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Predicting the Effects of Waning Vaccine Immunity Against COVID-19 through High-Resolution Agent-Based Modeling

Original

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(Article begins on next page)

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- ₃ ing
- Agnieszka Truszkowska, Lorenzo Zino, Sachit Butail, Emanuele Caroppo, Zhong-Ping
- 5 Jiang, Alessandro Rizzo, and Maurizio Porfiri*
- 6 Dr. A. Truszkowska
- 7 Center for Urban Science and Progress, Tandon School of Engineering, New York Univer-
- ⁸ sity, 370 Jay Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201, U.S.
- ⁹ Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Tandon School of Engineering, New
- ¹⁰ York University, Six MetroTech Center, Brooklyn NY 11201, U.S.
- ¹¹ Dr. L. Zino
- ¹² Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Groningen, Nijenborgh 4, 9747 AG Gronin-
- ¹³ gen, The Netherlands
- ¹⁴ Prof. S. Butail
- ¹⁵ Department of Mechanical Engineering, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb IL 60115,
- 16 U.S.
- ¹⁷ Prof. E. Caroppo
- ¹⁸ Department of Mental Health, Local Health Unit ROMA 2, 00159 Rome, Italy
- ¹⁹ University Research Center He.R.A., Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 00168 Rome,
- 20 Italy
- 21 Prof. Z.-P. Jiang
- ²² Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tandon School of Engineering, New
- ²³ York University, 370 Jay Street, Brooklyn NY 11201, U.S.
- 24 Prof. A. Rizzo
- ²⁵ Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Politecnico di Torino, 10129 Turin,
 ²⁶ Italy
- ²⁷ Institute for Invention, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Tandon School of Engineering,
- ²⁸ New York University, Six MetroTech Center, Brooklyn NY 11201, U.S.
 - 1

- ²⁹ Prof. M. Porfiri
- ³⁰ Center for Urban Science and Progress, Tandon School of Engineering, New York Univer-
- ³¹ sity, 370 Jay Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201, U.S.
- ³² Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Tandon School of Engineering,
- ³³ New York University, Six MetroTech Center, Brooklyn NY 11201, U.S.
- ³⁴ Department of Biomedical Engineering, Tandon School of Engineering, New York Univer-
- ³⁵ sity, Six MetroTech Center, Brooklyn NY 11201, U.S.
- 36 Email Address: mporfiri@nyu.edu

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The potential waning of the vaccination immunity to COVID-19 could pose threats to public health, as it is tenable 38 that the timing of such waning would synchronize with the near-complete restoration of normalcy. Should also test-39 ing be relaxed, we might witness a resurgent COVID-19 wave in winter 2021/2022. In response to this risk, the ad-40 ministration of an additional vaccine dose, the booster shot, is being implemented worldwide. Here, in a projected 41 study with an outlook of six months, we explore the interplay between the rate at which boosters are distributed 42 and the extent to which testing practices are implemented, using a highly granular agent-based model tuned on a 43 medium-sized U.S. town. Theoretical projections indicate that the administration of boosters at the rate at which 44 the vaccine is currently administered could yield a severe resurgence of the pandemic, even worse than the first 45 wave experienced in spring and summer 2020. Our projections suggest that the peak levels of mid spring 2021 in 46 the vaccination rate may prevent the occurrence of such a scenario. Our study highlights the importance of test-47 ing, especially to detect infection of asymptomatic individuals in the very near future, as the release of the booster 48 reaches full speed. 49

50 1 Introduction

Winter and spring 2021 marked a long-awaited massive vaccination campaign against COVID-51 19, starting approximately one year after the inception of the outbreak. As of the mid-52 September 2021, 42.6% of the World and 63.8% of the U.S. population took at least one 53 dose of the vaccine, while 30.8% and 54.5%, respectively, are fully vaccinated.^[1] However. 54 approaching fall 2021 brings to light a new unknown: the possibility of waning vaccination 55 immunity and the consequent need for an additional vaccine dose —the booster shot.^[2] 56 There is evidence that the booster shot would not only restore the original protection, but 57 would also enhance people's immunity against the most recent variants, including the widely 58 dominant and highly transmittable Delta variant.^[3, 4] Many countries, including the U.S., 59 are starting their re-vaccination campaigns, in an attempt to prevent new outbreaks ac-60 companied by socially and economically disastrous restrictions.^[3, 5, 6] 61 In the original (August 2021) schedule of booster shot administration by the U.S. Centers 62 for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the booster campaign was expected to start 63 on September 20th, 2021, with booster shots available to all the adults in the U.S. eight 64 months after they took their second vaccine dose, with plans for expansion to people tak-65 ing the one-dose Johnson&Johnson vaccine.^[2] At the same time, despite a surge in new in-66 fection cases^[7] and the nationwide dominance of the Delta variant,^[8] non-pharmaceutical 67 interventions (NPIs) are gradually being relaxed,^[9] and preparations for a return to full-68 time in-person education and work are underway.^[10, 11] Following mass vaccinations, COVID-69 19 testing is continuously reduced,^[12, 13] with the enforcement of mandatory testing slowly 70 abandoned by public health authorities^[13] and contact-tracing home-isolation no longer re-71 quired for fully vaccinated individuals;^[9, 14] not to mention the ongoing trend in encourag-72 ing indoor gatherings (e.g., restaurants, bars, gyms) for the fully vaccinated. In this evolv-73 ing scenario, scientifically backed policy-making is of paramount importance. 74 Mathematical modeling has played a key role in assisting public health authorities to com-75 bat the COVID-19 pandemic.^[15, 16] Since COVID-19 onset, mathematical models are be-76 ing routinely used to forecast the course of the pandemic and guide policymakers' decisions 77 on several chief issues, including the enforcing of NPIs,^[17, 18, 19, 20, 21] the design of testing 78 policies,^[22, 23] the implementation of contact tracing,^[24, 25, 26, 27] and the implementation of 79 vaccination campaigns in light of the concurrent uplifting of NPIs.^[28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] 80

Mathematical modeling can also play a critical role in the present scenario, where vaccine-81 induced immunity seems to be waning,^[36, 37, 38, 39] testing coverage is being lowered,^[12, 13] 82 and a booster shot campaign is going to be implemented.^[2] The interplay of these critical 83 issues has received only limited attention so far. Layton et al.^[4] have simulated the emer-84 gence of new virus strains, including hypothetical deadlier variants in Ontario, Canada, in 85 light of realistic vaccination and booster campaigns implemented in the region. Their re-86 sults, projected until the end of 2021, point out the need of vigilance and readiness to re-87 instate severe NPIs, as well as the possible importance of a large-scale campaign of booster 88 shots. Over longer time horizons, other studies have been carried out to evaluate the po-89 tential benefits of annual re-vaccination campaigns against COVID-19. In particular, Song 90 et al.^[40] have simulated different scenarios in the loss of immunity, spanning until 2029. 91 Their findings indicate that an annual re-vaccination campaign could avoid future COVID-92 19 outbreaks if the vaccine is sufficiently efficacious and provides at least six months of 93 protection. Sandmann et al.^[41] have compared the economic burden of introducing a regular vaccination program in the U.K. to the cost associated with implementing social distancing measures for the next decade. Their work highlights the benefits of re-vaccination 96 schemes, evidencing that they would allow to avoid large outbreaks and consequent restric-97 tions. Lastly, Li et al.^[42] have compared different re-vaccination strategies in 15 countries 98 over the next 20 years in terms of long-term efficacy. Their findings identify a public health qq benefit in alternating re-vaccination between fragile older strata and highly active portions 100 of the population, who habitually generate a high number of contacts. 101

Although conclusive evidence on the waning immunity of the vaccine and on its timing is yet to be established,^[36, 37, 38, 39, 43] these studies offer an improved understanding of the potential benefits of re-vaccination campaigns for a range of possible waning profiles. Yet, this knowledge does not immediately translate into predictions on the short-term roll-out of booster shots, which could be critical in shaping the future of the pandemic. Moreover, the long-term predictions of most of these studies are limited to coarse-grained considerations, which cannot take into account granular details of the population.

Here, we fill in this gap by providing a systematic study of the effectiveness of a re-vaccination
campaign in the ongoing 2021–2022 fall/winter season, considering as key factors the rate
of administration of booster shots and the population coverage of testing policies imple-

mented during this phase. We perform our study by means of a high-resolution agent-based 112 model (ABM), which faithfully provides a one-to-one digital reproduction of a real, medium-113 sized U.S. town. As a test case, we simulate COVID-19 spreading in the town of New Rochelle, 114 NY, for the next six months, expanding on our previous efforts published in previous issues 115 of this journal.^[23, 34] The town of New Rochelle is chosen as a representative medium-sized 116 US town, characterized by high levels of diversity and inequality.^[44, 45] The digital town 117 closely mirrors the geography and demographics of the actual one, including household dis-118 tribution, lifestyles, and mobility patterns of its residents, thereby incorporating the diver-119 sity of its population and potential inequalities across its fabric. The progression model is 120 expanded to include salient features of the predominant Delta variant,^[8] booster shot cam-121 paign, and co-existence of three vaccines (Johnson&Johnson, Pfizer, and Moderna) provid-122 ing different levels of protection over time, with a gradual waning immunity. The level of 123 detail in the model allows us to closely study the combined effect of booster shot adminis-124 tration and testing practices in this stage of the pandemic. The study was designed based 125 on information about the pandemic gathered during summer 2021; some of the original 126 design assumptions have changed during the first part of fall 2021,^[2] These changes have 127 prompted new simulation studies, which show robustness of our findings and are included 128 as part of Supporting Information. 129

¹³⁰ 2 Computational framework

¹³¹ Our computational framework consists of two components: a detailed database of the town ¹³² of New Rochelle, NY, and a high-resolution ABM that reproduces the spread of COVID-19 ¹³³ at a one-to-one granularity level that includes mobility patterns among households, schools, ¹³⁴ workplaces, and non-essential locations (including leisure locations).

The database of the town contains geographical coordinates of every building, residential and public. Public buildings include governmental institutions and private companies of any kind, open to the general population —the public. The database includes any workplace and non-essential locations, identified using SafeGraph,^[46] explicitly distinguishing schools, retirement homes, and hospitals. Town population is recreated using U.S. Census data on residents age, household and family structure, education, and employment characteristics. Residents can work and gather in New Rochelle, and in its vicinity, including
New York City. They commute to work via common means such as public transit, cars, or
carpools, and visit each other in private.

Each resident of New Rochelle is mapped into an agent in the ABM, resulting in 79,205 144 agents. In the ABM, agents are characterized by a health state that can change accord-145 ing to a disease progression model detailed in the following, and they can take two types 146 of tests — safe, contact-less car tests, and more risky ones performed in a hospital. If in-147 fected, agents may undergo three types of treatment — home isolation, routine hospitaliza-148 tion, and hospitalization in intensive care unit (ICU). The ABM was originally proposed in 149 Truszkowska et al.,^[23] while a later extension of the work incorporated a simplified version 150 of the vaccination campaign.^[34] Details on the generation of the synthetic population can 151 be found in Section 2 of Truszkowska et al.^[23] 152

For this projective study, we tailored the ABM to capture the scenario as of fall 2021, thereby introducing realistic and time-dependent vaccination effects, booster shots, increased mobility of fully vaccinated agents, and CDC-compliant contact-tracing measures.^[14, 47, 48] In the following, we detail these new features. For details on the other features of the model, the reader should refer to our previous publications.^[23, 34] Figure 1 schematically illustrates major components of our computational framework.

¹⁵⁹ 2.1 COVID-19 progression model

In our model, all the agents who are not infected, with exception of those recently recovered, are susceptible to COVID-19. Once infected, agents can undergo testing and treatment. Agents who are not symptomatic can get vaccinated, and anyone can be contacttraced and home-isolated.

The progression model is shown in Fig 2. A susceptible agent (S) can be vaccinated (S_v) , may be home isolated, irrespective of their vaccination status, as a result of a home-isolation order due to a contact with an agent with a confirmed COVID-19 infection (I_{CT}) . Isolation may also be triggered if a susceptible agent has COVID-19-like symptoms due to some other disease, such as seasonal influenza (I_{Hm}) . Agents can be tested, via one of the two available testing types, in a car (T_c) or in a hospital (T_{Hs}) . The former type is considered contact-less and safe, while the latter carries infection risks. Complete details on testing




Figure 1: Schematic outline of the ABM computational framework. The database of New Rochelle, NY, includes geographical information of every residential and public building in the town. It also incorporates workplaces and non-essential venues in the area as many town residents work outside of town and some frequent non-essential locations locations in its vicinity. Each resident is represented as an agent. The population faithfully mirrors the sociodemographic profile of the actual one. The top-right panel shows the age distribution of agents, as registered in the U.S. Census data. The pie chart represents the percentage of households with the indicated size, also in close agreement with the Census (values omitted for clarity). COVID-19 spreads through contacts at different locations associated with the agents, and infected agents can be tested and treated. Positive test result triggers contact tracing, resulting in CDC-compliant home-isolation of potentially exposed individuals. Finally, the platform models imperfect, realistic vaccines, which grant a number of benefits, and wane with time. After eight months, vaccinated agents become eligible for an additional vaccine dose, the booster shot.

procedures and the corresponding parameters are outlined in our two previous works.^[23, 34].
Specifically, we refer to Section 3.3 of Truszkowska et al.^[23] for more details on the testing
procedures and to Table S4 in the Supporting information of Truszkowska et al.^[34] for up-

174 dated parameters.

Susceptible individuals may become infected upon interactions with infectious individuals 175 who are in the same building. The same building may have a role in multiple spreading 176 pathways; for instance, a school provides pathways of infection between students, and stu-177 dents and teachers, but it is also the workplace for its teachers. Infections occur according 178 to a probabilistic mechanism that accounts for differences in infection probability with re-179 spect to the characteristics of the location and the number, role, and symptomatic state of 180 infectious individuals in the location, as detailed in Truszkowska et al.^[23, 34] (see the Sup-181 porting Information for more details and precise references). Specifically, following Fergu-182 son et al.,^[49] we assumed that symptomatic individuals are twice as much likely to trans-183 mit the disease than asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic individuals. For non-essential lo-184 cations, like leisure ones, we neglect spreading between employees and visitors, while re-185 taining spreading within the two groups. This choice was motivated by the enforced use of 186 personal protective equipment and social distancing toward minimizing contagions between 187 employees and customers. 188

Upon infection, a susceptible agent becomes exposed (E), not showing symptoms of the 189 disease. The exposed agent can also get vaccinated (E_v) as long as their infection status is 190 not known. Even without any symptom, exposed agents can be tested and home isolated. 191 Agents can either recover after being asymptomatic (R), or develop symptoms after the la-192 tency period and transition to the symptomatic state (Sy). Symptomatic agents cannot 193 get vaccinated, which is also the case for agents with symptoms similar to COVID-19 due 194 to another disease. However, vaccinated agents can become symptomatic as a result of an 195 infection (Sy_v) , potentially leading to milder symptoms. 196

¹⁹⁷ Agents with symptoms can test and subsequently receive treatment through home isola-¹⁹⁸ tion (I_{Hm}) , normal hospitalization (H_N) , or hospitalization in an intensive care unit, ICU ¹⁹⁹ (H_{ICU}) . Agents can either recover or die (D). Symptomatic and exposed agents can also ²⁰⁰ get contact traced, and home isolated on that account. A contact-traced symptomatic agent ²⁰¹ will undergo treatment regardless of their testing status. Recovered agents are temporar-

ily immune to COVID-19 and, after a certain period of time, they can also be vaccinated. 202 Once their natural immunity is lost, these agents transition to the vaccinated susceptible 203 category (S_v) . Recovered agents who do not receive the vaccine spontaneously lose natural 204 immunity after a fixed period of time. Based on some (possibly conservative) estimations,^[50, 51, 52, 53] 205 in our simulations we fixed such a period to six months. Additional simulations to assess 206 the robustness of our findings with respect to different duration of natural immunity (loss 207 of natural immunity after four or eight months) are reported in the Supporting Information 208 (Figs. S5–S6). 209

²¹⁰ Contact-traced agents cannot be vaccinated, and even if susceptible; they become vaccine-

²¹¹ eligible only after some period of time. These restrictions hold for the booster shots as well.

All the parameters that characterize the transitions in the COVID-19 progression model

²¹³ are listed in Table S4 in the Supporting Information. An explicit expression of the conta-

gion probability for each agent i, $p_i(t)$, depending on the agent's characteristics (including

²¹⁵ lifestyle, workplace or school, household in which they live) can be found in our previous ²¹⁶ publications (see Section 4.4 of Truszkowska et al.^[34]). The main elements of novelty of the ²¹⁷ present modeling extension include realistic treatments of the effect of vaccination and con-²¹⁸ tact tracing and are detailed in the following.

²¹⁹ 2.2 Vaccinations

An agent can get vaccinated with one of the three vaccine types distributed in the area according to their availability. We considered one vaccine mirroring the one-dose Johnson&Johnson (abbreviated as J), and two vaccines with the characteristics of the two-dose Pfizer and Moderna vaccines (abbreviated as P and M, respectively). The probability of being administered a given vaccine type was computed based on data collected manually on actual vaccine offer in the town, as of late July 2021, see Table S5 in the Supporting Information.^[54]

Once agent *i* is vaccinated, five of the model parameters related to the individual are modified accordingly. Specifically, four quantities decrease upon vaccination: (1) the probability of being infected by SARS-CoV-2, (2) the transmission rate if infected, (3) the probability of requiring hospitalization, and (4) of dying if infected. Conversely, (5) the probability being asymptomatic when infected increases upon vaccination.




Figure 2: Diagram of the COVID-19 epidemic progression. Agents' health states are susceptible (S), exposed (E), and symptomatic (Sy). Since a vaccination does not grant 100% immunity, and exposed agents can be vaccinated, the progression distinguishes those three health states in their vaccination version, S_v , E_v , and Sy_v . Susceptible and exposed agents can be tested and home isolated (I_{Hm}) . Testing can take place in a contact-less form in a car (T_c) or in a hospital (T_{Hs}) . All the agents can be subject to contact tracing and subsequent home-isolation (I_{CT}) . Exposed agent may recover without ever developing symptoms (R), or become symptomatic after a latency period. Symptomatic agents can undergo testing and subsequent treatment through home isolation (I_{Hm}) , normal hospitalization (H_N) , or hospitalization in an intensive care unit, ICU (H_{ICU}) . They can either recover or die (D). A recovered agent, if not already vaccinated, can vaccinate as well (R_v) . Recovered agents are temporarily immune to the disease and after some period of time they become susceptible again, regardless of their vaccination status.

To model such a temporal effect, for each vaccine $\alpha = J, P, M$ and for each model parameter k = 1, ..., 5, we introduce a function $\gamma_{\alpha,k}(s)$, which models the effect of vaccine α on parameter k as a multiplicative coefficient, s days after vaccine administration. As an example, the probability of COVID-19 infection $p_i^v(t)$ for agent i vaccinated with vaccine α at time t_i is reduced compared to the original probability in the absence of vaccination $p_i(t)$ to

$$p_{i}^{v}(t) := \gamma_{\alpha,1} \left(t - t_{i} \right) p_{i}(t) \,. \tag{1}$$

Similar expressions can be written for the other four properties (see the Supporting Information for more details).

The shape of these functions is estimated from efficacy data on vaccines. Specifically, they 240 are all defined as piece-wise linear functions. For the one-dose vaccine, they increase up to 241 their most favorable values two weeks after the shot (smaller than one for property k =242 $1, \ldots, 4$ and greater than 1 for property 5). In case of two-dose vaccines, the functions lin-243 early interpolate efficacy values collected at the time of the first shot, of the second one, 244 and at the attainment of full immunity. The second dose is always contemplated in the 245 model, following local vaccination campaign that sets the appointment for the second shot 246 at the time the first shot is administered, one month later.^[55] The peak benefits for all three 247 vaccine types last for an eight-month period following recent studies on the humoral and 248 cellular immune responses.^[37, 36] In this period, the functions have a constant value. 249 The scientific community has not yet reached consensus on the duration of such period. 250 Studies by Barouch et al.^[36] and Colliet et al.^[37] provide only a lower-bound on it, whereas 251 some preliminary analyses based on epidemic data collected over summer 2021 in coun-252 tries with fast vaccination campaigns (for instance, Israel and Qatar) suggest shorter du-253 ration of peak-level immunity.^[38, 39] To strengthen the robustness of our claims, some para-254 metric studies encompassing different timings of the waning vaccine immunity (six and 10 255 months) and a delay in the effect of the vaccine are considered and discussed in the Sup-256 porting Information (Figs. S3–S4 and S9). 257

Once the peak-benefit period is over, benefits start to gradually wane, yielding a gradual loss of immunity. Here, we assume that such an immunity is totally lost over the course of the following six months. This is modeled by letting the functions $\gamma_{\alpha,k}$ linearly approach 1, over a period of six months.

Following the original CDC guidelines, we assume that people are eligible for booster shots 262 starting from eight months after their second vaccine dose.^[2] We hypothesize that the booster 263 shot restores peak vaccination benefits in one day after its administration and beneficial ef-264 fects remain constant for a period that is longer than the simulation horizon (that is, six 265 months). The exact expressions of all the mathematical functions modeling such a phe-266 nomenon and details on their estimations are reported in the Supporting Information. 267 Agents 12 years and older can vaccinate. We model local vaccine hesitancy using an upper 268 bound on the vaccination coverage in the town. Specifically, no more than 64,364 people 269 are considered as eligible for vaccination (approximately the 81% of the population), com-270 puted as a projection based on the temporal evolution of the number of new vaccinations 271 in New York State,^[1, 56] re-scaled to the population of New Rochelle. An agent is consid-272 ered fully vaccinated two weeks after their shot of a one-dose vaccine, or two weeks after 273 the second shot of a two-dose vaccine. A fully vaccinated agent is more socially active, and 274 is more likely to visit other agents or non-essential venues, as detailed in Table S4 in the 275 Supporting Information. 276

277 2.3 Contact tracing

²⁷⁸ Contact tracing is implemented in the model by complying with local guidelines,^[14, 47, 48] in ²⁷⁹ accordance to their stricter version issued in winter 2021. When an agent is tested positive ²⁸⁰ to COVID-19 (we contemplated a realistic quota of false positives corresponding to 5% of ²⁸¹ the tests^[57]), their household members and all the agents with whom they carpool, in case ²⁸² this is their transit mode to work, are immediately home-isolated.

Moreover, a predetermined number of coworkers is home-isolated. To account for realis-283 tic implementation of contact tracing, we bound the maximum number of home-isolated 284 coworkers to a given value of 10 and the same upper bound is used throughout for schools 285 and residents. In particular, contact tracing of a retirement home employee results in home-286 isolating 10 residents in addition to coworkers. Conversely, a confirmed positive resident 287 leads to home-isolating 10 other residents and employees. With respect to schools, the gran-288 ularity of our model was set to the single school. Hence, contact tracing of a student who 289 tested positive is modeled by home-isolating 10 students of the same age from that agent's 290 school, plus one teacher. The same logic applies also upon tracing a teacher, with a ran-291

²⁹² dom choice of 10 same-aged students to be home-isolated.

Finally, since agents visit each other in private, we model contact tracing imposing homeisolation to the entire households visited by a COVID-19 positive agent during the course of 14 days preceding the time the agent was determined positive, according to local policies. Due to the limited supervision on restrictions to private visits, we accounted for reduced compliance, estimating such a parameter from the literature, see Table S4 in the Supporting Information.

In the model, home-isolation is implemented by placing the agent in home isolation for a period of 10 days. Afterwards, the agent continues to monitor themselves for COVID-19 symptoms for a duration of 4 days, reflecting the guidelines. If during this two-week period the agent develops COVID-19 symptoms, they are assigned to an adequate treatment, regardless their testing status. Finally, following the guidelines, fully vaccinated agents still have to home-isolate, and negative test results do not shorten the home-isolation duration.

305 2.4 Simulation setup

Simulations are initialized with a predetermined number of COVID-19 infected agents in 306 the two phases of the disease, that is, exposed or symptomatic, to mimic real conditions in 307 the town. These initial cases can be in different testing stages and undergo treatment. An 308 initial number of vaccinated agents is also contemplated, based on the data collected from 309 the vaccination campaign put in place between January 2021 and the start of the simula-310 tion. We assume that each of the 51,342 individuals already vaccinated at the beginning of 311 the simulations has received their first shot in a randomly chosen day between the begin-312 ning of the vaccination campaign in January 2021 and September 7th 2021 (see the Sup-313 porting Information for the temporal distribution of first shots), resulting in different level 314 of immunity at the beginning of the simulations for these vaccinated agents. In the Sup-315 porting Information, we also provide some additional simulations to show robustness of our 316 findings with respect to different approximations of the temporal distribution of first shots 317 (see Fig. S10). 318

³¹⁹ Model parameters related to vaccinations and contact tracing are based on the literature ³²⁰ and official releases from the CDC,^[58] as detailed in the above. The characteristics of dif-³²¹ ferent vaccine types are based on official CDC and Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

releases^[59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64] and are outlined in detail in the Supporting Information. As indicated therein, in the absence of confirmed values, we either interpolated between the known benefit levels, or we used them for scaling. The parameters used in our contact tracing practices are also listed in Table S4 in the Supporting Information, where our assumptions on the number of contacts each agent has in their workplaces, schools, and other visited locations, are detailed. The complete parameter set and all the modeling assumptions are detailed in Table S4 in the Supporting Information.

329 **3** Results

Our simulations projected COVID-19 spreading over a time span of six months starting 330 from September 7th 2021. At this time, most of the town residents eligible for a vaccine 331 had received their vaccination earlier in the year. Specifically, 51.342 residents were vac-332 cinated with at least one dose as of September 7th 2021.^[56] As the first dose was admin-333 istered in January 2021, during the six-month simulation window many of the vaccinated 334 residents would lose their immunity (see Fig. S2b in the Supporting Information). The types 335 of the vaccines and their effects mirrored those that were distributed in the area and in-336 cluded the two double-dose vaccines (Moderna and Pfizer) and one single-dose vaccine (John-337 son&Johnson), see Table S5 in the Supporting Information. Per the original, August 2021 338 CDC guidelines, an agent was set to start losing their immunity at approximately eight 339 months after they become fully vaccinated.^[2] At this time, they become eligible for a booster 340 shot, which would restore their peak resistance to the virus, thereby immunizing again the 341 population at the rate set by the administration. Booster shots in the model are distributed 342 alongside regular vaccination doses. In every simulation, only a fixed number of shots can 343 be administered each day, in the form of booster or first shots, with no particular prioriti-344 zation. For example, a rate of twenty vaccines per day implies that twenty randomly cho-345 sen, eligible agents will receive their vaccine dose that day, either their first or their booster 346 shot, according to their vaccination status. 347

3.1 Curbing an upcoming wave requires a vaccination rate at least equal to the rate in spring 2021

To quantify the impact of the vaccination rate on the spread of COVID-19, we performed simulations with two different rates: 0.58% and 0.11% of the total population per day. These two values correspond to the maximum first-dose vaccination rate attained at the beginning of April 2021 and the rate registered in early September 2021, respectively.^[56] The former represents an optimal scenario, which can be achieved only if local authorities implement large, temporary vaccination centers or other viable alternatives; the latter could be considered as a worst case scenario of low vaccination rate.

In our simulations, whose outcome is illustrated in Fig. 3, we assumed that highly effective testing practices were enacted during the entire period. In particular, we hypothesized that each symptomatic agent was tested with probability equal to 80%, while such a probability was reduced to 40% for asymptomatic agents. These parameters are representative of optimal testing practices,^[65] and they are used to illustrate that, even under optimistic assumptions on the efficacy of testing practices, low vaccination rates may lead to tremendous increases in infections and death toll.

We compared the number of infections and death toll for the two vaccination rates for six 364 months starting from September 7th, 2021. Results from Fig. 3 show that, for the higher 365 vaccination rate (green curves), the number of active cases should start decreasing from 366 mid-October. The average peak of active cases should exceed 400 active cases per day, and 367 then it should quickly drop in few weeks, potentially reaching the end of the outbreak at 368 the beginning of 2022. On the contrary, the current vaccination rate (red curves) would 369 lead to a 50% increase in number of cases per day during fall 2021. Even more alarming is 370 the projection that it would not be sufficient to eradicate the disease, leading to a possible 371 slow rise in number of cases during winter 2022, and potentially a resurgent wave in spring 372 2022. These results indicate the need to maintain a fast pace during the booster campaign 373 toward curbing potential upcoming waves and quickly eradicating the disease. 374

In all the simulations, we observed an initial phase in which the number of cases steadily increases. We believe that such an increase could be caused by an underestimation of the initial number of infected individuals, due to under-detection in the officially reported data used to initialize the simulations. However, such an initial increase does not impact our in-




Figure 3: COVID-19 spreading over six months from September 7th 2021, amid two different vaccination campaigns. Active cases, total number of infections, and total deaths for the next six months at either peak vaccination rate of 0.58% population/day (green) or present vaccination rate of 0.11% population/day (red). For each scenario, 100 independent realizations are shown and their average is highlighted. The vertical lines denote the date at which the entire non-hesitant eligible population is expected to be vaccinated with at least one shot. 16

sights into the effects of waning immunity, as more than 88% of the individuals vaccinated
during spring and summer 2021 has still full immunity at the end of October 2021 (see
Fig. S2b in the Supporting Information). To support the insights of our numerical analysis, we performed a set of additional simulations to show robustness of our findings with
respect to different assumptions on the underestimation of the initial number of infected
individuals. These simulations are reported in Figs. S7 and S8 in the Supporting Information.

³⁸⁶ 3.2 Testing is still needed, even with high vaccination rates

We also investigated the role of testing and contact tracing implemented during the booster shot campaign, toward elucidating the impact of these practices, their interplay with the vaccination rate, and, ultimately, to understand whether massive testing campaigns are still needed in this phase.

We conducted a parametric study by varying the vaccination rate and the overall efficacy 391 of testing practices over a two-dimensional grid. Specifically, we considered re-vaccination 392 rates ranging between 0.01–5% of the population per day. These two extreme values repre-393 sent scenarios in which the entire re-vaccination campaign would last more than 20 years 394 or just 20 days. For context, the first-dose peak vaccination rate was 0.58% during April 395 2021 and the lowest rate was 0.027% in mid-summer 2021.^[56] The efficacy of the testing 396 practices was encapsulated by a global parameter, termed "testing efficacy," which mea-397 sures the probability that a symptomatic agent is tested. In the simulations, we varied such 398 a parameter from 10% to 100%, representing scattered to ideal testing. 399

We performed these parametric studies within three different detection scenarios, accord-400 ing to the ability of detecting pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic agents (hereby, referred 401 to as exposed): high detection (in which exposed agents are tested with the same proba-402 bility of symptomatic ones), medium detection (in which the probability for an exposed in-403 dividual to be tested is reduced by 50% with respect to the one of a symptomatic agent), 404 and low detection (in which exposed agents reduce the probability of being tested to 10%405 of the one of symptomatic agents). While high detection of exposed is ideal —but likely 406 unrealistic, since asymptomatic infections are more difficult to be detected without a mas-407 sive implementation of testing practices and contact tracing— medium detection could be 408




Figure 4: Interplay between re-vaccination rates and testing efficacy. Two-dimensional heat-maps showing the combined effect of vaccination rate and testing efficacy on the total number of infected and deaths over a period of six months starting from September 7th 2021. Three different detection levels of exposed agents capture a range of contact tracing efforts.

⁴⁰⁹ a realistic proxy of testing practices seen since the onset of the pandemic,^[65] and low de-⁴¹⁰ tection could potentially represent a scenario in which most routine testing practices are ⁴¹¹ disbanded.

Our results, shown in Fig 4, highlight the need to continue testing during the upcoming booster shot campaign. In particular, for all the examined detection scenarios, testing less than 20–30% of symptomatic agents always resulted in a dramatic increase of infections and deaths. To overcome the ensuing surge it would necessary to apply unprecedentedly high vaccination rates of 1–5% of the total population per day, likely beyond the capacity of the healthcare system that we have seen in spring 2021.

⁴¹⁸ Our results also emphasize that detecting pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic agents is a ⁴¹⁹ critical issue. In fact, for all combinations of re-vaccination rate and testing efficacy, re-⁴²⁰ duced detection of such agents results in a many-fold increase of total number of infec-⁴²¹ tions and deaths. For example, with low detection of exposed agents (third scenario, in

 $_{422}$ blue in Fig. 4), the number of deaths may exceed over 600 (that is, approximately 0.8% of

the population of the town), reaching peaks of more than 1,000 deaths in the worst case
scenarios of both low testing efficacy and low re-vaccination rates. Further evidence on
the key role of contact tracing comes from an additional set of simulations (reported in
Fig. S11 in the Supporting Information), in which no contact tracing practices are enacted.
The results of these simulations suggest that, in the absence of any form of contact tracing,
the COVID-10 death toll can dramatically increase, even in the scenario of fast re- vaccination rates.

430 4 Discussion and conclusion

The chief goal of this work was to systematically analyze the spread of COVID-19 in the 431 upcoming 2021 fall/winter season, as immunity gained due to vaccination wanes over the 432 year and testing practices change. Toward this aim, we extended a mathematical model de-433 signed in our previous efforts,^[23, 34] a high-resolution ABM of a medium-sized U.S. town 434 faithfully reproducing spatial layout, demographics, and lifestyles of urban areas, to quan-435 tify the effects of a range of vaccination and testing efforts. As in our previous studies, we 436 focused on the town of New Rochelle, NY, which was the location of one of the first COVID-437 19 outbreaks in the U.S.. New Rochelle is representative of many towns in the country and 438 is characterized by high levels of diversity and potential inequalities.^[44, 45] 439

Complementing our earlier efforts, we enhanced the capabilities of the computational frame-440 work along three main directions. First, we considered realistic types and administration 441 of vaccines, as well as time-varying vaccination benefits, including waning immunity after 442 a tunable period^[36, 37, 38, 39] and administration of a booster shot.^[2] Second, natural im-443 munity achieved through recovery was also considered to be no longer permanent.^[50, 51] 444 Third, we modeled contact tracing, consistent with the CDC and local health department 445 guidelines.^[14, 47, 48] Overall, the current model is a highly realistic and detailed digital rep-446 resentation of the town and its residents, with the resolution of a single individual, thus 447 allowing for reliable "what-if" analyses of the epidemic during the upcoming fall/winter 448 season. Equipped with a new parameter set tuned on the now-dominant Delta variant, we 449 studied the local outcome of the interplay between the rate of vaccination and efficacy of 450 testing practices. 451

Predictably, we found that low testing efficacy may lead to a disastrous increase in both in-452 fections and deaths, irrespective of vaccination efforts of any intensity. In fact, low testing 453 efficacy seems to hamper any benefits that would be offered by realistic re-vaccination cam-454 paigns. The final count of cases and casualties would be substantially independent of vac-455 cination rates, unless booster shots were administered to more than 1% population per day 456 (an unrealistic scenario, since it exceeds the peak vaccination rate during spring 2021). For 457 low-to-moderate testing efficacy, vaccination rates below 0.5% consistently lead to a case 458 and death toll comparable with those experienced during the first wave.^[23] 459

These results, in agreement with other studies on testing practices during previous phases of the COVID-19 pandemic,^[66, 27] highlight the central role of testing, contact tracing, and home-isolation in the fight against COVID-19 and echo the "Path out of the Pandemic," presented by the U.S. Government on September 10th, 2021, as part of "President Biden's COVID-19 Plan."^[67]

To contain COVID-19 mortality below the level of the first wave, we predict that at least 465 0.5% of population per day should be immunized/re-immunized, as testing and contact 466 tracing are carried out with moderate efficacy. Such a 0.5% vaccination rate is not unrea-467 sonable, as it is comparable to the average vaccination rate during the peak of the spring 468 2021 vaccination campaign.^[56] However, such a peak vaccination rate was accompanied by 469 large, temporary vaccination centers that no longer exist. Hence, local authorities might 470 need to restore these temporary vaccination centers or provide viable alternatives, to keep 471 the administration of boosters at the desired rate. On the contrary, vaccination rates be-472 low 0.5% might lead to scenarios that are worse than those recorded in spring 2020.^[68] In 473 particular, using a vaccination rate equal to that adopted in September 2021 would lead 474 to a potentially disastrous rise in the number of infections around the beginning of 2022. 475 While the number of deaths projected in this scenario are still lower than those occurred 476 in the first wave, likely due to reduced mortality rates of vaccinated individuals, the steep 477 increase portends that this number would ultimately overcome first wave figures. 478

These projections emphasize the importance for a booster shot, in line with the "President Biden's COVID-19 Plan"^[67] that highlights the need of "further protecting the vaccinated" (with the booster shot). To efficiently combat the spread, the booster shot campaign should be conducted on a scale close to the one implemented during the peak im-

munization efforts in spring 2021. Similar conclusions have been drawn by other authors. 483 For example, Layton et al.^[4] report doubling of deaths by late December 2021 in Ontario, 484 Canada, as a consequence of reducing the baseline vaccination rate by 20%. Sandmann et 485 al.^[41] predict the occurrence of up to two annual COVID-19 waves in the UK, whose mag-186 nitudes are strictly tied to vaccine efficacy and active NPIs. In the worst case scenario, it 487 is expected that there will be a new wave this fall, with a magnitude comparable, or even 488 higher, than the one observed during 2020. Similarly, Song et al.^[40] indicate reoccurring 489 new surges in the worst cases of vaccination efficacy and immunity duration, and a con-490 stant, but non-zero COVID-19 incidence in the best scenarios, starting from mid-2021. 491 Testing of symptomatic individuals plays a key role in controlling the spread, especially 492 when it is accompanied by moderate contact tracing efforts. Seen from another perspec-493 tive, testing a mere 40% of the symptomatic individuals with moderate contact tracing 494 efforts should avoid exceeding mortality rates of the first wave. Beyond a 60% testing ef-495 ficacy, the effect of increased testing is diluted and higher vaccination rates are needed to 496 bring' down mortality rates. While testing levels of 40% or above are achievable.^[69] as they 497 are comparable with the estimates for the late summer 2020 in France^[65] they are still chal-498 lenging to attain. Reducing delays in testing and contact tracing could offer a pathway to 499 mitigate difficulties in reaching high testing levels.^[26, 27] 500

