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GLOBALISATION AND AUTOMATION AS SOURCES OF LABOUR-MARKET COMPETITION, AND SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNION UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

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Societies and economies are experiencing deep and intertwined structural changes that may unsettle the perceptions European citizens have of their economic and employment security. Such labour-market perceptions are likely in turn to alter people's political positions. For instance, those worried by labour-market competition may prefer greater social protection to compensate for the accrued risk, or might prefer more closed economies where external borders provide protection (or the illusion of protection). We test these expectations with a conjoint experiment in 13 European countries on European-level social policy, studying how citizens' demands align with parties' political supply. Results broadly corroborate our expectations on the moderating effects of different types of concerns about perceived sources of labour-market competition on the features of preferred European-level social policy.

Keywords: global risk, migration, technological change, globalisation, social protection, Europe, welfare state, conjoint analysis

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1 Introduction

Societies in Europe and elsewhere are experiencing deep and intertwined changes that unsettle the perceptions citizens have of their economic and employment security. Among the many changes raising concerns about labour market competition, globalisation, technological change and international migration stand out. These structural changes in the global economy have had a deep impact on western industrial societies: workers may be afraid that employers will relocate firms abroad to reduce employment costs, may fear unskilled migration exerting downward pressure on domestic wages *and/or* may fear technological change that might make many jobs redundant. Individuals with these fears and citizens that are less fearful are likely to have preferences that are substantially different with respect to social policy: those worried about the various threats to labour-market competition might prefer greater social security to compensate for the accrued risk, or prefer more closed economies where external borders provide protection (or the illusion of protection).

Scholarship supports the expectations that globalisation, migration and automation might each spark significant work-related insecurities, and also that one or another of such insecurities might influence support for compensation or protection. Globalisation, in particular, plays a central role in the scholarly understanding of political attitudes and preferences (see Walter 2021 for a comprehensive review). However, very few studies have been able to systematically connect how *different* labour market risks associate with different social-policy preferences, partly given the challenges of combining such issues in opinion surveys, ideally in an experimental set up that allows disentangling of the sources of risk and policy solutions envisioned to address such risks. For instance, Gallego *et al* (2022) devised a survey experiment to assess support for policy responses to technological concerns only. Rodrik and Di Tella (2020) looked at policies demanded by individuals exposed to technology or globalisation shocks. Original works by Aldrich *et al* (1999), Rueda (2005; 2006) and Burgoon and Dekker (2010) looked at employment status and certain social-policy preferences. But the effects of different perceived sources of labour-market vulnerabilities for different policy preferences remain understudied and hence unclear.

This paper builds on the sparse literature that explores how perceptions of vulnerability are associated with support for particular kinds of social policy (Walter and Maduz, 2009; Emmenegger, 2009; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Vlandas, 2020), or with social policies associated with particular party orientations (Marx, 2013; Dancygier and Walter, 2015; Negri, 2019; Kurer and Palier, 2019; Gingrich, 2019; Häusermann *et al*, 2020; Marx and Picot, 2020). We first explore how concerns about different sources of labour-market insecurities affect specific social-policy demands with respect to key

characteristics of realistically-debated European Union unemployment programmes. We then consider how concerns about different sources of insecurity affect support for the distinct social-policy positions of political families (Häusermann *et al*, 2013), looking at how ideal-typical EU social policy packages for the left, the centre and the right are met with differentiated support among different groups of concerned individuals.

We expect that concerns about economic globalisation (trade and capital openness), migration and rapid technological-change/automation carry distinct risks that should yield preferences for distinct kinds of European social protection. A first expectation concerns the generosity of social protection. Worries about globalisation or technological change can be expected to carry risks that directly foster support for policies to mitigate or indemnify against such risks. But concerns about migration, while also fostering support for such risk-reduction, also awaken concern about the fiscal and economic burdens of new social protections; migrants are often depicted as extracting resources from the welfare state, and therefore are often seen – particularly by those concerned with migration – to disproportionately and unfairly benefit from social spending. Hence, those concerned about labour-market competition stemming from migration – compared to those concerned about economic globalisation or tech change – may be generally less in favour of stronger unemployment insurance.

A second expectation concerns the extent of cross-border orientation of social protection. People worried about labour-market competition originating from ‘de-bordering’ – such as through economic globalisation or migration – may prefer policy alternatives that control or constrain cross-border commitments, including European-level social insurance. In contrast, concerns originating from threats with little to do with de-bordering, such as technological change, should not translate into concerns about policy options that constrain or control cross-border commitments.

And a third expectation concerns the key conditionality of social policy benefits relative to provisions that promote economic adjustment – what existing welfare-state scholarship refers to as ‘social investment’. We expect that labour market threats due to technological change, more than economic globalisation and migration, are likely to be strongly addressed by plans for skill upgrading and education. And we expect, therefore that such concerns with tech-change/automation should distinctly spur support for such social-investment provisions in European or other social benefits.

We test these expectations on data from a conjoint experiment in 13 European countries on a European-level social policy: *European Unemployment Risk Sharing* (2018 EURS survey; see Vandenbroucke *et al*, 2018; Burgoon *et al*, 2022). This dataset allows us to combine individual-level

measures of subjective concerns about three different sources of labour market competition with a survey experiment on citizens' preferences for European-level unemployment insurance. This makes it possible to explore the extent to which concerns about different sources of labour market competition alter individual preferences for social protection. It also allows us to simultaneously differentiate between key sources of perceived labour market competition and between different policy preferences for a large sample of individuals with diverse economic and demographic profiles.

Results broadly corroborate our expectations on the moderating effects of different types of concerns about perceived sources of labour market competition on the features of preferred European-level social policy. Concerns about competition stemming from globalisation and automation are strongly associated with preferences for more generous, unconditional, progressive packages, while fears of migration are associated with the opposite. At the same time, concerns about migration and globalisation are associated (with some nuances) with preferences for packages with less cross-country redistribution and nationalised governance, while concerns with automation are not. These are important results with significant policy implications for how different policy tools can be politically effective in addressing different economic risks.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on how concerns stemming from different sources of potential labour market competition relate to policy preferences. Section 3 describes the design of the EURS survey experiment, while section 4 illustrates our hypotheses regarding how concerns impact on the effects of policy design on preferences for social protection. Section 5 discusses data and our research design, while section 6 tests our hypotheses. Section 7 links policy packages that can be thought of as supplied by typical political party families to citizens' support, differentiated by source of labour market concern. The final section concludes.

2 Social policy demands, supply and perceived sources of labour market competition

Workers are today exposed to a number of potential challenges to the security of their employment. Many of them stem from automation, which has long been seen as disruptive for labour markets (Goldin and Sokoloff 1982; Acemoglu 1998; Autor *et al.*, 2020) and global economic integration. As people, goods, services and machines move around the globe, and automation gathers pace in many industries, the employment stability of many individuals becomes perceived as increasingly vulnerable; furthermore, these perceived vulnerabilities at times reinforce each other (Dancygier and Walter, 2015; Kaihovaara and Im, 2020). Some societies, like those of the EU member states, have gone further along on the path of undoing national boundaries than any other; while this comes with

substantial economic and social benefits, vulnerability in front of societal change is also increased. This, in turn, is reflected by people's fears and concerns vis-à-vis labour market competition (Milner, 2021), as well as in their demands for social protection (Sacchi *et al*, 2021; Häusermann and Kurer, 2022; Guarascio and Sacchi, 2022). In short, structural economic changes are linked with changing public demand for forms of social protection from activation policies towards more social assistance (Hemerijck, 2013; Garritzmann *et al*, 2022).

Although the process of European integration restricts the room national governments have to manoeuvre on socioeconomic policies, the introduction of the European pillar of social rights paved the way to a supranational intervention aimed to mitigate the growing economic insecurity (Vesan and Corti, 2019). In light of this renewed commitment of the EU to social protection, we fielded the EURS survey in 2018 (Vandenbroucke *et al*, 2018), which mainly focuses on the features and demands for social policy at European level. Furthermore, it asks respondents to qualify the extent they worry regarding the three main sources of perceived labour market competition: automation, globalisation and migration. We exploit this information to assess the extent to which individual concerns with diverse sources of competition moderate differently demands for specific forms and features of social protection. Although this information does not amount to an objective measure of labour market exposure, it allows us to identify the subjective dimension of specific risks, which are a fundamental mediator because objective threat and social policy preferences (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010)¹.

While interconnected, these measures of concern are distinct from each other and associate with different social policy demands. Concerns with the employment effects of *automation* fundamentally relate with the increasing pace of technological change. With few exceptions (Dekker *et al*, 2017; Sacchi *et al*, 2021; Busemeyer *et al*, 2022; Gallego *et al*, 2022; Guarascio and Sacchi, 2022; Häusermann and Kurer, 2022), existing research on fears of automation usually focuses on objective risks rather than subjective ones. In a survey conducted at the EU level, even though Europeans have a generally positive view of automation, about 70 percent of the surveyed population agreed with statements like "*robots steal people's jobs*" (European Commission, 2012: 9), and the subjective perception of being in competition with machines is particularly strong among unemployed workers. Realistically, individuals concerned with the risk of automation-induced labour displacement tend to see themselves as victims of technological transition and therefore are likely to have generally positive views of welfare provisions to support workers at risk of displacement (Busemeyer *et al*,

¹ It should be also noted that, in the models, we control for education and country of residence in order to take other sources of economic vulnerability into account. Unfortunately, information on sector of employment and occupation are not provided in the data.

2022; Guarascio and Sacchi, 2022; Häusermann and Kurer, 2022, but see Gallego *et al*, 2022, for contrasting results]. Importantly, it is plausible to consider as the potential risk to employment coming from automation as largely independent from the presence or absence of external barriers: workers concerned with labour market pressure coming from automation are likely to be concerned with being directly replaced in their jobs by new technologies. This, in turn, may alter their political preferences: although generally conducted on objective measures of the risk of automation rather than on subjective perceptions and concerns, preliminary evidence points to an effect of automation on support for radical right parties (Anelli *et al*, 2019; Im *et al*, 2019; Caselli *et al*, 2021; Milner, 2021).

Conversely, concerns with the adverse economic and employment effects of *globalisation* are much more studied in recent literature and so are their effects on public opinion (Bussemeyer *et al*, 2009; Autor *et al*, 2016, 2020). In the specific European context, De Vries and Hoffmann (2016) show that not only fear of globalisation is widespread in the European Union, but also that is an important determinant of voting for nationalist forces (Colantone and Stanig, 2019; Barone and Kreuter, 2021; Caselli *et al*, 2020; Milner, 2021; Nicoli *et al*, 2022). Fundamentally, high fears of globalisation relate with one's fear that world trade is increasingly making workers in the country of residence worse off. Choices over borders and international agreements affect the extent to which a country is exposed to globalisation. Globalisation and labour mobility are inherently a cross-country phenomenon: global and international openness are seen as a part of the problem by those highly concerned with globalisation-induced employment competition. As barriers decrease and industries undergo global restructuring of their activities, such individuals expect more labour displacement and worsening of employment conditions domestically. De Vries and Hoffmann (2016) show that working class respondents are much more likely to be concerned with globalisation than middle class respondents; globalisation is also much more likely to generate 'anxiety' in working-class respondents than in middle-class ones. This resonates with Walter (2017), who finds that the impact of globalisation on risk perceptions and demands for social protection is strongly mediated by skills levels.

Finally, workers may be concerned with the **mass migration** of individuals into their countries rather than with domestic jobs being lost to foreign production to exploit lower labour costs. Even though the majority of research on migration has shown that attitudes towards migration flows are not necessarily driven by material factors (see Hainmuller and Hopkins, 2014b, for a review), migration attitudes could still affect policy preferences. Migration flows could be seen as having similar effects to offshoring in terms of decreasing equilibrium wages, both because migrants widen the pool of the labour force and increase labour supply, and because newcomers may have lower reservation wages, forcing native-

born workers to decrease their claims if they want to remain competitive. Furthermore, migrants can be perceived as a threat not only when they compete for jobs, but also when they do not, since they may access social protection such as unemployment benefits. Concerns with migration are indeed very widely studied in contemporary public opinion research. Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), for instance, overview research into the ways that concerns of migration are associated with far-right voting and decreasing support for the welfare state, and subsequent research has inquired into both possible implications of concern with migration (Häusermann *et al*, 2015; Garand *et al*, 2017; Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021). The literature on welfare chauvinism (for instance, Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016; Kros and Coenders, 2019) further supports the view that there is a connection between attitudes towards migration and towards the welfare state. Fundamentally, individuals who are very concerned with competition stemming from migration flows often believe that the flow of migrants into one's country would put strains on the labour market, dilute the country's autochthon culture and especially weaken the amount of welfare state benefits available for natives. What is more, such individuals with high fears of migration believe that the number of migrants in the country is already 'too high', to the extent that they already put welfare provisions under stress (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Cremaschi *et al*, nd; Alesina *et al*, 2023; Lutz and Bitschnau, 2023; Eick and Busemeyer, 2023).

It follows that, even though migration is a form of labour market competition, classical instruments of compensation for the adverse effects of competition – for instance generous benefits – are likely less appreciated, since migrants would be perceived as beneficiaries, while taxation of natives finance such compensation schemes. Furthermore, generous welfare benefits are seen as problematic by those who fear migration also because they might constitute an additional 'pull factor', creating potential migration flows associated with 'welfare tourism'. From this point of view, extending the welfare state may mean favouring the (feared) migrants; consequently, research consistently finds that higher concerns with migration is associated with lower preferences for generous welfare provisions (see Kros and Coenders, 2019, for a review). In sum, migration could be seen by some as necessarily negative: either newcomers will take over local jobs, exerting labour market competition, or will receive social assistance, exerting welfare competition. In light of this understanding of the economic consequences of migration, therefore, we expect higher fears of migration-induced labour competition (differently from other sources of labour market competition) to lead to a preference for lower, rather than higher, unemployment insurance. Furthermore, migration is seen – like globalisation – as a phenomenon fundamentally associated with international openness. Hence, individuals with high fears of migration will have negative views of stronger, more open international institutions and

are likely to support nationalist and chauvinist parties (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; De Vries and Hoffmann, 2016; Nicoli and Reinl, 2019).

Based on this research, we can construct a typology of how concerns over these different sources of potential labour market competition relate with preferences over domestic welfare provision and the degree of internationalisation of the system (Table 1). Table 1 reports our overall priors, while the specific policy dimensions of the EURS are presented in Table 2.

Table 1: subjective sources of labour market competition and citizens' views		
Concerns over source of labour market competition	Concerned citizens' views	
	<i>With regard to welfare generosity</i>	<i>With regard to international openness</i>
<i>Automation</i>	Higher benefits protect more vulnerable workers.	No relationship with international openness.
<i>Globalisation</i>	Higher benefits protect more vulnerable workers.	The openness of the international system leads to labour market competition. Preference for more closed systems.
<i>Migration</i>	Higher benefits will be shared with migrants and may even induce more migration. Preference for lower and more conditional benefits.	The openness of the international system leads to labour market competition. Preference for more closed systems.

