Reflecting critically on Turin’s Strategic Planning Experience

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Reflecting critically on Turin’s Strategic Planning Experience

Silvia Saccomani (2011)

Abstract. Strategic planning experiences have been widespread across many European countries in the past decades and have been the subject of many articles and essays. In Italy these experiences occurred later than in other countries. Actually, the first well-known strategic planning experience in Italy was developed in Turin at the end of the 1990s. Thus, Turin could be an interesting case to study, because it can been looked at as a paradigmatic case from different points of view, perhaps not only related to the Italian situation: the point of view of economic and social changes, the point of view of spatial transformations, the point of view of the undertaken policies and also the point of view of the innovative government processes that have been developed in the last ten years.

At the end of the last decade this sort of innovative turn seemed to be over; a new cycle in the economy as well as in the strategy for looking at the future and in the policies and politics that will govern the city and its metropolitan area may be about to start.

This paper describes the changes that took place and tries to reflect critically on the results of the strategic planning process that was developed during the last decade as an answer to these changes, underlining especially the weak points of the experience, which could be at the base of the current situation too.

Keywords: Strategic planning; spatial planning; governance; industrial city in transition

Introduction

Strategic planning experiences have been widespread across many European countries in the past decades and have been the subject of many articles and essays. In Italy these experiences occurred later than in other countries. There could be different reasons, but one can be traced back to the legal planning system, which does not recognise such an instrument as a strategic plan, except in some more recent regional planning acts, but more generally does not set up the conditions for easily developing governance processes, which are more common in other countries. Actually, the first well-known strategic planning experience in Italy was developed in Turin at the end of the 1990s; other cases followed, and were influenced by this first experience. Hence, Turin could be an interesting case to study, as an example demonstrating the way the strategic planning process has been conducted in Italy.

More generally, Turin can be seen as a paradigmatic case from different points of view, in Italy, but probably not only in Italy: the point of view of its structural changes – during the last 15–20 years its economic structure, its social structure and even its way of life have changed; the point of view of its urban transformations – its spatial, physical and functional organisation has been radically changed; the point of view of the policies undertaken – policies, more similar to those of other European cities, explicitly targeted to compete at an international level in the field of tourism and attraction, quite an unusual target for such an industrial city; and finally also the point of view of the innovative government processes that have been developed in the last ten years, that is, the strategic planning process.

At the end of the last decade this sort of innovative turn seemed to be over: a new cycle in the economy, as well as in the strategy for looking at the future and in the
policies and politics that will govern the city and its metropolitan area, may be about to start. This is another reason that could make it interesting to reflect on this case. The objective of this article is to describe the changes that have affected the city and its metropolitan area and to reflect critically on the strategic planning process that was developed during the last decade as an answer to these changes. The article is organised as follows: a brief outline of the history of the city and its situation in the 1990s, in order to recall the starting point of the recent experiences, that is, the challenge the city had to face, the development and features of the traditional planning process and the new experiences through strategic planning, the features of this strategic planning process if compared with other experiences and finally some critical remarks about the results of this experience underlying especially the weak points of it, which could be at the base of the current situation too.

From a “one-company town” to the decline of a “Fordist” city

In Italy Turin has been the industrial city par excellence (Gabert, 1964). Its development has been based on industry since the second half of the eighteenth century. The turning point was the unity of Italy in 1861. Until then Turin had been the capital of a small kingdom and its economy was based on this role (state administration, the court, the army). In 1865 the capital was moved to Florence and then in 1970 to Rome; Turin lost its role, and this meant a serious economic as well as an identity crisis. Some authors (Ave, 2005) argue that in this situation Turin tried for the first time to define a strategy for its future, and this future had to be industry. From the last quarter of the nineteenth century until the 1970s, the economic development of the city and of its metropolitan area (MA) was linked to industrial development and especially to the car industry, that is, to Fiat, one of the biggest Italian companies. Especially during the 1950s and the 1960s, but also previously, most of the industrial plants in Turin and its area were dependent on mechanic and automotive construction. This resulted in an increasing specialisation of the area and in one of the greatest industrial concentrations in Europe: Turin was referred to as “the Italian Detroit”, a system oriented toward the mass production of standardised goods, based on great industrial concentration: in short a “Fordist” model. The economic structure of the town, even the way life was organised within it, and the local authority action too were strongly dependent on the will and destiny of the leading company; from the Second World War until the 1980s Turin was considered a “one-company town” (Bagnasco, 1986, 1988, 1990).

