We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment

Geographic Access Markets and Investments / Bourreau, M.; Cambini, Carlo; Hoernig, S.. - In: INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY. - ISSN 0167-6245. - 31:(2015), pp. 13-21. [10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003]

Geographic Access Markets and Investments

CAMBINI, CARLO;
2015

Abstract

We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11583/2602754
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