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Power dynamics and aid governance in a post disaster context: a case study of Haiti's recovery

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I hereby declare that, the contents and organisation of this dissertation constitute my own original work and does not compromise in any way the rights of third parties, including those relating to the security of personal data.

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Ermina Martini

Acknowledgment

I cannot start other than thanking the many beautiful Haitian people who crossed my path in this long and inspiring journey. This research would not make sense if it were not for them. With their patience to answer my questions and their effort to explain things that can hardly be understood, unless you are Haitian and unless you have lived through the pain of the 2010 earthquake, they offered me the rare opportunity to gather their stories and images. These stories and images represent a unique source of information that has been carefully examined in the following pages.

A special thanks goes to my PhD supervisors, and mentors, Marjaana Jauhola and Fabio Armao, who guided me until the end of this research with a perfect balance of expertise, firmness and empathy. This thesis would not have been made possible without their precious guidance.

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Summary

This research focuses on a case study of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake; it investigates the significance and the features of the governance of aid in a post-disaster context, looking at patterns of power distribution among the different actors involved, thus, revealing the complexity of the international aid system.

The work aims at shedding light on how different actors conceived the task of rebuilding the Haitian state/society; how patterns of cleavage and power relations were re-shaped through the disaster and the recovery process; and which features the governance of the reconstruction process in Haiti assumed and which contrasting/alternative approaches to the dominant reconstruction model arose.

The object of research is approached from four different perspectives, namely socio-political, institutional, grassroots and autobiographical. The result was a set of sub-cases of analysis dealing with the Build-Back-Better paradigm, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), watchdog initiatives, land tenure and housing issues and the aid workers' bubble.

The underlying scientific model is designed around principles of critical constructivism (Foucault and Gordon 1980), applied to social sciences, and more specifically to development studies. Coherently with the scientific model, the research's theoretical framework was built upon four key concepts, namely Power, Governance of Aid, Disaster and Post-development.

The research methods adopted are characterized by an empirical and ethnographic orientation. The ethnographic component of the research lies in the positioning of myself within the research object, living the everyday context of my study for almost one year.

To collect data a combination of qualitative methods were employed, including semi-structured interviews, dialogue with interviewees, informal conversations, participant observation, field note diaries, photographs and notes taken during the field work, and the acquisition of secondary data, including a large portion of grey literature.

The scope of this work is highly interdisciplinary touching upon topics relevant to the field of disaster governance, development studies and urban development, significant for both the scientific community and practitioners in these areas. Finally, Haiti, the chosen case study, is marginal to the mainstreamed research and deserves further scrutiny.

To my mother

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List of acronyms

Acronym	Full name
BBB	Build Back Better
ALNAP	Active Leaning Network for Accountability and Performanc in Humanitarian Action
CAED	Cadre de Coordination de l'Aide Externe au Development
CASECS	Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communale
CIAT	Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DGI	Direction General des Impots
DIST	Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)
FHRD	Fondation Haïtienne pour le Relèvement et le Développemer
FRH	Fund for the Reconstruction of Haiti
GoH	Government of Haiti
GmbH	German Corporation for International Cooperation
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HDI	Human Development Index
IDA	International Development Association
IHRC	Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
INARA	Institut National de la Réforme Agraire
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MPCE	Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation
NPM	New Public Management
OAS	Organization of American States

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONACA	Office National du Cadastre
PAO	Performance and Anti-Corruption Office
PARDN	Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Hait
PARDH	Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement d'Haïti
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
UCLBP	Unitè de Construction du Logement et des Batiments Publics
UNDCF	United Nations Development Cooperation Forum
WaSH	Water Sanitation Hygiene

Map of Haiti[1]

[1] Source www.ontheworldmap.com

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The beginning

This thesis narrates the steps, the encounters and the findings of a long and inspiring research journey. It began back in 2010 when I started my doctoral studies in Development Studies at the University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political and Economic Studies, and continued from 2017 in Turin, when I transferred to the Doctoral Program in Urban and Regional Development of the Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning (DIST).

There is also a hidden part of the journey that will not be captured in the following chapters; I refer to the process of self-discovery and my positioning of myself towards the field of research - Development Studies-, the topic and aim of my research, and academia.

This chapter introduces the research objective, the research questions and the methods adopted to collect and analyze data. The following sections are dedicated to present the scientific model and methods, the theoretical framework and the structure of the thesis. Finally, the significance and limitations of the research will be discussed.

1.2 The research aim and the research questions

The aim of this research is to investigate the significance and the features of the governance of aid in a post-disaster context, looking at patterns of power distribution among the different actors involved, and focusing in particular on the dichotomy between *foreign* and *local*. The scope of this work is highly multidisciplinary touching upon topics relevant to the field of disaster governance, land management and development aid, significant for both the scientific community and practitioners in these areas.

The research focuses on a case study of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. It is my experience of working in Haiti for an International No Governmental Organization (INGO) in 2010 that prompted the interest in this research.

Such professional experience offered me the opportunity to be a privileged observer of the complexity of the relief efforts that followed the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010. In particular, three different aspects which were observable in Haiti's complex scenario attracted my research interest:

1. The abundance of foreign actors involved in Haiti's post-earthquake context, the low level of involvement of local actors and the **lack of accountability** towards the local institutions and the local people;

2. The **perceived opportunity** to use the reconstruction of the country as a way to re-envision the state, reshaping the dominant governing model of Haiti, marked by exclusion, inequalities and foreign influence;

3. The **decontextualized lifestyle** of the majority of the expatriated aid workers (to which I belonged), living and working in a sort of bubble;

The above observations constituted what I define my "research intuition", which derived from the reality I had observed for fourth months in the aftermath of post-disaster Haiti. From this intuition, the research problems were unpacked into research questions and studied within a relevant theoretical framework; through a scientific method, the research aims to contribute to the scientific debate on the observed issues. The flowchart below shows the rationale behind the definition of the object of research.



Figure 1: Flow chart of the research process

The main research questions of the study, which evolved along the journey, are the following:

- How did different actors conceive the task of rebuilding the Haitian state/society?

- How were patterns of cleavage and power relations re-shaped through the disaster and the recovery process?

- Which features did the governance of the reconstruction process in Haiti assumed and which contrasting/alternative approaches to the dominant reconstruction model arose?

The research object was approached from different perspectives, and through the following thematic sub-case studies:

a. **Socio-political perspective**: Analysis of the significance of the "Build back Better" idea within the historical pattern of Haiti's state-building process. (Chapter 3)

b. **Institutional perspective**: Analysis of the conception, functioning and results of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC). (Chapter 4)

c. **Grassroots perspective**: Analysis of the civil society initiatives for an alternative approach to the reconstruction process. (Chapter 5 and chapter 6)

d. **Autobiographical perspective**: an autobiographical journey of resistance to the development hegemony (Chapter 7)

1.3. Methods

This research is qualitative and is based on an in-depth case study focusing on the context of Haiti post 2010 earthquake. I define casing as the process of cutting reality in pieces, and making it researchable. I applied a sort of *multi-layered casing process* to the way I first defined the temporal and geographic boundaries of my case (Haiti, post-2010), I then selected sub-cases from within the civil society and from among the institutional mechanisms to investigate my research questions.

In accordance with Vannesson's work (Vannesson, 2008) on the use of the case study in social science research, my research is significant as a descriptive case study, which sheds new light on a context which is marginal to the mainstream (Haiti, post 2010 development). It is also an interpretative case study that refines theories and clarifies the meaning of concepts in the area of disaster management, development and aid-governance.

To a certain extent I adopt in my investigation an extended case method, focusing on the analysis of social processes at the micro-level, wherein individual strategies and choices reveal the context of everyday life (Burawoy, 1991).

This research has an interdisciplinary orientation, where the discipline of development studies, itself interdisciplinary, blends with political science, international relations, human geography and urban studies.

The research methods adopted are characterized by an empirical and ethnographic orientation. Using an empirical approach I aim to disseminate my findings through a diversified epistemic community that includes not only scholars but also policy makers and practitioners. The ethnographic component of my research lies in the positioning of myself within the research object, living the everyday context of my study for almost one year; furthermore I primarily worked with unconstructed data, as during the data collection phase I did not have a closed set of analytic categories to analyze my data.

Tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1983), accumulated through my work and living experiences in the Global South is present throughout my research process.

The research is based on primary and secondary data. Primary data is the one created for the first time by the researcher while secondary data is the data already collected or produced by others.

To collect primary data a combination of qualitative methods were used, including semi-structured interviews, dialogue with interviewees, informal conversations, participant observation, field note diaries, photographs taken during the field work and a survey, comprising both closed and open questions.

The acquisition of secondary data through a literature review, including a large portion of grey literature (Auger, 1989), was particularly significant in the preparation of this thesis. Grey literature can be defined as "That which is produced on all levels of government, academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by commercial publishers" (Fourth International Conference on Grey Literature 1999).

The grey literature consulted embraces mainly policy and programme documents and reports edited by international organizations, civil society organizations and INGOs, governmental publications, working papers, news articles and consulted websites.

My data analysis is qualitative oriented and it mainly focused on content analysis through the mapping of topics and themes relevant to my research questions throughout my primary and secondary data. Chapter 2 is largely based on the analysis of secondary data; extensive desk review has been conducted, combing multiple sources. Finally, in Chapter 7 I used an experimental methodology combining reflexive memory and life-story method, creative writing

and auto-ethnography (Lewis 2013; Fechter 2013; Mosse 2005; Mosse ed. 2013; Denzin 2006).

I view at the methods as flexible instruments that can overlap and become integrated with each other, according to the type of data and the research question. I see methods as a research pathway (Titscher et al. 2000) that permits a researcher to go from the initial assumption to the level of data collection, and then to the level of transforming the data into information useful to answer the initial research question, or to answer a reformulated question.

1.4 Data collection

1.4.1 The organization of the fieldwork

The primary data collection took place in Haiti during almost one year of not consecutive fieldwork occurring between September 2010 and December 2012. In the following years up to 2018, secondary data, including literature and policy documents were gathered in an on-going process, providing up-to-date information relevant to the case study under scrutiny and offering new insights to look at the primary data. Throughout the period, contacts were maintained with Haitian informants and with international aid workers working in the country. Informal exchanges and conversations with them constituted an important feeding element that ensured a constant realty check and helped steering the research process by maintaining the communication flow with field open.

Finally, a survey of twenty questions was developed and administered in May 2018, addressing the specific target group of aid workers who worked in Haiti between 2010 and 2012. The survey was submitted online to 100 respondents belonging to the target group, reaching a response rate of 21%.

The first part of the fieldwork in Haiti was conducted from September to January 2011 while I was working for an international NGO (Finnish) in the humanitarian aid sector. During this period the raw data collection was limited to keeping a personal diary, having informal conversations with relevant informants, conducting participant observation, taking photographs of significant sites and collecting a large amount of secondary data. During this phase the framework of the research was still blurred and the research questions had not been clearly defined yet. That first encounter with the research object become extremely important to shape my reflection around the topic to investigate, to position myself and to organize the structure of my research.

The period going from January 2011 to March 2012, which was between the first and second phase of fieldwork, was dedicated to gain more solid background and knowledge on the context and topic of research by conducting extensive

analysis of secondary data. This preparation answered to a strong sense of unpreparedness perceived during the first stay in Haiti, which pushed me to become more familiar with the complexity of the history and socio-economic context, as well as with the field of disaster's governance. Only through this groundwork I felt sufficiently prepared to re-enter the field to conduct interviews.

The second part of the field research was conducted in two fractions in 2012, going respectively from March to June and from October to December 2012. This organization of the fieldwork derived by the need to mediate family and personal life with my doctoral studies, and by practicalities linked to funding constraints, given the high cost required for travelling and living in Haiti for an extensive period of time.

To address these multiples challenges I accepted an assignment for an international NGO (Italian), which was up to start its operation in the country.

However, the option of re-entering the field through a workable compromise implied the major challenge to carry at the same time a double hats, the one of the aid-worker and the one of the researcher. This dual role shaped, unconsciously, my participant observation of the social arena I was immerged into. To mitigate the spill-off effects on the data collection process, I refrained as much as possible from influencing the informants with my connection with the NGOs sector. Thus, when approaching the informants before the interviews I used to introduce myself as a PhD student, to present my research topic and my affiliation with the academia, while avoiding mentioning the NGO related assignment. On the other side, belonging to the international aid environment allowed me to get closer to aid workers colleagues and initiate discussions on an insider to insider basis.

1.4.2 The informants

The data was collected mainly via interviews conducted during the 2012 fieldwork; interviews were coupled with participant observation, informal conversations and field notes diary. Two focus group discussions were also conducted but with poor results. As already mentioned, written and visual data, including a significant amount of articles from local newspapers (Les Nouvelliste and Le Matin), which helped me to gain a local perspective on the events, and over three hundreds pictures, were gathered and filed during the field research period.

Open and semi-structured interviews were employed to conduct interview; they were privileged to structured interviews because they offer the flexibility to divert from a strict set of questions adapting the tool to the evolving of the interview process in order to dynamically focus the questions on the topic of interest (Kvale, 1996). In some occasions open interviews evolved into a dialogue

with key informants, letting in-depth information emerge from a face-to-face process which by being perceived natural and comfortable facilitate the openness of the discourse (Bailey, 2007).