While it is possible to derive testable hypotheses vis-à-vis preference for welfare state exclusively based on this typology, the 2018 EURS survey *experimentally tests* how specific policy features of supranational welfare regimes like EURS causally affect preferences for social protection. It does so by testing 324 different policy packages whose policy features vary substantially, especially across the two identified broad lines: the level of welfare protection and the level and the international footprint of the schemes. Hence, a dramatically more refined test of the baseline expectations highlighted in Table 1 can be performed by matching the dimensions of the EURS with subjective concerns over sources of labour market competition. This allows to test whether the expectations align with the actual policy preferences of the respondents.

3 EU-level social protection: a conjoint experiment

Fears and concerns with labour market competition constitute a particular challenge for social protection in the EU. On the one hand, no other area of the world has gone so far on the path of economic, monetary and cultural integration. On the other hand, the EU has long prioritised 'negative' integration, which aims at market integration by removing elements of distortion and therefore

constraining what governments can achieve [Scharpf, 1998]². Yet the European construction struggles to overcome these domestic constraints with the introduction of a genuinely European level of social protection [Ferrera, 2005; Scharpf, 2010]. In recent years, the introduction of a European pillar of social rights and protection has been widely discussed [Vesan and Corti, 2019], also as part of the broader debate for the euro-area reform along with several other proposed policies such as the Banking Union or the Eurobonds [Quaglia, 2019], and – more recently – the first [short-term] form of European unemployment guarantee [SURE: temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency] as a reaction to the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak [Andor, 2022], followed by Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility [Howarth and Quaglia, 2021; Armingeon *et al*, 2022]. A plethora of scholars and policymakers alike have suggested a form of European-level support for unemployed people across the continent [see for instance Dullien, 2014; Beblavý *et al*, 2017]. All these proposals can be subsumed under the term ‘European Unemployment Risk Sharing’ (EURS). Initiated by the then President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy during the Eurocrisis, they have appeared under different labels throughout the past decade, inspiring also the SURE emergency facility, which was meant to support domestic short-time work schemes in the pandemic and expired at the end of 2022.

In this article, we make a novel use of the experimental data collected by Vandenbroucke *et al* (2018) in the EURS project. Vandenbroucke *et al* (2018) and Burgoon *et al* (2022) show that a substantial overall support for EURS existed in 2018, in particular for ambitious designs marrying high generosity and strict conditionality. Kuhn *et al* (2020) show that the respondents’ political identities affect which alternative options are preferred. Nicoli *et al* (2020) show that patterns of national, European and regional identity influence respondents’ preferences. In this paper, even though we build on results from these other studies, we depart from the political identities approach adopted by our colleagues, pivoting instead towards a political economy rationale. We look at how preferences for alternative unemployment scheme designs vary according to the perceived intensity of labour market competition of respondents from different sources: globalisation, migration, and technological change.

Abstracting from specific proposals put forward in the literature, it is possible to provide a simplified summary of the main characteristics of EURS schemes. Fundamentally, these differ in whether unemployed citizens receive support directly from a centralised instrument, regardless of their residence (genuine EU-level unemployment benefit schemes), or whether funding is transferred to the

² By negative integration, we refer to the loss of complete sovereignty of member state over policy decisions, which enabled to extend liberalization through the interventions of the Commission and the European Court of Justice [see for instance Scharpf 1998].

member states, which remain in charge of the administration of unemployment benefit system (re-insurance schemes of national benefit schemes). The model of European Risk-Sharing tested in the 2018 EURS study combines both.

3.1 The design of the survey experiment

Vandenbroucke *et al* (2018) provide an extensive summary of the design of the survey experiment. As every conjoint experiment, the policy at hand is depicted as composed by a series of **dimensions**, each of which can take different **values**. Some of these dimensions are clearly having direct social effects on the welfare recipients, insofar as they determine the number of benefits, the amount of extra taxation and the degree of conditionality recipients must comply with. Other dimensions rather pertain to the international openness/closure of the system, capturing the governance and the cross-country redistribution features of a scheme. Finally, we consider social investment provisions (that is, making the provision of training and education integral to the scheme and a condition for its operation) as a stand-alone dimension. In this case, conditionality is bestowed upon the entire country rather than on specific individuals (ie the countries must fulfil specific conditionality requirements to access the funds). Table 2 summarises the dimensions of the experiment in light of these considerations³.

More in detail, the first dimension regards **generosity** and models different replacement rates, ie the share of the unemployed last wage that is covered by the scheme. In practice, the experiment includes three levels: a low (40 percent), a middle (60 percent), and a high (70 percent) replacement rate. The second dimension regards **individual-level conditionality**, ie the amount of activation effort required by welfare recipients. In practice, the experiment differentiates between no conditions, weekly job applications and weekly job applications complemented by compulsory acceptance of suitable offers. The third dimension includes options regarding the financing of the EURS through **domestic taxation**, with three alternatives: no long-term impact, a flat tax-increase, or progressive taxation. Fourth, existing proposals vary with respect to whether and to what extent they involve **cross-country redistribution**. Three alternatives are possible in the experiment: no long-term redistribution, some redistribution from rich to poor countries, or possible redistribution towards any country in need (rich or poor). The fifth dimension focuses on the levels of **governance**, which can be primarily European or primarily national. Finally, the last dimension models **social investment**, ie the conditions bestowed on the member states regarding the provision of education and training for the unemployed.

³ The operationalisation of these dimensions is further discussed in section 4.

Table 2: components of the EURS			
	(a) Welfare provision	(b) International openness	(c) Social investment
Experimental policy dimensions	Generosity (40%; OR 60%; OR 70% replacement rates)	Country-level redistribution (No international redistribution; OR all countries can receive money if in need; OR redistribution from rich to poor countries]	Social investment (No country-level social investment conditions; OR countries must offer education and training)
	Activation conditions (No conditions; OR apply for jobs; OR apply for jobs & accept suitable offers)	Governance (Governance at national level; OR governance at European level)	
	Taxation (No long-term impact; OR flat tax increase of 1%; OR progressive tax increase of 5%)		

Having introduced the policy variables on which the study focuses, the next section completes our theoretical framework by raising testable expectations regarding the effect of our identified concerns on the impact that policy design has on preferences for social protection.

4 EU-level social protection and concerns with global societal change

As discussed in section 2, the survey includes individual-level answers on the extent the respondents are concerned with sources of labour market competition: technological change (eg robotics), economic globalisation (eg increases in trade flows), and increased migration into the respondent's country of residence. The key feature of this paper, then, is to assess how individuals who are concerned with different sources of labour market competition differ in their preferences for supranational unemployment protection.

4.1 Sources of competition and welfare provision

As discussed in section 2, labour market pressure originating from automation or globalisation is likely associated with preferences for stronger protection. In practice, within the context of the survey experiment, this means that we expect individuals who are particularly concerned with labour market competition stemming from globalisation or automation to favour packages with higher levels of

protection for recipients. These are the dimensions of the experiment in column (a) of Table 2: individuals concerned with these sources of labour market competition will want immediate and generous social protection, hence demanding higher replacement rate, lower individual conditions attached to the scheme and possibly more progressive taxation. On the contrary, as discussed in section 2, individuals concerned with migration may pay more attention to the beneficiaries of this plan, fearing the competition with migrants, who can be attracted by higher and universal benefits. Hence, we expect individuals with high levels of concern for migration to be wary of generous schemes, to favour stronger conditionality and to oppose additional taxation. Accordingly, we raise **H1**:

H1: Concerns about (a) globalisation and (b) automation positively moderate the effects of dimensions pertaining to domestic welfare provision (generosity, conditionality, taxation) on support for European Unemployment Risk Sharing, while concerns about migration negatively moderate such effects.

4.2 Sources of competition and international openness

Further, we have argued that migration and globalisation as labour market concerns associate with a rather negative perception of international governance. Consequently, we expect individuals with high concern scores about globalisation and migration to support those packages with design features minimising the international footprint of the schemes. On the other hand, we expect automation to be perceived as a process, where countries are not automatically better or worse off. Hence, we do not generally expect automation fears to be associated strongly with those dimensions concerning the international footprint of the schemes. By the same token, we expect the perceptions of national welfare state retrenchment to be strongly associated with concerns over competition stemming from globalisation and migration and thus a relevant factor in moderating respondents' preferences for European-level social policy. Accordingly, we expect both migration and globalisation concerns to negatively affect support for packages inclusive of cross-country redistribution: when individuals are concerned with problems clearly originating outside their own country (as both globalisation and migration are perceived to be), they are probably less likely to support packages implying a stronger international dimension of social policy. Similarly, we expect that – on average – increased concerns with globalisation and migration would lead to preferences for national regulation, not quite differently from what we expect about cross-country redistribution. Individuals strongly concerned with competition from workers abroad or from migrants in their countries will want any decision over welfare to be strongly anchored in the hands of national decision makers; by contrast, such imperative

may not exist for individuals concerned instead with competition originating in technological change. On these grounds, we raise hypothesis H2:

H2: Concerns about (a) globalisation and (b) migration negatively moderate the effect of dimensions pertaining international openness (cross-border redistribution, governance) on support for European Unemployment Risk Sharing, while concerns about automation do not.

4.3 Sources of competition and social investment

Finally, since social investment requirements in the experiment are clearly presented in terms of additional provision of education and training, our mainstream expectation is that respondents who are very much concerned with labour market competition stemming from technological change will be strongly in favour of any policy targeted to the upskilling of workers and the expansion of human capital⁴. Naturally, a case could be generally made for a similar reasoning to be valid for globalisation and migration as well: in the case of globalisation, higher human capital would increase the competitiveness of domestic workers; in the case of migration, upskilling would lower the long-term burden migrants allegedly pose on the welfare state. However, we believe the connection is feeblers in these two cases than it is for automation. Furthermore, some may believe that investing in human capital is just another arrow in the quiver of alternative policies to deal with globalisation and migration, including all the gamut from labour market liberalisation to fortress Europe. By contrast, we find it hard to identify remedies to automation unanchored, in the long-term, in better education and more qualified human capital. Accordingly, we raise hypothesis H3:

H3: Concerns about automation positively moderate the effect of social investment on support for European Unemployment Risk Sharing, more than concerns about globalisation and migration do.

We test these hypotheses by means of the experiment embedded in the EURS dataset, as discussed in the next section.

⁴ Our mainstream hypothesis is based on a rational-choice approach, which prompts us to expect that individuals would ask for more training as a response to the fear of skill obsolescence and technological replacement. However, other contributions undermine this causal link (Güner and Nurski, 2023; INAPP, 2022).

5 Data and methods.

5.1 The design of the conjoint experiment

Conjoint experiments are becoming the gold standard to experimentally assess ex-ante public opinion regarding alternative policy options. To name but a few, conjoint experiments have been used to assess attitudes towards labour market reforms [Gallego and Marx, 2017], pension reforms [Häusermann *et al*, 2019], migration reforms [Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014b], bailouts [Betchel *et al*, 2017], welfare state recalibration [Bremer and Bürgisser, 2022], climate agreements [Bechtel *et al*, 2019], an EU fiscal union [Franchino and Segatti, 2019], support for the Euro [Baccaro *et al*, 2021] and EU institutional reform [Hahm *et al*, 2020].

All conjoint experiments rely on a similar mechanism: the possible variations over a specific policy are disentangled in *dimensions*, each of which can have different *values*. These values represent the treatment of the experiment; for each dimension, a specific value is randomly administered to a representative sample of respondents. The specific combination of values of all dimensions constitutes a package. Each individual is administered, in each experiment, two randomly sorted packages (ie combinations of values for each dimension) side-by-side; the respondent is then tasked to choose which package is preferred and rate each package independently. Hence, the experimenter can test both the relative effect of each specific treatment on choice and on rating, as well as the effect of different bundles (or packages).

The conjoint experiment at the centre of the EURS dataset asks respondents to evaluate randomly sorted alternative packages of Unemployment Risk-Sharing Schemes. By construction, every conjoint experiment needs to strike a difficult balance between three conditions: adherence to the reality of the policy debate, a sufficient simplification to ensure that respondents understand the content of the options and a clear depiction of the fundamental trade-offs at stake. Hence, the EURS experiment simplifies the debate around the establishment of unemployment reinsurance into the six dimensions discussed in the previous section: generosity, social investment conditions, cross-country redistribution, taxation, level of governance and individual-level activation conditions. The levels of these dimensions are chosen to be representative of the main lines of the policy debate and yet accessible and understandable by a sample that ought to be representative of the public opinion. For instance, generosity can be low (40 percent of last wage), medium (60 percent) or high (70 percent). Social investment conditions can either be absent or require countries to provide education and training to unemployed. Cross-country redistribution in the long-term can either be absent or allow all

countries to potentially draw more from the scheme than they had paid in, or allow only poor countries to do so. Long-term taxation impact can either be neutral or imply a 0.5 percent increase in the tax burden for everyone or imply a 1 percent increase in the tax burden only for the wealthy. Governance can either be at national level, or at European level. Finally, individual conditions can either be absent, or limited to accept any suitable job offer, or require both a minimum of a job application per week and to accept any suitable job offer. Clearly, these levels constitute a simplification of the alternative policy options into a sub-set of easily understandable 324 different packages. It is worth noting that not all these 324 different packages are internally consistent: for instance, very generous packages with cross-country redistribution would not be consistent, in many countries, with zero increases in the long-run tax burden. Yet we prefer to control for such inconsistent packages ex-post, rather than violating randomisation ex-ante.

5.2 Data collection and experiment administration

The survey was administered online to a sample of 1,500 individuals in 13 European countries, for a total of 19,500 individuals. Data collection was carried out by IPSOS on their representative online panels in the two weeks between October and November 2018. Even though IPSOS online panels are already quite representative of the population at large, quotas were introduced to make sure that the sample respected the adequate proportions of the population for gender, age, education and regional distribution. The 13 European countries (DE, IT, NL, BE, FR, AT, PL, EE, ES, HU, DK, IE and FI⁵) were chosen in such a way as to provide coverage with regard to Euro Area Membership, the impact of the Eurocrisis, the outstanding levels of debt and unemployment, the welfare state model, and the geographical positioning.

Each individual was first confronted with a short text introducing the situation at hand, where the experiment is introduced and the policy at stake quickly described. Each individual is then confronted with three iterations of the experiment. In each iteration, the respondent sees two different, randomly sorted packages side-by-side; they must first indicate which package is preferred and then rate each package independently on a five-point scale, before moving to the next iteration. These questions represent the main dependent variables in the study. The first question represents **package choice**, as respondents choose one package or the other. While **package choice** usually delivers statistically neat results, it suffers from forced-choice bias, as respondents cannot reject both packages if they do not like either. To moderate that, **the package rating** variable explicitly allows for negative rating of both

⁵ Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria, Poland, Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Denmark, Ireland, Finland.

packages; in other words, the rating of one package is independent from the rating of the other package. We primarily use package rating as dependent variable in this study.

