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Micro-Architectural features as soft-error markers in embedded safety-critical systems: preliminary study

Deniz Kasap⁺, Alessio Carpegna^{*}, Alessandro Savino^{*}, Stefano Di Carlo^{*}

^{*}Politecnico di Torino, Control and Computer Engineering Department, Torino, Italy

⁺Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

Corresponding email: stefano.dicarlo@polito.it

Abstract—Radiation-induced soft errors are one of the most challenging issues in Safety Critical Real-Time Embedded System (SACRES) reliability, usually handled using different flavors of Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) techniques. This solution is becoming unaffordable due to the complexity of modern microprocessors in all domains. This paper addresses the promising field of using Artificial Intelligence (AI) based hardware detectors for soft errors. To create such cores and make them general enough to work with different software applications, microarchitectural attributes are a fascinating option as candidate fault detection features. Several processors already track these features through dedicated Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU). However, there is an open question to understand to what extent they are enough to detect faulty executions. Exploiting the capability of *gem5* to simulate real computing systems, perform fault injection experiments, and profile microarchitectural attributes (i.e., *gem5* Stats), this paper presents the results of a comprehensive analysis regarding the potential attributes to detect soft errors and the associated models that can be trained with these features.

Index Terms—reliability, soft errors, machine learning, artificial neural networks, soft error analysis

I. INTRODUCTION

Radiation-induced soft errors, which started as a rather exotic failure mechanism causing satellite anomalies, have become one of the most challenging issues in all electronic systems, particularly Safety Critical Real-Time Embedded System (SACRES) [1]. Many efforts have been spent in the last decades to measure [2], model [3], and mitigate [4] radiation effects, implementing cross-layer reliability countermeasures [5]. Predictability is a crucial SACRES requirement as it helps ensure the system’s safety and reliability and makes it easier to test and maintain. Predictability is implemented by static partitioning and hardware isolation of available computing resources (e.g., memory, CPU cores, etc.) among a set of predefined tasks, making monitoring each task’s behavior in isolation easier. Resilience to soft errors is then supported through redundancy at different levels [6]. In particular, Double Modular Redundancy (DMR) implementing lock-step execution is a popular schema to achieve fault detection, and check-pointing is the solution to enable recovery from faults [7]. However, with the increasing complexity of microprocessor cores, DMR is becoming unaffordable, and designers are increasingly looking into smaller hardware/software error detectors [8]–[11]. AI is a fascinating instrument in this domain, bringing to the new

concept of artificial resilience, i.e., systems that can be trained to detect and possibly recover from faults [12].

AI has been employed for constructing hardware or software soft error detectors trained on software-specific input/output features [13]–[16]. Overall, in these approaches, the data used to determine whether the output of a task is correct or incorrect (i.e., the feature vector) includes the task input and output. While effective, having an application-dependent feature vector makes it challenging to create generic detectors, especially when looking at hardware implementations that require standard methods to collect and deliver features to the detector. Microarchitectural features (i.e., executed instructions, cache misses, or incorrectly anticipated branching for the active program) are easier to collect thanks to the availability of increasingly complex Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) tracking and measuring numerous performance-related events accessible through dedicated Hardware Performance Counter (HPC). Therefore an important question to investigate is: “are microarchitectural features able to explain faulty executions in the presence of soft errors?”. Dutto et al. showed that the answer to this question is ‘yes’ in the case of permanent faults [17]. However, permanent faults accumulate during software execution, amplifying anomalies and making detection easier. Da Rosa et al. [18] confirm a positive answer to this question, even if a deep analysis of several features is not reported. Recently Nosrati et al. proposed an AI detector for soft errors in embedded processors [19]. While results are promising in terms of fault detection accuracy, the approach relies on monitoring internal signals of the microprocessor that would require an invasive hardware redesign.

This paper proposes a preliminary study to understand to what extent microarchitectural features traced through a PMU can be exploited to build an AI-powered hardware soft error detector. For this purpose, a set of fault injection experiments performed using *FIMSIM* [20], a fault injector framework based on *gem5* [21] was used to create a dataset of features over several faulty and correct executions. This dataset was analyzed to give designers insights into the best options to build their soft error detection systems. Particular emphasis was devoted to understanding whether event timing could bring additional information to the model. This information is crucial to identify the best AI models to employ in this challenging task. The

paper focuses on assessing the idea’s feasibility. Therefore, the hardware implementation cost and related inference time are out of the scope of this study.

II. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP

Injecting faults directly into real hardware is complex [11], [22]; virtual simulators simplify the development of fault injection modules and the subsequent data collection task [23]–[25]. For this reason, simulation-based fault injection was used to collect data. Figure 1 summarizes the basic building blocks of the implemented experimental design.




Fig. 1: Experimental setup based *gem5* and *FIMSIM*.

The *gem5* simulator was used to emulate the hardware substrate [21]. Experiments were performed by simulating the full-system stack, modeling the hardware through the *AtomicSimpleCPU* model available in *gem5* configured to emulate the x86 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). The software stack included a Linux kernel and a set of target tasks of different complexity. Six MiBench [26] applications were considered: *qsort*, *dijkstra*, *susan*, *sha*, *bitcount* and *basicmath*. The fault injection task was accomplished using *FIMSIM* [20]. This preliminary study focused on Single-Bit Upsets (SBU) in the Integer Register File (intRF). After the fast-forward cycle required to boot the operating system, faults were injected at random locations and time intervals during the execution of the application. *gem5* enables monitoring of the internal microprocessor state using *checkpoints* (i.e., snapshots of the hardware architecture containing all the inner values at a particular clock tick) and *stats* (i.e., performance counters that profile the number of internal events, such as cache misses, jumps, accesses to memory, and so on). To speed up the experiments, every fault injection run started from a checkpoint collected at the end of the fast-forward cycle corresponding to the end of the Linux boot process (CPs). After the boot, faults were injected at random locations and time intervals during the execution of the application. Several *stats* (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n) were collected during the simulation to consider the time dimension when building the final dataset.

The fault effect was classified by comparing the last checkpoint of the fault injection run (CPn) with the golden execution (CPE). Possible outcomes following a fault injection can be explained in five categories: (i) *Crash*: the program completely stops working and exits; (ii) *Silent Data Corruption (SDC)*: the program reaches the end of the computation, but its outcome is wrong; (iii) *Benign*: even if there was a fault, the program’s outcome is correct (iv) *Hangs*: the program is stuck within a

loop; (v) *Reboots*: the operating system reboots. Crashes and hangs are straightforward to detect by inspecting the program counter [27], so they are not considered in this study. Reboots cannot instead be traced with the available simulation setup. Hence, this study focuses on detectors able to discriminate SDC and Benign executions.

The HPC in the *gem5 stats* collected during fault injection experiments were used to create the dataset analyzed in the next section. A total amount of about 600 features were monitored. Data were preprocessed and normalized before carrying out the analysis. Features with more than 5% non-numerical (NaN) values and attributes with zero variance across experiments were removed. Then, simulations containing a single NaN value were removed. Finally, missing values were set to zero, and the dataset was normalized. SDC and Benign classes are not balanced in a fault injection experiment. The dataset was balanced using downsampling on the Benign (major) class to enable a fair analysis. Table I summarizes the characteristics of the final dataset after preprocessing.

TABLE I: Summary of the dataset structure.

Benchmark	#Sim	#Feat	#Ticks ($\cdot 10^9$)	% Benign	% SDC	% crash/ hang
qsort	25,000	366	86.5	72 .1	25.6	2.3
dijkstra	29,180	378	64.2	79 .2	20.2	0.6
susan	21,440	363	35.1	67.9	26.5	5.6
sha	13,809	359	18.5	72.6	27.2	0.2
bitcount	25,000	360	9.8	81 .2	15.6	3.2
basicmath	25,000	358	6.5	92.7	6.4	0.9

Time series of 10 *gem5 stats* were collected for each benchmark at equidistant time instants depending on the total execution ticks of the benchmark given in Table I.

III. RESULTS

This section reports a comprehensive analysis of the collected dataset to try to answer the question proposed at the beginning of this paper, i.e., if microarchitectural features are sufficient to build machine learning models able to detect soft errors in microprocessor-based systems.

A. Data analysis

Figure 2 provides a visual representation using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the datasets for the six benchmarks plotting the first two principal components.

