In this article, we analyze the influence that crucial interest groups had with regard to one of the most debated policy processes in recent years: the so-called «Jobs Act» (law no. 183/2014) enacted by the Renzi government. We focus on the interplay between the government and the main stakeholders in labor market policy, by reconstructing the decision-making process leading to the labor market reform of 2014-2015. Interest groups played a rather marginal role and reached very partial policy results, whereas the government was able to steer the policy process and to achieve (most of) its policy goals. However, the «Jobs Act» is not a story of wholesale disintermediation and unilateralism: the main stakeholders were invited to help fine-tuning policy measures and were able to deter the government from approving the disposition on minimum wage.
I gruppi di interesse e il Jobs Act: lobbying con quali effetti? / Pritoni, A.; Sacchi, S.. - In: RIVISTA ITALIANA DI POLITICHE PUBBLICHE. - ISSN 1722-1137. - ELETTRONICO. - 14:2(2019), pp. 181-212. [10.1483/94319]
|Titolo:||I gruppi di interesse e il Jobs Act: lobbying con quali effetti?|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2019|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1483/94319|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|
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