Based on the research questions, it was relevant to interview a diversified and integrating set of informants, which has been structured before entering the field into macro-categories. In particular the research aimed at reaching representatives from the following groups:

- Members of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission;
- Members of the Haitian civil society, including civil society associations, community based groups, labor unions;
- Members of the Haitian economic elites, business sector;
- Governmental officials, including members of decentralized local authorities;
- Members of International Organizations;
- Aid workers of different international organizations;
- Representative of faith based congregations;

After defining the desired categories of informants, extensive resources have been dedicated to identify relevant persons, belonging to the different groups, to be interviewed. Before re-entering the field in 2012, through different connections developed during my earlier stay in Haiti, I had managed to have a limited list of names and contact details of informants, who in some cases were contacted prior to arrival by email in order to introduce the study. My affiliation with the INGO and building relations with other inhabitants of the guesthouse where I was lodged, were helpful to obtain additional contacts of potential informants. Filling the list of informants with names and contact details turned to be an on-going process during the entire fieldwork period.

I adopted a snowballing sample technique, which can be defined as a technique for gathering research respondents through the identification of an initial subject who is in the position to suggest other possible relevant informants (S. Lewis-Beck M., Alan Bryman A. and Futing Liao T. ed. 2004). At the end of each interview, I used to ask suggestions for other informants relevant to my research; the majority of my interlocutors felt pleased by this request, perceived as an opportunity to contribute to the study, and often advised on relevant persons to contact to gather further information.

This technique, given the informality of the local context, where it was challenging to access informants with a say on the subject, proved to be useful and helped widen the list of informants. Nevertheless, I was aware of the technique's limitations, which are intrinsic to the fact that people recommend other people with whom they have connection, and this might lead having biased views and alternative views left out. For this reason, the list of possible informants

was kept broad and with a good balance of representatives from different groups of interest.

1.4.3 The interview process

Before entering the filed I drafted an interview grid, based on some general guidelines to design qualitative interviews (Turner, 2010), and using my previous professional experience in developing baseline studies, needs assessments and participating in fact finding missions outside the academia. The grid was a guiding tool to operationalize my research questions throughout my fieldwork. In semi-structured interviews the order of the questions is not pre-fixed (Patton, 1990) and this allowed me to use the grid in a very flexible way, which I adapted to the different categories of informants and to the individual cases. Before meeting the informant, I was refining the interview grid, identifying the most relevant issues to cover based on the role, background, profile of the individual respondent and listing possible sub-questions to address. The development of the interview would generally start with some introductory and contextualizing questions, moving towards more open-ended questions on the key themes.

Table 1 below reports the main questions included in the initial interview grid, divided by the research sub-fields.

Institutional perspective
How was the ICRH established?
How did the ICRH work?
Who nominated the members of the ICRH?
To whom did you respond for your work in the ICRH?
Who were the other representatives? how did you relate with them?
What was the role of the ICRH in the recovery process?
Did the ICRH promoted accountability? Please explain.
Did the ICRH promoted a good governance of the recovery?
What were the major strengths of the ICRH?
What were the major weaknesses of the ICRH?
Why the ICRH was so highly criticized?
What happened in Santo Domingo when some members declared their dissatisfaction?
Could you please provide account of the functioning of the Commission?
What role the foreign representatives played in the establishment and functioning of the ICRH?
Did you feel members had different degree of power within the ICRH?
What is the future of the ICRH?
Socio-political perspective
Why after the earthquake there was so much hope to re-envision Haiti?

What does it mean re-envision Haiti? please explain
Can you explain on which basis the change of Haiti could occur?
Which were the living forces promoting a radical change in structure of the state of Haiti?
Which were the main obstacles to make this change real?
Do you think two years after the quake something has changed?
Why the change did not occur? Why the hope evanished?
Grassroots perspective
How does accountability work in your field/work?
How do you describe accountability of the reconstruction process?
How do you describe the governance of the reconstruction process?
What is the aim of your initiative?
What would you do promote accountability towards local people and local institutions?
Why in your view the different stakeholders of the reconstruction are not accountable to the Haitian people?
Which role the Haitian state could play to bring foreign and private actors more accountable?
How do you describe the relationship between foreign aid organizations and local partners?

Table 1: interview grid

During the fieldwork in total 39 semi-structured interviews were conducted, mainly in French; in same cases interviews were held in English and in Italian, based on the native language of the informants. All interviews were conducted in person and took place in different settings, usually complying with the logistic requests of the interviewee, including offices, public spaces and private houses. All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed; in addition, notes were taken during the interview and analyzed together with the transcripts. The full list of interviews is enclosed in Annex 1, including duration, topic and language of each interview.

Considering the sensitivity of the topic and the vulnerability of the group of informants, serious attention was paid to ethical considerations while conducting the interviews, following the general principles of research ethics. The choice of appropriate questions, the use of local language, a neutral attitude and integrity was mainstreamed in order to protect the informants avoiding any frustration or disturbance for them. Prior consent has been orally obtained to record, note and cite the information released; a special consideration has been paid to confidentiality. Attention has been also paid in the ethical use of visual data; all pictures used in the dissertation have been carefully examined and faces or identifiable features of local people, and particularly children, have been obscured. When personal features have not been obscured, prior consent to take and use the pictures has been obtained by the subjects concerned.

In table 2 the interviews are reported by main group of informants and by gender. Informants from the IHRC have been listed under their category of affiliation. A total of 26 male and 13 female were interviewed; the majority of respondents belonged to the Haitian civil society, followed by aid agencies and international NGOs.

Groups of informants	Number of interviews by gender
Haitian civil society	15 (7F-8M)
Haitian economic elites/business sector	4 (4M)
Public sector officials	5 (2F-3M)
Aid agencies and INGOs	9 (4F, 5M)
Faith based congregations	6 (M)

Table 2: Breakdown of interviews

Increased familiarity and confidence with the interviewing method made the quality of the interviews improving during the field research stay. One practical challenge encountered in a number of interviews was linked to the interview site; particularly when the interview took place in a public space or during events, the process was disturbed by an hectic environment and the recording was affected by background noise. When invited by the interviewees to their offices or houses, the interview was enriched by those not verbal elements observable in the hosting setting.

Regarding the focus group technique, its use in the data collection was limited to two attempts with groups of about 8 to 10 persons. Besides the original plan to adopt the focus group to capture discourses and positions of marginalized and vulnerable local people, whose voices are not directly represented in the sample of informants, the results were very modest and with limited data usability for the purpose of this thesis. The main challenge encountered in the focus groups derived by the difficulty to make the object of investigation concrete enough to animate a valuable discussion among the group, in addition to the Creole language barrier.

1.4.4 Participatory observation and additional data

Participatory observation constituted an important component of my field research. Participatory observation, often used by anthropologist as their main data collection technique, is the "process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the researcher setting" (Shensul and Le Compte 1999). Applied to my fieldwork, participant observation implied embracing an open and non-judgmental attitude toward the object of research and making efforts to understand the local context. I plunged into the Haitian culture, took Creole lessons, listened to the local radios and read

the local newspapers, mainly Les Nouvelliste and Le Matin, which during the period of my stay were not issued regularly on a daily basis. To act as a participant observer meant more than being just a simple observer: it involved taking part in events relevant to my object of investigation, observe situations informants have described during their interviews, having conversation and natural discussions, writing a field diary, visiting sites and taking a large number of photographs.

The added value of participant observation as research method has been broadly discussed by DeWalt and DeWalt (2002) who argued that participant observation can help to "develop a holistic understanding of the phenomena under study that is as objective and accurate as possible given the limitations of the method" (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002 p.92). Validity of the methods is increased when it's coupled with other research technique, including interviewing, document analysis and surveys (ibid).

During my first period of stay in Haiti I experienced significant historical and natural events, including the passage of Hurricane George, the first turn of the highly debated 2010 presidential election and the outbreak of the cholera epidemics. I followed the electoral campaign and elections' preparation and on election day I had the opportunity to observe voting in a pooling station located in a densely populated displaced camp in downtown Port-au-Prince, where I talked with some voters and camp dwellers who were denied the right to vote. Following the issuance of the election results, disorders broke down in Port-au-Prince with people contesting the results marching in the streets. Due to safety reason I had to live under curfew for few days and I could only perceive the events through the local media and grasping conversation in public spaces or with local colleagues.

Similarly, I experienced the outbreak of the cholera epidemics in the country in October 2010, followed the local debate on its causes and responsibility, witnessed the unpreparedness of the country to deal with this additional unexpected tragedy and the hectic reaction of the international community, with a mixture of fear for the safety of their operators and of real efforts to address the needs of the affected population.

During the fieldwork I had many informal conversations with friends and colleagues living in Haiti about the situation and about my research interest; reflexive memories of my stay in the country constituted also an important data set. Multiple secondary data, including books and journals locally edited by different stakeholders and extensive grey literature integrated the primary data.

The amount and diversification of data collected in the framework of this research has been significant and exceeded, to a certain extent, the scope of the present dissertation. The combination of primary and secondary data allowed to

an extensive accumulation of sources and to a meaningful triangulation of data sources, particularly looking at people with different view points (Patton, 2001).

1.5 Scientific model and theoretical framework

A critical constructivist research approach underpins the study presented in this dissertation; the importance attributed in the analytical methods to expose power dynamics affecting the researchable problem and the effort to reflect upon the researcher's positionality are symptomatic of this approach. Therefore it's legitimate to state that the underlying scientific model is designed around principles of critical constructivism (Foucault and Gordon 1980), applied to social sciences, and more specifically to development studies.

Knowledge is temporally and culturally situated according to the critical constructivists[2]; as a consequence, knowledge and social phenomena are crafted in a dialogue between culture, institutions, and historical contexts.

For Kincheloe (2005) critical constructivism involves the development of a dynamic and textured understanding of the way power works at macro and micro levels to share our understanding of the world and our role in it; the innovation of critical constructivism is to explore areas where the manifestation of power at the different levels connect (Kincheloe, 2005).

When looking at the micro level of the power relations within the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (Chapter 4), the watchdog initiatives (Chapter 5), the reconstruction process (Chapter 3 and 6) and discussing my self-reflective journey through the aid system in post disaster Haiti (Chapter 7), the research is not only inspired by a critical constructivism approach but it's also guided by an actor orientation. An actor-oriented scheme acknowledges that people are social actors, whose agency is influenced by their life experiences, social encounters and relational networks (Hilhorst, 2003). The aim of this research is to provide an understanding of the research problem from below and from inside. For this reason an actor-oriented perspective come in handy to realize that people operates and intertwines within a larger framework. As Long has argued in his theory on interface encounter (Long 1989, Long 2001), social actors have an agency and a capacity to act in a world, where this capacity and action is challenged by structural limitations.

The different chapters of this dissertation, while dealing with specific aspects of the examined case study, they all spin around a set of key concepts, which

[2] For further details on critical constructivism principles and theories see Freire, P. (1970), Kincheloe (2005), Foucault and Gordon (1980). For the purpose of this dissertation it is relevant only to mention critical realism and critical constructivism in order to delimit the frame of the scientific model; however, the aim of the research is to focus on the use of key concepts, used as guiding tools coherently with the scientific model, as discussed in the rest of the section.

guide the research's theoretical framework coherently with the macro scientific model mentioned above. The following key concepts will be presented next: Power, Governance of Aid, Disaster and Post-development.

Power

Power is one of the most commonly used and, at the same time, one of the most controversial concept in social sciences; it has been highly debated, researched and studied. However, because power is ineradicably value-dependent, "its definition and use are tied to a set of value assumptions that predetermine the range of its empirical applications" (Lukes 2005, p.62), there is no agreement on a single interpretation of the concept.

The study of power is key to identify those with power, to assign responsibilities and to evaluate social inequalities.

The theoretical debate around power has left many questions opened, partly applicable to the case study discussed in this dissertation: who has power and how is it possible to identify them? Which are the conditions that foster or hinder mechanisms of power? If power is so hidden and invisible, how does one scrutinize its manifestations? Which mechanism power uses to secure compliance? (Navarro 2006).

Steven Lukes published his masterpiece, *A Radical view of Power*, in 1974 and developed a theory of the three dimensions of power, according to which power can be exercised as decision-making power, non-decision-making power and ideological power (Lukes 2005). His analysis starts from the assumption that power is not solely reflected in concrete decisions, but that all the surrounding processes around the decision-making are embedded in less visible power relations (Lukes 2005). The innovativeness of his view is that power results to be as more effective as less observable it is. Lukes conceives social power in relational and asymmetrical terms; closely to the *potestas* of Spinoza, power implies the domination of one over another or others. Power in his view is also a dispositional concept, which means that power identifies a capacity that may or may not be exercised (ibid).

According to Foucault, there is a deep connection between power and knowledge; power is a pervasive aspect of social life and its success is proportional to the ability to hide its own mechanisms; subjects are constituted through subjection to power (Foucault, 1988). Connected to power, Foucault developed the concept of governmentality, which refers to the process by which in modern societies authorities administer population, and individuals shape their own self and the ways in which these processes get aligned (Lukes 2005).

In the framework of this research, the work of David Mosse, directly related to power in development, is highly relevant. Mosse, in what he calls a relational approach to poverty[3], urges the need to incorporate a multidimensional conception of power: "not just power as the direct assertion of will- the various forms of domination, intimidation and violence- but also the second order agenda-setting power (Lukes 2005) that sets the terms in which poverty becomes (or fails to become) politicized, which is closely related to power as political representation" (Mosse 2010, p.1157). Mosse, similarly to Lukes, understands power in relational terms: power is not a capacity *per se* that can be fostered through capacity building programs. Instead, the powerless should be seen as the product of the domination of others (individual or groups).

Discussing power leads naturally to enter the arenas of possible ways to challenge power relations, and thus to talk about participation.

