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# A Pseudorandom Number Generator Based on Time Variant Recursion of Accumulators

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**Abstract**—This paper presents a PseudoRandom Number Generator (PRNG) that requires very low resources from the hardware design point of view. It is based on a chain of digital accumulators whose coefficients are varied by an auxiliary, low complexity, Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). We present a predictability and periodicity analysis of the sequences generated by the proposed architecture to show that the system is a good candidate to be used for applications requiring high-quality pseudorandom sequences in portable devices. The statistical behavior of the proposed solution is also validated by tests from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The generated pseudorandom sequences pass all tests both at level-one and level-two approaches.

**Index Terms**—Pseudorandom Number Generator, Time Variant, Statistical Tests.

## I. INTRODUCTION

**A**N effective generation of Pseudorandom sequences has positive consequences on many types of application. To name a few, the increasing need of security in cryptography applications makes necessary to design complex systems which generate deterministic sequences with statistical features as close as possible to a random process [1]; and Built-In Self Test (BIST) of digital circuits that uses groups of digital sequences with random characteristics.

Opposed to *True-Random* number generators [2] that are based on some intrinsically random natural phenomenon, Pseudorandom number generators [3], [4] are numerical algorithms that, starting from an externally (and possibly randomly) chosen seed, can produce long, irregular, random-like sequences, which are nevertheless periodic and fully repeatable. This repeatability property makes them fundamental in many applications such as cryptography.

Independently of the employed methodology, hardware generation of pseudorandom numbers is becoming increasingly difficult due to the tight constraints in terms of power and area consumption which modern devices require, especially in the field of portable and consumer applications.

In a PRNG, the periodicity, the predictability, and more generally all its statistical features are important characteristics [5]. For instance, in cryptographic applications, the predictability is important as an attacker may be capable




Fig. 1. Block level model for the modulus  $M$  digital accumulator.

to get information observing the PRNG output, so that the system security is threatened because the seed of the PRNG (which is related to the cryptographic key [3]) can be exposed. The use of cumbersome algorithms (such as the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) [4]) ensures system security, but the cost is extremely high in terms of resources required. Simpler algorithms (such as the Mersenne-Twister [6]) can achieve a very high quality random stream, but they may not be cryptographically secure.

This brief proposes a low-resources architecture that is capable to generate pseudorandom sequences with very good statistical features. Along with the system architecture, which exploits a digital  $\Sigma\Delta$  modulator with quantization error mapping function variable within time and is based on a self-recursive structure, we present a basic predictability and periodicity analysis. With this, despite the fact that a formal cryptographic security analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, we show that, notwithstanding the simplicity of the architecture, the proposed PRNG is not easily predictable and it is good candidate for embedding in portable applications.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the architecture and the notation used to study the evolution of the system. Section III describes statistical analysis of the PRNG (including predictability and periodicity of the generated sequences) and estimates the lower bound of the computational power required to predict the evolution of the system. Section III-C validates this PRNG with the statistical tests of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [7]. The results refer to the level-one testing approach and also to the level-two testing both with the proportion of sequences and the  $\chi^2$  approaches. Finally in Section IV we discuss some implementation aspects and in Section V we draw the conclusion.

## II. PROPOSED PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR

Digital accumulators are widely used in digital processors, digital  $\Sigma\Delta$  modulators for fractional frequency synthesizers [8] [9], Digital to Analog converters [10], etc.. Let us

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simultaneously generate the  $d_0 \dots d_7$  values required. The choice of these parameters has been made since they are a good trade off between system performance and complexity.

### III. PROPOSED PRNG STATISTICAL FEATURES

In this section we analyze a few aspects related to the statistical properties of the proposed PRNG and show that, despite its simplicity, the statistical features are comparable with those achieved with much more complex architectures. We first propose a brief study on the PRNG predictability and periodicity, where in both cases we start from the case of the simple chain of accumulators, i.e. considering  $d_k = 0$ ,  $\forall k$ . Then we consider how the system is changed by the introduction of the time-varying coefficients as in (2). Finally, we provide statistical test results for sequences generated by the PRNG. The results were obtained using, at both level-one and level-two, the SP800-22 test suite provided by the NIST [7].

#### A. Predictability of the PRNG

Assuming  $d_k = 0$ , we get a system which is actually linear in modular arithmetic and its evolution can be easily predicted by means of a limited number of observations. In fact, if we define with

$$i^{(k)} = i(i+1)(i+2) \dots (i+k-1) \quad (3)$$

the Pochhammer symbol for a rising sequential product and we indicate with  $\bar{e}_k$  the initial condition of the  $k$ -th accumulator, i.e.  $e_k[0] = \bar{e}_k$ , we can unroll the recursive evolution equation (2) and write the evolution of the generic  $k$ -th stage as

$$e_k[i] = \frac{i^{(k+1)}}{(k+1)!} X + \sum_{l=0}^k \frac{i^{(l)}}{l!} \bar{e}_{k-l} \pmod{M} \quad (4)$$

i.e. we get that the output sequence  $e_k$  out of the accumulator  $k$  is completely determined by the the constant input  $X$  and the initial conditions of all the accumulators down to the first one, i.e.  $\bar{e}_k, \bar{e}_{k-1}, \dots, \bar{e}_0$ .