When analyzing the complete datasets (Figures 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(g), 2(h), and 2(i)), benign executions (blue dots) cluster in a small portion of the plot, while faulty executions (red dots) instead scatter over it. This suggests that the corruption of a single bit generates a significant deviation in the microarchitecture’s internal features, resulting in cases that can be detectable from a reliability standpoint. However, Figures 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 2(j), 2(k), and 2(l) highlight the presence in all datasets of a Hard-To-Detect Region (HTDR) of overlapping samples of the two classes. Since AI models are known to struggle with such data distributions, these regions must be carefully considered to avoid a significant loss in accuracy.

Up to now, the analysis considered all the features in the dataset, which are a considerable number, even after the data




Fig. 2: Visual representation of the dataset for the six benchmarks using PCA. It shows faulty runs (red) and benign runs (blue). Subfigures (a-f) show the full dataset, while (g-l) show the Hard-To-Detect Region (HTDR)

cleaning. Therefore, analyzing the correlation of each attribute with the final fault classification can guide through a feature selection phase. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to perform this analysis due to its minor sensitivity to false positives. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the correlation values for the six benchmarks.




Fig. 3: Statistical distribution of the correlation values between features and fault classification for all six benchmarks

The analysis highlights different results depending on the benchmark. In the case of *qsort*, *dijkstra*, *susan*, and *sha*, most features correlate more than 0.5 with faulty executions. This means that many microarchitectural features can be used to detect a faulty run. Results for *basicmath* are

weaker but still acceptable, while *bitcount* reports a low correlation. This aspect will be better investigated in the next section. Moving to the microarchitectural level, following the *gem5* hierarchical organization of features into six main sub-classes, Figure 4 shows the correlation of each group with faulty executions.




Fig. 4: Statistical distribution of the correlation values over the different *gem5* classes for the six benchmarks. All features.

Each of the six main sub-classes of attributes shows differences depending on the benchmarks. However, when the correlation is significant, few features emerge as indicators of faulty execution, such as the ones related to memory accesses (*mem_ctrls* and *membus*) to the input/output bus and the CPU.

By using correlations (Figure 3), a subset of 19 features (Figure 5) consistently highly correlated in most benchmarks was identified (the reader may refer to the *gem5* documentation for a detailed description of each feature).

It can be seen that all the features are related to memory transactions. In particular, the three dominant sub-classes, between the six reported in Figure 4 are *iobus*, *membus*, and *cpu*. For this last, accesses to instruction and data caches are the most affected features. This means that a single bit-flip can change instruction fetch order and data access consistently.

To summarize, this preliminary analysis allowed us to draw some initial insights. A reasonably simple model is expected to provide good fault detection capabilities for the data that can be separated. At the same time, pure microarchitectural attributes might prove insufficient due to the presence of the HTDR region.

B. Machine learning models

Starting from the preliminary analysis proposed in subsection III-B, this section studies how different machine learning models can detect soft errors based on the considered attributes, highlighting strengths and weaknesses. For this analysis, the datasets were split with 60% for the training set, 15% for the validation set, and 25% for the test set.

Features in Figure 5 were used to demonstrate that a sub-set of features can work with several benchmarks. All experiments used a 19-32-2 network architecture composed of three layers, including 19, 32, and 2 neurons. These numbers were tuned using trial and error. The first model considered is the Fully Connected Feed Forward Neural Network (FC-FFNN), trained using the cumulative dataset obtained by summing event counts over the different checkpoints.




Fig. 5: Top 19 features.

Table II reports high accuracy, confirming the hypothesis of soft error detection based on the collected features. Nevertheless, the accuracy alone may be misleading. The F1 score is lower than the accuracy. This is mainly due to the recall, which drops due to the HTDR. To confirm the quality of the model, Figure 6 investigates the performance of different models trained using an increasing number of features starting from the top correlated ones.

Regarding accuracy, using just a small subset of features already enables the detection of 80% of the faults, and adding more features does not lead to significant improvements. However, F1 scores remain controversial. By performing a more detailed analysis, we could directly relate this with the complexity of the benchmark and, in particular, its control flow and how the HTDR populate the data. As a further confirmation, an attempt to train a model on a reduced dataset focused on the HTDR reported deficient performance. This analysis suggests that microarchitecture-level features can only partially detect soft errors, contradicting previous works such as da Rosa et al. [18]. This problem seems less severe in control-flow intensive benchmarks such as *qsort*, *dijkstra*, *susan* and *sha* while exploding in simple linear algorithms like *basicmath* and *bitcount*. This suggests that data-related features are probably required in addition to the microarchitecture attribute to cover the gap.

