Usually network administrators implement a protection policy by refining a set of (abstract) communication security requirements into configuration settings for the security controls that will provide the required protection. The refinement consists in evaluating the available technologies that can enforce the policy at node and network level, selecting the most suitable ones, and possibly making fine adjustments, like aggregating several individual channels into a single tunnel. The refinement process is a sensitive task which can lead to incorrect or suboptimal implementations, that in turn affect the overall security, decrease the network throughput and increase the maintenance costs. In literature, several techniques exist that can be used to identify anomalies (i.e. potential incompatibilities and redundancies among policy implementations. However, these techniques usually focus only on a single security technology (e.g. IPsec) and overlook the effects of multiple overlapping protection techniques. This paper presents a novel classification of communication protection policy anomalies and a formal model which is able to detect anomalies among policy implementations relying on technologies that work at different network layers. The result of our analysis allows administrators to have a precise insight on the various alternative implementations, their relations and the possibility of resolving anomalies, thus increasing the overall security and performance of a network.

Inter-technology conflict analysis for communication protection policies / Valenza, Fulvio; Basile, Cataldo; Canavese, Daniele; Lioy, Antonio. - STAMPA. - (2015), pp. 148-163. (Intervento presentato al convegno CRiSIS-2014: 9th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems tenutosi a Trento (Italy) nel 27-29 August 2014) [10.1007/978-3-319-17127-2_10].

Inter-technology conflict analysis for communication protection policies

VALENZA, FULVIO;BASILE, CATALDO;CANAVESE, DANIELE;LIOY, ANTONIO
2015

Abstract

Usually network administrators implement a protection policy by refining a set of (abstract) communication security requirements into configuration settings for the security controls that will provide the required protection. The refinement consists in evaluating the available technologies that can enforce the policy at node and network level, selecting the most suitable ones, and possibly making fine adjustments, like aggregating several individual channels into a single tunnel. The refinement process is a sensitive task which can lead to incorrect or suboptimal implementations, that in turn affect the overall security, decrease the network throughput and increase the maintenance costs. In literature, several techniques exist that can be used to identify anomalies (i.e. potential incompatibilities and redundancies among policy implementations. However, these techniques usually focus only on a single security technology (e.g. IPsec) and overlook the effects of multiple overlapping protection techniques. This paper presents a novel classification of communication protection policy anomalies and a formal model which is able to detect anomalies among policy implementations relying on technologies that work at different network layers. The result of our analysis allows administrators to have a precise insight on the various alternative implementations, their relations and the possibility of resolving anomalies, thus increasing the overall security and performance of a network.
2015
9783319171265
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11583/2573139