Let us assume a PRNG based on an  $n$  stages architecture, and indicate with  $\mathbf{X}_n$  its seed, i.e. the vector  $\mathbf{X}_n = (X, \bar{e}_0, \dots, \bar{e}_{n-1})'$ . Predicting the evolution of the PRNG means finding  $\mathbf{X}_n$  by observing the  $e_{n-1}$ , i.e. the output of the system. By collecting  $n+1$  observations  $e_{n-1}[0], e_{n-1}[1], \dots, e_{n-1}[n]$ , we can write the system

$$\begin{pmatrix} e_{n-1}[0] \\ e_{n-1}[1] \\ \dots \\ e_{n-1}[n] \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{A}_n \mathbf{X}_n \pmod{M} \quad (5)$$

where  $\mathbf{A}_n$  is a  $(n+1) \times (n+1)$  matrix with integer coefficients, that depends only on  $n$ . Equation (5) is a system of  $n+1$  linear equations in  $n+1$  unknowns with integer coefficients in modular arithmetic. The solution of this system is generally not trivial [14], [15], and not strictly related with the solution of the associated system in  $\mathbb{R}^{n+1}$  (i.e. system (5) considered in  $\mathbb{R}^{n+1}$  instead of in modulo  $M$  arithmetic), which

is  $\bar{\mathbf{X}}_n = \mathbf{A}_n^{-1} (e_{n-1}[0], \dots, e_{n-1}[n])'$ . However, the above system has the interesting property that  $\mathbf{A}_n^{-1}$  is an integer matrix<sup>1</sup> i.e. also  $\bar{\mathbf{X}}_n$  is integer. In this case the solution  $\mathbf{X}_n$  of the modular problem is simply the congruential vector of  $\bar{\mathbf{X}}_n$ . In conclusion, using the simple chain of accumulators as PRNG makes the system easily predicible.

When considering the system in Fig. 4, we are changing the true nature of the system which is not linear anymore, since the terms  $y_k$  are a non-linear functions of the  $p_k$ . Despite the fact that the aim of this Section is not to define an algorithm for determining the seed of our PRNG from observations, we can compute, given the solution of (5), a lower bound for the computational power required for predicting the evolution the system of Figure 4.

Let us unroll the recursive equation (2), i.e.

$$e_k[i] = \frac{i^{(k+1)}}{(k+1)!} X + \sum_{l=0}^k \frac{i^{(l)}}{l!} \bar{e}_{k-l} + \sum_{l=0}^k \sum_{s=1}^i \frac{s^{(l)}}{l!} y_{k-l+1}[i-s] d_{k-l}[i-s+1] \pmod{M} \quad (6)$$

and let us collect as in the previous case the  $n+1$  observations  $e_{n-1}[0], e_{n-1}[1], \dots, e_{n-1}[n]$ . This leads to the system

$$\begin{pmatrix} e_{n-1}[0] \\ e_{n-1}[1] \\ \dots \\ e_{n-1}[n] \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{A}_n \mathbf{X}_n + \mathbf{B}_n \mathbf{Y}_n \pmod{M} \quad (7)$$

where  $\mathbf{B}_n$  is a  $(n+1) \times n^2$  coefficients matrix and where

$$\mathbf{Y}_n = \begin{pmatrix} y_1[0]d_0[1] \\ \vdots \\ y_n[0]d_{n-1}[1] \\ y_1[1]d_0[2] \\ \vdots \\ y_n[1]d_{n-1}[2] \\ \vdots \\ y_n[n-1]d_{n-1}[n] \end{pmatrix} \quad (8)$$

is a  $n^2$  length vector, that is a non-linear function of  $\mathbf{X}_n$ . Due to this non-linearity, system (7) may not have a single solution.

One easy way to solve the impasse of finding the seed  $\mathbf{X}_n$  is to assume to know *a priori* all the  $y_{k+1}[i-1]d_k[i]$  products, i.e. to assume that  $\mathbf{Y}_n$  is a constant vector. In this way, system (7) can be solved exactly as system (5). Note that, since we have  $2^{n^2}$  different  $\mathbf{Y}_n$ , we also have up to  $2^{n^2}$  different solutions  $\mathbf{X}_n$ . The actual seed of the system has to be chosen among the  $\mathbf{X}_n$  that are *coherent* with the assumed  $\mathbf{Y}_n$ .