The experiment is complemented by a long battery of questions aimed at profiling the respondents vis-à-vis their political opinion, their socioeconomic background and other standard public opinion items. These questions usually work as controls in the experimental set up. However, they can also be used as means to **split the sample** and see whether there are statistically significant effects between subgroups.

5.3 Research design of this article

In using the EURS dataset, we build on an existing body of work. Burgoon *et al* (2022) investigate the main experimental effects; Kuhn *et al* (2020) and Nicoli *et al* (2020) look instead at how sub-group variations with regards – respectively – to left/right positioning, EU attitudes, and territorial identities affect the effects of the treatments. We follow this latter approach, looking at how sub-group differences regarding fears of globalisation, migration and automation influence the effect of the treatments. To do so, we exploit a battery of questions in the EURS survey that reads as follows:

“On a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 is not at all worried and 10 is extremely worried), how worried are you for yourself and/or (#Country) about the following developments?”

The individual is prompted to respond with regard to globalisation (eg trade); *“technological change (eg robotics)”*; and *“migration into (#country)”*, where #country is a variable element dependent on the respondent’s location. On average, respondents show less concern about technological change, with a mean score of the corresponding variable of 4.7; migration is considered most concerning, with a mean score of 6.1; globalisation sits in between, with a mean score of 5.4⁶. While respondents tend to be clustered around the mean for globalisation fears, the higher standard deviations for automation- and migration-related worries show a stronger polarisation of views on these phenomena.

To test our hypotheses, we proceed with a series of econometric models where we run interaction effects between concerns over sources of labour market pressure and the experimental treatments – the values each dimension of the conjoint can take.⁷ These models are reported in Table A1 in

⁶ Distribution of risk perceptions along relevant demographic characteristics in the Appendix A4.

⁷ A lively debate on the best possible way of running interaction effects and subgroup analyses in conjoint experiments is ongoing. In their original contribution, Hainmuller *et al* (2014a) suggested to run standard interaction effects and coefficient plots. However, this approach is neither parsimonious (as each level within a dimension requires a dedicated interaction plot) nor straightforward to interpret (as the particular interaction effect plotted needs to be interpreted against the baseline and not in absolute terms). Numerous contributions, both published and unpublished, have suggested

appendix,⁸ while in the next section we focus the core of the analysis on the graphical representation of the interaction effects (Figures 2a-2c). All models have standard errors clustered at the individual level, to account for the fact that every individual is confronted with 6 packages and include a set of individual controls as well as country fixed effects (omitted from the table). Models 1 provides baseline model without interactions, using an OLS regression on a binary transformation of package support⁹. Models 2-4 introduce interaction effects with concerns over globalisation, automation and migration. In this work, we do not systematically investigate differences in policy preferences across countries. A wide literature explores these cross-national variations, often traced back to policy feedback effects (Busemyer and Sahm, 2022; Busemeyer and Tober, 2023; Gingrich and Ansell, 2012; Jæger 2006; Larsen, 2008)¹⁰.

Finally, in section 7 we use counterfactual reasoning to estimate which packages are the most preferred by individuals with strong fears of automation, globalisation and migration. We link such packages to the political supply of typical party families in Europe.

6 Social policy demands and sources of concern

6.1 Labour market competition concerns and the welfare dimension of EURS

To test our hypotheses, we run two sets of interaction effects. These interaction effects are estimated using a binary transformation of the **package rating** variable (often called ‘support’), where packages rated negatively or neutrally are assigned a value of 0, and packages rated positively are assigned a value of 1 (see footnote 4). Figures 2a-2c plot the effect of having a certain attribute **rather than the baseline attribute** in the same dimension, on the likelihood of support.

alternative ways. In particular, Leeper *et al* (2019) suggest using marginal means for subgroup analysis; Egami and Imai (2019) develop a new measure, dubbed Average Marginal Interaction Effect (AMIE), for interactions between dimensions; Goplerud *et al* (2022) propose yet an alternative estimator. As the judge is still out on what is the best way of running interaction effects in conjoint settings, we adopt the well-established Hainmuller *et al* (2014a) approach.

⁸ The models described in text are reported in Table A1. To make sure that these concerns really associate with labour market worries, we run a series of additional robustness checks. In Table A2 we replicate Table A1 controlling for labour market worries, while in Table A3 we run the main models only among those workers who are highly concerned with their labour market prospects. In A5, we run the main models for different clusters of countries (similar to welfare regimes: Scandinavian, Central-Eastern and Western European, and Mediterranean countries).

⁹ In this transformation, packages rates neutrally, negatively, or very negatively are coded as 0, and packages rated positively or very positively are rated as 1.


¹⁰ Although we are not interested in investigate cross-country differences in policy preferences, in Table A5 we report the results of models – both base and with interactions – run separately for four country clusters, which recall the broad categorization of political economies (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2001): Scandinavian countries (DK, FI), Western-Central Europe (AT, BE, DE, FR, IE, NL), Eastern-Central Europe (EE, HU, PL), Mediterranean countries (ES, IT).

The first set of interaction effects (Figure 2a – Table A2 in appendix) allows us to test H1. H1 postulates that when it comes to the effect of more generous and least constraining welfare arrangements on support/opposition for EURS, concerns with globalisation and automation largely behave in the same way in moderating preferences: the higher the concern, the stronger the effect on support. Looking at interaction effects, this means that we expect the slope of the interaction between automation/globalisation and the welfare-related dimensions to be positive for more progressive, less conditional packages, while we expect the slope to be negative for the interaction between concerns for migration. These interactions are reported in Figure 2a (estimates are instead reported in Table A2 in appendix): the panels in the first column report the interaction for the effects of the most generous dimension, those in the second column for the most progressive type of taxation and those in the third column for conditional packages. The estimates reported in Figure 2a demonstrate a **strong support for H1**, as all slopes follow the expected pattern. The coefficients of these interactions are generally significant (see Table A2), with the exception of the interaction between migration concerns and redistribution. Not only do the interactions of the welfare-related dimensions with automation and globalisation concerns have the same sign of the slope, while the interaction with migration has the opposite slope; the direction of the effects also aligns to our expectations. That is, the higher the concerns with globalisation or automation, the stronger the effect on support of having a generous, unconditional and taxation-progressive package, as opposed to the alternative. Similarly, the higher the concern with migration, the lower is the effect on support of being faced with generous packages, and the higher the effect of individual-level conditionality.

Note that lower support does not necessarily translate into negative support: as can be read on the y-axis, individuals who are extremely concerned with migration still prefer, for instance, generous packages over non-generous packages. But the effect attributable to generosity decreases: high generosity makes an individual approximately 14 percent more likely to support a package than low generosity if the individual is not concerned with migration, but only about 12 percent more likely if the individual is very concerned with migration. Conversely, high generosity increases support by about 10 percent in respect to the alternative among individuals who are not concerned with technological change, but this effect increases to nearly 14 percent among their highly concerned peers. These differences are perhaps most clear when looking at individual-level conditionality, ie labour market activation conditions bestowed upon the unemployed: the positive effect of activation on support is halved for individuals highly concerned with automation or globalisation, as compared to their non-concerned peers. On the other hand, this effect doubles for individuals highly concerned with migration as compared to their unconcerned peers. In sum, the estimates reported in Figure 2a

strongly support H1: when it comes to the dimensions of social policy that directly relate with welfare provision, there are substantial similarities between the effects attributable to globalisation and automation fears, whereas concerns with migration have an opposite effect.

Figure 2a: labour market concerns and EURS dimensions related to welfare provision



Note: the graphs show the average marginal effects of different policy dimensions – generosity (left column), progressive taxation (central column), and conditionality (right column) – on the individual support for the package (binary), conditional on the level of fear for technological change (first row), globalisation (second row), and migration (third row).

6.2 Societal concerns and the international footprint of EURS

We now move to a second set of interaction effects, allowing us to test H2 (Figure 2b, Table A2). H2 postulates that, since both concerns with globalisation and with migration originate in the country's interaction with the rest of the world, very high concerns in these two areas will be strong, negative moderators of the effect of those EURS dimensions embodying a more open, internationally oriented system. The EURS experiment includes two such dimensions: the possibility for supranational redistribution and the level of governance. The first dimension has three possible levels: the base level

constitutes a system with no redistribution in the long term; the second level allows any country to potentially draw resources from system; the third level instead makes sure that, whatever the actual need for reinsurance, poor countries will be drawing resources, while rich countries will pay for it. The second dimension captures the level of governance: the base level postulates that the system is governed by an EU body, while the alternative proposes a system governed by national authorities. Accordingly, we expect that slope for the interaction between globalisation/migration concerns and redistribution will be negative, while it will be positive for the interaction with national level of governance. Conversely, we expect the slope of the interaction between automation concerns and redistribution to be either flat or positive and the slope of the interaction with governance to be either flat or negative.

The results, reported in Figure 2b and in appendix Table A2, provide only qualified support for H2. Migration concerns certainly behave as expected: a very strong effect follows the predicted path, with strong, negative and highly significant slopes for the interaction with both levels of the redistribution dimension and a strong, positive interaction with national level of governance.


However, interactions with globalisation and automation do not quite align with our expectations. The slope for the interaction between globalisation concerns and governance and between automation concerns and governance, have the predicted inclination, suggesting that individuals more concerned with globalisation attach higher value to maintaining a national oversight of the EURS system. However, these effects are extremely marginal and statistically not significant. Similarly, the slope for the interaction with cross-country symmetric redistribution is negative as predicted for both concerns over technological change and globalisation, suggesting that the higher the concern with globalisation and automation, the lower the support for packages which allow *any* country to draw from the scheme if needed, yet, these interactions (as those for the alternative form of redistribution, from rich to poor countries) are not significant.

However, the interaction with the redistributive dimension **from rich to poor countries** display a significantly different path: the curve has a slight positive inclination, suggesting that a sizeable subgroup of individuals highly concerned with globalisation explicitly oppose a system where rich countries could potentially be net beneficiaries, while simultaneously supporting a system that enforces redistribution from rich to poor countries.

We also note that the confidence intervals for the interactions between automation and globalisation with the international footprint dimensions are substantially wider than both the confidence intervals

for migration, and the confidence intervals of the estimates for the interactions with the welfare provisions dimensions of EURS (seen in Figure 2a). This necessarily implies that a great variety of opinions exist among people who are highly concerned with globalisation and automation when it comes to the international footprint of EURS schemes, while respondents that share a common concern for migration are much closer to each other in their policy preferences than their peers¹¹. Overall, the interaction models reported in Figure 2b amount to a qualified support for H2. While individuals with high globalisation and migration concerns share some common opposition to schemes with a strong international footprint, the latter are much closer to each other in their opinions, while individuals concerned with globalisation not only are more varying in their opinion, but also seem to have an overall slightly positive view of cross-country redistribution insofar it remains directed towards helping poor countries.

Figure 2b: Global concerns and EURS dimensions with an international footprint




Note: the graphs show the average marginal effects of different policy dimensions – redistribution to all countries (left column), redistribution from rich to poor countries (central column), and governance (right column) – on the individual support for the package (binary), conditional on the level of fear for technological change (first row), globalisation (second row), and migration (third row).

¹¹ The fear of migrants poorly correlates with the other two risks perceptions (Person's coefficient around 0,35), while fear of automation and globalisation result to be more significantly correlated (Pearson's coefficient around 0,54).

6.3 Labour market competition concerns and the social investment dimension of the EURS

Finally, we move to test H3, which postulates that the interaction between social investment and automation concerns will be positive (the higher the concern with automation, the stronger the support for social investment). We test H3 in Figure 2c, which displays the interactions between the three concerns under study and social investment.

Figure 2c: Social investment



Note: The graphs show the average marginal effects of the social investment requirements on the individual support for the package (binary), conditional on the level of fear for technological change (first row), globalisation (second row) and migration (third row).

Accordingly, H3 is strongly rejected by our analysis. All three concerns display flat or negatively sloped interaction with social investment requirements: higher levels of concerns tend to be associated with lower support for social investment, even though only the interaction with migration concerns is statistically significant. More specifically, the slope is significantly negative for automation and migration concerns, while it is almost flat for concerns with globalisation. Even though the overall

effect of social investment remains positive (that is, even individuals that are highly concerned with migration or automation prefer packages inclusive of social investment than packages not including it), they are significantly less favourable towards it than their non-concerned peers. In other words, our analysis shows that H3 is rejected: individuals who are concerned with automation do not display stronger support for social investment and education requirements (see also Busemeyer *et al*, 2022; Kurer and Häusermann, 2022), but quite the opposite; even though they remain favourable to social investment, they do not display significantly different preferences from their non-concerned peers.

7 Political supply meets social policy demands? Ideal-typical packages approval among concerned groups.

Finally, we move to explore the nexus between social policy demands and political supply. We investigate how specific policy solutions that characterise the typical political offer of broad political families perform among groups differentiated by their source of concern, as political supply provided by parties and other ideological actors responds to changing labour markets (Häusermann *et al*, 2013; Dancygier and Walter, 2015; Gingrich and Ansell, 2015; Häusermann *et al*, 2020; Häusermann, 2020). Importantly, as showed by Figures 2a-2c, even when negative slopes exist between the effects on support of certain dimensions and the different sources of concern, very rarely does the intensity of concern lead to a shift from preferring a policy option to preferring the alternative. This means that, with some exceptions, the package that is absolutely preferred by individuals who are strongly concerned with each source of labour market competition is the same: only the intensity of the preference varies. For instance, all concerned individuals prefer a package that is highly generous, with social investment and with some activation. However, high levels of concern with migration produce a shift of preferences in three dimensions: from progressive taxation to no tax increases, from cross-country redistribution to no cross-country redistribution and from European governance to national governance.

How do these concerns affect typical policy packages put on the table by parties? We derive three overall policy packages which align with the stereotypical ‘policy offer’ presented by certain dominant political forces in Europe. We compare the political offer that could typically pertain to social-democratic parties with that of (social) liberal-internationalist parties and that of chauvinist-conservative, far-right parties. For each of the policy dimensions of our conjoint experiment, we can postulate the position that a typical party in these political families would take. We present these in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Ideal-typical social policy offers by political families


	Traditional social-democratic package	Liberal-internationalist package	Chauvinist-conservative package
<i>replacement rate</i>	maximum (70%)	maximum (70%)	medium (60%)
<i>social investment conditions</i>	yes	yes	yes
<i>cross-country redistribution</i>	always, from rich to poor	all countries, but only when needed	no cross-country redistribution
<i>taxation</i>	progressive increase (5% for the rich)	flat increase (1% for everyone)	no increase
<i>governance</i>	national governance	EU governance	national governance
<i>activation conditions</i>	no activation conditions	some activation conditions	some activation conditions

The first policy package includes features typical of classical social-democratic policy-making and focuses on generous social protection rooted in national traditions. This package features high generosity, progressive taxation, social investment and always includes redistribution from rich to poor countries; however, it does not include any labour market activation conditions and maintains national governance¹². As shown in Figure 3, such a domestically oriented package is particularly appreciated by individuals concerned with globalisation.

