Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.
Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options / Bourreau, M.; Cambini, C.; Hoernig, S.; Vogelsang, I.. - In: JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0922-680X. - (2020).
Titolo: | Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2020 |
Rivista: | |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09402-3 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
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Access_Options_JRE_rev2.pdf | 2. Post-print / Author's Accepted Manuscript | PUBBLICO - Tutti i diritti riservati | Embargo: 12/03/2021 Richiedi una copia | |
Bourreau2020_Article_FiberInvestmentAndAccessUnderU.pdf | 2a Post-print versione editoriale / Version of Record | Non Pubblico - Accesso privato/ristretto | Administrator Richiedi una copia |
http://hdl.handle.net/11583/2808468