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# A hybrid threat model for smart systems

Fulvio Valenza\*, Erisa Karafili\*†, Rodrigo Vieira Steiner, Emil C. Lupu

**Abstract**—Cyber-physical systems and their smart components have a pervasive presence in all our daily activities. Unfortunately, identifying the potential threats and issues in these systems and selecting enough protection is challenging given that such environments combine human, physical and cyber aspects to the system design and implementation. Current threat models and analysis do not take into consideration all three aspects of the analyzed system, how they can introduce new vulnerabilities or protection measures to each other. In this work, we introduce a novel threat model for cyber-physical systems that combines the cyber, physical, and human aspects. Our model represents the system's components relations and security properties by taking into consideration these three aspects. Together with the threat model we also propose a threat analysis method that allows understanding the security state of the system's components. The threat model and the threat analysis have been implemented into an automatic tool, called TAMELESS, that automatically analyzes threats to the system, verifies its security properties, and generates a graphical representation, useful for security architects to identify the proper prevention/mitigation solutions. We show and prove the use of our threat model and analysis with three cases studies from different sectors.

**Index Terms**—Threat Analysis, Cybersecurity modelling, Threat model, Cyber-Physical systems

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, novel paradigms and technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing pervade all aspects of the physical world [1]. Cyber-physical systems are ubiquitously present in our everyday life, their devices and environments are “intelligent”, interconnected, dynamic, and flexible. By “intelligent” we mean that such systems are capable of sensing and actuation on the physical environment and comprise digital elements capable of making actuation decisions in response to the sensed information alone or by communicating with others. Such systems are commonly referred to as “smart” as in “smart-toys”, “smart-cars”, or “smart-buildings”.

The opportunities offered by such smart systems come with their own security challenges. Determining the potential threats in these smart systems and providing an adequate amount of protection is more challenging than in traditional computer systems for a variety of reasons that include low computational power, inadequate software quality but also more importantly the fact that such environments combine human, physical and digital (cyber) aspects to the system design and implementation. In these scenarios, the attack surface is broader and extends beyond the realm of the “cyber” domain to the physical and human aspects of the system.

As shown in [2], cyber and physical attacks evolve as fast as the deployment of smart systems and are outpacing efforts to stop them. Such systems are deployed in a physical environment, and in addition to being reachable through their interconnections, they are also physically available to an attacker that can, for example, connect to the hardware interfaces of the device. Finally, these devices interact in several ways with human users. Thus, systems comprising of IoT devices are vulnerable to attacks that exploit their physical, human, and cyber vulnerabilities, as well as to attacks that combine exploits of these vulnerabilities in any order. For instance, unauthorised physical access to a wind turbine allows an attacker to generate a cyber-attack on the wind farm control network [3]. Whilst a number of methodologies perform threat modelling for cyber-attacks [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], they usually do not take into account attacks on the physical or human aspects of the system and cannot represent the propagation of attacks across the cyber-physical, human-physical, or human-cyber interfaces.

Current threat models and analysis mainly consider only one component amongst the human, cyber or physical aspects of the analysed system (e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7]), or, occasionally, two of them e.g., the human and cyber aspects in [8], [9]. There is a lack of analyses that consider all three components and how they can introduce new vulnerabilities or protection measures to each other, as well as their interactions. Furthermore, there is a need to develop efficient preventive and mitigating actions that use holistic analysis of the threats and for the construction of threat models for systems that include all three aspects.

This work aims to take the first steps towards a methodology for performing an exhaustive threat analysis, taking into consideration cyber, physical, and human aspects, as well as the relations between them. Specifically, we will use the term “*hybrid systems*” to emphasise that we refer to systems in which we take into account their human, physical and cyber perspectives and “*hybrid attacks*” to refer to

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multi-step attacks that can combine attack steps exploiting human, physical, or cyber vulnerabilities in combination. The security analysis of such systems cannot be done from one perspective alone but must consider the physical context of the system, its cyber resources and connections, and the humans that use or operate it [10]. Threat models for hybrid systems must be able to represent attack scenarios that exploit the interplay between the human, physical, and cyber aspects of the system. For example, attacks such as those conducted on ATM machines, e.g., jackpot, skimmer, shimmer, cash-out attacks [11], [12], [13], [14]. The “jackpot” attack, for example, exploits the vulnerability of the physical components and by cutting a small hole next to the PIN pad an attacker can insert a cable connected to a laptop and command the ATM to dispense all the money. Other attacks exploit human vulnerabilities, e.g., by bribing employees to sell customer data or provide sufficient information to conduct successful phishing attacks on the clients.

Hybrid attacks are not specific to the financial sector but also affect other sectors. For example, in the energy sector, researchers have shown that with little effort an attacker can compromise a whole windmill farm network starting by simply breaking a physical lock [3], [15]. Further steps of this attack exploit cyber vulnerabilities such as easy access, lack of encryption in communications, poor default passwords, and insecure remote management interfaces.

The physical security of a system, its cybersecurity, and human security are traditionally considered separately and by different teams inside an organization. In hybrid systems the cyber, physical, and human aspects can be leveraged in combination as part of the same attack. They also typically help protect each other and must be leveraged together to mitigate and respond to threats. For example, human or digital surveillance can be used to monitor a physical space.

Yet at the moment, there is no notation and no framework to represent threats that propagate across the physical, human, and digital aspects of a system. For this, it is not sufficient to just combine the different aspects/components of the system, any framework must also represent the relationships between them, their inter-dependencies and the compositional nature of systems.

The main aim of our work is to design a threat modelling approach that takes into account the human, cyber, and physical aspects of hybrid systems, their inter-dependencies, and that can analyse their weaknesses and help reason about remediation. We propose the first threat model that permits to describe and derive the security state of smart systems’ entities, their relations, and properties. The model permits to describe and analyse the system as part of its physical and human environment rather than in isolation from it. The main contributions are as follows:

- We propose a novel *hybrid threat model* that can represent the relations and security properties of the system’s components by taking into consideration their cyber, physical, and human aspects.
- We introduce a *threat analysis* method equipped with a set of derivation rules that permits to understand the properties of the system’s components and the overall security state.




Fig. 1. The main components of a hybrid system threat model

- We provide a *tool*<sup>1</sup> that represents the security properties and relations of the system’s components. This tool automatically analyzes the threats to the system and can automatically generate a corresponding graphical representation.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the main motivation for this work by means of a case study from smart buildings and provide an overview of the proposed solution together with some practical considerations. In Section 3, we introduce our novel threat model with its components, relations, and properties. In Section 4, we present the rules that permit to gather the facts behind the attack graphs, evaluated during the threat analysis of the system. In Section 5, we present the application of our threat model in three different case studies taken from the smart building scenario and a Wind Farm scenario. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the related work, and in Section 7 we draw the main conclusions and discuss directions for future work.

## 2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND APPROACH

Our main goal is to identify and construct a threat model for hybrid threats to cyber-physical systems that combine cyber, physical, and human aspects (i.e., a *hybrid system*) and can be attacked on each one of these aspects or in combination. We consider as a system component, any part of the system considered in the threat analysis (e.g., the lock of door X, the user with the ID Y, the phishing mail Z). Some components can have more than one nature, and we will explicitly identify their nature during the threat analysis.

To represent hybrid threats it is necessary to represent the relations between the different aspects of the system: the physical, cyber, and human. Of particular importance are how each one of these aspects can introduce a *threat* to the other, i.e., does compromising one aspect compromise the other? and how they can *protect* each other, i.e., can one aspect help to protect the other? Broadly, these relations can be represented, as shown in Fig. 1, where different components of various nature can protect or introduce/spread vulnerabilities to other components of the system, also of different nature. Note that Fig. 1 only intends to show that the human, physical, and cyber elements can threaten each other or can be used to protect each other. This is not necessarily a one-to-one relation and the components may be used in combination.

1. <https://github.com/FulvioValenza/TAMELESS>

A vulnerable physical aspect of a component can threaten the security of a cyber component of the hybrid system. For example, having physical access to a room, where it is possible to connect (unauthenticated) to the wired network, would enable the attacker to compromise the software/network components of the system. Similarly, having physical access to a sensor can enable an attacker to perturb what the sensor is measuring. Similarly, compromising the human aspects of a system can also compromise its security, e.g., deceiving the user to reveal access details or stealing access keys (both are well known examples). With the increased use of actuators that can affect the physical aspects, compromising the cyber aspects of a system also enables a physical compromise. An obvious example is a digital lock, or the control system, to open the door to a protected area of a building.