Second, we formulate a policy package characterised by policy features pertaining to international openness and generous social protection combined with individual responsibility, typical characteristics of (social) liberal policies. This package includes high replacement rates, social investment and labour market activation conditions; furthermore, it is governed at European level, includes cross-country transfers and is financed by flat taxation increases. This package is generally acceptable to very concerned individuals regardless of the source of concern, but it is appreciated the most among respondents concerned with automation and the least among respondents concerned with migration flows.

¹² Although the absence of individual-level conditionality requirements may seem at odds with the actual practice of social-democratic governments, it is a proxy for a policy package which puts more emphasis on overall enabling conditions (investing in education and training) than reliance on strict welfare-to-work regimes. The German SPD support for the new minimum income scheme *Bürgergeld*, introducing less-constraining rules with respect to activation, with an emphasis on training, is a case in point.

Figure 3: Specific policy packages by type of concern



Note the graphs show the average support of respondents extremely concerned either by globalisation (left column), technological change (central column), or migration (right column) for specific combinations of policy dimension.

Finally, we formulate a chauvinist, conservative-oriented package which could be ascribed to nationalist conservative and far-right parties with a welfare chauvinist agenda. This package features lower generosity (60 percent replacement rate), social investment and activation conditions, but no tax increases, no cross-country redistribution, and national governance. This package is usually rejected by the average respondent but meets instead the approval of those individuals who are highly concerned with migration pressures.

All in all, our results suggest that societal compromise around the social liberal-internationalist political supply is possible, since the losses in political support among individuals concerned with migration are lower in this compromise, than they are in the social-democratic one. Moreover, these ideal-typical policy packages suggest that partisan policymakers are quite responsive, in their political offer, to specific concerns and preferences of their constituents, suggesting that the divide over the generosity and global openness of future cross-national welfare arrangements is indeed influenced by sources of labour market concern, as political forces tailor their political offer to respond to the concerns of their constituents.

8 Conclusions

This paper set out to explore how subjective risk perceptions towards global societal change – such as the technological change of globalisation and migration – affect individual preferences for supranational social protection. We expected that individuals with different concerns might share preferences towards some aspects of social protection but differences towards others. We expected individuals highly concerned with automation to have a preference for strong, supranational action; we expected individuals who fear globalisation to have a preference for strong, national action; while we expected those who fear migration to generally prefer weaker, conditional, domestic actions.

We formulated these expectations as a set of three hypotheses and we tested them using a semi-experimental set-up. We exploited the conjoint experiment on preferences for a European Unemployment Risk-Sharing initiative contained in the 2018 EURS survey, which was fielded in 13 European countries in October/November 2018 returning a representative sample of 19500 respondents. We proceeded in testing our hypotheses by means of interaction effects between a battery of questions on the respondents' level of concern on global phenomena and the different dimensions of the EURS as tested in the conjoint experiment.

We found strong evidence in favour of our first hypothesis (H1): high levels of concern for technological change and for globalisation largely have the same positive effect when it comes to

support more progressive EURS alternatives, while high levels of concern for immigration lead to relatively less support for progressive EURS alternatives.

We found only qualified support for our second hypothesis (H2): while high levels of concern for migration strongly associate with lower preferences for internationally-open EURS alternatives, this applies only in part to high levels of concerns for globalisation; in fact, individuals who are highly concerned with globalisation seem to display quite a wide range of attitudes towards schemes that have a strong supranational footprint; this is witnessed both by the confidence intervals of the estimates (even when the effect is the one we expect, the confidence intervals are quite wide) and by the surprisingly positive slope of the interaction between globalisation concerns and explicit redistribution from rich to poor countries. Furthermore, we strongly reject our third hypothesis (H3) on preferences for social investment. While we expected individuals with high concerns for automation to have a somehow positive view of conditions regarding social investment (for instance, the provision of education or training schemes to the unemployed), our estimates support the view that respondents who are highly concerned with automation or immigration are less favourable of social investment packages than their non-concerned peers.

Finally, we show that there may be a consensus in Europe for a social liberal-internationalist compromise, embodied by a policy package that combines generous benefits with individual responsibility and activation conditions, an EU-level governance and cross-country redistribution when needed.

While our results contribute to advance our knowledge of how different labour market vulnerabilities associate with different perceived labour market vulnerabilities, this article does have some limitations which we plan to address in follow-up, dedicated work. First-off, we cannot match individual-level perceptions of labour market competition with objective information, because we do not have available detailed information on the economic sector and occupation of our respondents. This prevents us from having a detailed look at the objective vulnerability of respondents to shocks, avoiding the risk of misattribution. In future work, we plan to collect new data on respondents' sector and occupation, being therefore able to assess both their individual-level exposure to shocks via the Routine Task Index and/or other measures of exposure to trade, as well as the exposure of the regions the respondents live in. Second, this experiment is not geared to identify a causal link between sources of labour market pressure and policy preferences. Of course, it is notoriously complicated to randomly assign such sources of labour market shock since these conditions cannot be easily manipulated in an experimental setup. Nonetheless, we plan to run a dedicated survey experiment to

identify, to the extent possible, the effect of different shocks. Finally, we do not explore, in this article, whether responsiveness with political supply of the main party families is then associated with voting behaviour. In future work, we plan to better explore the link between EURS support and voting choices, building upon the results presented in this article.

Despite these limitations, our results strongly suggest that policy preferences for social policy at European level are moderated by concerns over labour market pressure. Concerns with globalisation, migration and automation are substantively different and associate with different demands over the type of social protection, determining different preferences regarding the generosity and conditionality of unemployment risk-sharing and over the degree of international openness it features. This paves the way for future research aimed at better understanding preferences and conditions for European level social policy.

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Appendix A1

A1.1 Main models investigating the impact of the experimental policy dimensions on individual support for the policy packages (Model 1 OLS; Model 2 logit)

VARIABLES	(1) Base model - OLS	(2) Base model - logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0884*** (0.00421)	0.365*** (0.0175)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.119*** (0.00438)	0.490*** (0.0182)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0710*** (0.00344)	0.292*** (0.0142)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	0.00912** (0.00421)	0.0375** (0.0173)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	0.0104** (0.00416)	0.0426** (0.0172)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0552*** (0.00416)	-0.227*** (0.0172)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0263*** (0.00419)	-0.108*** (0.0172)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	0.0211*** (0.00356)	0.0870*** (0.0147)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.0772*** (0.00447)	0.318*** (0.0185)
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	0.0680*** (0.00454)	0.280*** (0.0188)
Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	0.00290*** (0.00100)	0.0120*** (0.00412)
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	-0.000999 (0.000882)	-0.00413 (0.00363)
Migration into your country - How worried?	-0.00418*** (0.000730)	-0.0172*** (0.00300)

Recode education to low-middle-high = 2, Middle	0.0152** (0.00592)	0.0625** (0.0245)
Recode education to low-middle-high = 3, High	0.0316*** (0.00648)	0.130*** (0.0267)
equivalised net income, categorised in deciles per country	-0.00183** (0.000778)	-0.00755** (0.00320)
Constant	0.328*** (0.0103)	-0.710*** (0.0426)
Observations	78,786	78,786
R-squared	0.024	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A1.2 Main models, including interactions between the experimental policy dimensions and concerns for technological change (models 1,2), migration models 3,4), and globalisation (model 5,6). Models 1, 3, 5 OLS; models 2,4,6 logit

VARIABLES	(1) Automation interaction - OLS	(2) Automation interaction - Logit	(3) Migration interaction - OLS	(4) Migration interaction - Logit	(5) Globalisation interaction - OLS	(6) Globalisation interaction - Logit
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	-0.000651 (0.00210)	-0.00261 (0.00887)	-0.00101 (0.000882)	-0.00417 (0.00364)	-0.000997 (0.000882)	-0.00412 (0.00364)
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0841*** (0.00808)	0.347*** (0.0335)	0.100*** (0.00929)	0.409*** (0.0384)	0.0899*** (0.00964)	0.372*** (0.0401)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.102*** (0.00857)	0.420*** (0.0355)	0.135*** (0.00964)	0.550*** (0.0399)	0.101*** (0.0100)	0.417*** (0.0417)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0760*** (0.00662)	0.312*** (0.0273)	0.0904*** (0.00760)	0.369*** (0.0312)	0.0720*** (0.00796)	0.296*** (0.0328)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	0.0167** (0.00815)	0.0691** (0.0336)	0.0364*** (0.00922)	0.149*** (0.0379)	0.0232** (0.00965)	0.0956** (0.0398)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	0.0170** (0.00803)	0.0699** (0.0331)	0.0349*** (0.00922)	0.143*** (0.0379)	0.00439 (0.00955)	0.0180 (0.0395)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0675*** (0.00810)	-0.277*** (0.0334)	-0.0426*** (0.00918)	-0.174*** (0.0378)	-0.0696*** (0.00958)	-0.287*** (0.0396)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0452*** (0.00816)	-0.185*** (0.0335)	-0.0133 (0.00924)	-0.0540 (0.0379)	-0.0469*** (0.00971)	-0.192*** (0.0399)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	0.0243*** (0.00690)	0.100*** (0.0284)	-0.0151* (0.00786)	-0.0625* (0.0323)	0.0166** (0.00830)	0.0687** (0.0343)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.0952*** (0.00862)	0.392*** (0.0357)	0.0442*** (0.00985)	0.180*** (0.0406)	0.0999*** (0.0103)	0.413*** (0.0426)

D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	0.0812*** (0.00881)	0.335*** (0.0365)	0.0440*** (0.0101)	0.179*** (0.0415)	0.0895*** (0.0106)	0.370*** (0.0439)
1b.D1#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D1#CONCERNED	0.000904 (0.00147)	0.00384 (0.00612)	-0.00189 (0.00132)	-0.00711 (0.00548)	-0.000279 (0.00159)	-0.00131 (0.00660)
3.D1#CONCERNED	0.00365** (0.00156)	0.0149** (0.00647)	-0.00255* (0.00139)	-0.00976* (0.00575)	0.00335** (0.00168)	0.0134* (0.00695)
1b.D2#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D2#CONCERNED	-0.00105	-0.00425	-	-	-0.000149	-0.000740
			0.00314*** (0.00120)	0.0125*** (0.00449)		
1b.D3#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D3#CONCERNED	-0.00160	-0.00663	-	-	-0.00258	-0.0107
			0.00441*** (0.00147)	0.0181*** (0.00546)		
3.D3#CONCERNED	-0.00138	-0.00568	-	-	0.00111	0.00457
			0.00396*** (0.00146)	0.0163*** (0.00545)		
1b.D4#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D4#CONCERNED	0.00261* (0.00147)	0.0107* (0.00606)	-0.00201 (0.00132)	-0.00851 (0.00545)	0.00263* (0.00160)	0.0109* (0.00659)
3.D4#CONCERNED	0.00400*** (0.00147)	0.0164*** (0.00604)	-0.00212 (0.00132)	-0.00876 (0.00543)	0.00377** (0.00160)	0.0155** (0.00658)
1b.D5#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D5#CONCERNED	-0.000695 (0.00125)	-0.00288 (0.00514)	0.00586*** (0.00113)	0.0242*** (0.00466)	0.000853 (0.00137)	0.00342 (0.00566)
1b.D6#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D6#CONCERNED	-0.00381** (0.00158)	-0.0157** (0.00654)	0.00534*** (0.00142)	0.0224*** (0.00588)	-0.00418** (0.00170)	-0.0174** (0.00706)
3.D6#CONCERNED	-0.00281* (0.00160)	-0.0116* (0.00661)	0.00387*** (0.00144)	0.0164*** (0.00598)	-0.00398** (0.00174)	-0.0166** (0.00723)
Migration into your country - How worried?	- 0.00419*** (0.000730)	-0.0173*** (0.00301)	-0.00297 (0.00187)	-0.0132* (0.00787)	-0.00418*** (0.000730)	-0.0172*** (0.00301)
Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	0.00291*** (0.00100)	0.0120*** (0.00412)	0.00290*** (0.00100)	0.0120*** (0.00413)	0.00261 (0.00230)	0.0113 (0.00970)

Recode education to low-middle-high = 2, Middle	0.0152**	0.0626**	0.0151**	0.0626**	0.0152**	0.0626**
	(0.00592)	(0.0245)	(0.00592)	(0.0245)	(0.00592)	(0.0245)
Recode education to low-middle-high = 3, High	0.0316***	0.130***	0.0316***	0.130***	0.0316***	0.130***
	(0.00648)	(0.0268)	(0.00648)	(0.0268)	(0.00648)	(0.0268)
equivalised net income, categorised in deciles per country	-0.00183**	-0.00755**	-0.00183**	-	-0.00183**	-0.00756**
	(0.000778)	(0.00321)	(0.000778)	0.00755**	(0.000778)	(0.00321)
Constant	0.326***	-0.718***	0.320***	-0.735***	0.329***	-0.706***
	(0.0136)	(0.0571)	(0.0149)	(0.0622)	(0.0153)	(0.0643)
Observations	78,786	78,786	78,786	78,786	78,786	78,786
R-squared	0.024		0.025		0.024	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix A2

A2.1 Main models investigating the impact of the experimental policy dimensions on individual support for the policy packages (Model 1 OLS; Model 2 logit), including controls for labor market worries

VARIABLES	(1) Base model - OLS	(2) Base model - logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0888*** (0.00425)	0.371*** (0.0178)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.120*** (0.00442)	0.498*** (0.0186)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0720*** (0.00347)	0.299*** (0.0145)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	0.00915** (0.00424)	0.0381** (0.0177)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	0.0104** (0.00420)	0.0433** (0.0175)