Hayward uses Foucault's idea of boundaries to define power as the "network of social boundaries that delimits fields of possible action" and "freedom is the capacity to participate effectively in shaping the social limits that define what is possible" (Hayward 1998, p.2). Gaventa talks about power as the right to define and to shape the space of participation and brings the discussion to the current tendency in international development, marked by a participatory governance model and dominated by the language of participation and inclusiveness. But simply creating institutional frameworks, warns the author, focusing on new mechanisms of partnership and shared ownership, will not necessarily result in greater inclusion of the powerless (Gaventa 2006). Spaces of negotiation and participation are not neutral, but they are shaped by power relations (Cornwall 2002).

Useful to operationalize the concepts of power and participation in the context of development is the *power cube* framework developed by Gaventa, which is structured around three dimensions: the *level* where power relations occur (Global/National/Local), the *spaces* for engagement, how they are created, with whose interests (Closed/Invited/Claimed), and the *forms* of power (Visible/Hidden/Invisible) (Gaventa 2006). The most effective strategies to change power relations, according to Gaventa's application of the power cube, need to work linking the levels vertically, building alliances across the three spaces and with specific actions oriented to each form of power (Ibid).

Governance of Aid

Efforts have been made in the past years to define the governance of aid; the common starting point used by researchers and practitioners is to translate to

[3] A relational view of poverty, in very simple terms, asserts that the poor are the product of others, who have more power over them. In these terms, it is important to change social relations to affect poverty (Wood 2003).

development aid those key principles used in the literature to study good governance in a nation state framework (Kaufaman 2003, Hewitt de Alcàntara 1998, Hyden et al 2004). Those principles, with a particular focus on developing countries, have been well described by Hyden et al. (2004), who define governance as "the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions" (ibid p. 16).

According to Duffield, instead, who draws on Foucaudian ideas of power, the governance of aid is part of the larger global liberal governance framework. In this framework development is characterized by a thick network of public and private actors and the fulcrum of governance within the New Public Management (NPM)[4] is financial and technical (Duffield 2001). While informing the initial hypothesis of the thesis, the picture of international liberal governance offered by Duffield results, at times, too narrow, when applied to the context of Haiti. Findings of this research, in fact, showed a more nuanced and textured image of aid governance, shaped by the interplay of actors within the aid arena.

A different way to look at governance is to measure how well it performs according to the following six dimensions (Hyden et al. 2004):

- Participation: the degree of involvement by affected stakeholders;
- Fairness: the degree to which rules apply equally to everyone in society;
- Decency: the degree to which the formation and stewardship of the rules is undertaken without humiliating or harming people;
- Accountability: the extent to which political actors are responsible to society for what they say and do;
- Transparency: the degree of clarity and openness with which decisions are made;
- Efficiency: the extent to which limited human and financial resources are applied without unnecessary waste, delay or corruption.

Drawing on the above principles, it has been argued that a well functioning governance of the aid system should improve the effectiveness of the aid system, avoid unnecessary cost for donors or recipients, be legitimate, fair and transparent, representing all involved stakeholders; finally, aid governance should be adaptive to a changing environment (Barder et al. 2010). Some mechanisms of aid governance already exist, such as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the UN Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF), high level fora and in country specific coordination tools.

[4] New Public Management (NPM) is an approach developed during the 1980s to run public services more "businesslike" and to improve its efficiency by using private sector management models (Hood C. 1991).

The governance of aid, at different levels, from the global to the local, is desirable to ensure the collective provision of public goods, limiting negative spill-over effects and increasing the impact of aid interventions. Coordination mechanisms, information sharing and learning, division of labor, accountability and participation are some of the most relevant issues involved in the study and practical implementation of aid governance.

Disaster

Literature in the area of disaster is broad, spanning from anthropology of disasters, to disaster mitigation and prevention to disaster measurement; each branch of the literature focuses on different aspects of disaster, while missing to provide a more holistic perspective. On the other hand, practitioners working in the field of disaster tend to concentrate on policies and practices of disaster resilience and risk management. As Barkun has underlined, a disaster might be easier to recognize than to define (Barkun 1974, p. 51). Quarantelli attempted to systematize the multiple definitions given to disaster by social and behavioral scientists: according to his study "disasters have been equated with: physical agents; the physical impact of such physical agents; an assessment of physical impacts; the social disruption resulting from an event with physical impacts; the social construction of reality in perceived crisis situations which may or may not involve physical impacts; the political definition of certain crisis situations; and an imbalance in the demand-capability ration in crisis occasion" (Quarantelli 1985, p.43-44). More recently Quarantelli (2000, 2006) in his catastrophe model proposes a distinction between disaster and catastrophe, mainly based on the level structures that were supposed to respond to disaster have been impacted by it, and therefore incapable to operate.

In the context of this thesis disaster is understood as a social construction, in contrast with the positivist view of the phenomena. A widely accepted definition of disaster as a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR 2009), omits to discuss the complexity of causes originating the disaster. Ulrich Beck (1999, 2006) developed the idea that the industrialized modern system has lost control over the unpredictable consequences and risks it can produce, seriously harming the environment and the human beings. As Cannon (1994) explained, a natural hazard doesn't always turn into a disaster, which, instead, needs to be understood within the context of development. Socio-economical development determines the level of vulnerability and the capacity of a local community to prevent and cope with the impact of a natural hazard. In 2010 the World Bank published a book named *Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters*; according to this study, the explanation for a disaster lies in the multi layer vulnerabilities people are exposed to. Recent

reports[5] have "emphasized the 'unnaturalness' of natural disasters. Disasters are an outcome of trends in the location of people and assets, and economic, environmental and land use policies, rather than a series of exogenous and unpredictable misfortunes (Keating et al. 2017).

Finally, it is important to mention the role of media in the context of disasters: Benthall (1993), a former NGO worker, argued that the press has the power to create a disaster by deciding when to make it visible or not. His position has been supported by the findings of the CARMA report, which empirically demonstrated that there is no link between the scale of a disaster and the media coverage extension: the report concluded that timing, level of interest and story angle depend upon the economic impact of a disaster on western markets and upon the geopolitics (CARMA Int. 2006).

Post-Development[6]

Post-development appeared in the international arena at the beginning of the Nineties, following the controversial claim of Wolfgang Sachs, who argued in his "The Development Dictionary" (1992), that the development era was dead, provoking among scholars and development practitioners a lively debate around the definition of the notion of post-development. Following the post-structuralism analysis of development, which "pointed at the forms of exclusion that went along with the development project, particularly the exclusion of the knowledges, voices and concerns of those whom, paradoxically, development was supposed to serve: the poor of Asia, Africa and Latin America" (Escobar, in Ziai ed. 2007, p. 20), post-development meant that development could not longer take place purely "under Western eyes" (Mohanty 1991, quoted in Escobar 2007).

Post-development school[7] argues development is based on an unequal power distribution between the west and the rest of the world, following an Eurocentric and universalistic discourse. Post-developmentalists, therefore, called for a re-valorisation of local cultures in contrast with the pure expert knowledge at the centre of the development discourse, which had been built around the professionalization of development problems and the institutionalization of the development apparatus (Escobar in Ziai ed. 2007). One key message of post-development is "the need to change the practices of knowing and doing and the 'political economy of truth' that defines the development regime" (ibid p. 21).

[5] See the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (UN, 2015), and the Global Assessment Report 2015 (UNISDR, 2015).
[6] For a comprehensive analysis of post-development see the work edited by Aram Zai (2007), *Exploring post-development. Theories and practices, problems and perspectives,* Routledge.
[7] Scholars representative of the post-development school are, among others, Arturo Escobar, Gustavo Esteva, Majid Rahnema, Wolfgang Sachs, James Ferguson, Serge Latouche and Gilbert Rist.

Ferguson (1994) in his ethnographic analysis of the development arena in Lesotho from 1975 to 1984 showed not only the failure of the development projects disconnected from the local historical and political context, but the many side effects projects have generated. In particular he pointed out that development has transformed political problems of poverty and powerless into technical problems, awaiting solutions by development experts.

Escobar (1985, 2011), in addition, stressed the importance to make subjects of development the ones who are targeted by development strategies, whose voices have been largely excluded; taking into account movements of resistance lead by the local affected population and the alternative approaches promoted by social movements become, thus, particularly significant in the post-development practice.

Each chapter, as indicated in the table below, deepens the multifold meaning and connections of the four key concepts, bringing into the discussion further aspects and related references useful to analyse the specificity of the data presented in the different sections.

Chapter	Conceptual focus	Main references
2	Haiti's political economy and history, disaster vulnerability	Cannon T., Dupuy A., Lundahl M., Ferguson J.
3	Build-back-better, disaster governance	Mannakkara S., Wilkinson S. and Francis T.R., Khasalamwa S
4	Institutional tools of aid governance, aid effectiveness	Chandler D., M. Duffield M., Brassard C., Zanotti L.
5	Aid accountability, participation	Eyben R., Li T.M., OECD
6	Land tenure, urban planning, post disaster housing, slum	Noel L., Senat R. and Belvert A., Kats J.
7	Aidland, auto-ethnography, travelling rationalities	Mosse D., Inayatullah N., Ritu V.

1.6 Outline

This thesis is composed of eight themed chapters, including the current chapter.

Chapter 2 is an introduction to the context of Haiti and outlines the historical, socio, economic and political framework to better understand the main causes at the roots of Haiti's human emergency, framework that contributed to turn a natural hazard, the earthquake that hit the country in January 2010, into a devastating disaster. The chapter offers an analysis of the foreign influences

affecting the state formation and discusses, in its last section, elements of disaster theory and the factual analysis of the 2010 earthquake.

In chapter 3 the discourse of *build-back-better* Haiti is largely scrutinized by looking at the multifold meaning of the principle, as applied in context outside Haiti and as discussed by different groups of interest of the Haitian society. The pillars of the action plan for the development of Haiti, issued in March 2010, are examined in the light of the *build-back-better* paradigm, showing the disconnection between reconstruction policies and practices.

Chapter 4, providing an in depth account of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) and the correlated Fund for the Reconstruction of Haiti (FRH), investigates strengths and limitations of the institutional setting established in the aftermath of the disaster to promote coordination and accountability of the aid efforts; the analysis is contextualized in the broader framework of aid effectiveness and aid governance.

In Chapter 5 the phenomena of aid watchdogs, which marked the Haitian local civil society environment in the post disaster period, is scrutinized. Those experiences can be seen as a healthy reaction of resistance to the dominant development approach discourse and could strengthen domestic accountability in support of aid's effectiveness in fragile states. The IHRC and the watchdogs focus on the different forms of governance of aid and both forms are analysed as part of what Duffield (2001) defines governance at distance.

Chapter 6 explores one issue that has been historically problematic in Haiti and that turned to be a major challenge in the reconstruction phase: land regime. The chaotic resettlement in the outskirt area of Port-au-Prince, named Canaan, is analysed and the housing project of Father Joseph, from the Scalabrini congregation, is presented as an alternative approach to the dominant reconstruction process.

Chapter 7 narrates stories of the rhetoric of doing good, starting with my own story, elaborated in an introspective dialogue with my supervisor, also a former aid worker, discussing the emotional labour of the humanitarian aid practice in post disaster contexts and continued in the academia. The second part of the chapter is based on a survey conducted in 2018 with aid workers who worked in Haiti between 2010-2012. These data are discussed also in the light of Oxfam GB scandals made public in 2018 and related to the organizations' misconducts during Haiti's post-earthquake relief operation.

The last Chapter (chapter 8) provides a concluding interpretation to the research finding discussed in the previous chapters, remarking the logical common thread behind the different pieces of the dissertation. Significance and recommendations for future research are considered too.

1.7 Significance and limitation of the research

The present study is particularly significant to fill a gap in the literature in the area of aid governance in post disaster and to contribute to the production of knowledge on the context of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, marginal to the mainstreamed research trend. The findings of this research can be used by scholars in the academia as well as by practitioners working in field of development and humanitarian aid.

More specifically, the research offers an in depth analysis of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission which, up to date, remains unduly discussed in the literature and which provides a meaningful reference for the study of institutional mechanism to coordinate post-disaster's recovery. The phenomena of local aid watchdog, described in chapter 5, is also rarely investigated in the literature of development studies and open the possibility to further scrutiny. The analysis of the applicability of the build-back-better paradigm, largely researched in Aceh Indonesia (Daly P. et al. 2016), is innovative when looked in the context of Haiti; furthermore, it links up with Chapter 6, which discussing land tenure in the newly born informal neighbourhood of Canaan, shows the disconnection between build-back-better reconstruction policies and practices. Finally, the confessional unpacking of my aid-worker experience, together with the primary data collected through a survey of other aid workers, brings to the scientific and practitioners' community elements to reflect upon the assumingly natural and depoliticized aid system.

Besides its significance, this study has also limitations. Some limitations are linked to methodological and practical challenges encountered in the research process, which was scattered along a discontinuous and long period of time; this process witnessed a combination of intervals of full time study with full time work outside the academia, where study was only possible in the snippets.

The first phase of the fieldwork in 2010 took place before the research framework was fully developed and, even though it constituted an important source of data and inspiration, the data collected in that period were not structured according to a well-defined research plan. Therefore, my recorded and semi-structured interviews are limited to the second phase of the fieldwork in 2012.

The last quarter of 2010 and the course of 2012 offered different contextual features, mainly because of the different time lapse from the hit of the disaster, with the aid-machine slowly shifting from relief to reconstruction and development; in addition the local political context was marked by significant changes in that period, witnessing two turns of a controversial presidential election and the appointment of the new President of Haiti only in March 2011. In this sense, one main limitation of my research is the looking at dynamics that

spanned over two years, and still on going, but with the primary data collection largely concentrated in 2012. The relative ageing of my primary data in relation to an evolving research object has been partly mitigated by an extensive review of more recent secondary data and with the administration of an on-line survey in 2018.