These components can also protect each other. A human can inspect and monitor the physical security, e.g., of an area, a smart building, or a device. A physically secure enclosure can protect both human and digital components - this is why computers or servers are often stored in a secure location. Finally, we increasingly use the digital capability to monitor the security of both physical spaces, and the behaviour of humans, e.g., to protect from insider threats.

Our model allows to represent these relations between the human, physical and digital components of the system and to reason about them. In particular, it allows to reason about the propagation of attacks across the different parts of the system and to formulate protective and preventive measures to increase robustness to attacks that combine physical, cyber or human actions, whose relative balance depends on the system and the context of use.

We illustrate our approach through an example that we will use throughout the remainder of this paper. We consider the case of a smart building that may be subject to attacks combining physical attack steps (such as breaking a door, a window, or picking a lock), cyber-attack steps (compromising the network, digital locks, or the Building Management System) and human attack steps (such as stealing a pass, or losing a key). Our building comprises three different locations: the hall, the office area and the rooftop, as shown in Fig. 2. It is equipped with IoT devices and sensors, like smart cameras, temperature sensors, etc. There is a monitoring system on the hall (entrance) where the camera images are controlled by a human (guard) to prevent unauthorised access to the building. Moreover, part of the rooms on the office floor have locks on their doors to prevent unauthorised access. Although this example provides only a small scale illustration of our model and method, scalability aspects to larger systems are considered in Section 2.2 and 6.

## 2.1 Scenario

We consider the scenario shown in Fig. 3, which is part of the office floor shown in Fig. 2. We are concerned, in particular, about unauthorized access to a safe box, denoted by *sbox* and located in a particular room on the office floor. The safe box is used by the employees to store cash, company check books and confidential documents. It is physically protected through a digital lock requiring an access code (Password), which is set by an employee physically working




Fig. 2. Example of the smart building used in our case study

in that room. Physical security measures protect the room where the safe box is located: the room can only be accessed through a locked door. The key to open the door is based on an RFID card and provided solely to authorised employees (including the employee working in that room). Thus, to access the safe box an attacker needs to both access the room and to know the Password required to open the safe. For the purpose of keeping the example simple, we assume that a physical attack on the safe box is not practical.

For the sake of the example let us assume that the password for the safebox is stored in the employee on duty machine. Therefore, access to the employee's computer (e.g., through phishing) will eventually lead to finding the password. The RFID cards required to open the door can be read and cloned at a moderate distance (e.g., several feet away), leading to the possibility for an attacker to create a duplicate key.

To access the contents of the safe it is necessary to: exploit human vulnerabilities (e.g., with a phishing attack) to lead to a compromise of the digital environment, which enables exploiting further digital vulnerabilities to access the employee's machine to obtain the password. An attack would also require cloning the RFID card and using this to access the room where the safe is located, before using the password to open the safe. The scenario was only conceived to illustrate how the different relations can be represented in our model and how the model can be analysed for threats across the different aspects of the system. However, many modern systems exhibit similar characteristics.




Fig. 3. A threat model for the unauthorised safe box access

To create a comprehensive threat model, our approach allows to represent the properties of the system's components. This includes *security properties* such as vulnerability or detectability as well as *functional properties* such as device malfunction or recoverability.

## 2.2 TAMELESS

We propose a threat analysis model that can derive the current security state of the system and its components, given as input information about the system's components and their security properties. We have implemented the model and threat analysis as an automated tool called Threat & Attack Model Smart System (TAMELESS) that is made available with this paper<sup>2</sup>, and which relies on an XSB Prolog interpreter<sup>3</sup>.

As shown in Fig 4, the input for TAMELESS comprises the specification of the system to be analysed (i.e., the system's components and threats), the relations between the components, as well as between the components and the threats and the various (security) assumptions. The user (e.g., a security architect) can then perform the threat analysis by querying TAMELESS to display a set of pre-defined security properties of the system's components (see Section 3.2). Specifically, in our model, the security properties represent how the security state of the components can change<sup>4</sup>. This allows to determine whether the components' expected states differ from the derived ones (i.e., a *consistency check*). This aspect is important because each smart system has distinct features and differs from others. In some systems, it is fundamental that specific components should not be compromised, while in others that specific components work properly, or is important to know if it is possible to detect an attack, restore or fix the system's status. TAMELESS allows users to have a comprehensive view of the system's security and its risks across the human, physical, and cyber aspects. The complexity of the system, the propagation of threats across different relationships between components, and the number of possible attack paths make it impossible to conduct this analysis manually for systems larger than a toy example.

TAMELESS provides a graphical representation of the attack propagation. This allows users to add new *protection* and *monitoring* components. Users can then run the tool again together with the updated information to compute the revised threat model. This iteration can be repeated until the user is satisfied that the threat model is acceptable. The impact of mitigations on the threat model can also be determined and visualised.

TAMELESS can also help security architects consider the economical aspects of ensuring the security of the system if a cost is associated with each protection solution. This allows to compare the costs of mitigation approaches, for example the relative cost and guarantees of digital or human monitoring of physical spaces.

We focus here on the representation of the relations between the threats to the physical, cyber and human




Fig. 4. TAMELESS's architecture and workflow

aspects of the system and how they combine with the structural relations between the system components, as this is a fundamental aspect omitted in studies to date. Several other aspects, in particular extending TAMELESS with techniques for risk management and countermeasures are left for future work. More specifically:

- 1) We focus here on a **static analysis** of the system. When the system changes, the analysis needs to be run again. It is however, possible to extend TAMELESS with monitored conditions that detect such changes and trigger a re-evaluation of the analysis.
- 2) We focus on a deterministic analysis where relations and derived facts are either true or not. TAMELESS generates a logical attack graph [5]. Existing work on attack graph analysis has shown how it is possible to extend attack graphs with probabilistic information to reason about risk and countermeasures. For example, it is possible to express the probability of success of each vulnerability exploit and use Bayesian Analysis to reason about risk, both statically and dynamically as shown in [17]. Other approaches, such as [18] express this probability as a *Time to Compromise (TTC)*. Then, assuming a certain frequency distribution of attacks it is possible to conduct a similar risk analysis and examine the impact of countermeasures in terms of risk reduction. In this case, the output of the analysis is not a probability of compromise of certain components but rather a time to compromise through the different attack paths. Further approaches have considered how to associate the attack progression through the system to its impact on the system model (e.g. [19]). It is then possible to conduct a cost based analysis to identify the most cost effective countermeasures or to evaluate the cost effectiveness of different mitigating strategies. We leave the combination of TAMELESS with such techniques for future work.
- 3) We do not consider temporal aspects and temporal events in the current analysis. Whilst, in principle, it would be possible to extend the model to reason about temporal properties and temporal relations e.g. using Event Calculus and/or Situation Calculus [20], this

2. <https://github.com/FulvioValenza/TAMELESS>

3. A dialect of Prolog developed by the Stony Brook University [16] (<http://xsb.sourceforge.net/index.html>).

4. We use the term property instead of state, as it represents the ability to change state, not the state itself.

would require further in-depth studies.

In summary, the threat model we constructed is generic and can be used to analyse the hybrid threats to smart systems, such as: smart buildings, homes, industrial control systems, windmill farms, ATM machines, or financial transactions. Once the system components are provided together with their properties and relations, TAMELESS can automatically analyse them, and graphically display the possible threats and how they were derived. Furthermore, TAMELESS helps the architects and identify countermeasures to the threats, as it provides a set of possible entities that can be used to prevent or mitigate the threat. The provided entities could be entities that: protect, monitor, detect, restore, repair, or replicate.

### 3 HYBRID THREAT MODEL

We introduce, in this section, the proposed threat model that comprises the security properties a hybrid system, the relations between components and threats, and the relations between the system components themselves.

#### 3.1 System's Components

Our *threat model* comprises various entities that can be human, cyber, or physical.

**Definition 1.** An *entity* is a system or system component that can be of a cyber, physical, or human nature<sup>5</sup>. We denote with  $\mathcal{E} = \{A, B, C, \dots\}$  the set of all system entities.

**Definition 2.** A *threat* is one or a sequence of actions that directly or indirectly changes a property that can alter the security state of an entity. We denote with  $\mathcal{T} = \{T, T_1, T_2, \dots\}$  the set of all threats.

