We address the problem of Electric Vehicle (EV) drivers' assistance through Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). Drivers of EVs that are low in battery may ask a navigation service for advice on which charging station to use and which route to take. A rational driver will follow the received advice, provided there is no better choice i.e., in game-theory terms, if such advice corresponds to a Nash-equilibrium strategy. Thus, we model the problem as a game: first we propose a congestion game, then a game with congestion-averse utilities, both admitting at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The former represents a practical scenario with a high level of realism, although at a high computational price. The latter neglects some features of the real-world scenario but it exhibits very low complexity, and is shown to provide results that, on average, differ by 16% from those obtained with the former approach. Furthermore, when drivers value the trip time most, the average per-EV performance yielded by the Nash equilibria and the one attained by solving a centralized optimization problem that minimizes the EV trip time differ by 15% at most. This is an important result, as minimizing this quantity implies reduced road traffic congestion and energy consumption, as well as higher user satisfaction.
A Game-theory Analysis of Charging Stations Selection by EV Drivers / Malandrino F.; Casetti C.; Chiasserini C.F.; Reineri M.. - In: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION. - ISSN 0166-5316. - STAMPA. - 83-84(2015), pp. 16-31.
Titolo: | A Game-theory Analysis of Charging Stations Selection by EV Drivers |
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Data di pubblicazione: | 2015 |
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Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.peva.2014.11.001 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
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R2_peva_v2_nocolor.pdf | 1. Preprint / Submitted Version | PUBBLICO - Tutti i diritti riservati | Visibile a tuttiVisualizza/Apri | |
PEVA_evenets_2015.pdf | 2. Post-print / Author's Accepted Manuscript | Non Pubblico - Accesso privato/ristretto | Administrator Richiedi una copia |
http://hdl.handle.net/11583/2574142