The ultimate limitation stands in the research fatigue, in the weakening of the tie with the research context and topic. This downside derived mainly by the necessity to divide the fieldwork into shorter visits over a longer time and the need to combine unpaid PhD studies with regular jobs.

Chapter 2

Framing the context: Haiti, foreign influence, disaster.

> Haiti has always been a hub for the global flows of history, for the transboundary relations of inequality (Shah, 2009).

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this Chapter[8] is to introduce the context of Haiti; the historical, socio, economic and political framework is discussed to better understand the main causes at the roots of Haiti's human emergency. This framework, indeed, contributed to turn a natural hazard, the earthquake that hit the country in January 2010, into a devastating disaster. As Cannon (1994) explains, a natural hazard doesn't always turn into a disaster, which, instead, needs to be understood within the context of development. Development in turn determines the level of vulnerability and the capacity of a local community to prevent and cope with the impact of a natural hazard.

The World Bank in its publication *Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters* (2010) suggests that the explanation for a disaster lies in the multi-layered vulnerabilities people are exposed to. Accordingly, Paul Farmer, a doctor and a scholar, who lived many years in Haiti, describes the 2010 earthquake as an *acute-on-chronic event*. "A sound account of the quake must go deep into Haiti's history to illuminate what caused the chronic disabilities" (Farmer 2011 p.3).

This chapter is structured into four sections: first I provide an account of the political systems, leadership and forms of governance which characterized the historical formation of the Haitian state; next, I summarize the key features of Haiti's socio-economic context; the third section will be dedicated to discuss

[8] This chapter is largely based on secondary data, including grey literature, while it does not include any raw data analysis, differently from the following chapters.

those major elements of foreign influences which were observed in Haiti, including international aid, and that represent a sort of common thread in its past and current history. The final section focuses on disaster theory and the factual analysis of the 2010 earthquake.

The concluding remarks underline the institutional and structural nature of the challenging conditions of the country, supporting Lundahl's (2013) argument that the plight of Haiti can only be understood in the larger perspective of its historical trajectory.

2.2 The Historical Formation of the Haitian State

2.2.1 The origin of the first black republic

Farmer argues that "modern day Haitians are the descendants of people kidnapped from Africa in order to provide our forebears with sugar, coffee and cotton" (Farmer 2005 p.157) and the severe poverty affecting the country is a form of structural violence, deeply rooted in historical and geographical global dynamics. In this paragraph I describe the origin of the first black republic of Haiti, arguing that in its foundation it's possible to retrace the main features that have historically characterized the ruling patterns of the country.

Christopher Columbus established the first settlements in the territory of today's Haiti in 1492 and founded the colony of Hispaniola on the entire island.

The island before the arrival of Columbus was inhabited by the local indigenous population, the Taino, of Arawak descendants. Their origins can be traced back over 5000 years in waves of migrations from South America, mainly from the Amazon basin area; the Taino had developed a complex political, social and religious system, they were skilled in agriculture, fishing, sailing and made art crafts in pottery and weave (Alegria and Arrom 1998).

Following the arrivals of the Europeans, the Taino population suffered near extinction mainly due to their vulnerability to the new diseases and to labor exploitation, leading their pre-Columbian society to collapse (Hector and Hurbon, ed. 2009). According to Ferguson (1987) around half a million Taino were exterminated over the period of fifty years in the Spanish gold mines, leaving just 500 survivors in 1548 (Logan, 1968, p.11 quoted in Lundahl 2013 p.5). As Lundahl (2006 and 2013) explains, at the arrival of the Spaniard in Hispaniola, the island had abundant unexploited land covered with virgin forest. The colony during the Spanish domination went through a deep demographic crisis altering the man-land ratio, ending to provoke the failure of the production system and leading the economy into doldrums (Lundahl 2013). Therefore, while the Spanish interest in Hispaniola began to wane in the 1520s, as more lucrative gold and silver deposits were found in Mexico and South America, the French gained

interest on the Western part of the island and progressively took its control, establishing the settlement of Leogane in 1663 and Port-de-Paix, in the North, in 1665.

Under the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick, Spain officially ceded the western three-eighths of Hispaniola to France, which renamed the colony of Saint Domingue. The French, who maintained control for almost one century, developed a plantation system based on the main production of sugar, but also tobacco, coffee, indigo, cocoa and cotton were grown. All these products were traded and consumed in Europe and North America, where their demand was increasing. The production system, particularly for sugar, was land, capital and labour intensive; at large, the plantation system was based on labour provided by estimated 455,000 African slaves (Dupuy 1989, p.21). Slaves lived in awful conditions, which were formalized in the Code Noir of 1685; the Code, endorsed by the Catholic church, denied the slaves the right to move behind their plantation, to marry without their master consent and to possess properties. On the other side the code allowed the masters to punish their slaves and to kill any slave who struck a white person (Ferguson, 1987). Those slaves who managed to escape were called *marrons*, from the Spanish *cimarron* or wild; they established their communities in the hidden rural countryside.

Under the French domination Haiti gained the reputation of the "pearl of the Antilles" given its wealth and the income generated in France through the trade of its goods; in Saint Domingue the *grands blancs* (the white opulent French settlers) had reproduced amenities and a lifestyle similar to the mainland. The capital, Cap-Francais, in the north of the country, corresponding to today Cap-Haitien, was disseminated by theatres, cultural events and balls to keep the rich minorities entertained.

The insurrection of the slaves of Saint-Domingue started during the night of 22-23 August 1791 and ended thirteen years later when the French army, counting 50.000 soldiers led by General Leclerc, brother in law of Napoleon Bonaparte, was defeated by the army of former slaves under the leadership of Dessalines. During the war time three main social groups played a role: the white planters, the black slaves and the *mulattos*[9]; this last group was formed by an estimated 28.000 half-castes, "who occupied an uneasy middle ground between master and slave as

[9] The term *mulatto* refers to light-skinned free persons of color, also named in the French colonial system *affranchis*. Mulatto is broadly no longer considered an appropriate term and it should be replaced by a more appropriate reference to mixed race or to those people whose lines of descent cross, intersect, and transgress traditional racial boundaries. However, in the context of this dissertation, mulatto is used with its historical connotation, as it was used in the colonial time and as quoted in the sources consulted. In modern-day usage in the Haitian creole, often people refer to mulattos, and their descendants, with the word *grimo*. For further reference on the topic see Daut M. L (2015), *Tropics of Haiti: Race and the Literary History of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World, 1789–1865*. Liverpool, Liverpool University Press; Wade P. (2017) *Degrees of Mixture, Degrees of Freedom: Genomics, Multiculturalism, and Race in Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

children of both" (Ferguson, 1987, p.5). The *mulattos*, who did not have the same political rights of the *grand blancs*, at time joined forces with the slaves, but their alliance was never a solid one.

The country was proclaimed independent from France in 1804, and named Haiti, reclaiming the indigenous Taíno name of the land, meaning "Land of Mountains". Haiti became the first free black republic in the modern world. The flag was created by eliminating the white from the French tricolour, symbolizing the removal of the white man from the new Republic (Ferguson 1987).

Soon after the independence, between 1806 and 1820, the country was divided in two: in the North King Henry Christophe, who succeeded to Dessalines, was governing a black monarchy, while the *mulatto* general Alexandre Petion was running a republic based state in the South. It's only under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Boyer, at the death of Petion, that the country was unified. Boyer, another *mulatto*'s general, consolidated its government which lasted until 1843; in this time, Haiti became a subsistence economy based on peasant agriculture made of smallholders, the plantation system collapsed due to the lack of capital and labour, and foreign indebtedness started to grow. One observable common thread of the initial half century of the new independent Haiti was the reluctance to work of the new governing elites, inherited from the French governors. The governing elites tended to obtain a work-free income from the masses, reproducing a hierarchical and authoritarian social structure. The peasants, the large majority of the country, started to be heavily taxed without receiving services in return; rapidly they turned into the mass of *moun andeyo*[10] (Barthélemy 1996).

The Haitian historian Laennec Hurbon (2009) argues that the French and European historiographies have largely trivialized the events occurring in those years in Haiti. The Haitian Revolution was marked by a combination of anti-racism, anti-slavery and anti-colonialism idealisms. Even though what happened was in Haiti a Revolution with peculiar characteristics that neither the French nor the American Revolution had, its significance was largely diminished[11]. However, the Haitian revolution only apparently broke with past. "All we need to do is to note that the colonial system of production survived the wars of liberation- an astonishing fact given that this system rested on slavery" (Lundahl 2013, p.13). Ferguson (1987) argues that the French left in Haiti a tradition of military absolutism, which materialized in political leaders assuming also a role of military leaders and the racial hierarchy typical of the colonial system, fostering discrimination between blacks and mulattos.

[10] From Creole, literally meaning "people from outside"; the concept is used to identify, in the Haitian society, those who are taxed and marginalized and without representations. Moun andeyo largely coincides with the peasant community, settled in rural areas, in contrast with governors and elites who are based in the city.

[11] For an analysis of the unappreciated value of the Haitian revolution see the work of Michel Rolph Trouillot (1995), *Silencing the Past.*

Interestingly the first Constitution of Haiti remarked the hostility towards the European powers, and in particular France, by affirming that all Haitians, irrespective of the color of their skin, were to be called "black" and forbidding to any foreigner or white to own land or properties in the country[12]. As a peculiar example of the anti-French feeling, it's worth to mention that Dessalines, once in power, gave order to kill most of the white who had remained in Haiti (Nicholls, 1979).

Furthermore, the Constitution of 1816 (art.47) established universal suffrage but denied women, criminals, idiots and menials the right to vote, leaving thus peasants, who identified in the menial category, excluded from the suffrage (Ferguson 1987).

Despite the Haitian victory, France refused to recognize the newly independent country's sovereignty until 1825, and only in exchange of 150 million gold francs. This fee was demanded as an unusual indemnity for the economical loss of slaves, land, equipment and properties suffered by the former colonialists. Haiti agreed to pay the price but to do so, the Haitian government had to take out high interest loans.

According to Farmer (2002) and others (Dorigny, Fatton, Hector, Barthelemy) the Haitian elites, against the will of the farmers, decided to pay in order to lift the embargo imposed by France and thus to promote trade with the foreign countries. The United States was Haiti's main trading partner since its early independence, with Haiti becoming gradually dependent from the American import, but they only recognized Haiti in 1862.

2.2.2 The Duvalierism (1957-1986)

The period between the folding of Boyer's power, soon after the devastating earthquake of 1842, and the election of Francois Duvalier (1957) had been characterized by political instability, with continuous, and often violent, changes of governors, increased inflation and public debt, deterioration of infrastructures.

From 1915 to 1933 Haiti suffered the occupation of the United States, which will be further scrutinized in section 2.4 in the larger framework of the impact of the foreign influence. At this stage it's relevant to know that the American occupation left "an acute sense of resentment felt by a generation of black intellectuals and activists who, with ample justification, perceived the Marines as the natural allies and protectors of mulatto supremacy" (Ferguson

[12] Constitution Imperial de Haiti du 1805, Art.12. Aucun blanc, quelle que soit sa nation, ne mettra le pied sur ce territoire à titre de maitre ou de proprietaire et ne pourra à l'avenir y acquérir aucun propriété.
Art. 14. Toute acception de couleur parmi les enfants d'une seule et meme famille, dont le chef de l'Etat est le pére, devant nécessairement cesser, les Haitiens ne seront désormais connus que sous la dénomination générique de noirs.

1987, p.29). This resentment led into the long and brutal despotism of Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier.

Papa Doc, as Francois Duvalier was named, was elected in 1957 with a large majority in the first Haitian election with universal suffrage and with a voting process that the Time magazine (7.10.1957) reported as the freest and most peaceful election in decades. He belonged to the black Haitians and his origin were relatively humble; trained as a doctor he had the opportunity to study at the University of Michigan. The main pillar of his campaign, largely financed by the US, was the promotion of the negritude culture, together with the voodoo. Once in power, Papa Doc established an institutionalized state of terrorism and corruption, namely the *duvalierism* (Ferguson 1987 et al.). He created a paramilitary force, the Tontons Macoutes, more than 10.000 "bogeyman" under his direct control, free to extort and murder, while reducing the power of the army; in 1964, the Constitution was modified in order to declare the Duvalier president for life (Buss 2009). Francois Duvalier was tolerated by the United States because of his anti-communism fervor, particularly appreciated in the Caribbean region during the Cold War period. He was also able to obtain, after initial frictions, the blessing of the Catholic Church, with the approval by Pope Jean Paul VI of the establishment of Haiti's indigenous clergy, a native elite at the indirect dependence of the president. Papa Doc died on 21 April 1971, after having ensured the passage of power to his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, by mean of a referendum that posed the following question, and receive only one vote against:

Citoyen Dr Francois Duvalier has chosen citoyen Jean-Claude Duvalier to succeed him as president for life of the Republic. Does this respond to your aspirations and your desires? Do you ratify it?

Baby Doc, as Jean-Claude Duvalier was nominated, was only nineteen when took power in 1971. Beside his promises of reforms and opening up to more foreign investments, he maintained a repressive dictatorship which led the economy to further collapse and fostered riots and demonstrations against the government.

The population living in extreme poverty went from 48% to 81% at the end of the Baby Doc regime (Fatton, 2002) and approximately 220,000 Haitians immigrated to the United States between 1960 and 1990, including 25,000 in 1980 alone; the majority reached the cost of Miami by improvised vessels, and for those they gained the label of "boat-people", while the ones with financial resources, legally entered by flight (Stepick, 1982).