D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0553*** (0.00420)	-0.231*** (0.0175)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0266*** (0.00422)	-0.111*** (0.0175)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	0.0215*** (0.00359)	0.0893*** (0.0150)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.0792*** (0.00451)	0.330*** (0.0189)
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	0.0695*** (0.00458)	0.290*** (0.0192)
lowlhinc = 1	-0.00159 (0.00458)	-0.00654 (0.0191)
loweducB = 1	-0.0131** (0.00573)	-0.0545** (0.0240)
femaleB = 1	-0.00209 (0.00424)	-0.00851 (0.0177)
unempB = 1	0.00126 (0.0124)	0.00548 (0.0516)
welfdepB = 1	0.00240 (0.00608)	0.00996 (0.0253)
Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	0.00200** (0.000988)	0.00837** (0.00412)
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	0.000845 (0.000876)	0.00349 (0.00365)
Migration into your country - How worried?	-0.00305*** (0.000719)	-0.0127*** (0.00300)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 1, Very worried	-0.00213 (0.00904)	-0.00880 (0.0377)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 2, Somewhat worried	0.0124** (0.00592)	0.0515** (0.0247)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 4, I am already unemployed	-0.00752 (0.0132)	-0.0313 (0.0551)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 5, I am not working and I am not looking for a job (e.g. student, retiree, housewif	0.0165** (0.00672)	0.0690** (0.0280)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 6, I prefer not to answer	-0.0759**	-0.324**

	(0.0308)	(0.135)
country_code = 2	-0.0289***	-0.121***
	(0.00984)	(0.0411)
country_code = 3	-0.0355***	-0.148***
	(0.0105)	(0.0441)
country_code = 4	0.120***	0.494***
	(0.0100)	(0.0418)
country_code = 5	-0.00703	-0.0291
	(0.00973)	(0.0404)
country_code = 6	-0.0733***	-0.310***
	(0.00948)	(0.0404)
country_code = 7	-0.0454***	-0.191***
	(0.00916)	(0.0385)
country_code = 8	0.0894***	0.368***
	(0.0102)	(0.0421)
country_code = 9	0.0444***	0.183***
	(0.00989)	(0.0408)
country_code = 10	0.0690***	0.284***
	(0.00988)	(0.0407)
country_code = 11	-0.0307***	-0.128***
	(0.00907)	(0.0379)
country_code = 12	0.0179*	0.0734*
	(0.0101)	(0.0417)
country_code = 13	0.0645***	0.265***
	(0.0104)	(0.0429)
Constant	0.308***	-0.799***
	(0.0103)	(0.0433)
Observations	77,670	77,670
R-squared	0.037	

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A2.2 Main models, including interactions between the experimental policy dimensions and concerns for technological change (models 1,2), migration models 3,4), and globalisation (model 5,6), including controls for labor market worries. Models 1, 3, 5 OLS; models 2,4,6 logit

VARIABLES	(1) Automation interaction - OLS	(2) Automation interaction - Logit	(3) Migration interaction - OLS	(4) Migration interaction - Logit	(5) Globalisation interaction - OLS	(6) Globalisation interaction - Logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0856*** (0.00816)	0.358*** (0.0343)	0.102*** (0.00938)	0.424*** (0.0392)	0.0911*** (0.00973)	0.382*** (0.0409)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.104*** (0.00863)	0.436*** (0.0362)	0.137*** (0.00973)	0.566*** (0.0408)	0.103*** (0.0101)	0.430*** (0.0425)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0764*** (0.00667)	0.318*** (0.0279)	0.0919*** (0.00767)	0.380*** (0.0319)	0.0726*** (0.00802)	0.303*** (0.0335)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	0.0171** (0.00821)	0.0715** (0.0343)	0.0360*** (0.00931)	0.150*** (0.0388)	0.0227** (0.00974)	0.0947** (0.0407)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	0.0179** (0.00809)	0.0746** (0.0338)	0.0355*** (0.00931)	0.148*** (0.0388)	0.00470 (0.00963)	0.0193 (0.0403)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0678*** (0.00816)	-0.283*** (0.0341)	-0.0419*** (0.00927)	-0.174*** (0.0386)	-0.0712*** (0.00966)	-0.297*** (0.0404)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0441*** (0.00822)	-0.183*** (0.0342)	-0.0130 (0.00930)	-0.0537 (0.0386)	-0.0471*** (0.00978)	-0.196*** (0.0407)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	0.0250*** (0.00695)	0.105*** (0.0290)	-0.0140* (0.00791)	-0.0591* (0.0329)	0.0191** (0.00836)	0.0797** (0.0349)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.0969*** (0.00867)	0.405*** (0.0364)	0.0460*** (0.00995)	0.190*** (0.0416)	0.101*** (0.0104)	0.422*** (0.0435)
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	0.0817*** (0.00888)	0.341*** (0.0373)	0.0444*** (0.0102)	0.183*** (0.0424)	0.0909*** (0.0107)	0.381*** (0.0449)
1b.D1#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D1#CONCERNED	0.000677 (0.00149)	0.00277 (0.00626)	-0.00223* (0.00134)	-0.00863 (0.00561)	-0.000427 (0.00161)	-0.00206 (0.00675)
3.D1#CONCERNED	0.00325** (0.00158)	0.0132** (0.00661)	-0.00280** (0.00140)	-0.0110* (0.00588)	0.00312* (0.00169)	0.0125* (0.00711)
1b.D2#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D2#CONCERNED	-0.000932 (0.00122)	-0.00395 (0.00508)	-0.00324*** (0.00110)	-0.0131*** (0.00459)	-9.81e-05 (0.00133)	-0.000604 (0.00557)
1b.D3#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D3#CONCERNED	-0.00167 (0.00149)	-0.00703 (0.00622)	-0.00435*** (0.00134)	-0.0181*** (0.00558)	-0.00249 (0.00162)	-0.0104 (0.00675)
3.D3#CONCERNED	-0.00156 (0.00147)	-0.00653 (0.00615)	-0.00405*** (0.00133)	-0.0169*** (0.00557)	0.00106 (0.00160)	0.00446 (0.00670)

1b.D4#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D4#CONCERNED	0.00265* (0.00148)	0.0111* (0.00619)	-0.00215 (0.00133)	-0.00917* (0.00557)	0.00290* (0.00161)	0.0122* (0.00674)
3.D4#CONCERNED	0.00370** (0.00148)	0.0153** (0.00617)	-0.00222* (0.00133)	-0.00929* (0.00555)	0.00376** (0.00162)	0.0156** (0.00673)
1b.D5#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D5#CONCERNED	-0.000777 (0.00126)	-0.00330 (0.00525)	0.00574*** (0.00114)	0.0240*** (0.00475)	0.000454 (0.00138)	0.00183 (0.00578)
1b.D6#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D6#CONCERNED	-0.00377** (0.00159)	-0.0158** (0.00667)	0.00538*** (0.00143)	0.0228*** (0.00602)	-0.00398** (0.00172)	-0.0168** (0.00722)
3.D6#CONCERNED	-0.00259 (0.00161)	-0.0109 (0.00676)	0.00407*** (0.00146)	0.0174*** (0.00611)	-0.00395** (0.00177)	-0.0167** (0.00740)
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	0.00147 (0.00212)	0.00641 (0.00903)	0.000833 (0.000876)	0.00345 (0.00366)	0.000847 (0.000876)	0.00351 (0.00365)
Migration into your country - How worried?	-0.00305*** (0.000719)	-0.0127*** (0.00300)	-0.00152 (0.00188)	-0.00730 (0.00802)	-0.00305*** (0.000719)	-0.0127*** (0.00300)
Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	0.00201** (0.000988)	0.00841** (0.00412)	0.00200** (0.000988)	0.00837** (0.00413)	0.00183 (0.00232)	0.00825 (0.00988)
Low income = 1	-0.00159 (0.00458)	-0.00652 (0.0191)	-0.00160 (0.00458)	-0.00662 (0.0191)	-0.00161 (0.00458)	-0.00660 (0.0191)
Low education = 1	-0.0131** (0.00573)	-0.0546** (0.0240)	-0.0130** (0.00573)	-0.0544** (0.0240)	-0.0131** (0.00573)	-0.0546** (0.0240)
Female = 1	-0.00208 (0.00424)	-0.00847 (0.0177)	-0.00207 (0.00424)	-0.00841 (0.0177)	-0.00207 (0.00424)	-0.00844 (0.0177)
Unemployed = 1	0.00127 (0.0124)	0.00550 (0.0516)	0.00127 (0.0124)	0.00557 (0.0517)	0.00127 (0.0124)	0.00553 (0.0517)
Dependent on welfare = 1	0.00242 (0.00608)	0.0100 (0.0253)	0.00242 (0.00608)	0.0100 (0.0253)	0.00241 (0.00608)	0.0100 (0.0253)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 1, Very worried	-0.00211 (0.00904)	-0.00871 (0.0377)	-0.00215 (0.00904)	-0.00888 (0.0377)	-0.00213 (0.00904)	-0.00884 (0.0377)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 2, Somewhat worried	0.0124** (0.00592)	0.0515** (0.0247)	0.0124** (0.00592)	0.0516** (0.0247)	0.0123** (0.00592)	0.0513** (0.0247)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 4, I am already unemployed	-0.00756 (0.0132)	-0.0315 (0.0551)	-0.00759 (0.0132)	-0.0316 (0.0551)	-0.00754 (0.0132)	-0.0315 (0.0551)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 5, I am not working and I am not looking for a job (e.g. student, retiree, housewif	0.0165** (0.00672)	0.0689** (0.0280)	0.0164** (0.00672)	0.0689** (0.0280)	0.0165** (0.00672)	0.0688** (0.0280)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 6, I prefer not to answer	-0.0758** (0.0309)	-0.323** (0.135)	-0.0760** (0.0309)	-0.324** (0.136)	-0.0758** (0.0308)	-0.323** (0.135)

country_code = 2	-0.0289*** (0.00984)	-0.120*** (0.0411)	-0.0289*** (0.00984)	-0.121*** (0.0412)	-0.0289*** (0.00984)	-0.121*** (0.0411)
country_code = 3	-0.0356*** (0.0105)	-0.149*** (0.0441)	-0.0355*** (0.0105)	-0.149*** (0.0442)	-0.0356*** (0.0105)	-0.149*** (0.0441)
country_code = 4	0.120*** (0.0100)	0.494*** (0.0418)	0.120*** (0.0100)	0.495*** (0.0418)	0.120*** (0.0100)	0.494*** (0.0418)
country_code = 5	-0.00709 (0.00973)	-0.0293 (0.0404)	-0.00688 (0.00974)	-0.0286 (0.0404)	-0.00705 (0.00973)	-0.0292 (0.0404)
country_code = 6	-0.0733*** (0.00948)	-0.310*** (0.0404)	-0.0733*** (0.00948)	-0.310*** (0.0404)	-0.0733*** (0.00948)	-0.310*** (0.0404)
country_code = 7	-0.0454*** (0.00916)	-0.191*** (0.0385)	-0.0454*** (0.00916)	-0.191*** (0.0386)	-0.0454*** (0.00916)	-0.191*** (0.0385)
country_code = 8	0.0894*** (0.0102)	0.368*** (0.0421)	0.0895*** (0.0102)	0.368*** (0.0421)	0.0894*** (0.0102)	0.368*** (0.0421)
country_code = 9	0.0444*** (0.00989)	0.183*** (0.0408)	0.0444*** (0.00990)	0.183*** (0.0408)	0.0445*** (0.00989)	0.183*** (0.0408)
country_code = 10	0.0690*** (0.00988)	0.284*** (0.0408)	0.0691*** (0.00989)	0.284*** (0.0408)	0.0690*** (0.00988)	0.284*** (0.0408)
country_code = 11	-0.0307*** (0.00908)	-0.128*** (0.0379)	-0.0307*** (0.00908)	-0.128*** (0.0379)	-0.0307*** (0.00908)	-0.128*** (0.0379)
country_code = 12	0.0179* (0.0101)	0.0737* (0.0417)	0.0180* (0.0101)	0.0737* (0.0418)	0.0179* (0.0101)	0.0735* (0.0417)
country_code = 13	0.0645*** (0.0104)	0.265*** (0.0429)	0.0646*** (0.0104)	0.266*** (0.0429)	0.0645*** (0.0104)	0.265*** (0.0429)
Constant	0.305*** (0.0137)	-0.814*** (0.0582)	0.298*** (0.0149)	-0.833*** (0.0632)	0.309*** (0.0154)	-0.799*** (0.0653)
Observations	77,670	77,670	77,670	77,670	77,670	77,670
R-squared	0.037		0.038		0.037	

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Appendix A3 Main models run for subsamples of respondents highly concerned and not worried of job loss (split-sample models), including interactions between the experimental policy dimensions and concerns for globalisation (models 1,4), technological change (models 2,5), and migration (models 3,6)









VARIABLES		subsample: respondents worried for employment	CONCERN: TECH CHANGE	CONCERN: MIGRATION	subsample: respondents NOT worried for employment	CONCERN: TECH CHANGE	CONCERN: MIGRATION
		CONCERN: GLOBALISATION			CONCERN: GLOBALISATION		
experimental treatments	60% generosity	0.102*** (0.0122)	0.0884*** (0.0103)	0.104*** (0.0118)	0.0781*** (0.0162)	0.0846*** (0.0134)	0.103*** (0.0155)
	70% generosity	0.103*** (0.0129)	0.112*** (0.0111)	0.127*** (0.0123)	0.107*** (0.0166)	0.0932*** (0.0139)	0.160*** (0.0159)
	social investment conditions	0.0766*** (0.0102)	0.0794*** (0.00835)	0.0994*** (0.00952)	0.0685*** (0.0132)	0.0731*** (0.0111)	0.0803*** (0.0130)
	redistribution between all countries	0.0178 (0.0125)	0.0163 (0.0105)	0.0406*** (0.0118)	0.0337** (0.0158)	0.0187 (0.0132)	0.0280* (0.0152)
	redistribution from rich to poor countries	0.00668 (0.0124)	0.0255** (0.0104)	0.0426*** (0.0118)	0.00305 (0.0155)	0.00604 (0.0130)	0.0240 (0.0152)
	flat extra taxation	-0.0775*** (0.0124)	-0.0791*** (0.0104)	-0.0556*** (0.0119)	-0.0646*** (0.0156)	-0.0508*** (0.0132)	-0.0188 (0.0148)
	progressive extra taxation	-0.0461*** (0.0125)	-0.0481*** (0.0105)	-0.0213* (0.0118)	-0.0478*** (0.0159)	-0.0367*** (0.0133)	0.00308 (0.0151)
	national governance	0.0175 (0.0108)	0.0218** (0.00897)	-0.00289 (0.0101)	0.0203 (0.0133)	0.0297*** (0.0111)	-0.0350*** (0.0127)
	apply for jobs	0.0712*** (0.0132)	0.0762*** (0.0111)	0.0251** (0.0126)	0.139*** (0.0168)	0.124*** (0.0139)	0.0757*** (0.0163)
	apply for jobs and accept	0.0578*** (0.0137)	0.0520*** (0.0114)	0.0238* (0.0128)	0.135*** (0.0171)	0.124*** (0.0142)	0.0739*** (0.0166)
labour market concerns	concern: globalisation	-0.000546 (0.00286)	0.00167 (0.00120)	0.00166 (0.00120)	0.00480 (0.00405)	0.00235 (0.00173)	0.00235 (0.00173)
	concern: tech change	0.000931 (0.00105)	-0.000298 (0.00260)	0.000921 (0.00105)	0.000705 (0.00157)	0.00366 (0.00376)	0.000694 (0.00157)
	concern: migration	-0.00287*** (0.000879)	-0.00287*** (0.000879)	-0.00195 (0.00233)	-0.00336*** (0.00126)	-0.00337*** (0.00126)	-0.00128 (0.00323)
	interactions	-0.000797 (0.00195)	0.00179 (0.00181)	-0.00109 (0.00164)	-0.00130 (0.00288)	-0.00312 (0.00267)	-0.00533** (0.00233)
interactions	60% generosity#CONCERNED	0.00399* (0.00207)	0.00274 (0.00193)	-0.000162 (0.00173)	0.000193 (0.00305)	0.00355 (0.00281)	-0.00911*** (0.00240)
	social investment conditions#CONCERNED	-0.000472 (0.00163)	-0.00111 (0.00147)	-0.00402*** (0.00134)	6.78e-05 (0.00237)	-0.00100 (0.00221)	-0.00200 (0.00194)
	redistribution between all countries#CONCERNED	-0.00125 (0.00199)	-0.00112 (0.00182)	-0.00469*** (0.00165)	-0.00563** (0.00287)	-0.00306 (0.00267)	-0.00381 (0.00232)
	redistribution from rich to poor countries#CONCERNED	0.00117 (0.00198)	-0.00245 (0.00181)	-0.00459*** (0.00165)	0.000346 (0.00283)	-0.000259 (0.00259)	-0.00335 (0.00229)
	flat extra taxation#CONCERNED	0.00310 (0.00199)	0.00387** (0.00182)	-0.000682 (0.00167)	0.00379 (0.00283)	0.00120 (0.00262)	-0.00457** (0.00225)
	progressive extra taxation#CONCERNED	0.00362* (0.00199)	0.00455** (0.00182)	-0.000695 (0.00165)	0.00387 (0.00288)	0.00196 (0.00264)	-0.00541** (0.00228)