Likewise, the detection of asymptomatic individuals is of paramount importance to com-501 bat the spreading. In particular, going from high- to low-detection of such individuals more 502 than doubles the number of cases and deaths. This finding is consistent with the literature, 503 whereby efficacious tracking of the asymptomatic individuals has been shown to arrest the 504 progression of the spread of the virus.^[70, 71] High detection rates can be realized with ag-505 gressive contact tracing strategies that can identify stranger contacts in addition to close 506 contacts.^[72] At the same time, while it is reasonable that most people who develop symp-507 toms or are informed of exposure to an infected individual will isolate, and possibly test, 508 detecting asymptomatic individuals could become progressively more difficult, especially 509 with general decline in social distancing practices and lifting of mandatory testing by many 510 employers and institutions.^[13] 511

⁵¹² While insightful, our results are not free from limitations. Though calibrated in real data, ⁵¹³ the high granularity of our model comes at a cost of a series of assumptions. Importantly,

⁵¹⁴ immunity due to vaccination was modeled based on educated guesses due to limited data ⁵¹⁵ availability. Except for waning immunity benefits from vaccination, all the parameters in ⁵¹⁶ our simulations were time-invariant; in real settings factors such as NPIs or testing cover-⁵¹⁷ age are likely to change in response to emerging situations^[73, 74] and, likewise, vaccination ⁵¹⁸ rates to dynamically change. Moreover, we tested the general, uninfected population in a ⁵¹⁹ non-random fashion, and contact tracing guidelines within our model were more conserva-⁵²⁰ tive than those currently in-place.

Concerning the timing and profile of waning immunity, in our study we made several as-521 sumptions based on the knowledge available at the time of writing the paper. We acknowl-522 edge that the scientific community has yet to reach complete consensus. Specifically, we 523 set immunity benefits from vaccination to start to gradually wane after a period of eight 524 months from peak-level immunity. This is in accordance with recent studies on the hu-525 moral and cellular immune responses, which indicates eight-months as a lower-bound on 526 this period.^[36, 37] However, other studies suggest different, and potentially shorter, timings.^[38, 39] 521 thereby conclusive evidence is yet to be established.^[43] Similar uncertainty seems to be 528 present on the duration of natural immunity,^[50, 51, 52, 53] which, in this work, was chosen 529 to last for six months. To partially address these uncertainties, we performed a paramet-530 ric study that is reported in the Supporting Information, which ensure that our qualitative 531 findings and observations are robust to changes in the timing and profile of the waning im-532 munity. 533

The study design was based on information about the pandemic gathered during summer 534 2021. In particular, in the original (August 2021) schedule, booster shots were planned to 535 be available to all the adults in the U.S. eight months after they took their second vaccine 536 dose.^[2] This schedule has changed several times, as currently COVID-19 vaccine booster 537 shots are available for some categories of people who completed their initial series at least 538 six months ago (for Pfizer and Moderna), or two months ago (for Johnson&Johnson).^[75] 539 New changes to such a plan are expected in the near future, as the "President Biden's COVID-540 19 Plan" suggests "to quickly get booster shots into the arms of eligible Americans once 541 approved."^[67] As scenarios are rapidly changing in the U.S. and throughout the globe, we 542 have opted to adhere to the original CDC guidelines for our simulations. We believe that 543 the additional simulations in the Supporting Information (Figs. S3–S4) provide some in-544

sights into this issue, suggesting that the rate of vaccination is more important than its actual timing, to avoid potential, resurgent outbreaks in late winter/spring 2022.

The need to administer booster shots must also be put in context with respect to medical, 547 social, and moral concerns.^[3, 76] First, the waning of immunity is still not confirmed with 548 certainty[43], and the health effects of an additional dose remain, to some extent, unexplored.^[3] 549 It cannot be excluded that an additional dose may only selectively boost the efficacy for 550 individuals who are immunocompromised or whose initial vaccination had low efficacy.^[77] 551 Also, any adverse effects of the booster dose may have a negative impact to the vaccine 552 acceptance.^[77] Second, with less than 5% of the populations in low income countries being 553 fully vaccinated, the World Health Organization has deemed every booster shot as "ethi-554 cally questionable" and warned that unmitigated COVID-19 pandemic in those areas will 555 continue yielding new variants.^[76, 78] Despite these concerns, countries have already started 556 their booster shot campaigns in an attempt to curb the risk of new surges and restrictions.^[79] 557 These decisions are likely driven by the Delta variant, which dilutes the herd-immunity 558 thresholds estimated for the wild-type strain.^[80, 81, 82, 83] 559

560 Supporting information

⁵⁶¹ Supporting Information is available from the Wiley Online Library or the corresponding
 ⁵⁶² author. The complete computational framework, including code needed to reproduce the
 ⁵⁶³ study is openly available. The database is accessible in Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5
 ⁵⁶⁴ 281/zenodo.5659785, the agent-based model in Github at https://github.com/Dynamic
 ⁵⁶⁵ al-Systems-Laboratory/ABM-COVID-revac.

566 Author contributions

⁵⁶⁷ Conceptualization—AT, LZ, SB, AR, MP; data curation—AT; methodology—AT, LZ, SB,

AR, MP; software—AT, SB; validation—AT; formal analysis—all the authors; investigation—

⁵⁶⁹ all the authors; resources—MP; writing—original draft preparation—AT, LZ, SB, AR, MP;

writing—review and editing—EC, ZPJ; visualization—AT; supervision—SB, EC, ZPJ, AR,

⁵⁷¹ MP; project administration—MP; funding acquisition—SB, ZPJ,AR, MP.

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581 Conflict of interest

⁵⁸² The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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
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Mathematical models have proven to be indispensable in our fight against COVID-19. This paper expands on a high-resolution agent-based model published previously in this journal to study the effectiveness of the booster shot campaign in preventing a new wave in the town of New Rochelle, NY during this Fall and the coming Spring.