Note that refining this choice up to a single, coherent  $\mathbf{X}_n$  may require some additional observations. Note also that this approach gives only partial information on  $\bar{e}_n$  and on the auxiliary PRNG internal state.

<sup>1</sup>This property was checked using Mathematica for  $n$  up to 150.

The lower bound complexity for this approach is the same as solving (and checking for coherence)  $2^{n^2}$  linear systems. Therefore, neglecting the auxiliary PRNG, a Brute Force-Attack [16] on the system would try  $2^{(n+1)m}$  possible  $\mathbf{X}_n$  seeds. When the number of stages  $n$  is comparable with the number of bits  $m$  in each accumulator, the prediction of the system from the observed values has almost the same complexity as a Brute Force-Attack.

### B. Periodicity of the proposed PRNG

For the sake of simplicity, let us start as in the previous case by making some considerations on the basic chain of accumulators. The periodicity of the system is defined as the smallest time step  $I > 0$  for which  $e_k[i + I] = e_k[i]$ , or equivalently,  $e_k[I] = \bar{e}_k, \forall k$ . By using Eq. (4) we can compute  $I$  by solving the system

$$\begin{cases} IX = 0 \pmod{M} \\ \frac{I^{(2)}}{2!} X + I \bar{e}_0 = 0 \pmod{M} \\ \dots \\ \frac{I^{(n)}}{n!} X + \sum_{l=1}^{n-1} \frac{I^{(l)}}{l!} \bar{e}_{n-l-1} = 0 \pmod{M} \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

which is a non-linear system in  $I$ .

Let us neglect the obvious case where  $X = \bar{e}_k = 0$ , which generates a constant output. It is known in the Literature [12] that if  $M$  is a prime number, then the system periodicity is  $I = M$ . Otherwise,  $I$  depends on all system parameters, i.e.  $X$ ,  $M$  and  $n$ , and also on all the  $\bar{e}_k$ . In the worst case, i.e. when we get the shortest period,  $I$  is the smallest common divisor between  $M$  and  $X$ , i.e. conditions exist for which  $I = 2$ .

Without entering into the mathematical details, when the time-varying coefficients are introduced in the feed-back path as in Fig. 4, the periodicity of the system has to be computed by solving the system  $e_k[I] = \bar{e}_k, \forall k$ , where the  $e_k[I]$  are computed through Eq. (6). Furthermore, we have also to ensure that  $y_k[I] = y_k[0]$  and that the state of the auxiliary PRNG at time step  $I$  matches the initial one.

It is easy to see that computing the exact value of  $I$  is at least as difficult as to predict the evolution of the system. However, due to the condition on the auxiliary PRNG, we know that  $I$  has to be *an integer multiple of the periodicity of the auxiliary PRNG*, i.e. we have a lower bound for  $I$  which is *independent* on the seed. Therefore, the periodic behavior can be improved with the auxiliary LFSR.

Note, however, that this periodicity lower bound is usually a strong underestimation of the actual period. As an example, with the proposed parameters ( $n = 8$ ,  $m = 8$  and an 8 stages LFSR) we have a lower bound equal to  $2^8 - 1 = 255$ , but we were not able to observe any periodic behavior in many simulations with several millions time steps.

### C. Statistical tests results

In this Section we propose some statistical test results for the proposed architecture with  $n = 8$ ,  $m = 8$  and an 8-bit LFSR. We have tested many generated pseudorandom

SP800-22 test	standard	99%	$\chi^2$
Frequency	0.6020	0.9860	0.3285
Block Frequency	0.1834	0.9840	0.1750
Cumulative Sums	0.4549	0.9830	0.3309
Runs	0.8694	0.9920	0.7237
Longest Run of 1s	0.5901	0.9850	0.7090
Matrix Rank	0.5091	0.9920	0.2482
Spectral (DFT)	0.5157	0.9920	0.9374
NOT Matching	0.9042	0.9820	0.2382
OT Matching	0.5207	0.9830	0.6454
Universal	0.3416	0.9900	0.7749
Approx. Entropy	0.2258	0.9870	0.0499
Random Excursion	0.2099	0.9860	0.3419
Random Exc. Var.	0.1245	0.9890	0.4291
Serial	0.3916	0.9890	0.4286
Linear Complexity	0.1081	0.9910	0.2363

TABLE I

RESULTS OF RANDOMNESS NIST TESTS FOR THE PROPOSED PRNG. THE FIRST COLUMN IS FOR STANDARD APPROACH; THE SECOND ONE IS FOR THE LEVEL-TWO APPROACH BASED ON THE PROPORTION OF SEQUENCES PASSING A STANDARD TEST; THE THIRD COLUMN IS FOR A LEVEL-TWO APPROACH BASED ON A CHI-SQUARE TEST. ALL RESULTS ARE IN THE EXPECTED RANGE.

streams with the suite SP800-22 [7] which is a collection of tests developed by the NIST and is the suite most commonly used in the evaluation of RNG and PRNG for cryptographic applications. We used this suite since, in recent years, it has been recognized as the standard *de facto* for random generators testing; furthermore due to uniformity of the tests in the suite, it is possible to apply the so called *level-two* (or *second level*) testing approach, which has been shown to be much more selective in exposing weak generators [17].