Under the mounting of internal pressure and US threats, Baby Doc was forced to leave power and to exile in France in 1986, bringing with him 6.2 million USD of public funding (Codazzi and Sirchia, ed. 2011). The Reagan administration, in the effort to continuing using Haiti as pawn in the cold war

chessboard supported the appointment of a loyal military leader to temporary head the country, General Henry Namphy. General Namphy was associated with the Tonton Macoutes, presiding a bloody military giunta from 1987 to 1990 (DeWind and Kinley 1988). The fall of the Duvalier regime was an unfinished revolution (Ferguson 1987).

Jean-Claude Duvalier died in Port-au-Prince on 4.10.2014, where he had returned in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake; Mr Martelly, the at the time president of Haiti, praised him as a loyal son of the country and organized state funeral in his honour (Codazzi 2014).

2.2.3 The Lavalas and most recent development

A significant historical period to be mentioned in the turbulent history of Haiti is represented by the *Lavalas* social movement and its representative, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a popular priest, representative of the *Ti Legliz*[13], who was expelled from the Salesian Order due to his antigovernment activities. The *Lavalas*, literally the flood, was a grassroots movement that arose in Haiti in the eighties riding the quest for change against the Duvalierism and the military regimes. The movement embodied the hopes and the aspirations of the marginalized majority, the *moun andeyo*. Aristide when elected for the first time in February 2001 hailed the victory as "Haiti's second independence" (Buss 2009). However, Aristide lasted less than one year in power as he was overthrown by General Cedras who orchestrated a coup on 29-30 September 2001, with the support of those members of the elites, of the army and of the opposition who had been excluded by key positions.

Cedras lasted in power three years, during which an estimated 4000 people were killed (Buss 2009, p.31), largely tolerated by the international community and Aristide was obliged to exile. I agree with Fatton (2002) who explains that "the overthrow of Aristide was the inevitable outcome of the structural constellation of power" (Fatton 2002, p.197). The Lavalas movement had the only weapon of "rhetorical exhortation in its confrontation with dominant class, who in contradistinction controlled the force of arms" (op.cit).

Aristide was brought back in Haiti and restored to power in 1994 with the support of the US army[14] and after accepting the International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment plan, which imposed a 50% cut in the public services, policies that kept wages low and removed tariffs and other restrictions on imports (Bello M. and De Marchi A. 2011). Renè Preval, a former follower of Aristide, but whose alliance got compromised already in 1996, was elected president from 1996 to 2000 and again in 2006-2010. The new leadership in the country,

[13] Literally in Haitian Creole Ti Legilz means Little Church.
[14] The US military intervention was authorized by the United Nation Security Council Resolution 940 (1994).

however, did not produce any substantial change in the way public policies were managed. Aristide, who governed for a second mandate between 2000 and 2004, being elected in very controversial elections, in the wave of protests, left the country in 2004 on a US military flight toward the Central African Republic. Human and civil rights were continuously under threat, gangs proliferated and a general level of impunity for killings perpetrated in those years subsisted, besides the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces; not less than 1500 people were killed only from March 2004 to early 2006 (Dupuy 2007).

After years of exile in South Africa, Aristide returned to Haiti, similarly to Jean-Claude Duvalier, in 2011, to help Haiti's recovery; he was active in politics during the last 2016 elections.

In 2011, through a contested electoral process strongly pushed by the international community (Martini 2011), Michel Martelly, a former singer, was elected in the run-off against Mirlande Manigat (Piazzese 2011). Martelly stepped down after five years in office without ensuring the proper organization of the following elections, which resulted challenging and long delayed. Elections were finally held in November 2016 with twenty-seven candidates running for president; the large number of contestants is symptomatic of an highly fragmented political parties landscape, with many individual candidates running on their own without a clear political affiliation. Jovenel Moïse, member of the same political party of Martelly, was officially declared the new president of Haiti on 3 January 2017.

2.3 Significant socio-economic features of Haiti

Placed in the Caribbean sea, bordering with the Dominican Republic, Haiti has a territory of 27,750 square kilometres, a land slightly bigger than Sicily and slightly smaller than Belgium. Its climate is typically tropical, with two main rainy seasons (Oct-Nov, April-June).

The historical overview of the turbulent origin of the State of Haiti is useful to understand the roots of its internal divisions, inequalities and the prevailing ruling tradition. The analysis of key socio and economical indicators provides tangible data to capture a realistic picture of the life conditions in the country.

Haiti is by far the poorest country in the western hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world. In the 2016 Human Development Index Report, Haiti ranked 163 out of 187 countries with an HDI of 0,493. The graphic in figure 1 shows the trends during the past fifteen years of the HDI and its three components: life expectancy, education and gross national income per capita (UNDP 2017).



Figure 2: trends in Haiti HDI component indices (UNDP 2016)

The GDP pro-capita growth rate between 1999 and 2005 averaged zero; half of the population, estimated in just above 10 million inhabitants, lives on less than 1 USD for day and the richest 20% of the country owns 63.4% of the country's wealth (World Bank 2016). The Gini coefficient and the Palma ratio[15], which measure respectively the distribution of a nation's income and the differences between those in the top and bottom income brackets, put Haiti in 2016 at the second place in the world for highest level of income inequality (UNDP 2017).

The population of Haiti is growing at a rate of 2.2% a year, which combined with the scarce available resources and poor economic performances is lowering the GDP per capita; life expectancy at birth is 63 years (UNDP, 2017). Lack of access to education, healthcare and infrastructural services is particularly significant, registering worse performances in rural areas. For instance, almost 90% of the population in urban areas has access to electricity while this is true for only 10% in rural areas. Similar gap applies to access to water: only 7,9% of the rural population has access to clean drinkable water compared to 28% of those in metropolitan areas (World Bank 2006).

About 40% of the population is illiterate and over 80% of the educational institutions are private, limited public schools exist mainly in urban areas; out of the total primary and secondary school students, 82% attend private, fee-paying schools. Similarly to schooling, public health care services are limited; about 30% of health facilities in Haiti are public, mostly in urban areas. The majority of

[15] Haiti Gini coefficient in 2016 was 60,8 and the Palma Ratio 6.5

health service is provided by NGOs, faith based congregations and private providers (World Bank 2006).

Unemployment rate is extremely high, with higher rate in the metropolitan areas (49%), against 37% in rural areas where farming is still the main activity; Youth unemployment rate (47%) is the highest in Latin America (World Bank 2006). Employment rate in rural area is, however, not very significant as the main issue in the farming sector is the very low return for people's work.

According to the UNDP Disaster Risk Index, Haiti is one of the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters, due to 97% deforestation of the land and with wood used as a primary energy source; between 1990 and 2015 the forest area was reduced of 16.4% (UNDP 2016).

Haiti has been registering high level of corruption since its foundation (Péan 2003) and the country was ranked by Transparency International 161th out 175 countries in the corruptions perception index in 2014**.** Research conducted by the Heritage Foundation for Haiti (LFHH)[16] after the 2010 earthquake, the local chapter of Transparency International, indicated that corrupt and fraudulent practices infiltrated humanitarian programs, as well as community development, health, education and governance support programs, and undermined the efforts to achieve tangible and enduring results for the country and the Haitian people (LFHH 2012).

2.4 International influences

The analysis of the historical formation of the Haitian state presented in section 2.2 already highlighted the heavy foreign influence that the country and its people suffered since the colonial time. The Spanish, and furthermore the French dominance, left an heavy heritage in terms of military absolutism and the racial hierarchy, which contributed to shape high level of inequalities, long supremacy of totalitarian forms of government and a state struggling to deliver basic services to the population. "The racial hierarchy of the slavery society left marks and a lasting trauma that have consequences on the State's orientation" (Hector and Hurbon ed. 2009, p. 23).

2.4.1 The price of independence, US occupation and foreign-aid

Foreign influence in Haiti remained a leitmotif throughout the twentieth century, and its repercussion are evident in the dynamics of power and resistance to power following the 2010 earthquake that are analysed in this thesis. Therefore

[16] It's the local chapter of the International NGO Transparency International

I consider important to provide a deeper account of those most recent and significant factors of external influences that were key to characterize the context of my research.

The first aspect is the late recognition of the independence of Haiti by the international community. France, after being finally defeated in 1804, recognized Haiti only nineteen years later in 1825 and after Haiti accepting to pay a heavy indemnity to the former master of 150 millions francs payable in five instalments (Heinl 1978). Haiti basically had to pay for its independence and to secure itself from the danger of military intervention from the old colonial power. As remarked by Ferguson (1987), ironically, what was meant to be a sort of freeing lease, pushed Haiti into a debt spiral entering new forms of neo-colonialist dependence. "Foreign pressures for debt repayments required further borrowing, which resulted in the nation becoming even more indebted to French private interests. By the late nineteenth century, 80% of Haiti's wealth was devoted to serving external debts, first to France and then to financial institutions in Germany — and, most notably, the United States. By the turn of the century, the relatively independent and sovereign Haiti had become entangled in a web of debt held by American financial firms" (Alcenat 2017). Dupuy (1989) and other scholars (Farmer, Fatton, Ferguson) interpreted the repayment of the debt to France as one major causes of Haiti contemporary underdevelopment and heavy foreign dependency.

At that time Haiti's independence was not recognized by France and also by other European countries and the United States, because they were afraid of seeing the new black republic as a threat to their national interests. Even thought Haiti in 1822-23 was the sixth main importer of goods from the US, president Monroe refused to grant recognition until 1862 (Hector and Hurbon ed. 2009).

A second significant episode of foreign influence, often reoccurring with depreciative terms in the recollections of Haitians, is the US invasion of the country from 1915 to 1934. American President Woodrow Wilson on 28 July 1915 decided to send the Marines following the assassination of Haitian president Guillame Sam, with the declared motivation to restore order and promote democracy in the little neighbouring country. The fact that Haiti since over a decade was experiencing high level of violence and instability was used by the United States as a pretext to intervene. Truly, the intervention was meant to protect the American hegemony in the region, preventing any possible expansion of Germany. Haiti, in fact, was in a geographically strategic position, even more during the opening of the Panama Canal, whose operations ended in 1914 (Ferguson 1987). During the occupation, American technicians administered the country, without holding any local election, and its finance, including the transfer of 500.000USD to the US bank as a form of safeguard. A system of forced labor for public works was put in place to build roads and other infrastructures, a new

Constitution was written and adopted in 1917 giving rights to foreign citizens to own land and properties in the country, which had been prohibited since its independence (Buss 2009). Under the new Constitution US direct investment tripled between 1917 and 1930 and the first large multinational company, HASCO – Haitian American Sugar Company- arrived in the country; Germans, following Haiti formal war declaration, were expulsed from the country in 1918 (Ferguson 1987).

The Americans had to face constant riots and resistance, killing an estimated 3000 rebels and peasants in various confrontation, before being forced to withdrawal in 1934. According to Buss, who refers to a presidential commission report, the American occupation failed to train Haitian for self-governance, as originally claimed (Buss 1987, p.24).

US troops entered Haiti in more occasions: in 1994 to restore President Aristide to power and in 2010 in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, to support the logistic efforts of the emergency operations, bringing back to the Haitian imagination the specter of the earlier long occupation.

A third element of significant external influence to be scrutinized relates to the increasing dependence of Haiti from foreign aid and remittances, which has been observed for the past half century.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been fluctuating over the past 20 years, with a sharp increase since 2002 mainly due to the cost of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH[17]), as shown by OECD statistic reported herewith (OECD 2009). To give an understanding of the weight of external funding on the national revenue, ODA counted for about a quarter of Haiti Gross National Income in the period 2000-2011, reducing to about 14% in the following years[18] (World Bank 2017). As a general trend, ODA to Haiti was mainly used for technical cooperation and grants, while the amount allocated to direct budget support was limited to below 5%; the main recipients of ODA were constantly multilateral agencies, international NGOs and private contractors (OECD 2009).

[17] Details on the UN missions in Haiti will be presented in the following section 2.4.1
[18] In 2016 net ODA received by Haiti counted for 13,3% of its GNI (World Bank 2017).



Figure 3: Net ODA from all donors to Haiti (OECD 2009)

Civil society organizations (CSOs), faith based organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) flooded the country intervening in various forms to address the needs of the local population in those sectors not sufficiently covered by the public services, spanning from education, to health, water and sanitation, livelihoods, food security, human rights, just to mentions some; for this reason Haiti was often labelled as the "NGOs Republic". The number of NGOs in Haiti is a blurred issue, as the majority of organizations are not officially registered in the local Minister of Planning and External Cooperation (Pierre Luis 2011). The estimated number of NGOs operating in Haiti prior to the earthquake ranged from 3,000 to as many as 10,000 (Kristoff and Panarelli 2010), while no reliable data is available for the more recent period.

The remittances from the over 2 millions members of the Haitian diaspora, mainly residing in the United States and Canada, constitute approximately 20% of the GDP (UNDP, 2014) and account for about 30 percent of households income, making Haiti the world's most remittance-dependent country as measured by remittances' share of household income and GDP (World Bank 2006).

According to Zanotti (2010) the stability and economic development of Haiti have been negatively affected by a cacophony of aid, characterized by donors' strategies that tend to privilege NGOs rather than the State as recipients of funds. In this circumstance, the NGOs, religious congregations and private companies replace the State as main service providers for the population, being this trend highly detrimental for the public institutions, whose capacity is hindered rather than strengthen (Zanotti 2010, p. 759).

2.4.2 A long track of United Nations missions deployed in Haiti

Within the analysis of the international influence in Haiti, this section is dedicated to provide a snapshot of the long lasting and highly debated presence of United Nations peacekeeping missions in the country. The analysis presented is not meant to be exhaustive and detailed, given the complexity and the number of UN missions deployed in Haiti since 1993, and still on going. Secondly, the research's focus is more about the role played by other development actors, such as NGOs and CSOs, rather than the UN system. Nevertheless, while refereeing to other works[19] for a more comprehensive inquiry on the UN peacekeeping in Haiti, it's important to recognize the amplitude of the UN peacekeeping operations in the country, which have been deployed with different mandates and resources, and have been often contested by the local population (Dupuy 2013).

