This paper presents Fenics, a modular framework for evaluating the resilience of Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) networks under adversarial conditions. As a nascent field, DFL raises security challenges in decentralized network settings under adversarial behaviors. To our knowledge, Fenics is the first fully open-source framework of its kind, enabling user-defined topologies, multiple communication protocols, and customizable attack models to study how malicious node placement affects network performance. It integrates core components of DFL, including data distribution, dynamic node participation, and aggregation to establish the DFL architecture. We demonstrate the framework’s capabilities through different use cases under poisoning and delay attacks using the FashionMNIST dataset. The results validate its capability to reveal how node placement affects performance and expose network vulnerabilities. For example, poisoning attacks exhibit topology- dependent impacts, with accuracy dropping by over 55% in certain scenarios, leading to derailed convergence. Additionally, the ex- tensive logging features of the framework enable post-simulation analysis and insightful interpretation. Its modular architecture, simple deployment, and customizable options make it a lightweight yet useful tool for in-depth research on DFL network security.

Fenics: A Modular Framework for Security Evaluation in Decentralized Federated Learning / Saha, Shubham; Nawrin Nova, Sifat; Duvignau, Romaric; Chiasserini, Carla Fabiana. - (2025), pp. 146-151. (Intervento presentato al convegno DEBS 2025 19TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED AND EVENT-BASED SYSTEMS tenutosi a Gothenburg (Swe) nel 10–13 June 2025) [10.1145/3701717.37305].

Fenics: A Modular Framework for Security Evaluation in Decentralized Federated Learning

Carla Fabiana Chiasserini
2025

Abstract

This paper presents Fenics, a modular framework for evaluating the resilience of Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) networks under adversarial conditions. As a nascent field, DFL raises security challenges in decentralized network settings under adversarial behaviors. To our knowledge, Fenics is the first fully open-source framework of its kind, enabling user-defined topologies, multiple communication protocols, and customizable attack models to study how malicious node placement affects network performance. It integrates core components of DFL, including data distribution, dynamic node participation, and aggregation to establish the DFL architecture. We demonstrate the framework’s capabilities through different use cases under poisoning and delay attacks using the FashionMNIST dataset. The results validate its capability to reveal how node placement affects performance and expose network vulnerabilities. For example, poisoning attacks exhibit topology- dependent impacts, with accuracy dropping by over 55% in certain scenarios, leading to derailed convergence. Additionally, the ex- tensive logging features of the framework enable post-simulation analysis and insightful interpretation. Its modular architecture, simple deployment, and customizable options make it a lightweight yet useful tool for in-depth research on DFL network security.
2025
979-8-4007-1332-3
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
3701717.3730550.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: 2a Post-print versione editoriale / Version of Record
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 683.01 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
683.01 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11583/2998921