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EnglishRuntime memory vulnerabilities, especially present in widely used languages as C and C++, are exploited by attackers to corrupt code pointers and hijack the execution flow of a program running on a target system to force it to behave abnormally. This is the principle of modern Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs) and of famous attack paradigms as Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP), which have defeated the previous defenses against malicious code injection such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP). Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a promising approach to protect against such runtime attacks. Recently, many CFI solutions have been proposed, with both hardware and software implementations. But how can a defense based on complying with a graph calculated a priori efficiently deal with something unpredictable as exceptions and interrupt requests? The present paper focuses on this dichotomy by analysing some of the CFI-based defenses and showing how the unexpected trigger of an interrupt and the sudden execution of an Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) can circumvent them.
CFI: control flow integrity or control flow interruption? / Maunero, N.; Prinetto, P.; Roascio, G.. - ELETTRONICO. - (2019), pp. 1-6. ((Intervento presentato al convegno 2019 IEEE East-West Design and Test Symposium, EWDTS 2019 tenutosi a Batumi (GE) nel 2019 [10.1109/EWDTS.2019.8884464].
| Titolo: | CFI: control flow integrity or control flow interruption? | |
| Autori: | ||
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2019 | |
| Abstract: | Runtime memory vulnerabilities, especially present in widely used languages as C and C++, are exp...loited by attackers to corrupt code pointers and hijack the execution flow of a program running on a target system to force it to behave abnormally. This is the principle of modern Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs) and of famous attack paradigms as Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP), which have defeated the previous defenses against malicious code injection such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP). Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a promising approach to protect against such runtime attacks. Recently, many CFI solutions have been proposed, with both hardware and software implementations. But how can a defense based on complying with a graph calculated a priori efficiently deal with something unpredictable as exceptions and interrupt requests? The present paper focuses on this dichotomy by analysing some of the CFI-based defenses and showing how the unexpected trigger of an interrupt and the sudden execution of an Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) can circumvent them. | |
| ISBN: | 978-1-7281-1003-5 | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 4.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno |
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Descrizione | Tipologia | Licenza | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08884464.pdf | Articolo principale | 2a Post-print versione editoriale / Version of Record | Non Pubblico - Accesso privato/ristretto | Administrator Richiedi una copia |
| EWDTS2019-paper-CFI.pdf | 2. Post-print / Author's Accepted Manuscript | PUBBLICO - Tutti i diritti riservati | Visibile a tuttiVisualizza/Apri |
http://hdl.handle.net/11583/2838935
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