The table below provides an overview of the main UN and International Civilian missions deployed in the country so far, presented in chronological order and with a summary of their mandate:

Mission	Mandate	Duration
International Civilian Mission in Haiti, OAS/UN (MICIVIH)[20]	✓ To ensure respect for the human rights inscribed in the Haitian Constitution and in the international instruments which Haiti was party to; ✓ To contribute to the strengthening of judicial, police, and prison institutions important for the promotion and protection of human rights	Feb. 1993-March 2000
UNMIH[21] (UN Mission in Haiti)	✓ To assist in modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force; Mandate revised and extended in 1994-1995: ✓ To assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: sustaining a secure and stable environment established during the	Sept. 1993-June 1996

[19] See: Heine J, and Stuart Thompson A. ed. (2011) *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond*, United Nations University Press; Zanotti L. (2011), *Governing Disorder, Un Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-cold War Era*, Pennsylvania State University Press.
[20] First UN mission with a Regional Organization, it was established in February 1993 by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations at the request of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
[21] Established by Security Council resolution 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993; mandate revised by Security Council resolutions 940 (1994), 975 (1995), 1048 (1996).

	multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force. ✓ To assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities.	
UNSMIH[22] (UN Support Missions in Haiti)	✓ To assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; ✓ to assist Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the establishment and training of an effective national police force; ✓ to coordinate United Nations system activities to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.	June 1996-July 1997
UNTMIH[23] (UN Transition Missions in Haiti)	✓ To support the Haitian authorities in the further professionalization of Haitian National Police.	30 July -30 November 1997
MIPONUH[24] (UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti)	✓ To assist the Hatian Government in the professionalization of the National Police, with special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units.	Nov. 1997-March 2000
MICAH[25] (International Civilian Support Mission UN/OAS in Haiti)	✓ To consolidate the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor missions of the United Nations and International Civilian missions to promote respect for human rights in Haiti; ✓ to reinforce the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary;	March 2000-Feb. 2001

[22] Established by Security Council resolution 1063 (1996).
[23] Established by Security Council resolution 1123 (1997).
[24] Established by Security Council resolution 1141 /1997).
[25] Approved by the General Assembly resolution A/54/193 of 17 (December 1999).

	✓ to coordinate and facilitate the international community's dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.	
MINUSTAH[26] (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)	✓ To restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti's Government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, to promote and to protect human rights; ✓ Following the 2010 earthquake the mission's mandate was extended to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the country	June 2004-Oct. 2017
MINUJUSTH[27] (UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti)	✓ To assist the Government of Haiti to further develop the Haitian National Police (HNP); ✓ to strengthen Haiti's rule of law institutions, including the justice and prisons; ✓ to promote and protect human rights.	October 2017-ongoing

Table 1: UN Missions in Haiti, elaborated by the author (https://www.unmissions.org)

The longest deployed mission, MINUSTAH, whose mandate and forces were extended following the 2010 earthquake, has been highly debated also because of its implications in the cholera outbreak of October 2010 which caused about 5000 deaths by mid April 2011 (Luquero F. et al. 2016). Findings of an Independent Panel established by the UN Secretary General showed that the bacteria was introduced in Haiti by the contamination of the water of the Artibonite River by alleged UN soldiers from Nepal[28].

Some Haitians civil society representatives (Castor 2008) have argued intensively against the influence of foreign actors in the decision making process of the country, claiming that such influence is a violation of Haitian sovereignty. The former Chief of Staff of MINUSTAH, Col. Jaques Morneau shares a completely different view, arguing that the mandate of the mission was inadequate to solve Haiti's long term problems and that to succeed the

[26] Established by Security Council resolution 1542 (2004).
[27] Established by Security Council Resolution 2350 (2017)
[28] For a comprehensive analysis of the cholera epidemic see Piarraux R. et al. (2011), "Understanding the Cholera Epidemic, Haiti", in Emerg Infect Dis. 2011 Jul; 17(7): 1161–1168.

international community should establish a UN protectorate or trusteeship for ten to fifteen years (Morneau in Shamsie and Thomson ed. 2006 p.81).

It's relevant to note that the discourse of foreign influence, translated in arguments such as "the Haitians are not in power of their own destiny" and "the danger of foreign interference", has been a common thread of the recovery process. Indeed, the issue has been largely observed in the interviews collected in the field and it will be further unpacked in concrete examples and scrutinized in the next chapters.

2.5 Haiti's earthquake: a *man-made* disaster[29]?

On 12 January 2010, at 4.53pm local time, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti; the epicentre was in Léogâne, 25 kilometres from Port-au-Prince and the hypocentre located at a depth of 13km, making it a shallow earthquake, with even more destructive effect in surface than the deep ones. The InterAmerican Development Bank (Cavallo et al. 2010) estimated it was the largest earthquake in proportional impact that any country has ever experienced, when measured in terms of the number of people killed as a share of the country's population. However, the death toll has been controversial: the Haitian Government released inconsistent figure passing from 111,481 victims (23.01.2010) to 316.000 (12.01.2011), while more scientific studies estimated between 156.000[30] and 84,961[31] victims. It is acceptable to say that approximately 3.5 million individuals were affected by the disaster.[32]

An additional aggravating factor was that the quake affected highly densely populated areas in the capital city and its suburbs[33]; Port-au-Prince counts for more than 65% of Haiti's total economic activity and 85% of its tax revenues; furthermore the capital is the centre of commerce, government and communication (Government of Haiti 2010). It was estimated that it would cost USD 8.1 bn (Cavallo et al. 2010) and take ten years to rebuild the country, but the estimate of the economic damages, as the death tolls, are uncertain due to lack of fully reliable statistics.

The earthquake that hit Haiti was not, however, an exceptional event; according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS 2011), every year in the world there are in average 15 earthquakes of magnitude between 7 and 7.9. Evidences have showed that the damages caused by an earthquake are not

[29] For a clear classification of disasters and crisis in the literature, see Shaluf I. M., Fakharu-l- razi Ahmadun, Aini Mat Said, (2003) "A review of disaster and crisis", Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 12 Issue: 1, pp.24-32.
[30] The Michighan Study estimated a death toll between 93,273 and 156.000 persons. (Kolbe et al. 2010)
[31] The Schwartz Report estimated a death toll between 46,109 and 84,961 persons (Schwartz T. et al. 2011)
[32] For additional statistics see http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/lessons-from-haiti/key-statistics/
[33] The population of Port-au-Prince metropolitan area was estimated to be over 2 millions people (Hou and Shi, 2011).

proportional to its magnitude (Bilham 2010), rather, the level of people's vulnerability is key to determine the impact of a disaster on the affected country.

Vulnerability in the context of disasters can be defined as the diminished capacity of an individual or group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made hazard; poverty is the major factor to determine the level of vulnerability (IFRC 2006).

Daniel (2011) with his study shows that the earthquake death toll is indirectly proportional to the country's HDI (Human Development Index): the lower the HDI is, the higher the death toll will be. It's therefore legitimate to conclude that the level of endemic poverty and inequalities of Haiti, as described in section 3.3, in addition to the weakness of its public institutions, were crucial to turn a natural hazard into a major catastrophe. Bellgarde Smith (2011), in his analysis of the earthquake in Haiti, argues that the 12 January event is a man-made disaster, because its devastation was caused by the irresponsibility of those who governed the country for many years, creating the condition for its vulnerability and incapacity to prevent and mitigate the event. "Economic losses in Haiti have been particularly severe because they correspond to elementary necessities and have a debilitating impact on people's lives" (Hou and Shi, 2011, p.26).

Haiti, and particularly Port-au-Prince, had experienced earlier earthquakes[34], but none of the more recent ones entered collective memory; prior to 2010 Haitians had a more vivid lived experience of hurricanes and cyclones and the disaster prevention actions mainly targeted those kind of hazards (ibid). The 2010 earthquake entered the popular recollection with the name of "Goudougoudou": it is the onomatopoeic reproduction of the terrible noise heard during the shake that struck the Haitian imagination and local people started to refer to the event in this way.

Hou and Shi (2011) explain how prevention measures taken against hurricanes included building houses with concrete heavy blocks, which turned to be fatal traps during the seism, collapsing on their occupants.

[34] In the period between 1564 and 1789 18 major earthquakes occurred in Haiti (Prépetit 2008).

Picture 1: The presidential palace in Port-au-Prince, September 2012 (E.Martini)

Symbolic landmarks of political, cultural and strategic relevance in Port-au-Prince were heavily affected by the disaster, such as the Presidential Palace (Picture 1), the Cathedral (Picture 2), government buildings, hospitals and schools. The loss of symbolic infrastructures fostered the perception of emptiness, disorientation and absence of the local authorities in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The late and slow response to the disaster of the Haitian Government and the MINUSTAH contributed to aggravate the losses; one explanation is the fact that both institutions suffered severely in terms of infrastructures and human resources. However, the national authorities continued to show in the following weeks weak leadership and unpreparedness to deal with the situation (Farmer 2011). The president of Haiti at that time, Renè Preval, "turned to be both weak and indecisive, remote and bland, especially next to his prime minister, Jean-Max Bellerive, who stood out as the representative of Haiti vis-à-vis the international community" (Lundahl, 2013, p.191).

Picture 2: The Cathedral of Port-au-Prince, March 2012 (E.Martini)

After the Haitian Government declared the state of emergency on 16 January 2010, the United States swiftly intervened sending 20.000 marines to support the immediate logistic efforts of the massive relief operations, ensuring the running of the airport of Port-au-Prince. This intervention provoked criticism by representatives of the local civil society and by some Latin American and European states who warned against a new US invasion and the militarization of the emergency intervention (Bello and Demarchi 2011).

Based on the catastrophe model developed by Quarantelli (2000, 2006), who proposes a distinction between disaster and catastrophe, the severity of destruction caused by the earthquake in Haiti can be explained, together with other structural factors related to the country's poverty, by the fact that most of the structures that were supposed to respond to the disaster, were severely impacted by it. This severe impact applied to government buildings, hospitals, transportation and communication infrastructures, power supply and business chains; and it was aggravated by the absence of public servants, who had to prioritize their families' relief before returning to work. The earthquake in Haiti qualifies as a catastrophe also because almost all of the everyday community functions were sharply and concurrently interrupted, and the political system was overwhelmed by the event, showing the Government's unpreparedness to take the lead of the recovery process. As a consequence of its incapacity to react, the Government lost legitimacy, opening the door to the rise of newcomers in politics, as Martelly, in the 2010 elections (Hou and Shi 2011).

It is common that disaster governance structures established to respond to the aftermath take polycentric and multi-scale forms; similarly to what happened in

Haiti, following a disaster, a different mix of network actors comes into play, including national and international institutions, NGOs of different scale, group of volunteers and private entities. Diverse mechanisms aim to ensure coordination and national or international institutions, depending on the context and severity of the catastrophe, and to take the leadership of the recovery process (Tierney 2012). As it will be analysed in Chapter 4, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was established with an ambitious guiding role. However, many issues affected the synchronization of countless heterogeneous actors involved in the disaster response and the situation turned to be quite chaotic (Haver 2011, IASC 2010).

2.6 Significant legacy of Haiti's historical formation

As explained in this chapter the devastating consequences of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti largely derived by the inner disaster vulnerability that characterized the country since its early establishment. This vulnerability is grounded in the historical formation and the heavy heritage of foreign influences experienced by the country. As a way of concluding the chapter, three main features of Haiti are highlighted for their significance to understand the post-earthquake development: the predatory nature of the state authorities, the civil society's fragmentation and the land use.

The turbulent political scenario was constantly characterized by the dictatorship of personal rule: Haiti's political history "reflects the predatory nature of the dominant class that has persistently refused to ground its rule in a meaningful system of accountability" (Fatton 2011, p.6) and this dominant class has strongly refused to share its power, privileges and wealth with the subordinate groups (Fatton 2002). Since its early conception, the structure of the Haitian state assumed the characteristics of a predatory state; the people never trusted the public institutions and a double gap was furthered between the State and the citizens, as well as between the elites and the masses. The syndrome of the Haitian president is to stay in power by all means and to refuse to acknowledge any constructive role to the opposition. Lundahl argues that history constitutes the strongest obstacle for change in Haiti: a country that has always experienced autocratic forms of government ends by perceiving autocracy as the only natural and legitimate form. "In Haiti the politics has always been based on economic interests; and the political game has had a profound impact on the economy" (Lundahl, 1997 p.2).

A second significant characteristic of Haiti, rooted in its historical formation and influencing the post disaster dynamic of power, is the fragmentation of its civil society. "In spite of a strong popular basis, Haitian civil society has remained since Duvalier's fall the preserve of middle and privileged classes whose organizations- rooted in external sources of power and finance- have transformed

the country into the Republic of ONGs; rather than constituting a coherent social project, Haitian civil society has tended to embody a disorganized plurality of mutually exclusive projects that are not necessarily democratic" (Fatton 2002, p.29). As it will be scrutinized further in Chapter 3, in the post-earthquake context the civil society failed to merge towards a common goal; rather, it showed fragmented by different and competitive interests. The shared traumatism experienced by the population during the earthquake was not sufficient to turn energy and will into a common project to re-envision the country able to address deep issues such as inequality, corruption and weak public institutions.

