Generation of an infinite series of identical sub-trees may occur during the construction of a Fault Tree (FT) when one item of equipment in a plant is considered several times in the same sub-tree in the course of the tree extraction from a HazOp (Hazard Operability analysis) analysis. Generation of loops in the construction of an FT can be avoided by means of an ad hoc logical analysis in which certain simple rules of syntax are taken into account. A radical solution, however, can be obtained if identification of unwanted events in a process plant is not undertaken with conventional procedures, such as HazOp (Operability Analysis with guide words, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) etc.), but with a more modern and structured version, such as Recursive Operability Analysis (ROA), which is both systematic and complete, and allows direct extraction of logic trees, (FT, event trees, etc.) for subsequent quantification. This feature means that, by contrast with conventional operability analysis, the congruence of the ROA itself can be checked. The ROA method is illustrated in this paper with the aid of some simple examples.

How to avoid the generation of logic loops in the construction of fault trees / Demichela, Micaela; Piccinini, Norberto; Ciarambino, I.; Contini, S.. - In: RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYSTEM SAFETY. - ISSN 0951-8320. - STAMPA. - 84:(2004), pp. 199-209. [10.1016/S0951-8320(03)00141-8]

How to avoid the generation of logic loops in the construction of fault trees

DEMICHELA, Micaela;PICCININI, Norberto;
2004

Abstract

Generation of an infinite series of identical sub-trees may occur during the construction of a Fault Tree (FT) when one item of equipment in a plant is considered several times in the same sub-tree in the course of the tree extraction from a HazOp (Hazard Operability analysis) analysis. Generation of loops in the construction of an FT can be avoided by means of an ad hoc logical analysis in which certain simple rules of syntax are taken into account. A radical solution, however, can be obtained if identification of unwanted events in a process plant is not undertaken with conventional procedures, such as HazOp (Operability Analysis with guide words, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) etc.), but with a more modern and structured version, such as Recursive Operability Analysis (ROA), which is both systematic and complete, and allows direct extraction of logic trees, (FT, event trees, etc.) for subsequent quantification. This feature means that, by contrast with conventional operability analysis, the congruence of the ROA itself can be checked. The ROA method is illustrated in this paper with the aid of some simple examples.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11583/1399488
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