controls	national governance#CONCERNED	0.000370 (0.00172)	-0.000458 (0.00155)	0.00355** (0.00142)	0.00104 (0.00243)	-0.00104 (0.00222)	0.0104*** (0.00193)
	apply for jobs#CONCERNED	-0.00181 (0.00212)	-0.00310 (0.00195)	0.00562*** (0.00177)	-0.00465 (0.00303)	-0.00190 (0.00281)	0.00704*** (0.00247)
	apply for job and accept#CONCERNED	-0.00123 (0.00218)	-0.000252 (0.00197)	0.00424** (0.00180)	-0.00562* (0.00307)	-0.00416 (0.00287)	0.00577** (0.00251)
	low income	-0.00367 (0.00540)	-0.00365 (0.00540)	-0.00368 (0.00540)	0.000694 (0.00858)	0.000679 (0.00858)	0.000723 (0.00858)
	low education	-0.0133** (0.00661)	-0.0133** (0.00661)	-0.0133** (0.00661)	-0.0126 (0.0115)	-0.0127 (0.0115)	-0.0126 (0.0115)
	female	-0.00756 (0.00519)	-0.00758 (0.00519)	-0.00761 (0.00520)	0.00785 (0.00738)	0.00786 (0.00738)	0.00808 (0.00738)
	unemployed	-0.0155* (0.00931)	-0.0155* (0.00931)	-0.0155* (0.00931)	0.0471 (0.0509)	0.0473 (0.0510)	0.0475 (0.0510)
	dependent on welfare	0.00717 (0.00537)	0.00715 (0.00537)	0.00716 (0.00537)	-0.00339 (0.0138)	-0.00329 (0.0138)	-0.00331 (0.0138)
	Constant	0.336*** (0.0200)	0.330*** (0.0179)	0.318*** (0.0192)	0.281*** (0.0244)	0.281*** (0.0214)	0.281*** (0.0238)
	Observations	51,894	51,894	51,894	25,776	25,776	25,776
	R-squared	0.036	0.036	0.037	0.042	0.042	0.044

Appendix A4

Risk perceptions and genders





Appendix A5

A5.1 Main models run for different clusters of countries (split-sample models)

VARIABLES	(1) Scandinavian - OLS	(2) Scandinavian - Logit	(3) Central- Western - OLS	(4) Central- Western - Logit	(5) Central- Eastern - OLS	(6) Central- Eastern - Logit	(7) Mediterranean - OLS	(8) Mediterranean - Logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0755*** (0.0101)	0.317*** (0.0425)	0.103*** (0.00644)	0.440** * (0.0278)	0.0801** * (0.00894)	0.328** * (0.0368)	0.0751*** (0.0104)	0.308*** (0.0427)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.0844*** (0.0106)	0.354*** (0.0446)	0.139*** (0.00670)	0.589** * (0.0288)	0.108*** * (0.00916)	0.444** * (0.0379)	0.117*** (0.0109)	0.480*** (0.0449)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0717*** (0.00857)	0.298*** (0.0358)	0.0742** * (0.00521)	0.314** * (0.0221)	0.0656** * (0.00725)	0.271** * (0.0300)	0.0742*** (0.00849)	0.305*** (0.0350)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	-0.0296*** (0.0105)	-0.123*** (0.0438)	0.00102 (0.00631)	0.00405 (0.0267)	0.0471** * (0.00894)	0.194** * (0.0369)	0.0170 (0.0104)	0.0697 (0.0430)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	-0.0241** (0.0103)	-0.100** (0.0429)	-0.0103 (0.00632)	- 0.0443* (0.0268)	0.0603** * (0.00877)	0.249** * (0.0363)	0.0320*** (0.0101)	0.132*** (0.0418)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0397*** (0.0103)	-0.166*** (0.0432)	- (0.00635)	- (0.0270)	- (0.00869)	- (0.0360)	-0.0778*** (0.0102)	-0.320*** (0.0422)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0135 (0.01000)	-0.0561 (0.0414)	- (0.00642)	- (0.0270)	- (0.00876)	- (0.0363)	-0.0446*** (0.0105)	-0.183*** (0.0431)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	0.0577*** (0.00891)	0.241*** (0.0372)	0.0300** (0.00529)	0.127** (0.0224)	0.00961 (0.00761)	0.0398 (0.0315)	-0.0219** (0.00899)	-0.0898** (0.0370)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.0184 (0.0114)	0.0766 (0.0474)	0.0996** (0.00677)	0.424** (0.0290)	0.0689** (0.00930)	0.284** (0.0383)	0.0966*** (0.0109)	0.396*** (0.0451)
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	-0.00391 (0.0116)	-0.0164 (0.0483)	0.0870** (0.00688)	0.371** (0.0295)	0.0744** (0.00950)	0.306** (0.0392)	0.0864*** (0.0110)	0.355*** (0.0454)
Low income = 1	0.0327*** (0.0122)	0.136*** (0.0506)	-0.00726 (0.00619)	-0.0306 (0.0263)	-0.00736 (0.0101)	-0.0304 (0.0417)	-0.0151 (0.0126)	-0.0623 (0.0519)
Low education = 1	-0.0564***	-0.238***	-0.00550	-0.0230	0.00653	0.0270	-0.0111	-0.0456

	(0.0152)	(0.0649)	(0.00768)	(0.0328)	(0.0186)	(0.0770)	(0.0120)	(0.0494)
Female = 1	0.00547	0.0232	-0.00773	-0.0326	0.00995	0.0411	-0.0107	-0.0440
	(0.0115)	(0.0480)	(0.00577)	(0.0245)	(0.00932)	(0.0385)	(0.0113)	(0.0465)
Unemployed = 1	-0.0506	-0.214	0.0164	0.0709	-0.0126	-0.0528	0.00150	0.00639
	(0.0356)	(0.152)	(0.0181)	(0.0771)	(0.0323)	(0.134)	(0.0237)	(0.0973)
Dependent on welfare = 1	-0.0127	-0.0524	0.00178	0.00771	0.0142	0.0589	0.00851	0.0347
	(0.0176)	(0.0730)	(0.00848)	(0.0360)	(0.0132)	(0.0546)	(0.0148)	(0.0609)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 1, Very worried	-0.00837	-0.0365	-	-	0.00765	0.0317	0.0342*	0.141*
			0.0277**	0.118**				
	(0.0329)	(0.140)	(0.0133)	(0.0573)	(0.0176)	(0.0730)	(0.0205)	(0.0844)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 2, Somewhat worried	0.0480**	0.199**	-0.00194	-	0.0187	0.0772	0.0228	0.0941
				0.00833				
	(0.0190)	(0.0787)	(0.00812)	(0.0344)	(0.0120)	(0.0495)	(0.0156)	(0.0640)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 4, I am already unemployed	0.0163	0.0698	-	-	0.0411	0.171	0.0334	0.137
			0.0385**	0.164**				
	(0.0342)	(0.145)	(0.0190)	(0.0813)	(0.0337)	(0.140)	(0.0300)	(0.123)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 5, I am not working and I am not looking for a job (e.g. student, retiree, housewife)	0.0487***	0.203**	0.0169*	0.0717*	-0.00793	-0.0330	0.00230	0.00990
	(0.0189)	(0.0787)	(0.00915)	(0.0387)	(0.0146)	(0.0602)	(0.0183)	(0.0751)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 6, I prefer not to answer	0.0432	0.181	-0.0650*	-0.282*	-0.163**	-	-0.0828	-0.345
						0.685**		
	(0.0789)	(0.324)	(0.0382)	(0.171)	(0.0661)	(0.290)	(0.117)	(0.501)
country_code = 2			-	-				
			0.0295**	0.124**				
			*	*				
			(0.00989)	(0.0417)				
country_code = 6			-	-				
			0.0732**	0.312**				
			*	*				
			(0.00947)	(0.0407)				
country_code = 7			-	-				
			0.0472**	0.200**				
			*	*				
			(0.00919)	(0.0390)				
country_code = 10			0.0744**	0.309**				
			*	*				
			(0.00984)	(0.0410)				
country_code = 11			-	-				
			0.0331**	0.139**				
			*	*				
			(0.00916)	(0.0385)				
country_code = 5	0.0278**	0.116**						
	(0.0118)	(0.0492)						
country_code = 8					-	-		
					0.0245**	0.102**		

country_code = 12					(0.0114)	(0.0472)		
					-	-		
					0.0945**	0.389**		
					*	*		
country_code = 13					(0.0114)	(0.0473)		
							0.0189*	0.0781*
							(0.0113)	(0.0466)
Constant	0.305***	-0.811***	0.293***	-	0.400***	-	0.365***	-0.554***
				0.877**		0.411**		
				*		*		
	(0.0183)	(0.0780)	(0.0113)	(0.0485)	(0.0162)	(0.0670)	(0.0188)	(0.0780)
Observations	12,390	12,390	35,094	35,094	17,568	17,568	12,618	12,618
R-squared	0.023		0.040		0.030		0.029	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A5.2 Main models run only for Scandinavian countries, including interactions between the experimental policy dimensions and concerns for automation (models 1,2), migration (models 3,4), globalisation (models 5,6)

VARIABLES	(1) Scandinavian – automation int- - OLS	(2) Scandinavian – automation int- - Logit	(3) Scandinavian – migration int- - OLS	(4) Scandinavian – migration int- - Logit	(5) Scandinavian – globalisation – int- - OLS	(6) Scandinavian – globalisation – int- - Logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0807*** (0.0184)	0.344*** (0.0785)	0.0980*** (0.0223)	0.403*** (0.0932)	0.0797*** (0.0211)	0.337*** (0.0896)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.0816*** (0.0198)	0.348*** (0.0842)	0.115*** (0.0241)	0.473*** (0.101)	0.0850*** (0.0235)	0.358*** (0.0995)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.103*** (0.0156)	0.432*** (0.0660)	0.121*** (0.0189)	0.497*** (0.0786)	0.0921*** (0.0186)	0.385*** (0.0782)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	-0.0188 (0.0193)	-0.0793 (0.0813)	-0.0137 (0.0229)	-0.0551 (0.0948)	0.0135 (0.0230)	0.0575 (0.0961)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	-0.0254 (0.0192)	-0.108 (0.0811)	-0.0193 (0.0227)	-0.0797 (0.0943)	-0.0172 (0.0225)	-0.0731 (0.0943)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0619*** (0.0191)	-0.262*** (0.0810)	-0.0192 (0.0230)	-0.0777 (0.0955)	-0.0895*** (0.0226)	-0.376*** (0.0953)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0549*** (0.0182)	-0.231*** (0.0765)	-0.00411 (0.0224)	-0.0164 (0.0928)	-0.0629*** (0.0216)	-0.261*** (0.0899)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	0.0801*** (0.0162)	0.339*** (0.0684)	0.0178 (0.0199)	0.0708 (0.0825)	0.0625*** (0.0199)	0.263*** (0.0836)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.0892*** (0.0209)	0.376*** (0.0886)	0.0296 (0.0260)	0.122 (0.108)	0.0529** (0.0250)	0.221** (0.105)
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	0.0514**	0.217**	-0.0301	-0.125	0.0239	0.0997