After analyzing the cumulative dataset, the analysis moves to new models considering the time dimension using data




Fig. 6: Performance of several models trained on the full dataset with an increased number of features ordered by decreasing correlation

collected at different checkpoints.

The first one accounts for a flat dataset composed of $N_{\text{features}} \times N_{\text{checkpoints}}$ features and trains the same FC-FFNN model used before. Table II reports no significant gain in performance metrics, thus confirming what was observed in subsection III-A, i.e., the temporal dimension is not improving the results but allows for earlier detection.

TABLE II: FC-FFNN performance metrics, 10 checkpoints

Benchmark	FF-FC				LSTM	
	cumulative dataset		flat dataset 10 checkpoints		10 checkpoints	
	Acc	F1	Acc	F1	Acc	F1
qsort	91.10	79.91	92.60	83.07	91.62	81.09
dijkstra	92.19	75.67	91.67	59.00	90.25	68.98
susan	88.79	71.92	87.95	69.67	87.83	82.50
sha	87.03	68.45	87.14	68.24	86.85	69.08
bitcount	90.75	56.81	90.19	58.42	90.08	54.74
basicmath	96.22	59.66	96.38	62.29	95.61	53.64

A second temporal model, based on Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM), was trained on the time-expanded dataset. Table II reports the performance of the LSTM model, confirming no gain on the different metrics.

TABLE III: FC-FFNN, model evaluation at each checkpoint

Time step	qsort		djksra		susan		sha		basicmath		bitcount	
	Acc.	F1 score	Acc.	F1 score	Acc.	F1 score	Acc.	F1 score	Acc.	F1 score	Acc.	F1 score
1	80.09	39.26	81.07	13.72	72.62	9.13	73.48	-	83.99	-	92.86	-
2	87.78	69.99	85.96	44.79	75.06	13.36	74.72	9.55	83.68	-	93.67	-
3	87.38	67.13	90.40	67.84	80.56	40.83	74.61	8.61	84.70	10.42	93.36	-
4	90.53	78.02	90.12	60.36	87.08	68.12	75.86	17.38	85.54	21.63	94.31	24.46
5	91.44	80.15	90.70	64.65	87.86	68.93	80.79	34.31	86.93	30.38	94.78	36.54
6	91.08	80.00	91.38	72.14	87.52	67.57	83.27	42.56	88.18	40.20	95.78	51.40
7	91.23	80.13	90.82	70.14	87.08	66.86	87.25	65.92	88.90	45.24	95.93	58.28
8	91.72	81.56	90.44	69.99	87.84	69.86	86.77	62.85	89.73	49.47	96.33	63.91
9	91.80	80.86	90.55	69.46	88.24	69.65	86.94	68.62	91.26	42.27	96.35	60.21
10	91.95	81.39	91.24	73.06	88.07	69.69	86.83	67.66	89.99	57.10	96.36	61.93

Since fault detection latency can be crucial in safety-critical applications, an FC-FFNN model was then trained on the cumulative dataset and tested on cumulative data available at different checkpoints to understand the early detection of faults. Table III shows the results obtained with ten checkpoints. The F1 score with no values (-) is due to insufficient data to evaluate precision and recall. Considering that the fault injection is uniformly distributed in time, results confirm that error detection could be achieved without waiting for the end of the program execution. This is important to minimize the error detection latency. As expected, the model's performance drops during the early checkpoints and rises while data are collected.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This paper performed a data-driven investigation to answer the fundamental question of using AI-powered hardware soft error detectors: are micro-architectural features able to explain faulty executions? The results of the analysis were controversial. While in terms of accuracy, results suggest a positive answer, the presence of HTDRs suggests that pure microarchitectural attributes are insufficient, especially for simple tasks. Additional features are probably required if the corruption is limited to the data domain. In conclusion, the results in this paper are preliminary. It is clear that further investigation is needed, both considering additional benchmarks and investigating a new set of features.

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