intervento presentato al convegno Applications in Electronics Pervading Industry, Environment and Society, APPLEPIES tenutosi a Torino (Ita) nel 19-20 September 2024) [10.1007/978-3-031-84100-2_3].

Performance Comparison: Software vs. Hardware Implementation of Novel S-Box Designed to Resist Power Analysis Attack

Mirigaldi, Mattia;Martina, Maurizio;Masera, Guido
2025

Abstract

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the only approved symmetric encryption algorithm by security agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The algo-rithm is designed to be fast and robust against cryptanalysis attacks. However, the original design lacks of any countermeasure against a novel class of attacks: side-channel attacks. This vulnerability necessitates the implementation of supplementary security measures to guarantee AES security in a deployment scenario. This paper explores a solution that targets the AES Substitution Box (S-Box) structure. The original S-Box is replaced with novel structures inherently more resistant to power-based side channel attacks. This concept is demonstrated by testing six different novel S-Box implementations. Each is subjected to real exp erimentsviaacorrelationpoweranalysisattackonanAEShardwareimplementation.AcompletecomprehensionoftheireffectivenessisgainedbycomparingtheresultsfoundtothosederivedfromtheAESSWimplementation.Thesolutioninvestigatedleveragestheinherentmathematicalproper-tiesoftheS-Boxtoprovidealightweightcountermeasureagainstpoweranalysisside-channelattackswithzeroimplementationcost.
2025
978-3-031-84100-2
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11583/2998384