1b.D1#CONCERNED	(0.0210)	(0.0893)	(0.0256)	(0.106)	(0.0247)	(0.104)
	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D1#CONCERNED	-0.00119	-0.00578	-0.00375	-0.0143	-0.000801	-0.00353
	(0.00357)	(0.0152)	(0.00314)	(0.0132)	(0.00377)	(0.0160)
3.D1#CONCERNED	0.000758	0.00225	-0.00496	-0.0193	-9.29e-05	-0.000609
	(0.00389)	(0.0165)	(0.00345)	(0.0145)	(0.00422)	(0.0178)
1b.D2#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D2#CONCERNED	-0.00722**	-0.0307**	-0.00795***	-0.0318***	-0.00401	-0.0168
	(0.00309)	(0.0130)	(0.00275)	(0.0115)	(0.00331)	(0.0139)
1b.D3#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D3#CONCERNED	-0.00261	-0.0107	-0.00256	-0.0112	-0.00851**	-0.0358**
	(0.00384)	(0.0161)	(0.00326)	(0.0136)	(0.00415)	(0.0174)
3.D3#CONCERNED	0.000485	0.00243	-0.000764	-0.00333	-0.00130	-0.00512
	(0.00381)	(0.0159)	(0.00328)	(0.0137)	(0.00404)	(0.0169)
1b.D4#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D4#CONCERNED	0.00515	0.0220	-0.00331	-0.0145	0.00995**	0.0418**
	(0.00374)	(0.0158)	(0.00328)	(0.0138)	(0.00403)	(0.0170)
3.D4#CONCERNED	0.00962***	0.0404***	-0.00158	-0.00673	0.00989***	0.0411**
	(0.00357)	(0.0149)	(0.00312)	(0.0130)	(0.00384)	(0.0160)
1b.D5#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D5#CONCERNED	-0.00515	-0.0222*	0.00637**	0.0273**	-0.00101	-0.00443
	(0.00315)	(0.0133)	(0.00284)	(0.0119)	(0.00355)	(0.0149)
1b.D6#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D6#CONCERNED	-0.0163***	-0.0687***	-0.00185	-0.00752	-0.00686	-0.0288
	(0.00415)	(0.0174)	(0.00371)	(0.0155)	(0.00445)	(0.0187)
3.D6#CONCERNED	-0.0129***	-0.0540***	0.00418	0.0175	-0.00561	-0.0234
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	0.0139**	0.0596**	0.00204	0.00856	0.00206	0.00862
	(0.00547)	(0.0233)	(0.00244)	(0.0102)	(0.00244)	(0.0102)
	(0.00418)	(0.0176)	(0.00367)	(0.0154)	(0.00448)	(0.0188)
Migration into your country - How worried?	-0.00838***	-0.0351***	-0.00276	-0.0129	-0.00837***	-0.0350***
	(0.00189)	(0.00792)	(0.00476)	(0.0202)	(0.00189)	(0.00791)
Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	-0.000302	-0.00124	-0.000369	-0.00147	0.00329	0.0144
	(0.00278)	(0.0117)	(0.00278)	(0.0117)	(0.00588)	(0.0250)
Low income = 1	0.0309**	0.129**	0.0308**	0.128**	0.0306**	0.128**
	(0.0122)	(0.0508)	(0.0122)	(0.0507)	(0.0122)	(0.0507)
Low education = 1	-0.0518***	-0.220***	-0.0515***	-0.218***	-0.0516***	-0.219***
	(0.0152)	(0.0652)	(0.0152)	(0.0652)	(0.0152)	(0.0651)
Female = 1	0.00275	0.0121	0.00268	0.0115	0.00278	0.0120
	(0.0115)	(0.0483)	(0.0115)	(0.0482)	(0.0115)	(0.0482)
Unemployed = 1	-0.0487	-0.207	-0.0493	-0.210	-0.0486	-0.207
	(0.0350)	(0.150)	(0.0351)	(0.151)	(0.0351)	(0.151)
Dependent on welfare = 1	-0.00938	-0.0389	-0.00978	-0.0406	-0.00969	-0.0403

How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 1, Very worried	(0.0175) -0.000802 (0.0329)	(0.0731) -0.00462 (0.140)	(0.0175) -0.000564 (0.0329)	(0.0730) -0.00393 (0.140)	(0.0175) -0.000342 (0.0329)	(0.0730) -0.00324 (0.140)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 2, Somewhat worried	0.0523*** (0.0189)	0.218*** (0.0784)	0.0524*** (0.0189)	0.218*** (0.0784)	0.0521*** (0.0189)	0.217*** (0.0784)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 4, I am already unemployed	0.0170 (0.0335)	0.0732 (0.143)	0.0182 (0.0336)	0.0784 (0.143)	0.0172 (0.0336)	0.0736 (0.143)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 5, I am not working and I am not looking for a job (e.g. student, retiree, housewif	0.0468** (0.0188)	0.196** (0.0789)	0.0474** (0.0188)	0.198** (0.0788)	0.0473** (0.0188)	0.198** (0.0788)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 6, I prefer not to answer	0.0401 (0.0776)	0.168 (0.319)	0.0398 (0.0776)	0.167 (0.319)	0.0394 (0.0776)	0.165 (0.319)
country_code = 5	0.0278** (0.0121)	0.117** (0.0507)	0.0280** (0.0121)	0.117** (0.0507)	0.0279** (0.0121)	0.117** (0.0507)
Constant	0.298*** (0.0307)	-0.852*** (0.131)	0.315*** (0.0355)	-0.761*** (0.150)	0.331*** (0.0346)	-0.709*** (0.147)
Observations	12,390	12,390	12,390	12,390	12,390	12,390
R-squared	0.028		0.027		0.027	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A5.3 Main models run only for Central-Western European countries, including interactions between the experimental policy dimensions and concerns for automation (models 1,2), migration (models 3,4), globalisation (models 5,6)

VARIABLES	(1) Central- Western – automation int- - OLS	(2) Central- Western – automation int- - Logit	(3) Central- Western – migration int- - OLS	(4) Central- Western – migration int- - Logit	(5) Central- Western – globalisation int- - OLS	(6) Central- Western – globalisation int- - Logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0878*** (0.0132)	0.373*** (0.0567)	0.109*** (0.0148)	0.456*** (0.0630)	0.0969*** (0.0157)	0.416*** (0.0677)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.102*** (0.0139)	0.430*** (0.0594)	0.152*** (0.0155)	0.631*** (0.0659)	0.114*** (0.0162)	0.486*** (0.0695)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0834*** (0.0106)	0.350*** (0.0447)	0.0833*** (0.0119)	0.346*** (0.0502)	0.0704*** (0.0125)	0.298*** (0.0533)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	0.0140 (0.0130)	0.0591 (0.0551)	0.0512*** (0.0145)	0.215*** (0.0610)	0.0202 (0.0154)	0.0852 (0.0650)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	-0.00232 (0.0127)	-0.0102 (0.0539)	0.0302** (0.0145)	0.128** (0.0613)	-0.0312** (0.0150)	-0.134** (0.0639)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0603***	-0.253***	-0.0249*	-0.102	-0.0561***	-0.238***

D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	(0.0131) -0.0543***	(0.0554) -0.228***	(0.0148) 0.00989	(0.0622) 0.0423	(0.0154) -0.0406**	(0.0655) -0.171**
D5 = 2, National governments administer	(0.0134) 0.0182*	(0.0562) 0.0760*	(0.0148) -0.00632	(0.0621) -0.0291	(0.0158) 0.00859	(0.0669) 0.0361
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	(0.0109) 0.120***	(0.0462) 0.508***	(0.0122) 0.0373**	(0.0512) 0.150**	(0.0128) 0.141***	(0.0546) 0.601***
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	(0.0139) 0.0911***	(0.0596) 0.387***	(0.0158) 0.0215	(0.0668) 0.0845	(0.0163) 0.125***	(0.0706) 0.535***
1b.D1#CONCERNED	(0.0144) 0	(0.0619) 0	(0.0163) 0	(0.0690) 0	(0.0172) 0	(0.0744) 0
2.D1#CONCERNED	(0) 0.00304	(0) 0.0139	(0) -0.000997	(0) -0.00231	(0) 0.00107	(0) 0.00456
3.D1#CONCERNED	(0.00234) 0.00751***	(0.0101) 0.0323***	(0.00208) -0.00210	(0.00897) -0.00646	(0.00256) 0.00448*	(0.0111) 0.0187
1b.D2#CONCERNED	(0.00244) 0	(0.0105) 0	(0.00219) 0	(0.00938) 0	(0.00268) 0	(0.0115) 0
2.D2#CONCERNED	(0) -0.00184	(0) -0.00732	(0) -0.00146	(0) -0.00506	(0) 0.000739	(0) 0.00306
1b.D3#CONCERNED	(0.00185) 0	(0.00787) 0	(0.00169) 0	(0.00714) 0	(0.00207) 0	(0.00880) 0
2.D3#CONCERNED	(0) -0.00260	(0) -0.0111	(0) -	(0) -	(0) -0.00345	(0) -0.0146
3.D3#CONCERNED	(0.00229) -0.00160	(0.00969) -0.00681	0.00795*** (0.00205)	0.0336*** (0.00867)	(0.00251) 0.00382	(0.0107) 0.0164
1b.D4#CONCERNED	(0.00224) 0	(0.00954) 0	0.00642*** (0.00205)	0.0274*** (0.00870)	(0.00248) 0	(0.0106) 0
2.D4#CONCERNED	(0) 0.000797	(0) 0.00292	(0) -0.00497**	(0) -0.0218**	(0) -3.01e-05	(0) -0.000124
3.D4#CONCERNED	(0.00230) 0.00611***	(0.00978) 0.0256***	(0.00208) -0.00539**	(0.00881) -	(0.00256) 0.00297	(0.0109) 0.0125
1b.D5#CONCERNED	(0.00232) 0	(0.00979) 0	(0.00210) 0	0.0229*** (0.00883)	(0.00259) 0	(0.0109) 0
2.D5#CONCERNED	(0) 0.00235	(0) 0.0101	(0) 0.00579***	(0) 0.0250***	(0) 0.00390*	(0) 0.0165*
1b.D6#CONCERNED	(0.00192) 0	(0.00816) 0	(0.00172) 0	(0.00729) 0	(0.00210) 0	(0.00894) 0
2.D6#CONCERNED	(0) -0.00417*	(0) -0.0170	(0) 0.00990***	(0) 0.0440***	(0) -0.00751***	(0) -0.0322***
3.D6#CONCERNED	(0.00246) -0.000820	(0.0106) -0.00314	(0.00224) 0.0104***	(0.00959) 0.0459***	(0.00269) -0.00689**	(0.0116) -0.0298**
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	(0.00251) -0.00243	(0.0108) -0.0115	(0.00229) 0.000578	(0.00981) 0.00239	(0.00280) 0.000579	(0.0121) 0.00240
Migration into your country - How worried?	(0.00323) -	(0.0142) -0.0111***	(0.00122) -0.00223	(0.00518) -0.0134	(0.00122) -0.00259***	(0.00518) -0.0111***
	0.00259*** (0.000994)					
		(0.00422)	(0.00290)	(0.0127)	(0.000995)	(0.00422)

Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	0.00238*	0.0102*	0.00237*	0.0102*	0.00191	0.00878
	(0.00137)	(0.00582)	(0.00137)	(0.00583)	(0.00360)	(0.0159)
Low income = 1	-0.00722	-0.0305	-0.00726	-0.0307	-0.00725	-0.0305
	(0.00619)	(0.0263)	(0.00619)	(0.0264)	(0.00619)	(0.0263)
Low education = 1	-0.00437	-0.0184	-0.00440	-0.0186	-0.00437	-0.0183
	(0.00776)	(0.0331)	(0.00776)	(0.0332)	(0.00776)	(0.0331)
Female = 1	-0.00817	-0.0345	-0.00811	-0.0343	-0.00821	-0.0347
	(0.00579)	(0.0246)	(0.00579)	(0.0246)	(0.00579)	(0.0246)
Unemployed = 1	0.0148	0.0642	0.0147	0.0638	0.0149	0.0644
	(0.0181)	(0.0774)	(0.0181)	(0.0775)	(0.0181)	(0.0773)
Dependent on welfare = 1	0.00190	0.00826	0.00197	0.00864	0.00188	0.00819
	(0.00849)	(0.0360)	(0.00849)	(0.0361)	(0.00849)	(0.0360)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 1, Very worried	-0.0289**	-0.124**	-0.0289**	-0.124**	-0.0289**	-0.124**
	(0.0134)	(0.0578)	(0.0134)	(0.0579)	(0.0134)	(0.0578)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 2, Somewhat worried	-0.00285	-0.0122	-0.00287	-0.0124	-0.00288	-0.0125
	(0.00819)	(0.0348)	(0.00820)	(0.0348)	(0.00819)	(0.0348)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 4, I am already unemployed	-0.0382**	-0.163**	-0.0381**	-0.163**	-0.0382**	-0.163**
	(0.0190)	(0.0814)	(0.0190)	(0.0815)	(0.0190)	(0.0813)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 5, I am not working and I am not looking for a job (e.g. student, retiree, housewif	0.0165*	0.0700*	0.0164*	0.0698*	0.0165*	0.0702*
	(0.00918)	(0.0388)	(0.00918)	(0.0389)	(0.00918)	(0.0389)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 6, I prefer not to answer	-0.0660*	-0.286*	-0.0667*	-0.289*	-0.0659*	-0.286*
	(0.0385)	(0.173)	(0.0386)	(0.173)	(0.0385)	(0.173)
country_code = 2	-0.0302***	-0.128***	-0.0301***	-0.128***	-0.0304***	-0.128***
	(0.00992)	(0.0418)	(0.00992)	(0.0419)	(0.00992)	(0.0418)
country_code = 6	-0.0752***	-0.321***	-0.0751***	-0.322***	-0.0752***	-0.321***
	(0.00959)	(0.0413)	(0.00959)	(0.0413)	(0.00959)	(0.0412)
country_code = 7	-0.0472***	-0.200***	-0.0471***	-0.200***	-0.0473***	-0.201***
	(0.00920)	(0.0390)	(0.00920)	(0.0391)	(0.00920)	(0.0390)
country_code = 10	0.0706***	0.293***	0.0708***	0.293***	0.0706***	0.293***
	(0.00995)	(0.0414)	(0.00995)	(0.0414)	(0.00995)	(0.0414)
country_code = 11	-0.0330***	-0.139***	-0.0329***	-0.138***	-0.0330***	-0.139***
	(0.00917)	(0.0386)	(0.00917)	(0.0387)	(0.00917)	(0.0386)
Constant	0.310***	-0.801***	0.292***	-0.858***	0.297***	-0.863***
	(0.0199)	(0.0866)	(0.0221)	(0.0956)	(0.0228)	(0.0999)
Observations	35,094	35,094	35,094	35,094	35,094	35,094
R-squared	0.041		0.042		0.041	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A5.4 Main models run only for Central-Eastern European countries, including interactions between the experimental policy dimensions and concerns for automation (models 1,2), migration (models 3,4), globalisation (models 5,6)

VARIABLES	(1) Central- Eastern – automation int- - OLS	(2) Central- Eastern – automation int- - Logit	(3) Central- Eastern – migration int- - OLS	(4) Central- Eastern – migration int- - Logit	(5) Central- Eastern – globalisation int- - OLS	(6) Central- Eastern – globalisation int- - Logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0861*** (0.0157)	0.353*** (0.0645)	0.0903*** (0.0173)	0.373*** (0.0715)	0.0972*** (0.0189)	0.401*** (0.0779)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.112*** (0.0162)	0.464*** (0.0672)	0.114*** (0.0172)	0.472*** (0.0718)	0.0916*** (0.0187)	0.378*** (0.0774)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0578*** (0.0130)	0.240*** (0.0539)	0.0939*** (0.0140)	0.389*** (0.0584)	0.0703*** (0.0155)	0.291*** (0.0641)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	0.0490*** (0.0158)	0.203*** (0.0651)	0.0372** (0.0170)	0.155** (0.0704)	0.0537*** (0.0184)	0.222*** (0.0761)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	0.0823*** (0.0156)	0.341*** (0.0646)	0.0650*** (0.0171)	0.270*** (0.0709)	0.0749*** (0.0185)	0.310*** (0.0768)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.0606*** (0.0156)	-0.251*** (0.0649)	- (0.0165)	- (0.0687)	-0.0779*** (0.0181)	-0.323*** (0.0752)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0152 (0.0159)	-0.0635 (0.0661)	-0.0426** (0.0165)	- (0.0689)	-0.0368** (0.0184)	-0.153** (0.0763)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	0.0183 (0.0137)	0.0765 (0.0567)	-0.0251* (0.0148)	-0.105* (0.0616)	0.0185 (0.0167)	0.0767 (0.0694)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.0669*** (0.0161)	0.277*** (0.0665)	0.0647*** (0.0176)	0.268*** (0.0727)	0.0815*** (0.0195)	0.336*** (0.0805)
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	0.0766*** (0.0168)	0.317*** (0.0697)	0.104*** (0.0179)	0.432*** (0.0746)	0.0949*** (0.0202)	0.392*** (0.0835)
1b.D1#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
2.D1#CONCERNED	-0.00135 (0.00298)	-0.00555 (0.0122)	-0.00183 (0.00265)	-0.00790 (0.0109)	-0.00335 (0.00322)	-0.0141 (0.0132)
3.D1#CONCERNED	-0.00105 (0.00308)	-0.00461 (0.0127)	-0.00100 (0.00267)	-0.00458 (0.0111)	0.00308 (0.00328)	0.0125 (0.0136)
1b.D2#CONCERNED	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)

