We investigate cooperative investment for the deployment of a new infrastructure, and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment increases total coverage only if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for coinvestment not only through lower returns but also by the existence of the access option itself. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.

Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access / Bourreau, M.; Cambini, Carlo; Hoernig, S.. - 9376:(2013), pp. 1-36.

Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access

CAMBINI, CARLO;
2013

Abstract

We investigate cooperative investment for the deployment of a new infrastructure, and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment increases total coverage only if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for coinvestment not only through lower returns but also by the existence of the access option itself. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
DP9376.pdf

non disponibili

Tipologia: 1. Preprint / submitted version [pre- review]
Licenza: Non Pubblico - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 220.49 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
220.49 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11583/2506417
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo