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Abstract

We analyse the security of some variants of the CFS code-based digital signature scheme. We show how the adoption of some code-based hash-functions to improve the efficiency of CFS leads to the ability of an attacker to produce a forgery compatible with the rightful user's public key.

1 Introduction

With the discovery and the increasingly closer advent of quantum computers, the most adopted signature schemes (e.g. DSA [18], ECDSA [15], EdDSA [7], Schnorr [26]) are often considered not secure anymore because they are well known to be broken by Shor's algorithm [27]. In spite of this, new cryptosystems based on the Integer Factorisation Problem and the Discrete Logarithm Problem are still developed [1, 20, 22], as well as variants of existing cryptosystems for specific use cases [4]. Nevertheless, several applications need to be resistant even against quantum attacks, and possible countermeasures are obtained by the exploitation of schemes whose security relies on NP-hard problems, or, more in general, on problems whose solutions are thought to be difficult in both the classic and quantum frameworks of computation. Among these alternatives, some of the most prominent are represented by lattice-based cryptography, multivariate polynomial cryptography, hash-based cryptography and interactive identification schemes. These branches of post-quantum cryptography are all present among the finalists of the NIST Post-Quantum Standardization process[1] (the interested reader can see the overview [9]). Notably, code-based digital signature algorithms

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[1]NIST Post-Quantum Standardization process webpage: `https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardization`, Accessed: 2021-12-01

are not in this list. It is worth mentioning that Classic McEliece [10] is a code-based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism among the finalists of the competition regarding post-quantum key-agreement protocols, and about forty years of cryptanalysis have shown its resiliency and security (Classic McEliece is based on the works of McEliece [21] and Niederreiter [23]). Instead, the initial code-based digital signature schemes did not pass the first round of selection. Although since the earliest and historical proposal CFS [11] (which will be discussed later on) plenty of ideas and projects have followed, the issue of finding a viable candidate is still an open and tough problem. The key points here are two: of course security, but also efficiency. The main drawback of CFS is the signing time, in fact the message is hashed with a counter until the digest is a decodable syndrome.

Further signature schemes have been provided with KKS [16] and its variants [3,14]. This scheme converts the message in a decodable syndrome, using a different strategy with respect to CFS, but, taking into account the attack highlighted in [8], all the variants have to be considered at best one-time signature schemes; additionally, strong caution has to be taken in the choice of parameters, as shown by [24] which broke all the parameters proposed in [3, 16, 17].

On the other hand, most CFS-like schemes persist to be unbroken, despite their slow speed in the signing process due to the attempt-based design. Some schemes try to reduce the signing time using the idea behind KKS: instead of searching for a decodable syndrome through the hash of the message, a map that aims to the space of decodable syndromes is used. An example is the mCFS_c signature [25], that hashes the message into a decodable syndrome using a code-based hash function. Unfortunately, in this work we prove that this approach does not work, leaving room to an attacker to forge a valid signature without knowing the secret key.

This work is organized as follows: in the first section we present the notation and some basic notions from Coding Theory, then we introduce the two signature schemes CFS and mCFS. The second section presents the variant mCFS_c and the concerning code-based hash function. We show an attack on this construction. The third and final section generalizes the strategy adopted in the mCFS_c signature and shows that such approach leads to an attack.

1.1   Notation

With $\mathbb{F}_2$ we denote the field with 2 elements and with $(\mathbb{F}_2)^n$ the vector space of dimension n over $\mathbb{F}_2$. An $[n, k]$ *binary code* $\mathcal{C}$ is a vector subspace of $(\mathbb{F}_2)^n$ of dimension k. The elements of $\mathcal{C}$ are called *codewords*. Every $[n, k]$ binary code can be represented as the kernel of a $(n - k) \times n$ matrix H called *parity-check matrix*. The syndrome of a vector $v \in (\mathbb{F}_2)^n$ is given by $s = Hv^\top$ and the *Hamming weight* of a vector is the number of its non-zero coordinates. With $\|$ we denote the concatenation of strings or vectors.

1.2   Digital signatures and CFS

A digital signature is a public-key cryptosystem consisting in three algorithms: KGen is the key generation algorithm that takes in input a security parameter λ and outputs the pair of secret and public keys (sk, pk), a signature algorithm Sign that on input sk and a message m outputs a signature σ of m, and a verifier algorithm Verify in which, given a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ, it verifies if the signature of the message is valid and is generated by the corresponding secret key sk.

A digital signature algorithm must satisfy some security proprieties: authentication, non repudiation, integrity, non reusability and unforgeability. See [19] for a more detailed study on digital signatures.

The CFS algorithm [11] consists in producing a signature exploiting the Niederreiter public-key cryptosystem [23]. This scenario entails a substantial difference with respect to RSA, for instance: since trapdoor functions allow digital signatures taking advantage of the unique capability of public key owner to invert those functions, it is clear that only the messages whose hashes fall within the ciphertext space can be signed in this way. In our framework, we would like to deal with a linear code for which there exists an efficient decoding algorithm and for which the set of decodable syndromes (namely the ciphertext space) is as big as possible. In formal terms, given a $(n-k) \times n$ parity-check matrix H of such a code, this translates into having a meaningful portion of vectors $s \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n-k}$ for which there exists a corresponding error pattern $e \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ of Hamming weight less than the correcting capability of the code t, such that the syndrome of e is s. Since the fact that the union of the spheres centered in codewords and of radius t covers the whole space $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ only happens in the case of perfect codes (which are banally unusable because of the overmuch leak of information they would disclose) the smartest play to make remains to repeatedly hash the message until one obtains a decodable syndrome. Binary Goppa codes [5] represent the best choice as underlying code for both their efficient decoding method (Patterson algorithm) and their steady resistance against all known attacks. This procedure is nothing more than a "hash-and-sign" routine, which inevitably requires several tries. Concretely, given suitable hash function h, one produces a sequence $d_0, \ldots, d_\iota$ of elements in $\mathbb{F}_2^{n-k}$ such that

$$d_0 = h(m \parallel 0), \ d_1 = h(m \parallel 1), \ \ldots, \ d_i = h(m \parallel i), \ \ldots \ d_\iota = h(m \parallel \iota)$$

where ι is the smallest integer such that d_ι is a decodable syndrome. The signature is then composed by the corresponding error pattern e_ι (that only the signer can compute) and by the counter ι. The first straightforward question that arises is about how many attempts are needed in order to obtain a useful syndrome. The answer can be easily found by comparing the total number of syndromes to the number of (efficiently) correctable syndromes:

$$\frac{\#\ \text{DECODABLE SYNDROMES}}{\#\ \text{TOTAL SYNDROMES}} = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^{t} \binom{n}{i}}{2^{n-k}} \simeq \frac{\binom{n}{t}}{2^{n-k}} \simeq \frac{\frac{n^t}{t!}}{n^t} = \frac{1}{t!}$$

which represent the probability of a syndrome to be decodable (here the relations among the parameters of a generic binary Goppa code have been used, i.e. $k = n - mt$ and $n = 2^m$).

This scheme bases its security on two assumptions: the hardness of both the Syndrome Decoding Problem [6] and the Goppa Code Distinguisher Problem [11].

Now we present the signature scheme of CFS.

- $\mathsf{KGen}_{\mathrm{CFS}}(1^\lambda)$: select n, k, t according to the security parameter λ then pick a random $[n, k]$ binary Goppa code $\mathcal{C}$ with correcting capacity t and parity-check matrix H and let $\mathcal{D}_H$ be an (efficient) syndrome decoding algorithm for $\mathcal{C}$. Pick a random $(n-k) \times (n-k)$ invertible matrix S and a random $n \times n$ permutation matrix P and set $H_{\mathrm{pub}} = SHP$. Chose a hash function h. Output $\mathsf{pk} = (h, t, H_{\mathrm{pub}})$ as public key and $\mathsf{sk} = (S, H, P, \mathcal{D}_H)$ as secret key.

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- $\mathsf{Sign}_{\mathrm{CFS}}(m, \mathsf{sk})$: given the message m, compute $d_i = h(m \parallel i)$, starting from $i = 0$ and increase it until d_ι is a decodable syndrome. Set $e = \mathcal{D}_H(S^{-1}d_\iota)$ and output the signature $\sigma = (\iota, eP)$.

- $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{CFS}}(m, \sigma, \mathsf{pk})$: let $\sigma = (\iota, u)$, verify that u has Hamming weight less or equal than t, then compute $a = h(m \| \iota)$ and $b = H_{\mathrm{pub}} u^\top$. The signature σ is valid if and only if $a = b$.

We can see that the signature is correct, in fact

$$a = h(m \parallel \iota) = d_\iota = SH \cdot e^\top = SHPP^{-1} \cdot e^\top = H_{\mathrm{pub}} \cdot u^\top = b$$

where $S^{-1}d_\iota = H \cdot e^\top$ comes from the fact that e has syndrome $S^{-1}d_\iota$.

In [12] authors propose a modified version of the CFS signature called mCFS. Here the counter i used in Sign is replaced by a random nonce.

2 The mCFS$_c$ signature

In this section we describe and analyze the signature in [25], and in Proposition 2 we explicit an attack.

2.1 Code Based Hash Function

This signature is build on the protocol mCFS [11, 12] using a particular code based hash function. This hash function is based on the work of [2] and it follows the Merkel-Damgard design [13]. Let r be the length of the digest and let s be an integer. The hash function is the iterative application of a *compression function* $f : (\mathbb{F}_2)^s \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^r$, in fact, given a string m proceed as following:

1. consider m padded such that its length is a multiple of s and split m in $|m|/s$ blocks of length s;

2. in the first round, combine the first block of m with a fixed initial vector (IV) obtaining the state L_1 of length s and compute $f(L_1)$;

3. in the i-th round combine $f(L_{i-1})$ with the i-th block of m obtaining the i-th state L_i and apply f to it;

4. the output of the hash function is given by $f(L_{|m|/s})$.

The hash function used in mCFS$_c$ uses the scheme above and the following compression function f. Let r be the length of the digest. Given a $r \times n$ parity-check matrix H of a $[n, n - r]$ binary code $\mathcal{C}$, let w be an integer dividing n and set $l = n/w$ and $s = w \log(l)$. Now we describe the compression function $f : (\mathbb{F}_2)^s \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^r$ based on H:

1. let $H_1, \ldots, H_w$ be $r \times w$ matrices such that $H = (H_1, \ldots, H_w)$;

2. given $x \in (\mathbb{F}_2)^s$, split it in w blocks of length $\log(l)$: $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. We can see each x_i as an integer between 0 and $l - 1$;

3. set $f(x)$ as the sum of the $(x_i + 1)$-th column of the matrix H_i, for $i = 1, \ldots, w$. In formulas, if $(H_i)_j$ is the j-th column of H_i, we have

$$f(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{w} (H_i)_{x_i + 1}.$$

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Observe that f strongly depends on the choice of the parity-check matrix H.

For the signature mCFS_c, in [25], H is chosen as the parity-check matrix of a $[n, n-r]$ binary Goppa code, and the parameter w is less than the correcting capacity t of the code. This yields to the hash function $h_H : \{0,1\}^* \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^r$ based on H. Observe that the computation of h_H implies the knowledge of H.

Proposition 1. *For every state L_i of the hash function h_H, $f(L_i)$ is a syndrome of a vector of Hamming weight w.*

Proof. By construction, the state $x = L_i$ is splitted in w integers $x_1, \ldots, x_w$ between 0 and $l-1$. Let c_i be the vector of length n having support $(x_1+1) + 0 \cdot l, (x_2+1) + 1 \cdot l, \ldots, (x_w+1) + (w-1)l$, it has Hamming weight w and $f(L_i)$ is exactly $Hc_i^\top$, the syndrome of c_i. $\qquad\square$

We can summarize the compression function as follows: let n and w be positive integers such that w divides n and set $s = w \log(n/w)$. Consider the bijection

$$\mathrm{split} : (\mathbb{F}_2)^s \to ((\mathbb{F}_2)^{\log(n/w)})^w$$
$$(u_1, \ldots, u_s) \mapsto (z_1, \ldots, z_w)$$

that splits a binary vector of length s into w vectors of length $\log(n/w)$. Now we can see every vector in $(\mathbb{F}_2)^{\log(n/w)}$ as an integer between 0 and $n/w - 1$. Define

$$\delta_t : (\mathbb{F}_2)^s \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^n \tag{1}$$
$$(u_1, \ldots, u_s) \mapsto (v_1, \ldots, v_n)$$

where $(v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ is the vector of Hamming weight w whose support is given by $(\mathrm{split}(x)_1 + 1) + 0 \cdot \frac{n}{w}, (\mathrm{split}(x)_2 + 1) + 1 \cdot \frac{n}{w}, \ldots, (\mathrm{split}(x)_w + 1) + (w-1)\frac{n}{w}$. Then the compression function f can be written as $f(x) = H \cdot \delta_t(x)$.

2.2 The signature scheme

Since in [25] it is not specified if the hash function is based on the secret matrix H or the public matrix H_{pub}, we first observe that since the hash function is part of the public key, this discloses the secret matrix H and an attack can be performed confronting columns of H and H_{pub}, finding the permutation in quadratic time. Hence, assuming that the hash is based on the public matrix, the signature is given by the following algorithms. Let λ be the security parameter.

- $\mathsf{KGen}_{\mathrm{mCFS}_c}(1^\lambda)$: select n, k, t according to λ then pick a random $[n, k]$ binary Goppa code $\mathcal{C}$ with correcting capacity t and parity-check matrix H and let $\mathcal{D}_H$ be an (efficient) syndrome decoding algorithm for $\mathcal{C}$. Pick a random $n \times n$ permutation matrix P and set $H_{\mathrm{pub}} = HP$. Choose an integer w less than t and such that w divides n and construct the hash function $h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}} : \{0,1\}^* \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^{n-k}$ based on H_{pub}. Output $\mathsf{pk} = (h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}, t, H_{\mathrm{pub}})$ as public key and $\mathsf{sk} = (H, P, \mathcal{D}_H)$ as secret key.

- $\mathsf{Sign}_{\mathrm{mCFS}_c}(m, \mathsf{sk})$: given the message m, pick a random R in $\{1, \ldots, 2^{n-k}\}$ and compute $d = h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m) \parallel R)$ and set $e = \mathcal{D}_H(d)$. Output the signature $\sigma = (R, eP)$.

- $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{mCFS}_c}(m, \sigma, \mathsf{pk})$: let $\sigma = (R, u)$. Verify that u has Hamming weight less or equal than t, then compute $a = h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m) \| R)$ and $b = H_{\mathrm{pub}} u^\top$. The signature σ is valid if and only if $a = b$.

The signature scheme is correct using the same argument for CFS.

Proposition 2. *Let* $(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{pk})$ *be the output of* $\mathsf{KGen}_{mCFS_c}(1^\lambda)$. *An attacker knowing the public key* pk *can forge a signature compatible to the private key* sk *for any message* m.

Proof. Given a public key $\mathsf{pk} = (h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}, t, H_{\mathrm{pub}})$ and a message m, the attacker picks a random R in $\{1, \ldots, 2^{n-k}\}$ and computes $d = h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m) \parallel R)$ but it stops before the last round of the outer hash function $h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}$, obtaining the round state $\bar{L} = L_{|m|/s} \in (\mathbb{F}_2)^s$ instead of the digest $d = f(L_{|m|/s})$. He set $u = \delta_t(\bar{L})$ and outputs as a signature for m the tuple $\sigma = (R, u)$. Anyone can verify that this is a valid signature of m compatible with the secret key $\mathsf{sk} = (H, P, \mathcal{D}_H)$, in fact we can compute $a = h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m) \| R)$ and $b = H_{\mathrm{pub}} u^\top$ and observing that a is equal to b since multiplying $u = \delta_t(\bar{L})$ by H_{pub} is the last step of the hash function $h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}$. Therefore σ is a valid signature. $\qquad\square$

3 A generalisation of mCFS$_c$

We now slightly generalise mCFS$_c$ by considering a modification of h_H, proving that this new entire family of hash functions is vulnerable to the same attack we described for h_H and therefore is not suitable for secure applications.

Let $B_{n,t}$ be the set of vectors in $(\mathbb{F}_2)^n$ of Hamming weight less or equal than t. Let $\gamma_t : (\mathbb{F}_2)^s \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^n$ be such that $\mathrm{Im}(\gamma_t) \subseteq B_{n,t}$, i.e. γ_t is a function mapping bitstrings of length s into bitstring of length n with a Hamming weight bounded by t:

$$\mathrm{w}(\gamma_t(v)) \leq t \quad \forall v \in (\mathbb{F}_2)^s$$

We denote with $\bar{h}_H : \{0, 1\}^* \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^{n-k}$ the function mapping messages into syndromes associated to the parity-check matrix H defined by the formula

$$m \mapsto \bar{h}_H(m) = H \cdot \gamma_t(h(m)) , \tag{2}$$

where $h(\cdot)$ is any efficient function $\{0, 1\}^* \to (\mathbb{F}_2)^s$. For simplicity of notation, we will call h a hash function, even though we do not require here that h satisfy any security property (even though it would be a good practice to choose a cryptographically-secure hash).

With this definition we can consider the following version of CFS, that we call $\widetilde{\mathrm{CFS}}$:

- $\mathsf{KGen}_{\widetilde{\mathrm{CFS}}}(1^\lambda)$: randomly choose a code $\mathcal{C}$ to be used in the CFS algorithm (i.e. $\mathcal{C}$ is a code for which there exists an efficient decoder up to t errors and whose randomly picked equivalent codes are indistinguishable from random) with parity-check matrix H and efficient syndrome decoding algorithm $\mathcal{D}_H$. Then randomly choose an invertible $(n-k) \times (n-k)$ matrix S and a permutation $n \times n$ matrix P, and define $H_{\mathrm{pub}} = SHP$. Choose an efficient map γ_t and a hash h. Output $\mathsf{sk} = (S, H, P, \mathcal{D}_H)$ as the secret key and $\mathsf{pk} = (h, \gamma_t, t, H_{\mathrm{pub}})$ as the public key.

- $\mathsf{Sign}_{\widetilde{\mathrm{CFS}}}(m, \mathsf{sk})$: given the message m, compute $d = \bar{h}_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m)$ according to (2). Decode $S^{-1}d$ with the decoder for H and thus obtaining an error vector $e = \mathcal{D}_H(S^{-1}d)$ of Hamming weight at most t and then compute $\bar{e} = eP$. Output the signature $\sigma = \bar{e}$.

- $\mathsf{Verify}_{\widetilde{\mathrm{CFS}}}(m, \sigma, \mathsf{pk})$: verify that $\sigma = \bar{e}$ has Hamming weight less or equal than t, then compute $a = \bar{h}_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m)$ and $\bar{b} = H_{\mathrm{pub}}\bar{e}$. The signature is valid if $a = b$.

The correctness of the above signature scheme is straightforward and follows directly from the correctness of CFS.

We remark that mCFS_c is (basically) obtained by adopting the algorithm above where:

- $\mathcal{C}$ is a binary irreducible Goppa code;

- $S = I_{n-k}$ is the identity matrix of order $n - k$;

- γ_t is the map δ_t defined in (1);

- h is the code-based hash function $h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}$ stopped before the last application of δ_t and multiplication by H_{pub}, which we denote momentarily $h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}^{\mathrm{stopped}}$;

Indeed, with these choices we have $\bar{h}_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m) = H_{\mathrm{pub}} \cdot \delta_t(h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}^{\mathrm{(stopped)}}(m)) = h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m)$. We also remark that in mCFS_c there are other marginal differences with respect to our generalisation, which however do not impact on the main points of the scheme that we sketched above (e.g. computing $h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m)||R)$ instead of $h_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m)$).

Theorem 3. *Let* $(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{pk})$ *be the output of* $\mathsf{KGen}_{\widetilde{CFS}}(1^\lambda)$. *An attacker knowing the public key* pk *can forge a signature compatible to the private key* sk *for any message* m.

Proof. An attacker $\mathcal{A}$ knowing the public parameters $(h, \gamma_t, t, H_{\mathrm{pub}})$ is able to forge any signature. Instead of performing the steps of the signature algorithm, $\mathcal{A}$ performs the following:

1. Given any message m, compute $x = \gamma_t(h(m))$;

2. output x as the signature of m.

Indeed, x is a valid error vector in $(\mathbb{F}_2)^n$ of Hamming weight at most t (by definition of γ_t) whose syndrome with respect to the parity-check matrix H_{pub} is $s = \bar{h}_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m)$. Therefore, any verifier obtains

$$H_{\mathrm{pub}}x^\top = H_{\mathrm{pub}}x^\top = H_{\mathrm{pub}} \cdot \gamma_t(h(m)) = \bar{h}_{H_{\mathrm{pub}}}(m)$$

and the signature results valid. $\square$

We remark how an attacker does not need to know the private key, and the number of operations performed by $\mathcal{A}$ to successfully obtain a forgery are less than the number of operations performed by a honest user to obtain a valid signature. The key-point of the vulnerability of the scheme is that, to obtain a decodable syndrome, we force the application of a function γ_t to the output of the hash function before computing the syndrome. Even though this step allows us to obtain a decodable syndrome without having to rely to the (expensive) re-iteration of the signature steps of the original CFS protocol, during the signature algorithm we are forced to explicitly determine a decodable error compatible with the output syndrome.

4   Conclusions

One of the practical issues of the CFS signature scheme is the computational effort required to obtain a decodable syndrome from the hash of the message. In [25] the authors attempt to overcome this problem using a Merkel-Damgard-style code-based hash function from the space of binary strings into the set of decodable syndromes, significantly reducing the cost of signing. This approach has proven unsuccessful, since the protocol allows to an attacker who does not know the private key to produce a valid signature.

We showed that a generalization of this approach remains insecure: a hash function that sends arbitrarily long binary strings into the set of decodable syndromes can be constructed and yet there exists an attack on this new variation of the CFS signature. Therefore, other solutions should be found, in order to preserve the original security of the scheme but also to reduce the computational effort used in the signing process. The design of a suitable code-based signature should keep in mind both the provable security of CFS-like signatures and the efficiency of the KKS scheme.

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