The high demand for workforce attracted a lot of immigrants, especially from the southern part of Italy. The population grew first in Turin, then in the municipalities of the MA, following the overspill of factories or the search for lower-priced houses. The growth of the leader industry, the growth of the population owing to immigration and the sprawl of industry and inhabitants from the core city to the rest of the MA formed the urban development model until the 1970s. The consequence was a polarised development pattern in Piedmont Region, the region in which Turin is located.

This development model meant a lot of social problems, due also to a lack of social housing: in Italy the public housing policy has never been able to cope with the demand (Governa and Saccomani, 2009).

Things changed in the 1970s, when, after the oil crisis of 1973, the limits of this economic development model based more or less only on the car industry became clear. During the 1970s, Fiat changed a great deal: financial reorganisation, new labour-saving technologies and the relocation of part of its production plants out of Turin and out of Italy. This resulted during the 1980s in a loss of jobs in Turin in the large companies, an
increase in small and medium companies and also an increase in the number of them (high-tech or science-based sectors); once dependent on Fiat, they became more autonomous and began to find new markets abroad too, owing to their acquired know-how (Dematteis and Segre, 1988). Since the 1980s Turin can no longer be considered a “one-company town”, even if Fiat maintains its dominant role.

The demographic trend has also changed: in the mid-1970s Turin began to lose its population, owing to a very low birth rate, the end of the immigration flows from the rest of Italy and the moving of many families to the outskirts (in search of lower flat rents and a better environmental situation). This demographic process has changed the MA from a basically monocentric one to a more polycentric one.

The physical evidence of the economic changes was the increase in the number and dimensions of brown fields, many of which were located along the railway system, not very far from the centre of the city. The word “de-industrialisation” was brought into the debate along with a feeling that the future of Turin would no longer be industrial, but that it would become a service city. This was the background of the new Piano regolatore generale (Comprehensive Master Plan) that was prepared at the end of the 1980s, adopted in 1993, just when a new centre-left coalition was elected in the city council, and finally approved by the regional government in 1995. When the plan was approved the economic situation had already changed.

At the beginning of the 1990s a serious economic crisis took place in Italy and it was probably most serious in Piedmont and in Turin; the peak was reached in 1993 and it led to a downsizing of industrial activities. In the early 1990s the city viewed itself, and was viewed from the outside, as a town in steep industrial decline and the dominant feeling was one of pessimism regarding the future: the Fordist model was over and a decline in employment in the leading industry was occurring. In 1990 Arnaldo Bagnasco wrote that we knew that we were “after Ford”, but we did not know yet clearly where the transition was going to bring us.

The challenge: towards a new strategy

The crisis in the leading company went on at least until 2005, but starting in the second half of the 1990s the economic situation began to ameliorate and this trend lasted, between light and shadows, until 2007, when the recent international crisis began. In spite of the Fiat crisis, there was evidence that Turin’s economy was still linked to the car and car components industries, but also that Turin’s automotive industries were becoming much more fully integrated into global automotive supply (Whitford and Enrietti, 2005), that developments in other important industrial sectors (such as industrial automation, components, aeronautical parts, information technology and satellite systems) were taking place and that there was also an increase in the number of jobs generated in innovative segments of the service sector (banking and insurance, design and publishing), even if not at the same rate and with the same features as in other Italian cities, like, for instance, Milan.

In short, in spite of the crisis and the changes, at the end of the 1990s Turin was still an industrial city with a great challenge in front of it: to invent a new economic future, in the new contest of globalisation and competition within Europe, and, despite major job losses, this future still had to be linked to the skills and to the social and cultural milieu that the industrial history had grounded in the city and its area, even if this did not mean returning to the industrial productions the city economy had been developing for a long time (Emanuel and Governa, 1997).
This task of inventing a new future had to be undertaken in a new social situation, in which the population decline was continuing, even if at a lower rate, with a strong growth of elderly people, while there was an increase in immigration from non-EU countries. The new immigration was and is still another important issue that would change a lot in the local labour market and in the social situation.

The answer to the challenge

Before describing the answer the city provided to this challenge it is useful to recall the tools it had, at least from the point view of planning. One of these was the new Master Plan approved in 1995.

The Comprehensive Master Plan (MP)

As stated before, the scenario the plan foresaw was one of a radical change in the economic structure of Turin: no longer an industrial town, development based on the service sector and intensive as well as symbolic reuse of the huge amount of brown fields.

