We present new evidence on the relationship between ownership, control and performance in family firms, by using a sample of Italian publicly listed companies from 2000 to 2017. We account for the potential self-selection bias of family firms with an endogenous treatment selection model. We do not find consistent evidence of a performance premium of Italian family firms or family CEOs as family firms achieve superior profitability, but lower market to book ratios. Interestingly, however, firm value is negatively impacted when the high controlling shares are disjointed from family ownership and when the family CEO is also Chair of the board. We also find that the equity stake is significantly lower when the CEO is a member of the controlling family, suggesting a trade-off between ownership and control within family firms.
Ownership and performance in the Italian stock exchange: the puzzle of family firms / Abrardi, L.; Rondi, L.. - In: ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE. - ISSN 0391-2078. - (2020).
|Titolo:||Ownership and performance in the Italian stock exchange: the puzzle of family firms|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2020|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40812-020-00160-z|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|