This paper presents a bidding model based on a two-stage electricity market structure to solve the bidding difficulties which emerging retail companies would face under the Spread-Rebate mechanism. In order to increase the market efficiency while reduce the risk of retailers, a general retailer agent, surrogate for all retailers, is modeled as the only buyer in the market who distributes the spread tariff among retailers after market clearing. In the upper stage, a bilateral Bayesian game model with asymmetric information between the generation companies and the general retailer agent is structured, whereas in the lower stage, a decision-making model with demand side elasticity for retail companies is built. Finally, an illustrative simple example is given to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of the proposed method.
A game-theoretic model for retail companies under the spread-rebate mechanism / Wu, H.; Lei, X.; Huang, T.; He, J.. - In: DIANLI XITONG BAOHU YU KONGZHI. - ISSN 1674-3415. - 47:12(2019), pp. 84-92.
|Titolo:||A game-theoretic model for retail companies under the spread-rebate mechanism|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2019|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.180870|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|