In short, it is a plan based on a great offer for the property market (a large supply of spaces for offices, service activities and residences), in order to attract investors owing to the quality of a new urban design in the redevelopment areas. These areas were mostly the abandoned industrial areas: the post-industrial city was going to heal its wounds. This policy had common elements with those of other European cities that were experiencing or had previously experienced de-industrialisation processes.

The plan proposes a spatial reorganisation around three axes: the leisure axis along the river Po, a private service activities axis (Marche Avenue at the western boundary) and the so-called spina centrale (central backbone), the most important axis. The last one takes advantage of an important infrastructure project for the reorganisation of the regional and metropolitan railway system, decided at the beginning of the 1980s, the so-called passante ferroviario (railway link), owing to which tracks will be underground and covered and new stations built or enhanced along them. The biggest industrial vacant areas were mostly located along this infrastructure. The spina centrale is a sort of north–south axis with a wide lane built over the covered tracks, divided into four large redevelopment zones located near the stations. Their urban design is quite unusual for Turin: high densities among great open spaces. Other important redevelopments are located along the passante ferroviario from Porta Nuova station (the old central station) to Lingotto, one of the abandoned Fiat plants, which was closed at the beginning of the 1980s. Other smaller redevelopment zones are located in the rest of the territory on industrial areas, especially in the periphery (Figure 1): some were already vacant; some were still in use, but the plan considered them vacant. The spatial reorganisation of the city is completed by a metro line.

The real engine of the redevelopment foreseen by the plan has been the spina centrale. Actually, at the beginning the implementation of the plan proved not to be so easy and the city administration had to change some of its rules by means of a large amount of varianti (changes) to it: some of the plan rules made it difficult for developers to take advantage of it in a weak building and real estate market (Saccomani, 2001), which lasted until late 1990s. Then state funds for regeneration programmes, for the Olympic Games programme and finally a newly hot real estate market pushed forward the plan implementation, which is now nearly complete. In the last three years
the economic crisis has struck and the real estate market entered an oversupply phase, while the economic crisis made it difficult for households to buy a dwelling.\textsuperscript{10}

Figure 1 - Turin Master Plan: redevelopment zones

**The Strategic Plans**

The Master Plan was not the best tool for answering the challenge I mentioned before. Turin was in search of a new development model and of a new identity — in the fields of research, innovation and so on; the urban policy of the plan, which was in fact nothing other than a real estate development policy, was not enough to fulfil the task of inventing a new future for the city. In 1998 a new planning action started: the strategic planning process.

This decision was also fostered by an institutional change: since 1993 mayors in the big Italian cities have been elected directly. This reform gives the elected mayors a greater leadership role, more visibility and more freedom from the power of political parties, with local politics becoming more personalised. The mayor elected in 1993 was not a politician, but a professor at Politecnico, and his election was supported not only by a political coalition (centre-left), but also by a sort of mobilisation of the civil society (Pinson, 2003, 2009). This formed the basis for what was called the “forum for development”, which included about 30 public and private actors representing the cultural, economic and social forces of the city.

Given the growing importance of internationalisation, the forum for development put forward a project to promote the international position of Turin and brought about the Strategic Plan (SP), the title of which is in fact “Strategic Plan for the International Promotion of Turin” (TorinoInternazionale, 2000). The mayor and the city
council approved the project; the mayor was the leader, but the plan was not made by the city administration.\textsuperscript{11}

The plan was carried out quickly, in 18 months, and during its preparation Turin was assigned the Winter Olympic Games of 2006, which was seen as a powerful driver for the plan itself and integrated into it. Actually, the plan’s strategic lines (Table 1) include sport, tourism and culture as important factors for the vision of the future city. This is quite an innovative goal for such an old industrial city, which was seen as a grey, foggy city and had never attracted tourists, even if it owns an interesting architectural heritage, being one of the most significant baroque cities in Europe, and has a fine landscape owing to its position between the Alps and the hills along the river Po.

Table 1 – The first Strategic Plan: goals, vision, strategic lines

| The goal: a new international identity for the city in order to compete in the globalised world |
| The vision: |
| - Turin as a European metropolis; |
| - Turin, an ingenious city, which gets things done and does them right; |
| - Turin that knows how to choose: the intelligence of the future and the quality of life |
| The strategic lines: |
| - line 1: to integrate the metropolitan area into the international system |
| - line 2: to construct the metropolitan government in order to coordinate and optimise projects and services |
| - line 3: to develop training and research as strategic resources |
| - line 4: to promote enterprise and employment |
| - line 5: to promote Turin as a city of culture, tourism, commerce and sports |
| - line 6: to improve urban quality |

Source: TorinoInternazionale (2000)