We denote as  $\mathcal{F}$  the set of all formulas that can be expressed by the grammar below:

$$\phi ::= \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \phi \vee \phi \mid \phi \rightarrow \phi \mid p(A) \mid \neg p(A) \mid r(A, A) \mid r'(A, A, A)$$

where  $\phi \in \mathcal{F}$ ,  $A \in \mathcal{E}$ ,  $p \in \mathcal{P}$  and  $r, r' \in \mathcal{R}$ .  $\mathcal{P}$  denotes the set of all security properties and  $\mathcal{R}$  the set of all relations. The connectors  $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, (, )$  and  $\neg$  are the standard ones. This language permits to define a set of *rules* to derive the different security properties.

#### 3.2 Security Properties of the Entities

The properties of the entities can be either explicitly assumed to be true or can be derived to be true by applying the rules. We distinguish between *basic* properties describing primary security knowledge about the components and *auxiliary* properties describing the states of an entity, when it is compromised or malfunctioning due to a threat.

5. In some cases, the same entity might have more than one nature.

##### 3.2.1 Basic Properties

We denote with  $\mathcal{P}_B$  the set of all *basic properties*, where:

$$\mathcal{P}_B = \{\text{Comp}, \text{Malfun}, \text{Vul}\}.$$

**Compromised**  $\text{Comp}(A, T)$ : entity  $A$  has been *compromised* by threat  $T$ ;

**Malfunctioned**  $\text{Malfun}(A)$ : entity  $A$  is *malfunctioning* and one or more of its functionalities are not working as expected and/or there are any performance issues for  $A$ , e.g., a server expected to be running is down;

**Vulnerable**  $\text{Vul}(A, T)$ :  $A$  has a known vulnerability which makes it *vulnerable* to threat  $T$ .

For simplicity we write  $\text{Comp}(A)$  when there exists at least one threat  $T$  for which  $A$  is compromised ( $\text{Comp}(A, T)$ ), and  $\neg \text{Comp}(A)$  when no such threat  $T \in \mathcal{T}$  exists.

##### 3.2.2 Auxiliary Properties

We denote by  $\mathcal{P}_A$  the set of all auxiliary properties, where:

$$\mathcal{P}_A = \{\text{Det}, \text{Rest}, \text{Fix}\}.$$

**Detected**  $\text{Det}(A, T)$ : describes that it has been *detected* that entity  $A$  has been compromised by threat  $T$ , e.g., a physical or digital unauthorised access has been detected.

**Restored**  $\text{Rest}(A)$ : describes that Control over  $A$  is *restored*, usually after  $A$  has been compromised, e.g., a room has been secured again, or the system has been cleansed, patched and restored.

**Fixed**  $\text{Fix}(A)$ : describes that the *functionality* of  $A$  is *repaired*, usually after  $A$  malfunctioned ( $\text{Malfun}$ ), e.g., the lock of a door is repaired, or the antivirus has been updated.

We distinguish between the Rest and Fix properties to differentiate between the security and functional properties of a system. Rest is applied after an entity has been compromised (Comp) and a malicious user had control over the entity. Fix concerns the functionality of an entity, and is applied when an entity was malfunctioning (Malfun). Thus, an entity can be restored but still malfunction or be fixed but still compromised.

##### 3.2.3 Assumed and derived properties

We distinguish between *assumed* or *derived* properties. Assumed properties (prefixed with  $\alpha$ ) are part of the security assumptions, denote initial knowledge and need to be explicitly declared. Derived properties (prefixed with  $\kappa$ ) are obtained by applying the derivation rules to the known properties. The set of assumed properties is:

$$\mathcal{P}_\alpha = \{\alpha \text{Comp}, \alpha \text{Malfun}, \alpha \text{Vul}\}.$$

Derived properties indicate security properties that may/can become true ( $\kappa$ ), as a malicious user exploits vulnerabilities. The set of all derived properties is:

$$\mathcal{P}_\kappa = \{\kappa \text{Comp}, \kappa \text{Malfun}, \kappa \text{Vul}, \kappa \text{Det}, \kappa \text{Rest}, \kappa \text{Fix}\}.$$

#### 3.3 Relations

The entities in our system have different relations with each other as well as different relations to the threats. For simplicity, we consider binary and ternary relations; further relation types can easily be added if needed.



### 3.3.1 Relations between entities

$\mathcal{R}$  represents the set of all relations between system entities. These include structural relations (containment, interconnection) as well monitoring and control relations influencing how entities can respond to threats.

$$\{\text{Contain, Control, Connect, Depend, Check, Replicate}\} \in \mathcal{R}$$

**Contain**  $\text{Contain}(A, B)$ : means that  $A$  contains  $B$ , and represents how the system is composed, e.g., a room contains a server, or a server  $A$  contains data  $B$ . This permits to represent the structure of the system, and from it how the attack could propagate.

**Control**  $\text{Control}(A, B)$ : means that  $A$  controls  $B$ , e.g., a person controls the use of their identification badge, or a controller controls the sensors.

**Connect**  $\text{Connect}(A, B, C)$ : means that  $A$  connects  $B$  to  $C$ . In other words,  $A$  can reach  $C$  via  $B$ , e.g., the door connects the room with the hall, or network  $A$  connects server  $B$  with server  $C$ . Moreover, it is important to note that the Connect relation is unidirectional.

**Depend**  $\text{Depend}(A, B)$ : the functionality of  $A$  depends on that provided by  $B$ . In brief,  $A$  works only if  $B$  works. For example, the air conditioning depends on its outside fan, or the web server depends on the data base. The depend relation is used for example when identifying the spread of the vulnerabilities or the protective measures.

**Check**  $\text{Check}(A, B)$ : means  $A$  checks that  $B$  is functioning normally and thus detects malfunctions.

**Replicate**  $\text{Replicate}(A, B)$ :  $A$  is a replica of  $B$ . The availability of a replica makes it possible to fix an entity.

### 3.3.2 Relations between entities and threats

Relations between entities and threats permit to represent which entities are vulnerable to a particular threat, identify which other entities are vulnerable or how entities can protect each other. The set of relations is presented below.

$$\{\text{Protect, Monitor, Spread, PotentiallyVul}\} \in \mathcal{R}$$

**Protect**  $\text{Protect}(A, B, T)$ :  $A$  protects  $B$  from threat  $T$ , e.g., a lock protects the door from unauthorised access, or firewalls protect systems from unauthorised traffic. Protect means that entity  $A$  is able to protect entity  $B$  from a threat  $T$ . If an entity is vulnerable and not protected, then it can be compromised.

**Monitor**  $\text{Monitor}(A, B, T)$ :  $A$  monitors  $B$  from threat  $T$ , e.g., an intrusion detection system monitors the system against cyber-attacks, or a camera monitors the room against thieves. This expresses that attacks can be detected, even if they can not be prevented. Thus, if  $T$  can compromise  $B$ , then  $\text{Monitor}(A, B, T)$  describes that  $A$  can detect that  $B$  is compromised by  $T$ . Note that, if  $A$  monitors  $B$  for threat  $T$ , this does not mean that  $A$  protects  $B$  from  $T$ . Although both the Check and Monitor relations monitor the target system, Check refers to the functionality of the systems, whereas Monitor refers to its security.

**Spread**  $\text{Spread}(A, T)$ :  $A$  can propagate threat  $T$ , e.g., a phishing email used to spread a malware, or an IoT device enable an attack to spread to other devices. This property connects a device with the threats it can propagate.

**Potentially Vulnerable**  $\text{PotentiallyVul}(A, T)$ :  $A$  can be vulnerable to threat  $T$ , e.g., a user can be vulnerable to phishing. This property is used to model that an entity can become vulnerable to threat  $T$  in certain circumstances, e.g., when it malfunctions.

### 3.4 High-level properties

Having defined the properties and the relationships needed we now introduce some high-level properties ( $\mathcal{P}_H$ ) that can be expressed in terms of lower level primitives. These enable users to understand more easily a system's security state, e.g., if an entity is defended or monitored from a threat. They also permit to represent the overall state of an entity including its components, dependencies, and connections. We introduce below the definitions of these high-level properties; Table 1 gives their formal definitions in terms of the lower level primitives.

$$\mathcal{P}_H = \{\text{Val, Def, Safe, Mon, Che, Rep}\}.$$

**Valid**  $\text{Val}(A)$ :  $A$  is *valid* when it has not been compromised and is not malfunctioning. An entity is *not valid* when it has either been compromised or it is malfunctioning.

