This paper compares the impacts of traditional one–way access obligations and the new regulatory scheme of co-investment on the roll-out of network infrastructures. We show that compulsory access leads to smaller roll-out, first because it reduces the returns from investment, and second because in the presence of uncertainty it provides access seekers with an option whose exercise hurts investors. Co-investment without access obligations leads to risk sharing and eliminates the access option, implying highest network coverage. Allowing for access on top of co-investment actually decreases welfare if the access price is low.
Cooperative Investment, Access, and Uncertainty / Bourreau, M.; Cambini, C.; Hoernig, S.. - In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-7187. - STAMPA. - 56(2018), pp. 78-106.
|Titolo:||Cooperative Investment, Access, and Uncertainty|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2018|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.11.004|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|