The final document was an agreement for the future of the city by 2010, signed by 57 public and private partners, among whom were also the mayors of 22 municipalities around Turin (not all the municipalities of the MA\textsuperscript{12} because the process was a voluntary one). In May 2000 a public–private agency, Torino Internazionale, was formed with the task of implementing the plan.\textsuperscript{13}

The first Strategic Plan (SP) vision was a better position of the city and the metropolitan area in the European and international arena.\textsuperscript{14} The plan recognised that a process of change was already taking place in the city and wanted to direct it. The 6 strategic lines included 20 objectives and 84 projects, many of which concerned economic transformations and some physical transformations too. The latter were projects already in progress foreseen by the Master Plan or by other programmes.\textsuperscript{15}

The first SP was an important step in the political and administrative life of the city and helped move away from the pessimism of the early 1990s to a new vision of the future of the city, at least among the city elites. A similar effect was provided by the Olympic Games concerning the population. The reaction of the city population to this event was surprising and perhaps a pride and hope reaction: pride because the city had been able to organise it and hope for a real change in the future of the city. However, this effect was rather transitory.

Five years later the revision of the first SP started; the new plan was presented in July 2006. Why was there a new plan after only five years when the previous one had to last until 2010? The reason the first document put forward was that the transformation process of Turin was going on and it was necessary to be more selective in defining the priorities on which to concentrate investments.

As a matter of fact, the vision changed. If the first plan’s vision was to build a new international identity for the city, the second one’s was to foster knowledge-based
development involving not just the traditional élite, but increasingly large segments of a responsible and active society. The new vision is based on the following ideas: the development model of the more advanced economies is based on knowledge, a knowledge-based economy and society does not mean only services and the production of immaterial goods, but also innovation and research in the production processes of material goods, and Turin owns all the assets necessary for this kind of development model; it is not necessary to give up its industrial past, because the milieu it has grounded can evolve rapidly towards a research and knowledge economy. Besides, it is necessary to pay special attention to the already-existing human capital. This kind of development also needs greater attention to be directed towards the metropolitan dimension of government, to the social cohesion issues and to economic strategies and their territorial dimension (Table 2).

Table 2 – The second Strategic Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The vision: a development process based on knowledge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Four thematic areas:</td>
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<tr>
<td>− the metropolitan territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− the social quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− the cultural potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− the economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− Twelve strategic directions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− creativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− industrial transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− health and care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− urban and territorial transformations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− accessibility, transports and mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− logistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− urban regeneration and housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>− cultural resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>− city image promotion and tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>− immigration</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Some elements can be underlined in this change of strategy. In the second SP there is a greater stress on the metropolitan dimension and on a multi-level form of governance; the metropolitan area is seen as the right level both for governance and for government, even if as far as the government is concerned no institutional solution is proposed. There is greater attention to the spatial dimension of the strategies: for instance, some of the issues are a more polycentric city, urban design quality, the relationship between big projects to be selected and the transport and mobility system. There is greater attention to social cohesion issues: problems such as health, youth, education and jobs, immigration, housing and urban regeneration. There is a clearer focus on the strategies for economic development: Turin cannot renounce its industrial tradition, but it has to select those forms of productions and services with a higher knowledge and research content (the focus is on automotive, ICT and aerospace sectors). The new development conditions, necessary for competing in a globalised world, are seen also to be the base for a new way to make Turin an attractive city, even if tourism, culture and finally the great events policy are part of the strategy.¹⁶
Actually, the presence of tourists increased, undoubtedly because of the visibility obtained with the Olympic Games. However, this effect was maintained over time thanks to intensive work on the recovery and promotion of cultural heritage in the city and its surroundings. In the early 2000s, in fact, even in the wake of the Strategic Plan, the renovation of museums and the recovery of cultural heritage were significant, supported by a strong increase in expenditure by local authorities as well as banking foundations. It should be noted that, unlike many measures taken under the Master Plan in the rest of the city, this renovation of museums and, above all, the redevelopment of public spaces in the historic centre (the museum district) in particular is of good quality and really modified the usability of this district. Other important projects were carried out on historic buildings in the municipalities of the metropolitan area. The programming of a new innovative cultural offering has been quite active, supported by a new interest in contemporary cultural consumption, and helped to spread an image of Turin as a city of culture. The increase in spending, however, has been greatly reduced since 2006 (ComitatoGiorgioRota and L’EauVive, 2009).

