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EnglishWe analyze Nash games played among leaders of Stackelberg games (NASP). We show it is $Sigma^p_2$-hard to decide if the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MNE), even when there are only two leaders and each leader has one follower. We provide a finite time algorithm with a running time bounded by $O(2^{2^n})$ which computes MNEs for NASP when it exists and returns infeasibility if no MNE exists. We also provide two ways to improve the algorithm which involves constructing a series of inner approximations (alternatively, outer approximations) to the leaders' feasible region that will provably obtain the required MNE. Finally, we test our algorithms on a range of NASPs arising out of a game in the energy market, where countries act as Stackelberg leaders who play a Nash game, and the domestic producers act as the followers.
When Nash Meets Stackelberg / Carvalho, Margarida; Dragotto, Gabriele; Feijoo, Felipe; Lodi, Andrea; Sankaranarayanan, Sriram. - ELETTRONICO. - (2019).
| Titolo: | When Nash Meets Stackelberg |
| Autori: | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2019 |
| Abstract: | We analyze Nash games played among leaders of Stackelberg games (NASP). We show it is $Sigma^p_2$-hard to decide if the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MNE), even when there are only two leaders and each leader has one follower. We provide a finite time algorithm with a running time bounded by $O(2^{2^n})$ which computes MNEs for NASP when it exists and returns infeasibility if no MNE exists. We also provide two ways to improve the algorithm which involves constructing a series of inner approximations (alternatively, outer approximations) to the leaders' feasible region that will provably obtain the required MNE. Finally, we test our algorithms on a range of NASPs arising out of a game in the energy market, where countries act as Stackelberg leaders who play a Nash game, and the domestic producers act as the followers. |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
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