We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets threebasicethicalrequirementsandallowscommunitymemberstoinfluence,viamon- etary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either public or private information about personal values. This produces two distinct public provi- sion games, which are experimentally implemented and analyzed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they rely on strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism mostly leads to the implementation of the most efficient project.

Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process / Cicognani, S.; D'Ambrosio, A.; Guth, W.; Pfuderer, S.; Ploner, M.. - In: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. - ISSN 0176-1714. - ELETTRONICO. - 44:1(2015), pp. 109-132. [10.1007/s00355-014-0822-y]

Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process

D'Ambrosio A.;
2015

Abstract

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets threebasicethicalrequirementsandallowscommunitymemberstoinfluence,viamon- etary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either public or private information about personal values. This produces two distinct public provi- sion games, which are experimentally implemented and analyzed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they rely on strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism mostly leads to the implementation of the most efficient project.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11583/2788332