**What has happened since 2006**

In the last ten years the socio-economic situation of Turin and its region has certainly changed a lot, but the changes have been contradictory. Until 2007 some signals of an improving situation emerged. At the beginning of the recent crisis it was possible to observe that, following the changes in the sector composition of employment, there had been an increase in jobs in the service sector, no longer driven by the externalisation from the industry, but that in Turin the amount of industrial occupation was, and still is, greater than that in other big Italian urban areas. Other indicators show that the conditions for a knowledge-based society (such as educated people, research centres, etc.) are growing more slowly than in other areas, including Italian ones. It can be added that starting in 2005 Fiat seemed to be recovering after a period in which it seemed to be running towards failure. Then it started a new international strategy by a joint venture with the American Chrysler; this new strategy is now going to resize Fiat’s presence in Italy in general and in Turin in particular. There is a risk that the most important functions of the Fiat Group (especially those linked with direction and innovative projects) could be moved elsewhere and resized. This would have a serious impact on an economy that is still linked to the automotive sector (components production, technology and design).

Besides, in the last three years, the global economic crisis has been hitting the economic situation in Piedmont and Turin strongly, with an increasing loss of jobs. It can be said that the recent crisis started just when Turin’s economic changes were underway but still in mid-stream (Staricco, 2010). There are doubts that the changes that took place are sufficient to ensure a new future for Turin in the field of the knowledge-based economy (Cominu, 2011).

From the point of view of the strategic planning process we can observe that the process stopped or at least changed in its essential features. In fact, the second plan has never been formally approved by anyone. The Torino Internazionale Agency remained an independent agency, but was progressively more linked to the central city administration, formally in charge of implementing and monitoring the Strategic Plans projects, but, as a matter of fact, in the last years its task has been merely carrying out research and promoting some information or participation events. Recently it also created a new Association – Torino Nord Ovest – that develops studies, consultancy and
evaluation activities in the socio-economic field as far as the North-West Italian region is concerned (http://www.Torinonordovest.it/).

From the point of view of urban planning, in 2008 the city administration produced a new document, “Indirizzi di politica urbanistica” (Urban Policy Addresses), which should have been the starting point for a general revision of the Master Plan, and which was presented and discussed via a forum online, but then nothing happened. This document confirmed the three-axis reorganisation of the city (Marche Avenue, *spina centrale* and river Po axes) established by the MP, whose implementation is in progress, adding new projects included in the second SP and a new strategic redevelopment area. The first ones are linked with the high-speed Lyon–Turin train line. Turin is located along European corridor 5 (Lisbon–Kiev), which includes railway infrastructures among which are the Turin–Milan line, which is already built, and the Lyon–Turin line. The last one was included in the SP, which considers it a strategic project not only for the city and its MA, but also for the region and Italy as a whole. The project is partly funded by the EU and encompasses a tunnel 57 km long under the Alps. Until 2005 no one discussed this project with the inhabitants of Susa Valley, which the line will cross, even though, of course, they will be strongly affected by a building site that will last many years, without gaining any significant advantage from the new line. There were riots in the valley and in 2007 a participation action was established in order to find a solution, which has not yet been totally defined. In the MA the project concerning the new line affects the already-existing Marche Avenue project and contemplates three different levels of lines: an underground railway line for trains to the goods station and to the passenger station, an underground road that will connect two points of the existing motorway ring road, which is currently very congested, and an avenue at the ground level for the local traffic. Along this avenue new important urban developments are expected (a sort of new urban centre, a new hospital and medical research centre and a museum). At the end of the new Marche Avenue another redevelopment project, included in the second Strategic Plan, is foreseen concerning the biggest Fiat plant (Mirafiori), which today has only about 5000 workers, and hence a great part of its area is vacant. A public–private partnership was formed, involving Fiat and the city administration too, in charge of redeveloping this area with the aim of establishing a high-tech production and education pole (including a new Politecnico Campus). The last project to be launched is the so-called *Variante 200* and Metro line 2. It is a *variante* (change) to the Master Plan in the north-east part of the city and it encompasses the new metro line and a huge redevelopment of an old goods station, involving public and private funds. The idea is to form a public–private company involving the developers with the aim of drawing from the redevelopment funds for building partly the new metro line. Recently the city administration launched a sort of competition for project ideas.