SP800-22 test results are shown in Table I, where we have adopted all three approaches proposed by NIST. The first column is the result of a standard test, where we have generated a single sequence and processed it with all the tests in the suite. The test result is a  $p$ -value, which is a number in  $[0, 1]$  which should be larger than a *level of significance*  $\alpha$  for considering a test passed. The value suggest by NIST is  $\alpha = 0.01$ . According to the table results,  $p > \alpha$  for all tests, which can be considered passed.

The second and third column are the result for level-two approaches. In the second column we have generated 1000 different sequences from different initial conditions, and we have checked the proportion of sequences where  $p > \alpha$ . This number should lie in the confidence interval  $0.99 \pm 0.0094$ . For all tests, the ratio of sequences passing the test is in the confidence interval. In the third column we have taken the same 1000 sequences as above and we have tested the uniformity of their  $p$ -values with a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. The results is a level-two  $p$ -value  $p_T$ , which has to be larger than a significance level  $\alpha_T$ . For all tests,  $p_T > 0.01$ , i.e. also this level-two test is passed.

Note that when increasing the complexity of the PRNG by considering a higher number of stages, the statistical tests are passed with similar results. Similarly, increasing the complexity of the auxiliary LFSR (note that in this example we have considered an 8 stages LFSR which is the minimum length for which we can change the required coefficients, since  $n = 8$ ) we obtain similar results. This means that the



Design	This paper	[18]	[19]	[20]
Architecture	<b>xc4vfx12 (Virtex-4)</b>	xc4vfx100 (Virtex-4)	xc2000e (Virtex-E)	N/A
Slices (LTUs)	<b>57 (91)</b>	128 (213)	330 (539)	429 (N/A)
RAM	<b>No</b>	4 Blocks	2 Blocks	Yes (unspecified)
Speed (MSa/s)	<b>90.98</b>	26.13	24.16	38.41

TABLE II

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF RESOURCES OCCUPIED BY THE PROPOSED GENERATOR AND BY SOME LOW-RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE MERSENNE-TWISTER PRNG.

auxiliary PRNG does not influence the statistical properties of the random generated stream.

Since we have also shown that the auxiliary PRNG has a little influence on the predictability of the system, while has a very strong influence on its periodicity, we suggest to choose the auxiliary PRNG with the only aim of maximizing the periodicity of the generated sequences. For this reason, the best choice is a maximum-length LFSR.

#### IV. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION

The proposed architecture, composed by 9 accumulators with 8-bits of resolution, plus an auxiliary 8-bit LFSR, has been synthesized with automatic layout generation tools. In the synthesis obtained by Cadence Silicon Ensemble in a CMOS  $0.35\mu\text{m}$  process a total of 474 digital cells are required with an area of  $280\mu\text{m} \times 280\mu\text{m}$ . This is a very small amount of digital cells for an high quality PRNG implementation. We have implemented the proposed architecture also on a Virtex-4 FPGA using Xilinx ISE Web Pack 13.1. The number of slices required is only 57, with no additional RAM requirements. These resources have been compared in Table II with some implementations of the *Mersenne-Twister* generator on common FPGA platforms [18]–[20], which require from 128 to 420 FPGA slices depending on the area/timing optimization, and some additional RAM blocks. The proposed architecture has clear advantages in terms of resources required and speed.

Note that the lack of a RAM requirement is a twofold advantage, since the RAM is usually the bottleneck both for the FPGA speed and for resource allocation. The implementation of the Mersenne-Twister without the RAM Blocks [19] will costs 5815 slices; this payload in terms of area would result in a significant reduction in the FPGA clock maximum speed.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS

We proposed a new low-complexity pseudorandom number generator based on a chain of digital accumulators with feedback coefficients. The feedback coefficients are changed within time with the help of a low complexity LFSR. With this system the congruent relationships that rule the evolution of a chain of accumulators are transformed in a non-linear mapping that increments the periodicity of the output sequence. Moreover, predicting the evolution of the system in general, requires almost the same computational power of a Brute Force-Attack. Sequences obtained from the proposed architecture have similar statistical properties of PRNGs used even for cryptographic applications, it passes all NIST statistical tests at the level two, both with the proportion of sequences and the  $\chi^2$  approaches.

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