Finally, a third, and often overlooked, key structural element of Haiti's vulnerability is intrinsic with its land use: as described before, when the French colonial system collapsed, Haiti passed from a staple-led development into a peasant nation of smallholders. As well explained by Lundahl (1979, chapter 5), the masses of farmers switched from coffee production (land intensive) to crop farming (more labor intensive) after the closure of the land frontier around the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The peasants were forced to this switch under the pressure of the population growth and the lack of available land. Limited infrastructures and capital fostered the tendency, as the quality of the Haitian coffee deteriorated and its price in the export market dropped. Uprooting coffee trees, precisely during the sowing period, which coincides with the rainy season, left the soil bare and exposed to land erosion. The heavy rains then destroyed the soil, the man-land ratio increased again, and the process became cumulative and self-propelling, entering a downward spiral (Lundahl 2013, p. 26).

Severe environmental degradation, plunging trend in agricultural production and failing attempts to develop non-agricultural sectors of the economy add up to a kleptocratic ruling tradition and internal division to explain the severe level of poverty that turned a natural hazard into a major disaster.

Chapter 3

Build-Back-Better (BBB) Haiti: a state of play

> « Les tragedies individuelles changent l'homme, mais les tragedies collectives changent-elles les societies? »[35] (Rainhorn ed. 2012, p.19)

3.1 Introduction

The post-disaster period is often considered as a fertile ground to sow the seeds for positive political and social development; indeed, from a collective tragedy a new generation of leaders can arise, carrying the will to change the governing rules[36]. In addition, the shared traumas experienced by the population can direct energies towards a common cause, a shared good. There are cases that show how a disaster, natural or man-made, can generate a societal change. Yet disasters' impact varies from context to context, and thus, challenge the notion that a linear and progressive development for better is likely. For instance, the earthquake in Armenia in 1988 accelerated the collapse of the communist regime, Katrina (2005) showed drastically the fragmentation of the American society, the cyclone Nargis (2008) promoted new internal power relations in Myanmar, the earthquake in Cashmere (2005) allowed to a cease-fire between India and Pakistan (Rainhorn, 2012).

In Haiti, in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that struck the country on 12 January 2010, an optimistic vision of the tragedy was widespread among intellectuals, policy makers and common people. In March 2010, Oxfam International claimed the reconstruction process to be a once-in-a-century opportunity to re-envision the country: "Haiti's reconstruction, if badly managed, will perpetuate the country's inequality, benefiting the rich and creating new risk for the poor. If well managed, it really could help to build a better Haiti. The goal of reconstruction now must be a genuinely more equitable Haiti, in which poverty

[35] Translation from French by the author: "Individual tragedies change people, but do collective tragedies change societies?"
[36] See Daly P. et al. (2016) and Waizenegger, A. and J. Hyndman (2011) for earlier research on the subject.

and instability are reduced. The way to achieve that is through reconstruction led by Haiti's government and other institutions, genuinely accountable to all Haitians". (Oxfam International 2010, p.1).

According to these visions, the reconstruction, if well managed, could lead to a better Haiti, promoting the rethinking of the State, fostering larger equity and inclusion, and addressing the structural issues at the origin of the poverty and vulnerability of the country. However, not always a disaster, and its response, can engender positive changes; growing literature explores whether natural disasters may in fact lead to poverty persistence[37] (Saint-Macary and Zanuso 2016). Often there are on-going dynamics within the affected societies that can overpass the collective will and energy. As pointed out by Rainhorn (2012) the history, religion, culture, physical and geopolitical environment of the society, in addition to the influences of the international context, are some of the elements that can obstacle the societal change. Furthermore, according to Stokke (2010), catastrophes can only reinforce or influence a current political trend. Bustelo et al. (2012) have studied the impact of the 1999 Colombian earthquake and suggested that natural disasters may contribute to poverty and its diffusion if households cut their investment in children's human capital.

In the case of Haiti history seems to hamper changes: Lundahl (1989) has argued that history[38] constitutes the strongest obstacle for change in Haiti[39]; a country that has always experienced autocratic forms of government ends by perceiving autocracy as the only natural and legitimate form. Indeed, the structure of the Haitian state, since its early conception, assumed the characteristics of a predatory state and the main cause of Haiti´s underdevelopment can be connected to the lack of political will to foster changes (See Chapter 2).

In this chapter I first illustrate the origin of the build-back-better discourse exploring existing literature and policy frameworks; next, the analysis focuses on the multifold interpretation of the concept in the context of Haiti, as discussed by different group of interest of the society. The pillars of the action plan for the development of Haiti, issued in March 2010, is then examined, highlighting the BBB elements and discussing major adaptation of the concept to the context. Finally I attempt to identify what from the plan and the BBB paradigm has been implemented in the eight years that followed the 2010 disaster. In particular the focus is on the process of decentralization, unanimously mentioned as key for the effective re-construction of the country. As a concluding remark, I argue that rather than adopting a fit-for-all discourse on BBB, the paradigm should be

[37] For a review see De la Fuente (2010)
[38] See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive overview of Haiti's historical formation.
[39] Lundahl (1989) defines Haiti an hysteretic state, i.e. a state where the past hasn't simply shaped the present, but where history constitutes one of the strongest obstacles to change.

articulated in different ways depending on the socio-political and economic contexts, and on the contestations over state.

3.2 2010 and the hope to build-back-better: mapping the concept

The Build-Back-Better (also referred in this dissertation as BBB) principle has been used in post-disaster contexts in a growing number of occasions since the late Nineties. It was first adopted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the US government in its disaster recovery and preparedness discourse, initially in connection to the reporting of the April 1997 Grand Forks, North Dakota floods (Jauhola 2013, p.13). BBB gained popularity in the aftermath of the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquake in 2004, which resulted with over 120,000 deaths and displaced over 700,000 people in Indonesia, and after the hurricane Katrina of 2005. It attracted progressively significant attention from the multilateral development agencies, the actors of the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) community and the academia, giving rise to multiple efforts of definition, identification and operationalization of its best practices.

The world struggled with the scale of the 2004 disaster in Indonesia; it wondered how this could happen, and how so much devastation could be inflicted. The tsunami caused untold damage to lives, communities, infrastructure and livelihoods. The phrase 'Build Back Better' was broadly used during this response, becoming a recurrent leitmotiv. It was during this time, Bill Clinton, at the time UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, articulated the propositions at the hearth of BBB around the following principles:

- Governments, donors, and aid agencies must recognize that families and communities drive their own recovery.
- Recovery must promote fairness and equity.
- Governments must enhance preparedness for future disasters.
- Local governments must be empowered to manage recovery efforts, and donors must devote greater resources to strengthening government recovery institutions, especially at local level.
- Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on good information.
- The UN, World Bank and other multilateral agencies must clarify their roles and relationships especially in addressing the early stage of a recovery process.
- The expanding role of NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent carries greater responsibilities for quality in recovery efforts.

- From the start of recovery operations, governments and aid agencies must create the conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish.
- Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agency partnerships that move beyond rivalry and unhealthy competition.
- Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience. (Clinton 2006)

Mannakara, Wilkinson and Francis (2014) define BBB "an ideal reconstruction and recovery process that delivers resilient, sustainable and efficient recovery solution to disaster affected communities" (Mannakara, Wilkinson and Francis 2014 p.1). The concept calls for a post-disaster holistic intervention able to promote a new state of normalcy that is more resilient than the ex-ante condition (Boano 2009).

Khasalamwa, looking at the post-tsunami humanitarian intervention in Sri Lanka (Khasalamwa 2009), examined the national and international policy frameworks developed to lead the post-tsunami recovery efforts, which constitute the basis for her discussion of the BBB discourse. The Government of Sri Lanka, international donors and civil society in 2005 agreed to the following set of guiding principles for the recovery process:

Resource allocation based on identified needs and local priorities
Subsidiarity
Consultation with local affected communities and stakeholders
Communication and transparency in decision-making and implementation
Future vulnerabilities ought to be reduced
Analysis of individual interventions
Prudent management of debt relief
Coordination of the recovery effort (GoSL2005a,b).

Khasalamwa continued unpacking the BBB paradigm by looking in particular at the policy narrative in relation to livelihoods and comes to the conclusion that the BBB "narratives seems to promise more than it can actually deliver" (Khasalamwa 2009, p.79). The same conclusion has been confirmed by other scholars (Daly et al. 2016 and Jauhola 2013). Through her analysis of selected livelihood interventions Khasalamwa demonstrated that structural vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka were still evident after the recovery's interventions, or even deeper than before. This was the result of poor targeting of relief efforts. Larger resources were channelled towards the Southern provinces of the country; whereas, the needed attention to the buffer zone, where already existing inequities had been fostered by a hastily devised policy, was lacking. Other findings of the research showed an heavy asset replacement with a bias towards the fisheries sector; the large use of cash transfers to households in the absence of any reasoned spending

plan; the unsolved issue of land property, which was highlighted by beneficiaries as a central challenge and required coordinated efforts at the policy level (Khasalamwa 2009). Similar issues have been observed and discussed in the Haitian context (Chapter 6).

A more recent document on BBB was published in 2015 by AVID (Australian Volunteer for International Development), in collaboration with the Australian Department of Interior and Local Government. It took the form of an operations manual and represented an ambitious attempt to systematize best practices of BBB in a single document with a strong action oriented approach globally. In particular, the manual was designed in order to best interpret and adapt the BBB principle to the Philippine's context after that major natural disasters that affected the country in 2013. According to the AVID manual, BBB is about empowering local authorities and communities to incorporate planning, consultation, analysis, design, construction and community in post disaster recovery. It addresses not only building stronger buildings, but also building stronger communities through inclusive planning and consultation, improved disaster preparedness and improving equity between the rich and poor. Seven main elements are combined in BBB: consultation, information, social inclusion, economic recovery, resilient infrastructures, resilient communities, local empowerment.

> Consultation: The residents and community affected are directly involved and consulted in BBB decision-making processes. This is about talking to the communities and the end users of the infrastructure. It is about identifying the recovery priorities for communities. Each community may be slightly different in their needs, and this is perfectly legitimate. Listen to the needs and try to respond to hear the needs and what might help the communities.
>
> Information: Information is gathered to improve the ability of decision makers to achieve BBB. Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on reliable and comprehensive information. During reconstruction, information in the form of hazard maps, ecological data, soil information, flood areas is vital to be able to make informed decisions and ensure that what is being planned will be sustainable and safe.
>
> Social inclusion: BBB is for all of the community. Recovery must promote fairness and equity, addressing the needs of People with Disabilities (PWD), elderly, women, children, rich or poor, formal or informal residents.
>
> Economic Recovery: BBB cannot be complete without the community regaining economic self-sufficiency. From the start of recovery

operations, governments and aid agencies must create opportunities for (small) entrepreneurs to flourish.

Resilient Infrastructure: structures are designed and constructed to serve the community needs and meet the performance requirements in terms of design life and function. Resilient infrastructure enables local governmental authorities to initiate a quick recovery post calamity with minimal damage to buildings that are important for the operation of local governments and communities.

Resilient Communities: Communities who are working together to achieve an understanding of BBB can increase their collective strength and resilience to confront future calamities. Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience.

Local empowerment: Knowledge to allow local residents better understand risks can empower residents to make informed decisions. Local governments must be empowered to manage recovery efforts, and donors must devote greater resources to strengthening government recovery institutions, especially at the local level.
(AVID 2015)

Through the study of several BBB policies and practices across the globe, Mannakara and Wikinson (2014) developed an analytical framework in an effort to systematize the existing BBB guidelines (figure 4). According to the authors, a holistic BBB approach requires combining Disaster Risk Reduction with Community Recovery and (effective) Implementation. Each macro-category is articulated into its essential components: DRR calls for land-use planning and improvements of structural design; community recovery merges the economic and social dimensions; implementation cannot avoid managing multiple stakeholders and addressing legislation and regulation. Monitoring and Evaluation is a fundamental crosscutting dimension which spam throughout the three pillars of BBB.



Figure 4: BBB analytical framework (Mannakara and Wikinson, 2014 p. 12)

The BBB discourses and frameworks presented in this section tend all to offer a one-size-fits-all technical solution, applicable to any disaster's recovery; however, as it will be discussed in the next section, BBB is inherently always political, rather than simply technical, and thus open to negotiations.

3.3 Interpreting the Build-Back-Better paradigm in Haiti

Not surprisingly, Haiti was first labelled with the *Build-back-better* term by United States former president Bill Clinton, who, after his post-Tsunami experience in Aceh Indonesia, meant to set-up a similar approach, eager to adopt a ready to use solution. The term was then taken up by Ban Ki-Moon, former United Nations Secretary and was consolidated in the context of the international donors conference held in New York on 31 March 2010. According to Hector (2012) the adoption of the term provoked the critics of major representatives from the Haitian civil society[40] who feared that with this terminology the focus was no longer on the holistic approach that sees the reconstruction also from the socio-

[40] See at this regard PAPDA declaration February 2010

political perspective and originates from the demand to re-shape the nation-state. They perceived the reconstruction as physical and technical, a process aiming to address infrastructures, schools, buildings, roads; namely, the most visible damages, and thus, the main objectives of the donors pledge.

In the context of Haiti, the issue of re-envisioning the state had been largely discussed much earlier than when the quake hit the country. The most used French term in this debate is *refondation*, which derives from the word *refonder*. Its meaning stems from the idea of searching new guiding values and rebuilding the entity based on those values, with a strong political connotation[41] (Larousse 2018). According to Hector, the discourse of the re-foundation of the Haitian state is intimately connected to the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986. It was formalized with the adoption of the new Constitution in 1987, which was innovative particularly because of its preamble and the provisions on local authorities and decentralization (C.Hector 2012). Even though, continues Hector, it was a common point in the political agenda of the country between 1990 and 2011 and it was used to argue for a major institutional transformation, it was never fully translated into sustainable long term public policies to shape the post-Duvalier Haiti (op.cit).