**Conclusions**

From this outline Turin emerges as a city in search of a new identity, which tried to develop competitive strategies in order to achieve a new position within the international scenario, also by means of promoting tourism under the visibility effect of the Olympic Games. It did so using a new planning methodology – strategic planning – which was quite innovative in Italy at the end of the 1990s, even though it was already in use in other countries. In Italy this experience has been evaluated as a successful one and Turin has been viewed as a place of urban innovation (Dente et al., 2005), but not only in Italy (Falk, 2003; Winkler, 2007). Of course, some achievements are
undeniable. However, as the innovative turn seems to be over and a new cycle in the economic and political life of the city seems to be about to start, it is more interesting to point out and discuss some points that, in my opinion, are weak points and are perhaps at the origin of the present situation.

The first one is the change that occurred between the first and the second strategic planning process. According to Patsy Healey (2010, p. 442), the central dimension of a strategic planning process is “… whether, why and how to mobilise attention to an urban complex, understood as a whole …”, that is, the momentum that leads to explicit strategy-making work.18

In the case of the two Turin Strategic Plans the momentum changed a lot. The first plan arose from the urgency to mobilise resources around a shared vision of the future for an area in deep decline; the strategic key issues were related to this urgency and the involved actors were the key actors.19 In the second case there was not such urgency, part of the previous strategy was being implemented (notably the preparation for the Olympic Games) and some actors in charge of the plan implementation (notably the Torino Internazionale Agency) were in place and ready to play a role in the strategy-making process, but, possibly just owing to these reasons, the process went on in a sort of automatic way, and then it slowly faded away until the present situation. The experience was to some extent a real attempt to establish a governance process, at least as far as the identification and involvement of important stakeholders and the creation of an arena for discussion are concerned, but if this can be considered a real achievement of the process, in the end it proved to be an unstable one.

The second point concerns the actors involved in the process. In Turin the strategic plan-making process involved the key actors, but it was not able to communicate with the general population and to incorporate the differences and the different demands coming from it. This is an important issue, which is more general than the specific case. Is there a contradiction between a strategic approach and the need for an inclusive process? Defining strategies means being selective, identifying priorities and making decisions; inclusion means consensus, participation, etc., and is generally a long and costly process. The risk is that in the end the stakeholders who are really involved are the economic key actors, the strong agents, the élites. It is not unusual that cities in strong transition, which try to enter the international competitive scenario, bet on the élites’ cohesion, in order to present themselves as a whole; this happened in the case of Turin, but in the long run this risks the occurrence of conflicts and social demands (Pinson, 2009). From this point of view it can be added that, just during the first strategic planning process, Turin was experiencing an innovative way of tackling social problems by means of the so-called Progetto Speciale Periferie (PSP, Special Project for Peripheries), a project decided in 1997 by the city administration and which promoted urban regeneration programmes encouraging inhabitants’ participation (Governa and Saccomani, 2004; Governa et al., 2009). In Italy PSP ranked as a major innovation in planning policies, and as the forerunner of other similar initiatives. However, in spite of the fact that line six of the first SP referred to it, there has always been a gap just inside the municipal administration between this experience and the strategy-making process. The increasing importance, and the rhetoric, of the issues of competitiveness, international visibility and so on in practice has deepened the gap with the issues linked with social cohesion (Governa and Rossignolo, 2010), in spite of the greater rhetoric reference to them in the second plan. It can be added that starting in the second half of the last decade the PSP experience has been gradually downsized in its goals and practices.
In the case of the second plan the mobilisation of actors, even the key actors, was weaker, despite the attempts made by Torino Internazionale to involve other actors, including NGO ones. According to Bruno Dente (Dente and Melloni, 2005), a strategic planning process can have a double function: to increase the relations among different actors as an instrument to define and implement shared projects, and to implement shared projects as an instrument to increase the whole cooperation ability by means of the established relations. The latter should have long-lasting effects because it affects the local governance. In the case of Turin’s experience this effect did not become solid over time. Six years after the second Strategic Plan the experience seems to be over, and the image of cohesion seems to have been replaced by a form of “flattened unanimity” (Bobbio, 2009), which does not seem to be sufficiently aware of the still unsolved social, economic and urban problems, some of which are becoming more serious owing to the recent international crisis. The season of the attempts to form a different relationship between government and governance is over and this points out difficulties that were not solved.