**Defended**  $\text{Def}(A, T)$ :  $A$  is *defended* from threat  $T$  when an entity  $B$  exists that protects  $A$  from  $T$  and  $B$  is valid. On the contrary, an entity is *not defended* from  $T$  when no such  $B$  exists, or it exists but is not valid.

**Safe**  $\text{Safe}(A, T)$ :  $A$  is *safe* with respect to  $T$  when  $A$  is not vulnerable to  $T$  or can be defended from  $T$ .  $A$  is *not safe* from  $T$  when it is vulnerable and not defendable from  $T$ .

**Monitored**  $\text{Mon}(A, T)$ :  $A$  is *monitored* for threat  $T$ , when an entity  $B$  exists that monitors  $A$  with respect to threat  $T$  and  $B$  is valid. Entity  $A$  is *not monitored* when no such entity  $B$  exists, or it exists but is not valid.

**Checked**  $\text{Che}(A)$ :  $A$  is *checked*, when an entity  $B$  checks the functionality of  $A$  and  $B$  is valid. Entity  $A$  is not checked when no such entity  $B$  exists, or it exists but is not valid.

**Replicated**  $\text{Rep}(A)$ :  $A$  is *replicated*, when at least one entity  $B$  that replicates  $A$  exists and  $B$  is valid. Entity  $A$  is not replicated when no such  $B$  exists that replicates  $A$ , or it exists but is not valid.

## 4 THREAT ANALYSIS

In this section, we first introduce the derivation rules used for our threat analysis. These rules apply to the relations and properties initially known to derive the new security properties that reflect the system's state and/or can be used to protect it. Through the derivation rules, we derive which entities can become vulnerable, compromised, and/or malfunction. We can also identify if any existing mechanisms can detect that an entity is compromised and whether it is possible to restore it.

We then describe how the derived security properties, help to construct the attack graph for our system, which graphically represents the results of the threat analysis and the attack paths through the system.

### 4.1 Derivation Rules

We first describe a set of basic derivation rules, followed by specific derivation rules to determine when an entity is compromised, malfunctioning, vulnerable, restorable, or fixed. As mentioned in Section 3.2, derived properties indicate security properties that may/can become true. This means that in our approach, we detect some security properties that may not occur (e.g., malfunctioning, or a vulnerability is never exploited).

#### 4.1.1 Basic derivation rules

Basic derivation rules state that if a property is assumed true, then naturally it can be derived to be true (Rules 1-3). Furthermore, these rules express the transitivity of relations such as Replicate and Depend. Note that  $\text{Contain}(A, B)$  and  $\text{Control}(A, B)$  are not transitive when applied to the human, cyber, and physical aspects of a system.

$\text{Val}(A) := \neg \text{Comp}(A) \wedge \neg \text{Malfun}(A)$	$\neg \text{Val}(A) := \text{Comp}(A) \vee \text{Malfun}(A)$
$\text{Def}(A, T) := \exists B. \text{Protect}(B, A, T) \wedge \text{Val}(B)$	$\neg \text{Def}(A, T) := \nexists B. \text{Protect}(B, A, T) \vee (\forall B. \text{Protect}(B, A, T) \wedge \neg \text{Val}(B))$
$\text{Safe}(A, T) := \neg \text{Vul}(A, T) \vee \text{Def}(A, T)$	$\neg \text{Safe}(A, T) := \text{Vul}(A, T) \wedge \neg \text{Def}(A, T)$
$\text{Mon}(A, T) := \exists B. \text{Monitor}(B, A, T) \wedge \text{Val}(B)$	$\neg \text{Mon}(A, T) := \nexists B. \text{Monitor}(B, A, T) \vee (\forall B. \text{Monitor}(B, A, T) \wedge \neg \text{Val}(B))$
$\text{Che}(A) := \exists B. \text{Check}(B, A) \wedge \text{Val}(B)$	$\neg \text{Che}(A) := \nexists B. \text{Check}(B, A) \vee (\forall B. \text{Check}(B, A) \wedge \neg \text{Val}(B))$
$\text{Rep}(A) := \exists B. \text{Replicate}(B, A) \wedge \text{Val}(B)$	$\neg \text{Rep}(A) := \nexists B. \text{Replicate}(B, A) \vee (\forall B. \text{Replicate}(B, A) \wedge \neg \text{Val}(B))$

TABLE 1  
High-level properties definitions

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| $\alpha \text{Comp}(A, T) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Comp}(A, T)$                           | (1) |
| $\alpha \text{Vul}(A, T) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Vul}(A, T)$                             | (2) |
| $\alpha \text{Malfun}(A) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Malfun}(A)$                             | (3) |
| $\text{Replicate}(A, B) \wedge \text{Replicate}(B, C) \rightarrow \text{Replicate}(A, C)$ | (4) |
| $\text{Depend}(A, B) \wedge \text{Depend}(B, C) \rightarrow \text{Depend}(A, C)$          | (5) |

#### 4.1.2 Derivation rules for compromised

We now introduce the derivation rules to reason about how threats can compromise different entities and propagate across the system.

**Rule 6:**  $A$  can be compromised by threat  $T$  when  $A$  is not safe from  $T$  and an entity  $B$ , which controls  $A$ , can be compromised and spread threat  $T$ .

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| $\text{Control}(B, A) \wedge \kappa \text{Comp}(B) \wedge \text{Spread}(B, T) \wedge \neg \text{Safe}(A, T) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Comp}(A, T)$ | (6) |
|---|-----|

**Rule 7:**  $A$  can be compromised by threat  $T$  when  $A$  is not safe from  $T$ , and  $A$  is connected to  $B$  through  $C$ ,  $B$  can be compromised and spreads  $T$ , and either  $C$  can be compromised or  $C$  is not protected against  $T$ .

- |  |     |
|--|-----|
| $\text{Connect}(C, B, A) \wedge \kappa \text{Comp}(B) \wedge \text{Spread}(B, T) \wedge \neg \text{Safe}(A, T) \wedge (\kappa \text{Comp}(C) \vee \neg \text{Def}(C, T)) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Comp}(A, T)$ | (7) |
|--|-----|

**Rule 8:**  $A$  can be compromised by threat  $T$  when  $A$  is not safe from  $T$ , and either  $A$  contains  $B$  or is contained in  $B$ , and  $B$  can be compromised and spread  $T$ .

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| $(\text{Contain}(B, A) \vee \text{Contain}(A, B)) \wedge \kappa \text{Comp}(B) \wedge \text{Spread}(B, T) \wedge \neg \text{Safe}(A, T) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Comp}(A, T)$ | (8) |
|---|-----|

#### Example

We illustrate the use of these rules in the scenario introduced in Section 2.1. The employee ( $E$ ) controls their PC, where the password to open the safe is stored. The employee can access emails (including phishing emails  $\text{phishEm}$  with a malicious attachment) on a server ( $\text{server}$ ) that connects the employee with the emails.

$\text{Control}(E, PC) \quad \text{Connect}(\text{PhishAttack}, E, \text{PhishEmail})$   
 $\text{Contain}(PC, D)$

The employee is assumed vulnerable to phishing attacks, denoted by  $\text{phishAt}$ , the PC is assumed vulnerable to malware ( $\text{malw}$ ) and the password ( $Pw$ ) is assumed vulnerable to being stolen, denoted by  $\text{stealInfo}$ . There are no protective measures  $P$  in place, against these threats.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| $\alpha \text{Vul}(E, \text{phishAt})$    | $\nexists P. \text{Protect}(P, E, \text{phishAt})$    |
| $\alpha \text{Vul}(PC, \text{malw})$      | $\nexists P. \text{Protect}(P, PC, \text{malw})$      |
| $\alpha \text{Vul}(Pw, \text{stealInfo})$ | $\nexists P. \text{Protect}(P, Pw, \text{stealInfo})$ |

Furthermore, the phishing attack ( $\text{phishAt}$ ) can be spread via emails, the employee can accidentally spread the malware code (e.g., as an attachment) and the PC can “spread” the steal information threat, as access to the PC, entails access to the information stored in it.

- |   |                                 |
|---|---------------------------------|
| $\text{Spread}(\text{phishEm}, \text{phishAt})$ | $\text{Spread}(E, \text{malw})$ |
| $\text{Spread}(PC, \text{stealInfo})$           |                                 |

Using the high-level properties, we derive that the employee ( $E$ ), the PC, and password are not *defended* and not *safe*, while the server is not defended (as below).

- |   |
|---|
| $\neg \text{Def}(Pw, \text{stealInfo}) = \nexists P. \text{Protect}(P, Pw, \text{stealInfo})$                                   |
| $\neg \text{Def}(PC, \text{malw}) = \nexists P. \text{Protect}(P, PC, \text{malware})$  |
| $\neg \text{Def}(E, \text{phishAt}) = \nexists P. \text{Protect}(P, E, \text{phishAt})$   |
| $\neg \text{Def}(\text{server}, \text{phishAt}) = \nexists P. \text{Protect}(P, \text{server}, \text{phishAt})$                 |
| $\neg \text{Safe}(Pw, \text{stealInfo}) = \alpha \text{Vul}(Pw, \text{stealInfo}) \wedge \neg \text{Def}(Pw, \text{stealInfo})$ |
| $\neg \text{Safe}(PC, \text{malw}) = \alpha \text{Vul}(PC, \text{malw}) \wedge \neg \text{Def}(PC, \text{malw})$                |
| $\neg \text{Safe}(E, \text{phishAt}) = \alpha \text{Vul}(E, \text{phishAt}) \wedge \neg \text{Def}(E, \text{phishAt})$          |

Using Rule 7 in conjunction with the above, we derive that the employee can be compromised by a phishing attack.

- |  |
|--|
| $\text{Connect}(\text{server}, \text{phishEm}, E) \wedge \kappa \text{Comp}(\text{phishEm}) \wedge \text{Spread}(\text{phishEm}, \text{phishAt}) \wedge \neg \text{Safe}(E, \text{phishAt}) \wedge \neg \text{Def}(\text{server}, \text{phishAt}) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Comp}(E, \text{phishAt})$ |
|--|

Similarly, using Rule 6, we derive that the employee’s PC can also be *compromised*.

- |  |
|--|
| $\text{Control}(E, PC) \wedge \kappa \text{Comp}(E) \wedge \text{Spread}(E, \text{malw}) \wedge \neg \text{Safe}(PC, \text{malw}) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Comp}(PC, \text{malw})$ |
|--|

Finally, using Rule 8 we derive that the password can be *compromised*.

- |  |
|--|
| $\text{Contain}(PC, Pw) \wedge \kappa \text{Comp}(PC) \wedge \text{Spread}(PC, \text{stealInfo}) \wedge \neg \text{Safe}(Pw, \text{stealInfo}) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Comp}(Pw, \text{stealInfo})$ |
|--|

Thus, the employee’s password can be compromised by exploiting the system’s human and cyber vulnerabilities in conjunction with each other.

#### 4.1.3 Derivation rules for malfunctioned

**Rule 9** specifies that an entity  $A$ , compromised by threat  $T$  can malfunction. **Rule 10** specifies that  $A$  can malfunction when  $A$  depends on  $B$  and  $B$  malfunctions.

- |  |      |
|--|------|
| $\kappa \text{Comp}(A, T) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Malfun}(A)$                           | (9)  |
| $\text{Depend}(A, B) \wedge \kappa \text{Malfun}(B) \rightarrow \kappa \text{Malfun}(A)$ | (10) |



### Example

Let us assume a physical server (physical entity) that hosts a website (cyber entity). The functionality of the website strictly depends on the functionality of its server:  $\text{Depend}(\text{website}, \text{server})$ .

If the server can be physically compromised through threat  $T$ , we can derive that it can malfunction by using Rule 9, as shown below.

$$\kappa\text{Comp}(\text{server}, T) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{server})$$

Given the dependency between the website and its server, we can derive that the website can also malfunction by applying Rule 10.

$$\text{Depend}(\text{website}, \text{server}) \wedge \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{server}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{website})$$

#### 4.1.4 Derivation rule for vulnerabilities

When  $A$  malfunctions, and  $A$  is potentially vulnerable to threat  $T$ , then  $A$  can be vulnerable to  $T$ , **Rule 11**.

$$\kappa\text{Malfun}(A) \wedge \text{PotentiallyVul}(A, T) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Vul}(A, T) \quad (11)$$

For example, a broken lock can become vulnerable to being open by unauthorised users.

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{lock}) \wedge \text{PotentiallyVul}(\text{lock}, \text{breakOpen}) \\ \rightarrow \kappa\text{Vul}(\text{lock}, \text{breakOpen}) \end{aligned}$$

#### 4.1.5 Derivation rule for detecting threats

**Rule 12** states that when  $A$  can be compromised by threat  $T$  and  $A$  is monitored for threat  $T$  by some entity that is not compromised (see TABLE 1), then  $T$  can be detected for  $A$ .

$$\kappa\text{Comp}(A, T) \wedge \text{Mon}(A, T) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Det}(A, T) \quad (12)$$

For example, if a system is monitored for intrusions (e.g., with an IDS), then the intrusions can be detected.

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{system}, \text{intrusion}) \wedge \text{Mon}(\text{system}, \text{intrusion}) \\ \rightarrow \kappa\text{Det}(\text{system}, \text{intrusion}) \end{aligned}$$

#### 4.1.6 Derivation rule for restoring services

**Rule 13** states that when threat  $T$  can be detected for  $A$  and  $A$  has been replicated, then  $A$  can be restored.

$$\kappa\text{Det}(A, T) \wedge \text{Rep}(A) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Rest}(A) \quad (13)$$

Restoring from backup stands as an immediate example.

$$\kappa\text{Det}(\text{system}, \text{intrusion}) \wedge \text{Rep}(\text{system}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Rest}(\text{system})$$

#### 4.1.7 Derivation rule for fixed

**Rule 14** states that when  $A$  can malfunction and is checked (i.e., its malfunction can be detected) then  $A$  can be fixed.

$$\kappa\text{Malfun}(A) \wedge \text{Che}(A) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Fix}(A) \quad (14)$$

For example, if the air conditioning (AC) malfunctions, and it is detected, then the AC can be fixed.

$$\kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{AC}) \wedge \text{Che}(\text{AC}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Fix}(\text{AC})$$

## 4.2 Application of the threat analysis

The rules introduced above are used automatically to derive new (security) properties for the system's entities. Specifically, given the initial relations and properties, the threat analysis will derive new security properties, which together with answers to other queries will be used to output the threat analysis model. To perform the analysis a security architect must choose the right level of abstraction and the trustworthiness assumptions. For example, if all the security mechanisms are assumed not vulnerable and not potentially vulnerable (as we did for brevity in the following examples), then TAMELESS will identify only a subset of possible attacks. Conversely, the security architect assumes all security mechanisms as vulnerable (e.g., adopting an approach similar to zero-trust), then TAMELESS computes all known attacks that can be performed. In this last case, the size of the resulting graph can be considerable. TAMELESS is flexible and scalable enough to support analysis at different levels of abstraction and with different assumptions.

To simplify the work of the security architect, TAMELESS outputs a graphical representation of security properties, their derivations, and threats in the format akin to a generalised attack graph.

### 4.2.1 Attack graphs

The derivation rules allow us to compute the basic and auxiliary properties (i.e., can be compromised, malfunction, vulnerable, detected, restored, and fixed). This also enables us to construct an attack graph [21] for a target in our system and its properties that we want to verify. For example, we can build the attack graph to compromise a web server or to a door malfunction. This graph offers a graphical and simple representation of the result of the threat analysis.

Attack graphs are a powerful tool for security assessment by analysing network vulnerabilities and the paths attackers can use to compromise system resources. They permit a priori analysis of the possible avenues an attacker can exploit to compromise the system. When coupled with probabilistic information about the likelihood of success of each attack step, Bayesian inference can be used to derive measures of risk i.e., probability that parts of the system can be compromised. The analysis can be conducted statically, a priori, but also dynamically during an attack. For example, when system elements are compromised, this can be taken into account and the new probabilities of compromise can be calculated [22],[17]. The new probabilities of compromise can be used to choose countermeasures [23] and can also be combined with system models and cost models for resilience analysis as shown in [19]. However, our focus here is on the analysis and the generation of the graph for hybrid systems and we leave such extensions for further work.

TAMELESS does not only represent the threat information and the generated attack paths but also the application of the derivation rules, as shown in Fig. 5. Nodes represent the assumed and derived properties of the entities, the dashed edges represent the relationships between entities, and the solid red edges represent connections created by application of the derivation rules. In the next section, we show the graphs for two different case studies taken from our scenario described in Section 2.1.

## 5 CASE STUDY EVALUATION

In this section, we apply our analysis to two use-cases taken from the smart building scenario introduced in Section 2.1 and one use case from a critical infrastructure system. We describe in detail the first scenario and, for brevity, provide only the significant steps for the remaining two. TAMELESS is able to analyse the given information automatically. It provides users with the derived security properties as well as a graphical representation of the security properties and relations derived.




Fig. 5. Part of a Generated Attack Graph from our Threat Analysis

### 5.1 Unauthorized Safe Box Access

We continue with the Safe box example introduced in Section 2.1 and the example in section 4.1.2. Using TAMELESS, we will show how the attacker can access the safe box including all the steps of the successful attack. We will explain in detail how the security properties of the various entities change. This detailed analysis is performed by TAMELESS, automatically and the result is provided as a list of answers to users' queries and a graphical representation, see Fig. 6.

The contents of the safe box are protected through a combination that requires a password. The safe box is located in a room that can be accessed through a door, which can be open only with an RFID card. Using the results of the example in section 4.1.2, we know that the password can be compromised as it can be stolen through a phishing attack:  $\kappa\text{Comp}(\text{Pw}, \text{stealInfo})$ . However, the attacker Att, still needs to physically access the safe to use the password and the room is protected from unauthorised access by the door lock, denoted by lock.

We also know that the door lock can also be compromised, by following the steps shown in the graph generated by our threat model, shown in Fig. 6. More specifically, the door lock is *controlled* by its RFID card (denoted as key) and is vulnerable to unauthorised users controlling the card or making a copy of it (unAuthUser). As no other protection measures are in place to defend the door lock, such as a human guard, the door lock is not safe from being opened by an unauthorised user. We show below the relations and security properties for these entities.

Control(key, lock),  $\alpha\text{Vul}(\text{lock}, \text{unAuthUser})$ ,  
 $\neg\text{Def}(\text{lock}, \text{unAuthUser})$ ,  $\#P. \text{Protect}(P, \text{lock}, \text{unAuthUser})$ ,  
 $\neg\text{Safe}(\text{lock}, \text{unAuthUser})$

The RFID card is assumed to be vulnerable to being physically copied (denoted as copy), and there are no protection measures in place to prevent this. Therefore, using the high-level property definition for Safe, we can state that the RFID card is not safe with respect to the threat of being copied (copy). Any user can open the door, using the card, thus, if the card is compromised, then it can spread the unAuthUser threat.

Vul(key, copy),  $\neg\text{Def}(\text{key}, \text{copy})$ ,  
 $\neg\text{Safe}(\text{key}, \text{copy})$ , Spread(key, unAuthUser)

The attacker Att has malicious purposes, and thus, can be considered compromised, ( $\kappa\text{Comp}(\text{Att})$ ), and they have information about the RFID card (e.g., employees having the card<sup>6</sup>). The

6. This information is useful for the attacker to then copy the RFID card even by staying at a distance from the employee and the card.




Fig. 6. Attack Graph for the Safe Box Scenario

*CardInfo* connects the attacker to the RFID card. Furthermore, once the attacker has this information, we can consider the card information to be compromised ( $\kappa\text{Comp}(\text{CardInfo})$ ). Considering the high-level property about the RFID card described above (the RFID card is not safe to the copy attack) and that the attacker can spread the copy attack, TAMELESS derives (using Rule 7) that the RFID card can be compromised by the copy card threat, as shown below.

Connect(CardInfo, Att, key)  $\wedge \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{Att}) \wedge$   
Spread(Att, copy)  $\wedge \neg\text{Safe}(\text{key}, \text{copy}) \wedge$   
 $\kappa\text{Comp}(\text{CardInfo}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{key}, \text{copy})$

Then, as the card can be compromised (i.e., copied), we derive using Rule 6 that the door lock can be compromised by copying the card. In detail, we know that the lock is controlled by the RFID card and is not safe to the unAuthUser threat and that the RFID card can spread this threat. Thus, as the card can be compromised, we derive that the lock can also be compromised, as shown below.

Control(key, lock)  $\wedge \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{key}, \text{copy}) \wedge$   
Spread(key, unAuthUser)  $\wedge \neg\text{Safe}(\text{lock}, \text{unAuthUser})$   
 $\rightarrow \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{lock}, \text{unAuthUser})$

If the lock is compromised, it is no longer *valid* (see high-level property definitions) and the room the door leads to is no longer *defended* from unauthorized access (unAuthAccess):

Protect(lock, room, unAuthAccess),  $\neg\text{Val}(\text{lock})$ ,  
 $\neg\text{Def}(\text{room}, \text{unAuthAccess})$

From the example in section 4.1.2, we know that the password (Pw) can be compromised as it can be stolen through a phishing attack:  $\kappa\text{Comp}(\text{Pw}, \text{stealInfo})$ . Thus, we can derive the Pw to not be valid ( $\neg\text{Val}(\text{Pw})$ ), following the high-level property definition ( $\neg\text{Val}(\text{Pw}) = \text{Comp}(\text{Pw})$ ).

As the Pw was protecting the sbx from unauthorised accesses but is no longer *valid*, and there is no other way to protect the safe box, then we can derive that it is not *defendable*.

$$\neg\text{Def}(\text{sbx}, \text{unAuthAccess}) = \\ \text{Protect}(\text{Pw}, \text{sbx}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \wedge \neg\text{Val}(\text{Pw})$$

From the definition of  $\neg\text{Safe}$  we can derive that sbx is not safe as shown below.

$$\neg\text{Safe}(\text{sbx}, \text{unAuthAccess}) = \\ \text{Vul}(\text{sbx}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \wedge \neg\text{Def}(\text{sbx}, \text{unAuthAccess})$$

We know that the room connects the attacker to the safe box and that the attacker can spread the unauthorised access. Furthermore, we derived that the safe box is not safe to unauthorised access and the room is not defendable. We thus derive from the information above by applying Rule 7 that the safe box can be compromised through an authorised access, as the attacker can physically access the room<sup>7</sup>, by compromising its protection measures, and they can insert the password of the safe box.

$$\text{Connect}(\text{room}, \text{Att}, \text{sbx}) \wedge \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{Att}) \wedge \\ \text{Spread}(\text{Att}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \wedge \neg\text{Safe}(\text{sbx}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \wedge \\ \neg\text{Def}(\text{room}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{sbx}, \text{unAuthAccess})$$

To summarise, in order to compromise the safe box, the attacker needs to exploit the vulnerabilities of the *human* component of the system, i.e., the employee's vulnerability to phishing attacks, the vulnerabilities of the *cyber* component, i.e., the employee's PC, and the vulnerabilities of the *physical* component, i.e., the RFID card of the door lock. As shown in this example, thanks to the use of our threat analysis the security architect is able to understand which part of their system can be compromised by exploiting a sequence of vulnerabilities belonging to different components of the system. As clearly seen in this example, without considering the human element in the threat model, the threat landscape is limited and the analysis is not exhaustive.

Moreover, due to the representation of the graph, the architect is able to choose the best place where to put in place a new security mechanism (i.e., protection and/or monitor component) to interrupt the attack propagation or to prevent the occurrence of the attack. For example, it is possible to avoid the compromise of the safe box in several ways: (i) by installing an anti-phishing system on the email server; (ii) using a door lock where entry cards cannot be copied; (iii) add a guard in the room or (iv) adding a camera in the room. Clearly each solution has its advantages and disadvantages. However, through TAMELESS, the security architect has a holistic view on how to provide the security of a system, and they can consider each solution based on effectiveness, logistic, economical, and ethical aspects.

## 5.2 Compromise a Web Server

We now consider a second scenario where the attacker needs to exploit the vulnerabilities of different components of our smart building to compromise a particular entity.

This case study takes place in two different rooms, as shown in Fig. 7. We consider a web server, denoted by *server*, located in one of the rooms, which is protected from unauthorised access, denoted by *unAuthAccess*, through biometric authentication,

7. For simplicity, we ignore that the attacker needs to physically get to the room, e.g., by entering the building.




Fig. 7. A threat model for compromising a Web Server

bioMAuth. An air conditioning unit, denoted by AC, is located in the same room. The server functionality depends on the functionality of the AC, because if the AC is not working, then the server overheats and shuts down or can be damaged. The server hosts a particular website, and is protected against cyber-attacks on the website ( $\text{Safe}(\text{server}, \text{cyberAttack})$ ). The functionality of the website *depends* on the functionality of the web server. The server is *connected* to the internet. The functionality of the AC depends on the functionality of its fan-box, denoted by *fan*, located on the terrace of the building. We introduce below the main properties of this scenario.

$$\text{Contain}(\text{server}, \text{website}), \text{Depend}(\text{website}, \text{server}), \\ \text{Contain}(\text{room}, \text{server}), \text{Contain}(\text{room}, \text{AC}), \\ \text{Depend}(\text{AC}, \text{fan}), \text{Depend}(\text{server}, \text{AC}), \\ \text{Connect}(\text{path}, \text{Att}, \text{fan}), \text{Connect}(\text{path2}, \text{Att}, \text{room}), \\ \alpha\text{Vul}(\text{fan}, \text{PhysAtt}), \alpha\text{Vul}(\text{AC}, \text{PhysAtt}), \alpha\text{Comp}(\text{Att}), \\ \alpha\text{Vul}(\text{server}, \text{cyberAttack}), \alpha\text{Vul}(\text{website}, \text{cyberAttack}), \\ \text{Spread}(\text{Att}, \text{PhysAtt}), \text{Protect}(\text{bioMAuth}, \text{room}, \text{unAuthAccess}), \\ \text{Safe}(\text{server}, \text{cyberAttack}), \text{Safe}(\text{bioMAuth}, \text{falsification})$$

A malicious attacker is not able to compromise the website or the web server using a cyber-attack, e.g. DoS, or malware, or by compromising *cyber components* related to them, as there are protection measures in place that are assumed not vulnerable. The attacker is also not able to compromise any *human component*, as the access to the room is restricted to a small group of trusted people. Furthermore, the attacker is also not able to access the room, thus, they cannot compromise the server physically or take physical control over it.

Let us now analyse the given properties and relations for this case study. The AC unit is driven by an external fan-box. As this is placed outside, the box is vulnerable to *physical attacks*. Therefore, we can derive that it is not *defendable* and not *safe* with respect to physical attacks.

$$\neg\text{Def}(\text{fan}, \text{PhysAtt}), \neg\text{Safe}(\text{fan}, \text{PhysAtt}), \neg\text{Def}(\text{path}, \text{PhysAtt})$$

This is automatically derived by Rule 7 as shown below.

$$\text{Connect}(\text{path}, \text{Att}, \text{fan}) \wedge \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{Att}) \wedge \\ \neg\text{Safe}(\text{fan}, \text{PhysAtt}) \wedge \text{Spread}(\text{Att}, \text{PhysAtt}) \wedge \\ \neg\text{Def}(\text{path}, \text{PhysAtt}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{fan}, \text{PhysAtt})$$

We can further derive that the fan-box can malfunction given that it can be compromised; rule 9 states that if an entity is compromised, then it can malfunction.

$$\kappa\text{Comp}(\text{fan}, \text{PhysAtt}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{fan})$$

As the functionality of the AC depends on the functionality of its fan-box, we can derive that if the fan-box malfunctions the AC can also malfunction, using rule 10.

$$\kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{fan}) \wedge \text{Depend}(\text{AC}, \text{fan}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{AC})$$




Fig. 8. Attack Graph for the Web Server Scenario

As the functionality of the server depends on the AC, we can further derive that the server can malfunction if the air conditioning malfunctions using rule 10.

$$\kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{AC}) \wedge \text{Depend}(\text{server}, \text{AC}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{server})$$

As the functionality of the website depends on its server, we can derive that the website can malfunction, as shown also in Example 4.1.3.

$$\kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{server}) \wedge \text{Depend}(\text{website}, \text{server}) \rightarrow \kappa\text{Malfun}(\text{website})$$

Thus, in this case, the attacker can compromise the functionality of a digital component of the system (the website) by performing a *physical attack* on a physical component, that at first sight is not directly connected with the website. In particular, as shown in (Fig. 8), the attacker does not need to physically access the server room but can create a cascading malfunction between the different components leveraging the fact that they depend on each other. This use case shows users that there is no need to add more protection to the room, the server, or the employee, but better physical security to the space outside e.g., the terrace and the fan-box.

### 5.3 Attack on a Wind Farm

We now show a representation in our model of an attack on a wind farm, first presented and realised in [3], [15]. In this case, the attacker is able to physically access the wind turbine by physically breaking the lock on the wind turbine door. Once the attacker accesses the wind turbine, they place a Raspberry Pi into the network switch, thus, enabling remote digital access. The network switch is connected through the network with the Wind Farm Control Network (WFCN). Thus, the device newly plugged in can now access the WFCN that has no protection measures on the inside network. Several attacks can now occur, e.g., implanting malware in the WFCN, obtaining information, network configuration, protocols, as well as, the disruption of the Wind Farm operation (that brings economical losses) and damage to key physical components given the architecture of the Wind Turbine and the Wind Farm.

In our model, it is possible to see that the Wind Turbine (WT) is potentially vulnerable to physical unauthorised access (unAuthAccess) as it is protected against this attack by a lock, which is vulnerable to be physically broken (*physBreak*). Given that the lock is not protected against this type of attack we can state that it is not *defended* and not *safe* against this attack.

$$\alpha\text{Vul}(\text{WT}, \text{unAuthAccess}), \text{Protect}(\text{lock}, \text{WT}, \text{unAuthAccess}), \neg\text{Def}(\text{lock}, \text{physBreak})$$

Given the above information, we can derive that the lock is *compromised* by the attacker (Att) through a physical attack. As the attacker can now physically get to the Wind Turbine, which

is usually located in remote areas and with no surveillance and thus not defended.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Connect}(\text{path}, \text{Att}, \text{lock}) \wedge \alpha\text{Comp}(\text{Att}) \wedge \\ &\text{Spread}(\text{Att}, \text{physBreak}) \wedge \neg\text{Safe}(\text{lock}, \text{physBreak}) \wedge \\ &\neg\text{Def}(\text{path}, \text{physBreak}) \rightarrow \text{Comp}(\text{lock}, \text{physBreak}) \end{aligned}$$

Once the lock has been compromised, the attacker can physically access the Wind Turbine.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Connect}(\text{lock}, \text{Att}, \text{WT}) \wedge \text{Comp}(\text{Att}) \wedge \\ &\text{Spread}(\text{Att}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \wedge \text{Comp}(\text{lock}) \wedge \\ &\neg\text{Safe}(\text{WT}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \rightarrow \text{Comp}(\text{WT}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \end{aligned}$$

Subsequently, the attacker by having physical access, can connect the malicious Raspberry Pi in the network switch located inside the Wind Tower.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Contain}(\text{WT}, \text{switch}) \wedge \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{WT}) \wedge \\ &\neg\text{Safe}(\text{switch}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \wedge \text{Spread}(\text{WT}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \\ &\rightarrow \text{Comp}(\text{switch}, \text{unAuthAccess}) \end{aligned}$$

The Raspberry Pi can then attack the Wind Farm Control Network e.g., through a malware program (*malw*)<sup>8</sup>.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Connect}(\text{network}, \text{switch}, \text{WFCN}) \wedge \kappa\text{Comp}(\text{switch}) \wedge \\ &\text{Spread}(\text{switch}, \text{malw}) \wedge \neg\text{Safe}(\text{WFCN}, \text{malw}) \wedge \\ &\neg\text{Def}(\text{network}, \text{malw}) \rightarrow \text{Comp}(\text{WFCN}, \text{malw}) \end{aligned}$$

An analysis of this example also shows possible mitigations that can be deployed including: (i) putting a physical guard or a camera to monitor the entrance to the wind turbines; (ii) improving the quality of the lock; (iii) protecting the internal network from internal attacks e.g., using a 0-trust strategy.

Once again, this case study shows, like the previous ones, the importance of a complete view of the physical, cyber, and human interaction. In particular, it shows the interactions between human-physical and human-cyber, that are not considered exhaustively by the existing threat models.

## 6 RELATED WORK

The work presented here relates to a number of different research studies ranging from threat modelling and analysis, to formal specifications of smart systems. Specifically, we focus on the closest related approaches that seek to analyse the security properties in cyber-physical and smart systems and the existing studies that focus on attack graph generation from threat modelling and analysis.

Generally, a significant amount of effort has been devoted in the literature to the development of threat models and analysis. A recent survey of existing threat models and threat analysis for other application domains is provided in [24].

### 6.1 Threat analysis of cyber-physical systems

In recent years, threat analysis for cyber-physical and smart systems is becoming a popular topic in cybersecurity. Some of the most promising results are shown in [9], [25], [26], [27], where the authors present novel threat models but none of these studies models together the system's cyber, physical and human aspects together.

