Enterprise networks are increasingly offloading the responsibility for worm detection and containment to the carrier networks. However, current approaches to the zero-day worm detection problem such as those based on content similarity of packet payloads are not scalable to the carrier link speeds (OC-48 and up-wards). In this paper, we introduce a new system, namely DoWitcher, which in contrast to previous approaches is scalable as well as able to detect the stealthiest worms that employ low-propagation rates or polymorphisms to evade detection. DoWitcher uses an incremental approach toward worm detection: First, it examines the layer-4 traffic features to discern the presence of a worm anomaly; Next, it determines a flow-filter mask that can be applied to isolate the suspect worm flows and; Finally, it enables full-packet capture of only those flows that match the mask, which are then processed by a longest common subsequence algorithm to extract the worm content signature. Via a proof-of-concept implementation on a commercially available network analyzer processing raw packets from an OC-48 link, we demonstrate the capability of DoWitcher to detect low-rate worms and extract signatures for even the polymorphic worms.
DoWitcher: Effective Worm Detection and Containment in the Internet Core / Ranjan, S; Shah, S; Nucci, A; Munafo', MAURIZIO MATTEO; Cruz, R; Muthukrishnan, S.. - (2007), pp. 2541-2545. (Intervento presentato al convegno IEEE INFOCOM 2007 tenutosi a Anchorage, Alaska, USA nel 6-12 May, 2007) [10.1109/INFCOM.2007.317].
DoWitcher: Effective Worm Detection and Containment in the Internet Core
MUNAFO', MAURIZIO MATTEO;
2007
Abstract
Enterprise networks are increasingly offloading the responsibility for worm detection and containment to the carrier networks. However, current approaches to the zero-day worm detection problem such as those based on content similarity of packet payloads are not scalable to the carrier link speeds (OC-48 and up-wards). In this paper, we introduce a new system, namely DoWitcher, which in contrast to previous approaches is scalable as well as able to detect the stealthiest worms that employ low-propagation rates or polymorphisms to evade detection. DoWitcher uses an incremental approach toward worm detection: First, it examines the layer-4 traffic features to discern the presence of a worm anomaly; Next, it determines a flow-filter mask that can be applied to isolate the suspect worm flows and; Finally, it enables full-packet capture of only those flows that match the mask, which are then processed by a longest common subsequence algorithm to extract the worm content signature. Via a proof-of-concept implementation on a commercially available network analyzer processing raw packets from an OC-48 link, we demonstrate the capability of DoWitcher to detect low-rate worms and extract signatures for even the polymorphic worms.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/11583/1644047
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