The third point concerns just this matter, that is the dualism between Torino Internazionale and the administration body of the city. Patsy Healey (2007, p. 184) states: "To have long-lasting effects, strategies need to move from the stage of frame constructions or discourse structuration, to discourse institutionalisation ...; that is, to the routine practices." This asks for continuity between the strategy and related projects’ elaboration and their implementation and management: “... the process must involve managing, as well as planning strategically” (Albrecht, 2006, p. 1165). As a matter of fact, in Turin the implementation of the Strategic Plan has established a sort of dualism: Torino Internazionale had difficulties in developing its role of coordination in the policies’ implementation, because in practice this took place through the administrative bodies, while the strategies were not captured in the administrative routines of those same structures. In the second plan’s experience these difficulties increased: in a phase in which it was necessary to go deep into the strategic directions and objectives, the agency’s role became less and less clear and sharp and less able to play a coordination role or even a role of accompaniment of the strategy-deepening process, while Turin’s administrators, meaning both the politicians and the technicians, acted in an independent way. Gradually the role of the agency was reduced to the present one of an organizer of conferences and workshops. In short, in my opinion, over time the only voluntary associations lose their ability to pursue policy objectives because they lack power and operational capabilities, which, in the end, belong to institutional bodies, especially when a strategic plan deals with a metropolitan region.

This raises the fourth important point to be discussed, the relations between the government institutions scale and the plan scale. Both Strategic Plans underline the importance of the metropolitan dimension of their strategies. The more the strategy takes into account the metropolitan dimension, the more it is necessary to strengthen the multi-level governance network, which has always been far from being accomplished in the case of Turin, but it is also necessary to recognise the institutional dimension of the metropolitan government. From this point of view one of the failures of the strategic planning process, perhaps one of the most important, was the missed implementation of some forms of metropolitan government (Pinson and Santangelo, 2007). Of course, this issue is also linked to the Italian institutional system and its implementation, which foresees a metropolitan government institution that has never been established. After the first Strategic Plan there was an attempt to establish a metropolitan conference including 37 municipalities as a way to cross the institutional gap, but this initiative
failed. The second plan dealt much more with the necessity to change the action scale, from the town to the urban region, but the results were only a few forms of cooperation in the field of some public facilities. This also shows the persistent difficulty of dialogue between the central city and the outskirt municipalities. Actually, many of them were able to establish cooperation processes through different “territorial pacts” dealing with the economic development of their territories (Corrado, 2007), but these pacts generally did not include Turin.

The fifth point concerns another important issue, the integration between the spatial dimension and the socio-economic one in the strategic planning experience of Turin, i.e. the relationship between the strategic plans and the traditional urban planning. As stated before, strategic planning was and still is not a legal requirement in Italy. All the strategic planning experiences that were developed in Italy following that of Turin tried to establish a relation between planning regulations and strategic plans in different ways, according to the stage of urban planning (existing, old or new, or in-progress Master Plans) (Sartorio, 2005). However, generally they have a certain weakness as far as the spatial dimension of the strategic choices is concerned. They are predominantly “policy documents” that sometimes occur alongside traditional urban and territorial plans.

The case of Turin is generally appreciated (Bobbio and Gastaldi, 2003) because, having a recent Master Plan that was being implemented, the few projects that in the first SP had a physical definition obviously referred to it, linking the two planning instruments. However, apart from them, the strategic lines and objectives lack a spatial dimension.

Spatial strategies focus attention on the “where” of activities and values, on the qualities and meaning of places, on the flows that connect one place to another and on the spatial dimensions of the way activities are organised ... what gives spatial strategy its distinctive focus and contribution is the recognition that “geography matters” (Healey, 2007, p. 201).

In other European experiences of metropolitan or regional strategic planning spatial schemes exist. I do not mean that in these cases the result of the process is a “plan-as-a-map”, like the old structure plans, but that the strategy is grounded on “the where”. In Turin’s first SP, but also in most of the other Italian experiences, spatial schemes are lacking (Sartorio, cit.). In the second SP some attempts at greater integration between the strategic vision and the varianti of the Master Plan were made, but significantly these concern only the central city Master Plan and not the rest of the MA, where the other municipalities were and are taking spatial decisions by means of their MPs. Again the traditional planning elaborations are put side by side with the strategic vision without real and complete integration. It is significant too that the new urban planning document of the city, discussed in 2008, and the new important spatial projects I mentioned before, even if included in the SP, are not being discussed within the same arena that had been established during the strategic planning experience. What I want to underline is not the lack of a map, but the fact that the strategy seems not to be strongly grounded in the knowledge of what the metropolitan region is concerned with from the point of view of its spatial features, the qualities of places, etc. It is not a question of a missed collection of data, but of the way the knowledge of the urban region entered the strategy-making process. This can be linked to the kind of actors who were involved in the process (stakeholders, elites, more than technical bodies), to the specific Italian planning system, which does not generally include such experiences, and/or to the different powers of the different subjects involved.