2.D2#CONCERNED	0.00170	0.00666	-	-	-0.000888	-0.00383
	(0.00243)	(0.0101)	0.00517**	0.0215**	(0.00265)	(0.0110)
1b.D3#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D3#CONCERNED	-0.000432	-0.00188	0.00181	0.00728	-0.00132	-0.00557
	(0.00298)	(0.0123)	(0.00268)	(0.0111)	(0.00320)	(0.0132)
3.D3#CONCERNED	-0.00490*	-0.0205*	-0.000883	-0.00394	-0.00279	-0.0117
	(0.00293)	(0.0121)	(0.00265)	(0.0110)	(0.00323)	(0.0134)
1b.D4#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D4#CONCERNED	0.00303	0.0127	0.00261	0.0111	0.00598*	0.0248*
	(0.00292)	(0.0121)	(0.00261)	(0.0108)	(0.00311)	(0.0129)
3.D4#CONCERNED	-0.00277	-0.0113	0.00277	0.0118	0.00180	0.00753
	(0.00293)	(0.0121)	(0.00260)	(0.0108)	(0.00318)	(0.0132)
1b.D5#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D5#CONCERNED	-0.00194	-0.00813	0.00638**	0.0265**	-0.00165	-0.00684
	(0.00253)	(0.0104)	* (0.00231)	* (0.00958)	(0.00288)	(0.0119)
1b.D6#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D6#CONCERNED	0.000430	0.00157	0.000796	0.00309	-0.00243	-0.0102
	(0.00311)	(0.0128)	(0.00275)	(0.0114)	(0.00336)	(0.0139)
3.D6#CONCERNED	-0.000507	-0.00237	-0.00545*	-	-0.00400	-0.0167
				0.0229**		
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	0.000617	0.00301	-0.00209	-0.00870	-0.00202	-0.00836
	(0.00419)	(0.0174)	(0.00184)	(0.00761)	(0.00184)	(0.00760)
	(0.00321)	(0.0132)	(0.00282)	(0.0117)	(0.00350)	(0.0145)
Migration into your country - How worried?	-0.000780	-0.00318	-0.000973	-0.00369	-0.000788	-0.00322
	(0.00148)	(0.00614)	(0.00370)	(0.0154)	(0.00148)	(0.00614)
Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	0.00335*	0.0139*	0.00338*	0.0140*	0.00564	0.0237
	(0.00202)	(0.00835)	(0.00202)	(0.00836)	(0.00455)	(0.0189)
Low income = 1	-0.00710	-0.0294	-0.00704	-0.0293	-0.00708	-0.0294
	(0.0101)	(0.0418)	(0.0101)	(0.0418)	(0.0101)	(0.0418)
Low education = 1	0.00720	0.0298	0.00727	0.0300	0.00714	0.0296
	(0.0186)	(0.0771)	(0.0186)	(0.0770)	(0.0186)	(0.0771)
Female = 1	0.0109	0.0450	0.0108	0.0448	0.0109	0.0450
	(0.00936)	(0.0387)	(0.00937)	(0.0388)	(0.00936)	(0.0388)
Unemployed = 1	-0.0119	-0.0500	-0.0121	-0.0509	-0.0116	-0.0488

	(0.0322)	(0.134)	(0.0323)	(0.134)	(0.0323)	(0.134)
Dependent on welfare = 1	0.0135	0.0560	0.0133	0.0555	0.0135	0.0562
	(0.0132)	(0.0548)	(0.0132)	(0.0548)	(0.0132)	(0.0548)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 1, Very worried	0.00639	0.0266	0.00644	0.0265	0.00649	0.0267
	(0.0178)	(0.0734)	(0.0178)	(0.0735)	(0.0178)	(0.0734)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 2, Somewhat worried	0.0188	0.0775	0.0189	0.0779	0.0187	0.0774
	(0.0120)	(0.0496)	(0.0120)	(0.0496)	(0.0120)	(0.0496)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 4, I am already unemployed	0.0411	0.171	0.0412	0.172	0.0410	0.171
	(0.0337)	(0.140)	(0.0337)	(0.141)	(0.0337)	(0.140)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 5, I am not working and I am not looking for a job (e.g. student, retiree, housewif	-0.00782	-0.0324	-0.00762	-0.0316	-0.00777	-0.0323
	(0.0146)	(0.0602)	(0.0146)	(0.0603)	(0.0146)	(0.0602)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 6, I prefer not to answer	-0.163**	-0.682**	-0.162**	-0.680**	-0.163**	-0.682**
	(0.0661)	(0.290)	(0.0662)	(0.290)	(0.0662)	(0.290)
country_code = 8	-0.0258**	-0.107**	-0.0258**	-0.107**	-0.0258**	-0.107**
	(0.0116)	(0.0483)	(0.0116)	(0.0483)	(0.0116)	(0.0483)
country_code = 12	-0.0936***	-0.386***	-	-	-0.0937***	-0.386***
			0.0936***	0.386***		
	(0.0121)	(0.0500)	(0.0121)	(0.0501)	(0.0121)	(0.0501)
Constant	0.384***	-0.479***	0.397***	-	0.384***	-0.479***
				0.428***		
	(0.0253)	(0.105)	(0.0262)	(0.109)	(0.0280)	(0.116)
Observations	17,568	17,568	17,568	17,568	17,568	17,568
R-squared	0.030		0.031		0.031	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A5.5 Main models run only for Mediterranean countries, including interactions between the experimental policy dimensions and concerns for automation (models 1,2), migration (models 3,4), globalisation (models 5,6)

VARIABLES	(1) Mediterranean – automation int- - OLS	(2) Mediterranean – automation int- - Logit	(3) Mediterranean – migration int- - OLS	(4) Mediterranean – migration int- - Logit	(5) Mediterranean – globalisation int- - OLS	(6) Mediterranean – globalisation int- - Logit
D1 = 2, 60% last wage	0.0866*** (0.0205)	0.359*** (0.0848)	0.116*** (0.0258)	0.477*** (0.107)	0.0739*** (0.0256)	0.305*** (0.106)
D1 = 3, 70% last wage	0.129*** (0.0225)	0.533*** (0.0937)	0.168*** (0.0273)	0.695*** (0.114)	0.118*** (0.0280)	0.486*** (0.116)
D2 = 2, Country must offer educ/training to all unemployed	0.0612***	0.253***	0.0788***	0.327***	0.0588***	0.242***

	(0.0169)	(0.0698)	(0.0216)	(0.0895)	(0.0220)	(0.0910)
D3 = 2, Countries can receive more than they receive	0.0187	0.0776	0.0333	0.138	-0.000676	-0.00331
	(0.0208)	(0.0860)	(0.0261)	(0.108)	(0.0265)	(0.109)
D3 = 3, Poor countries receive more, rich countries less, than they pay in	0.0142	0.0589	0.0398	0.165	0.0224	0.0923
	(0.0204)	(0.0845)	(0.0261)	(0.108)	(0.0263)	(0.109)
D4 = 2, Taxes will increase by 0.5% for everyone	-0.112***	-0.461***	-0.0860***	-0.357***	-0.0992***	-0.408***
	(0.0203)	(0.0840)	(0.0255)	(0.106)	(0.0260)	(0.107)
D4 = 3, Taxes will increase by 1% for rich in your country	-0.0620***	-0.255***	-0.0316	-0.131	-0.0801***	-0.330***
	(0.0205)	(0.0846)	(0.0263)	(0.109)	(0.0262)	(0.108)
D5 = 2, National governments administer	-0.0120	-0.0496	-0.0583***	-0.242***	-0.0279	-0.115
	(0.0174)	(0.0721)	(0.0213)	(0.0885)	(0.0219)	(0.0905)
D6 = 2, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer	0.111***	0.461***	0.0619**	0.257**	0.111***	0.455***
	(0.0221)	(0.0917)	(0.0266)	(0.111)	(0.0277)	(0.115)
D6 = 3, Unemployed must accept suitable job offer AND apply weekly	0.114***	0.472***	0.0778***	0.323***	0.0964***	0.397***
	(0.0215)	(0.0893)	(0.0268)	(0.111)	(0.0276)	(0.114)
1b.D1#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D1#CONCERNED	-0.00240	-0.0104	-0.00614*	-0.0254*	0.000176	0.000429
	(0.00360)	(0.0148)	(0.00350)	(0.0145)	(0.00389)	(0.0160)
3.D1#CONCERNED	-0.00241	-0.0105	-0.00769**	-0.0320**	-0.000143	-0.000844
	(0.00399)	(0.0166)	(0.00374)	(0.0156)	(0.00427)	(0.0177)
1b.D2#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D2#CONCERNED	0.00270	0.0107	-0.000712	-0.00337	0.00261	0.0106
	(0.00306)	(0.0126)	(0.00290)	(0.0120)	(0.00339)	(0.0140)
1b.D3#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D3#CONCERNED	-0.000270	-0.00125	-0.00243	-0.0101	0.00294	0.0121
	(0.00364)	(0.0150)	(0.00354)	(0.0147)	(0.00403)	(0.0166)
3.D3#CONCERNED	0.00373	0.0152	-0.00111	-0.00478	0.00159	0.00654
	(0.00357)	(0.0148)	(0.00351)	(0.0145)	(0.00395)	(0.0163)
1b.D4#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D4#CONCERNED	0.00694*	0.0289*	0.00120	0.00538	0.00357	0.0147
	(0.00364)	(0.0150)	(0.00349)	(0.0145)	(0.00398)	(0.0164)
3.D4#CONCERNED	0.00365	0.0151	-0.00194	-0.00778	0.00591	0.0244
	(0.00369)	(0.0152)	(0.00358)	(0.0148)	(0.00400)	(0.0165)
1b.D5#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D5#CONCERNED	-0.00204	-0.00837	0.00545*	0.0227*	0.000976	0.00408
	(0.00310)	(0.0128)	(0.00296)	(0.0123)	(0.00334)	(0.0138)
1b.D6#CONCERNED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
2.D6#CONCERNED	-0.00312	-0.0133	0.00520	0.0209	-0.00232	-0.00966
	(0.00388)	(0.0160)	(0.00365)	(0.0151)	(0.00423)	(0.0175)
3.D6#CONCERNED	-0.00577	-0.0242	0.00126	0.00469	-0.00162	-0.00687
	(0.00382)	(0.0158)	(0.00364)	(0.0151)	(0.00421)	(0.0174)
Technological change (e.g. robotics) - How worried?	0.00409	0.0178	0.00459**	0.0189**	0.00458**	0.0189**
	(0.00529)	(0.0220)	(0.00225)	(0.00928)	(0.00225)	(0.00927)

Migration into your country - How worried?	-0.00189 (0.00205)	-0.00784 (0.00845)	-0.000373 (0.00493)	-0.00108 (0.0206)	-0.00190 (0.00205)	-0.00785 (0.00844)
Economic globalisation (e.g. trade) - How worried?	0.00115 (0.00258)	0.00474 (0.0107)	0.00110 (0.00258)	0.00456 (0.0107)	-0.00404 (0.00588)	-0.0164 (0.0245)
Low income = 1	-0.0146 (0.0126)	-0.0602 (0.0519)	-0.0146 (0.0126)	-0.0602 (0.0519)	-0.0145 (0.0126)	-0.0600 (0.0519)
Low education = 1	-0.0128 (0.0120)	-0.0528 (0.0496)	-0.0129 (0.0120)	-0.0530 (0.0496)	-0.0129 (0.0120)	-0.0533 (0.0496)
Female = 1	-0.0112 (0.0113)	-0.0460 (0.0467)	-0.0111 (0.0113)	-0.0457 (0.0467)	-0.0111 (0.0113)	-0.0460 (0.0467)
Unemployed = 1	-0.000444 (0.0237)	-0.00181 (0.0973)	2.90e-05 (0.0237)	0.000236 (0.0973)	-0.000347 (0.0237)	-0.00139 (0.0973)
Dependent on welfare = 1	0.00816 (0.0148)	0.0334 (0.0609)	0.00790 (0.0148)	0.0324 (0.0609)	0.00805 (0.0148)	0.0328 (0.0608)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 1, Very worried	0.0296 (0.0207)	0.123 (0.0851)	0.0292 (0.0207)	0.121 (0.0851)	0.0294 (0.0206)	0.122 (0.0851)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 2, Somewhat worried	0.0193 (0.0156)	0.0797 (0.0645)	0.0193 (0.0156)	0.0798 (0.0645)	0.0193 (0.0156)	0.0798 (0.0644)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 4, I am already unemployed	0.0335 (0.0301)	0.139 (0.124)	0.0331 (0.0301)	0.137 (0.124)	0.0335 (0.0301)	0.138 (0.124)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 5, I am not working and I am not looking for a job (e.g. student, retiree, housewife)	0.00104 (0.0182)	0.00475 (0.0752)	0.00120 (0.0183)	0.00540 (0.0752)	0.00113 (0.0182)	0.00521 (0.0751)
How worried are you about losing your job in the near future? = 6, I prefer not to answer	-0.0854 (0.115)	-0.357 (0.494)	-0.0857 (0.115)	-0.358 (0.493)	-0.0858 (0.115)	-0.358 (0.493)
country_code = 13	0.0176 (0.0113)	0.0725 (0.0466)	0.0176 (0.0113)	0.0727 (0.0466)	0.0175 (0.0113)	0.0722 (0.0466)
Constant	0.355*** (0.0339)	-0.602*** (0.141)	0.343*** (0.0387)	-0.649*** (0.162)	0.384*** (0.0400)	-0.479*** (0.166)
Observations	12,618	12,618	12,618	12,618	12,618	12,618
R-squared	0.030		0.031		0.030	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



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