Tsigkanos *et al.* [25], [26] described an approach for topology aware adaptive security for cyber-physical systems, focusing on the interplay between cyber and physical spaces characterising the operational environment. Even though this work shares some ideas with our paper, their goal is different: they aim

8. The network and the other components might be protected from external malware from outside components, but the internal network is considered trusted and thus, no protective measures are in place.

to identify potential violations of security requirements (speculative threat analysis), whilst we aim to identify the untrusted elements of our system.

Lemaire *et al.* [9] presented a tool that automates in a formal way the threat analysis of ICS (Industrial Control Systems). Using a knowledge-based system, the tool extracts vulnerabilities both at the component and system level. When the vulnerabilities are extracted, the security security architects can adapt the system to mitigate or remove them.

Oladimeji *et al.* [27] proposed a goal-oriented approach for analysing cyber threats. The approach provides support for guiding the threat analysis process using the notions of negative soft goals for detecting cyber threats and identifying solutions for threat mitigation.

Akella *et al.* [28] defined a formal method to detect threats in confidential communications. The proposed approach detects threats by analysing the interactions between physical systems with the cyber components. Sensitive information about a physical component can be inferred through behaviour observation about the related cyber components.

Rocchetto and Tippenhauer [29] survey the different attacker models and profiles proposed in the literature with a focus on Cyber-Physical Systems and Industrial Control Systems, in particular. They define taxonomy and identify several attacker profiles (e.g., basic use, cybercriminal, hacktivist, a nation-state) based on measures of the attributes defined in the taxonomy. Their framework does not appear to consider the type of hybrid attacks we consider here, i.e. combining physical and cyber attack steps as part of the same attack, and their framework could be extended to account for this. However, they consider two relevant attack dimensions: the *Aim-Physical/Aim-Virtual dimension*, which represents whether the attacker's objective is a physical or a virtual component, and the *Distance* of the attacker concerning the target. The semantics of the former is not entirely clear as in a CPS/ICS context, the attacker may seek to cause physical damage by employing only cyber attack steps. This is different from the hybrid attacks we consider. With respect to the latter, the physical attack steps we consider require a level of physical proximity.

Finally, in [6] the authors constructed a model for threat analysis on Virtualized Systems called FATHoM. We took inspiration from this work's formal description of the system components relations and security properties. In our work we extend, change and enrich this model, by adding more types of relationships, security properties, derivation rules and defining an attack graph representation, in order to properly model and detect hybrid threats in smart systems. In particular, our framework represents entities that can be of cyber, physical, or human nature, while FATHoM is constructed to analyse the threat models for Virtualized (Cloud) Systems. Given the triple nature of our cyber-physical and smart systems, we include properties and relations that cannot hold in Virtualized Systems. Furthermore, our model represents also the functionality property of the system's entities.

## 6.2 Threat Detection via Attack Graphs

Several studies [5], [8], [30], [31], [32], [33] have investigated the generation of attack graphs from the threat model and analysis of the system. These studies use the generated attack graphs to detect and show threats relations and possible mitigations, in a graphical representation. To the best of our knowledge, we list and present below the more relevant studies.

MulVAL (Multihost, multistage Vulnerability Analysis) is a framework for modelling and analyzing the interaction of software bugs with system and network configurations. As it uses First Order Logic, it is able to automatically infer system vulnerability and derives the attack graphs with the probability that an adversary could successfully conduct an attack. MulVAL's language and infer system was extended

in several works and by several research groups. The most significant improvements are reported in [34], [35]. In this work we use MulVAL for the automatic graph generation provided the inputs from our hybrid threat model.

In [8], the authors proposed an attack graph generation tool that builds upon MulVAL. In their representation, a node in the graph is a logical statement, i.e., representing some aspect and propriety of the network. While, the edges of the graph, specify the causality relations between network configurations and an attacker's potential privileges. The attack graph, in this way, illustrates snapshots of attack steps and causes of the attacks ("how and why the attack can happen").

In [30], the authors presented methodologies that starting from the information of the MulVAL model are able to: (i) automatically identify portions of an attack graph that do not help a user to understand the core security problems and so can be trimmed, and (ii) automatically group similar attack steps as virtual nodes in a model of the network topology, to increase the understandability of the data.

In [31], the authors proposed a static analysis approach where attack trees are automatically inferred from a process algebraic specification. In their algebraic specification, they identify an attack as a set of channels that an adversary has to know in order to attain a given location in the system.

P<sup>2</sup>CySeMoL (Predictive, Probabilistic Cyber Security Modelling Language) [32] provides an attack graph tool that can be used to estimate the likelihood that professional penetration testers are able to accomplish different attacks on enterprise architectures within time(s) designated by a user. The proposed tool automatically generates attack graphs from a CySeMoL specification. P<sup>2</sup>CySeMoL as well as CySeMoL combine attack graphs and system models through the use of a language that is not flexible. In order to introduce flexibility, the Meta Attack Language (MAL) was introduced in [36] that is a domain specific language for probabilistic threat modelling and attack simulations. Starting from the MAL language, powerLang [37] was proposed to create and evaluate a MAL-based domain-specific languages for the representation and simulation of cyber-attacks for the power domain (i.e., power grids, energy providers, and other critical infrastructure).

Finally, in [33] the attack graphs are generated using an ontology and SWIRL (Semantic Web Rule Language) rules to express cause-consequence relationships of all known attack scenarios.

The main difference between the existing approaches with our work is that these studies do not consider simultaneously the physical, cyber, and human aspects. Moreover, in the approaches proposed by Mulval, P<sup>2</sup>CySeML and MAL a user or an item has only a static role. Furthermore, no relationships between the system's components are considered, as well as aspects like monitoring. Except for the works based on MulVAL no logical inference is applied to the attack graph analysis.

## 7 CONCLUSION

In this work, we propose a novel hybrid threat model and analysis that permits us to describe and derive the security state of smart systems. Our approach includes in its reasoning the cyber, physical, and human aspects as well as relations between them and the relationships between the architectural components of the system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first threat model that describes and analyses threats for smart hybrid systems, where the system's components can be of cyber, physical, and/or human nature.

The novel threat model introduced is able to represent the various relations between the components of the system, their security properties, and their relations with the possible threats. We analyse the different aspects and properties of the system's components that are not simply considered as possible sources of threat, but also considering their defensive and preventive



capabilities. An important aspect is the analysis of the human aspects of some components both in terms of their vulnerabilities but also in their role of protecting the physical and digital aspects of the system.

Our model and analysis are implemented in a Prolog based tool called TAMELESS. We tested TAMELESS in several scenarios of which two smart systems and a critical infrastructure attack example were presented in this paper. We provided in detail the threat analysis steps performed by our threat model for one of the scenarios and an overview for the other two. Our tool automatically generates attack graphs that can be used by the security analyst/system administrator to understand the current state of the system and its components. In particular, the threats and vulnerabilities of the system and system's components are identified. The result of the tool can be used also to identify the most-effective countermeasures, as the user given the current state of the system can decide to make some appropriate changes to it. Before making the changes in the real system, the user can simulate the state of the system with the changes using TAMELESS and decide if they are appropriate or not.

An interesting direction for future work is the automatic extraction of the relations and security properties of the system's components. While in this work, we provided them to the threat model, many could be extracted automatically from system designs, physical plans, Building Information Models etc.. We see the smart building scenario as a good starting point, as the increased use of Building Information Modelling readily makes available not only the physical plans of the building but also its interconnections with the digital aspects of the system and the building management systems. Industrial systems such as in Industry 4.0 or industrial processes are also good candidates where the design documents include much of the information needed to automatically extract the model. Another interesting automation aspect that we aim to address is the integration with existing vulnerability databases (e.g., CVEs) to further automate the creation of the model.

The relations, security properties, and rules used by our threat model are static and have binary values. By associating stochastic information with the different properties and vulnerabilities it is possible to reason about risk management both statically at design time or during an attack, as is done in several studies on attack graphs. In the future, we also aim to investigate how TAMELESS can be extended to dynamic systems where new components can join or leave the system and where it is possible to reason about temporal properties.

Finally, we aim to enrich the expressiveness and reasoning capabilities of our model by adding time constraints and probabilistic assumptions on the relations and rules, in order to model more complex systems, such as resilient components or devices able to auto-repair.

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