Notes
1. Among them for instance: Gibelli (1996); Healey (1997); Pinson (2002); Healey (2004); Dente et al. (2005); Healey (2006a); Healey (2006b); Pinson and Santangelo (2007); Healey (2010).
2. Just because it has been the first one Turin’s strategic planning experience has been analysed by many authors, especially in Italy; see for instance: Falk (2003); Pinson (2003); Rosso (2004); Ave (2005); Sartorio (2005); Albrecht (2006); Pinson and Santangelo (2007); Winkler (2007); Pinson (2009); Saccomani (2010); Colantoni and Dixon (2011).
3. In 20 years, between 1951 and 1971, Turin’s population doubled with about 50,000 more inhabitants each year.
4. In 1971 48% of the employment and 42% of the population of Piedmont Region was located in Turin MA. At the beginning of the 1970s the employment in Fiat’s plants in the TMA added up to about 120,000 jobs.
5. Turin’s population was decreasing until 2002, from 1,167,968 inhabitants in 1971 (1,802,723 in the 53 municipalities of the traditional MA), to 860,000 in 2002. Then a slight increase started to 908,501 inhabitants at the end of 2010.
6. Fiat’s local production fell by 56% by 2003, many big plants in the MA were closed and the remaining big plant, Mirafiori, which still had 60,000 employees in the 1980s, had about 25,000 in 2000 and was down to just 11,500 in December 2004.
7. In 1994 foreign-born residents of Turin accounted for less than 2% of the city’s population, while at the end of 2010 the foreigners legally resident in Turin made up 14.2% of the total population. These new citizens are at the origin of the small change in the demographic trend.
8. Lingotto is a huge building with a test track on the roof, built in the 1920s and now hosting an exhibition centre, congress centre, commercial centre, hotels, university, etc.
9. In 2007 a local journal took stock of the implementation of the Master Plan; see Various Authors (2008).
10. As a matter of fact, the real estate market in Turin has some specificities. Also during the hot period prices remained lower than in other Italian big cities, and now they are not decreasing, which is happening elsewhere, but the number of transactions decreased greatly with a longer selling time.
11. The task of developing the project was given to Turismo Torino, an agency created to support tourist development, and ITP Investimenti Torino Piemonte, a public/private agency created in the mid-1990s with the task of offering opportunities to investors, especially foreign investors.
12. When I refer to Turin MA (TMA) I refer to a legal delimitation of 53 municipalities, recognised in 1972 by a regional law, for analytical purposes. Within this area there are functional interdependences among the various centres; the spatial configuration is dense and compact, due to the constant addition of new productive and residential areas around the existing ones and along the main traffic roads (Saccomani, 2007). The city administration of Turin has no institutional competence over this area, but the central city does have great influence over it. Dialogue between the outskirt municipalities and Turin has always been difficult because of the great socio-economic and political influence the central city has had over decades.
13. It included 120 members, leaders throughout the area: mayors, representatives of banking foundations, members of public–private agencies, directors of educational institutes and research centres, etc., as well as institutions like the Province. The president is the mayor of Turin.
14. The background was the experiences of other European cities, which were able to create a sort of “city brand”, above all Barcelona’s experience. Actually the former Barcelona mayor, Pasqual Maragal, was called to help the scientific committee in charge of the plan making.
15. For instance, alongside promotion and cooperation at an international level, the plan proposes projects intended to improve the connections with the rest of Europe (metro line, airport, passante ferroviario, high-speed railway system).
16. For instance, in 2008 the Architects World Congress, “Turin world design capital”, European Gymnastic Championship; in 2009 the Indoor Athletic Championship; in 2010 the
European Meeting of Euro-Science open forum (Esof); in 2011 celebration events for the 150 years since the Unity of Italy.

17. In some of the surrounding municipalities there are palaces built over the centuries by the past royal family, which form what is called the “corona di delizie” (crown of delights), which are now being restored and enhanced.

18. It can be added that during the first process Turin’s mayor was just the one who had started the process, in the second case, the new mayor “inherited” the experience and was probably less involved in it.

19. It could be interesting to underline that Fiat, the leading company that has always been a key actor in the city’s political decisions, was not involved in the process.

20. In 1990 a law introduced a new institution, the Metropolitan City (MC), to be established in nine metropolitan areas formed by a central city and other municipalities geographically, economically, socially and culturally connected with it: TMA is one of them. The Metropolitan City had the functions of planning and programming for the whole area, but the law was not implemented and no MC does exist.

21. Only recently some new regional laws have introduced optional strategic documents at the provincial and municipal levels alongside the traditional planning tools and regulations.

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