Already in 1998, the political scientists Julien Mérion, argued that the main challenge for Haiti was to re-envision its internal structure and called for an urgent need for decentralization (Mérion, 1998). Various works promoting the redoundation discourse were published in the decade before the quake: the OPL (Organization de people en lutte) published in January 2000 the OPL Political Project, where the discourse of re-envisioning the state model was put forward. Contributing to the debate, in 2004 the Manifesto of the Presidential Commission for the bi-century anniversary was issued. In 2006 Waner Cadet published its masterpiece "Haiti: Le naufrage de l'Etat. Quelle sortie?" The following year Saveur Pierre Etienne published "L'Enigme haitienne. Echec the l'Etat moderne en Haiti". Therefore, the tragic events of 12 January 2010, did not bring a new debate on the table. On the contrary, the disaster fostered an already latent discourse, which given the toll of devastation and death caused by earthquake, was never as before, so high in the political agenda (Cary Hector, 2012).

The historian Michel Hector (interview #17) argued that the earthquake exposed to the largest extent the state and its incapacity to deal with the need of the country, to prevent the disaster and to address its immediate recovery. For this reason, the debate about re-building the state and society was brought back with force into the debate.

[41] Translation from French *Reconstruire sur des bases, des valeurs nouvelles, notamment dans le domaine politique.*

Various initiatives aiming at defining the desired model of Haiti for the post-disaster took place in Haiti between 2010 and early 2011; they were led by public authorities but, more actively, under the initiative of civil society organisations. I summarize some of the more relevant positions in the following section.

The inter-ministerial committee for the territory development of Haiti (i.e. Comitè interministeriel d'Aménagement du Territoire, Republique d'Haiti), in its document "Haiti demain" published in March 2010 (CIAT, 2010), explained that the earthquake showed the vulnerability of the Haitian territory, whose urban and environmental dimensions had been progressively de-structuralized. The committee suggested that the idea of a strong and sustainable economy, ruled by a responsible and decentralized state apparatus, was an objective for Haiti already before the quake. However, due to the disaster, by necessity, this same objective needs to be achieved in a context of emergency. The main consequence being that the reconstruction programme will be the drive for the transformation of the state, and not the other way around. The Committee further supported the idea that the post-disaster situation is surely an opportunity. For the success of the transformation it is key to develop a guiding grid that harmonizes the puzzle of actions that to be implemented in the upcoming years. According to the Haitian state authority, the policy priorities are articulated around three main axes:

a. Reduce social inequalities;
b. Rebalance national territory by reducing the load on the Port-au-Prince Region;
c. Stem the process of environmental degradation. (CIAT 2010)

Those axes have been guiding the preparation of the action plan for the reconstruction of Haiti, which is further analysed in section 3.4.

The hope to exploit the catastrophe as an opportunity was not isolated to the Haitian state. In the course of 2010 and 2011, a number of initiatives were developed in Haiti and abroad to ride the wave of the widespread agreement of building better the country. Movements and organizations from the civil society organized fora of discussion, prepared recommendations, positions papers, statements, stressing their vision and guiding principles for the country to be rebuilt. Using material and interviews[42] collected during my fieldwork in Haiti in 2010 and 2012, I examine next the main features of the alternative vision/s of the new-Haiti, which reflect also the fragmentation of the non-state actors environment in the country.

[42] See chapter 1 for an overview of respondents and interview grid; see Annex 1 for the full list of respondants.

The study "A voice for the voiceless" (2010) was conducted by six partner organizations[43] in March 2010 aiming to capture the ordinary people's views on the future of Haiti. 156 focus groups were held in the ten Departments of Haiti, covering urban and rural areas and involving around 1750 Haitian citizens. The study confirmed that the majority of respondents, regardless of their gender, age, social status and location at the time of the earthquake, shared hope for profound change. Normal citizens viewed the quake as a watershed and the beginning of a period of (re)construction where all Haitians could participate in the shaping and progressing of the country (op.cit. p.7). An overwhelming majority of the participants in the study believed that Haiti can change for the better only if a change of "mentality" at all levels of society takes place. For the new-Haiti, they envisaged a complete transformation in the way individuals and institutions act through a new "Awakening", unity and accountability. Those pillars are needed to foster a greater sense of civic responsibility; to overcome social divisions and join forces for a common purpose, and to promote the establishment of a State which fights corruption for the public good. It seems that the position emerging from the *Voice from the voiceless* study reflects a neoliberal subjectivization, which understands inequalities as something depending from individual traits and behaviours, rather than due to structures of violence and discrimination.

Several respondents emphasized the Haitian involvement in the reconstruction as key to counterbalance the risk of dependence on foreign support. In this framework, the demands include an equitable share of the benefits of international aid, which should not be concentrated in the capital and physically damaged areas, but they should also reach the regions, which have been indirectly affected. Secondly, the reconstruction of Haiti should draw upon Haitian, and not only foreign, resources and competencies; citizens should be seen by the State and the international community as fully enfranchised actors. Mutual accountability through international, national and local supervision of spending was seen as necessary to ensure that aid reaches the intended beneficiaries (Voice for the Voiceless 2010).

The participants of the study want the reconstruction process to support Haiti by tackling pre-existing structural problems, such as, according to their responses, the over-population and congestion of the capital, social inequalities and an atrophied agricultural sector. A key finding of the study was the strong social demand for decentralization and de-concentration of public services, which were widely seen as the remedy to the country's hills and the unsustainable drift to urban areas. Finally, support for agriculture production was stressed as a top priority, including by city dwellers; the prevailing sentiment of the respondents was that peasantry had been neglected. (Voice for the Voiceless 2010)

[43] The six partner organizations are: Help, Zosepep, ATD Quart Monde, Sanmi Lsante, The Office of the UN Special Envoy and MINUSTAH.

A statement reflecting a similar view was issued on 13 March 2010 jointly by 34 civil society organizations, which besides criticizing the top-down approach of the Post Disaster Need Assessment (see Section 3.4), marked by the lack of involvement of local actors, they also pointed at key guiding principles for a radical shift from the past paradigm (Position des Mouvements sociaux haitiens sur le processuss PDNA et la question de la "reconstruction" dans notre pays, 13.4.2010). According to the statement, it was necessary to break with the imperialistic model that prevailed in the past. This model, it is argued by the authors, led to the exclusion of the poor, a strong dependency from the foreign, more powerful, countries, the embrace of the capitalist economic model and a land regime detrimental to the large majority of Haitian people. The social movements signing this statement strongly called for an inclusive consultation process; according to them, only if the masses were involved in all steps of the process it would be possible to launch the basis for a new Haiti.

The "Charter for the reconstruction of Haiti" (2010) was a different initiative initiated by the Haitian civil society in Switzerland but with commonalities with the visions for a better Haiti previously discussed; it was published in March 2010 in French, English and Haitian Creole. The Charter reflected the point of view of the Haitian diaspora and called for an effective reconstruction of Haiti built around seven pillars: sovereignty and economic development, the physical reconstruction, the moral reconstruction, education, environment, security, and civil society. The Charter stated clearly that the "Sovereignty of Haiti is not negotiable" (Art.1), that the Government decentralizes itself, empowers local authorities, and redistribute resources following decentralization and proportional principles (Art 4). Physical reconstruction in the Charter was articulated in the endeavour to use Haitian material and human resources and in the priority for all actors, foreigners or nationals, to respect principles of good governance and anticorruption, disclosing regularly their budget reports and annual accounts. The moral reconstruction section invited the Government and Civil Society Organizations to reinforce the self-esteem and the spirit of the Haitian people, consolidating the vision of a reconstruction based on self-sufficiency. Furthermore it included references to the provision of psychological and moral support for the victims of the quake, the support of the Government for the population to honour their deaths with dignity and the establishment of a Truth and Memory Commission, whose function would be to educate citizens about their history as a Nation and repair errors of the past (Art 12). Finally the Charter stressed the need for the Government to encourage and facilitate the active participation of all citizens, including the Haitian diaspora, whose recognition, including the double nationality, is a priority (Art. 21).

Also the labour unions active in Haiti, such as the Confederation of Labour Union and the International Confederation of Labour Union gathered in the

aftermath of the disaster to think about the desirable features for the country. The conclusion of their discussion was presented in April 2010 in Santo Domingo with the presentation of the "Feuille de route syndicale pour la reconstruction et le developpmente d'Haiti". The manifesto stated that the disaster of 12 January should give rise to a new Haiti with the agenda of decent work as a driving principle of the reconstruction. This includes the implementation of the Global Labour Pact, adopted unanimously by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in June 2009; the definition of concept of society where economy is at the service of the country development; the reinforcement of the public institutions; the promotion and protection of women and youth rights.

The labour unions highlighted the need to apply to public procurement and contracts related to the reconstruction the respect of the national labour law and the provisions of the ILO fundamental conventions, including the right to be organized in labour unions. It specified that these provisions must apply to national and foreign companies, as well as NGOs operating in Haiti. Furthermore, a point was raised concerning the protection of decent work in the reconstruction, particularly mentioning that "cash for work", largely adopted by many actors involved in the post disaster scene, cannot become the main pillar of Haiti employment policy. While cash for work allows the swift creation of employment in the short term, the report raised concerns, arguing that it's not a long term and sustainable labour strategy. This critique aligns with the critical research conducted in other post-disaster contexts (see Jauhola 2013; Khasalamwa 2009). The establishment of an observatory of decent work was also proposed. Another pillar of the Union Manifesto for the reconstruction was the provision of free, public, compulsory and of good quality education and vocational training as a driver of development. The reinforcement of the rule of law is mandatory and can be achieved only by promoting access to education and health services, modernizing the judiciary system, renewing the Haitian Labour Code, which is dated 1984, and implementing the provision of all international treaties for the protection and promotion of human rights which have been ratified by Haiti but they lack enforcement. Finally, the Manifesto urges the process of decentralization through the reinforcement of the local communities' role and the means.

According to a religious representative, the issue of refounding Haiti touches upon different aspects, but it's first of all an issue of mentality. It's necessary to change the way of living together, to promote a shared development of the country, more social justice and respect for everybody. But such changes clash with the cleavages dominating Haiti since two centuries. This is a real resistance to change. The discourse emerging from the highly divided and diversified Haitian civil society is fragmented and tends to be sterile; civil society should call for an inclusive approach, rather than being polarized and exclusivist (Interview # 23).

A businessman belonging to the economic elites of Haiti explained that the refoundation of the country depends on large investment in education (primary education, vocational training, universities), the political decentralization and the liberalization of the market. The middle class is the leverage for economic, political and social stability. But the middle class has never been historically strong in Haiti, because there is no credit system neither services for small entrepreneurs, and the quake seriously affected the middle class.

« People from the middle class who lost their homes or small business during the earthquake were the ones who lost more assets, because the poor had nothing major to loose, but the middle class lost twenty year of economic efforts and has nothing to re-start with » (Interview # 13).

The director of a large local civil society organization working in the field of human rights (RNDDH[44]) argued that to build back better it was necessary to strengthen the state. The post disaster recovery was to be used as an opportunity to build a state which can deliver basic services, can answer to citizens' needs. Training people, fight corruption and impunity, build the institutions from inside so to progress towards the rule of law: these were the elements to renew Haiti. But nothing happened; the reason was that the state was already so weak before the quake and it became even weaker and empty after the disaster. There was no common will among leaders in the country and in the international community to bring the refoundation project into actions (Interview #2).

A woman active in a local spontaneous civic group called "comitè d'initiative" in the province of Jacmel, western region of Haiti, argues that the main obstacle for change in Haiti is the people way of thinking. She continued explaining that "the state constitution on paper is perfect, but in reality, it does not exist. In Haiti the rule is *chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous* – everyone takes care of himself and God takes care of all" (Interview #12).

The data presented in this section showed that there is a dominant narrative of Build-Back-Better, or using the French term, *refonder*, Haiti, in the sense that the hope of using the disaster as an opportunity to reshuffle the country was commonly widespread among different sectors of the society, state representatives and opinion leaders. Recurrent issues in the articulation of BBB were the protection of Haitian sovereignty against foreign influences, the reduction of inequalities, the need for a cultural and moral change and the promotion of accountability of all actors involved in the reconstruction. Nevertheless, the findings pictured contrasting perspectives and showed that the initial enthusiasm in the refoundation process was losing space to an empty hope and a hollow BBB paradigm.

[44] Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains

The next section focuses on the formal action plan, which the documents and process discussed above, were all attempting to influence, but with limited impact.

3.4 The Action plan for the National Recovery and Development of Haiti: an overview

In March 2010 the Minister of Planning and External Aid of the Government of Haiti, with the technical support of a Canada based multinational consulting company (Group IBI-DAA), specialized, among other fields, in landscape architectural services, industrial design services and environmental consulting services, issued the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development (PARDN/PARDH[45]). The Plan was prepared on the basis of the Post Disaster Needs Assessment conducted immediately after the 12 January 2010 earthquake and it was presented at the international donors conference on 31 March 2010 in New York. The Plan reported the vision of the Haitian head of state for the orientation of the country: "We will rebuild the Haitian Nation transforming the catastrophe of 12 January 2010 into an opportunity to let Haiti become an emerging country by 2030. This recovery will be based on fair, equitable and inclusive society, that lives in harmony with its environment and its culture; a modern society where rule of law, freedom of association and expression, land management are ensured." (PARDH, 2010, p.8). Build Back Better Haiti was articulated into four pillars, each of them with the following financial resources foreseen for the initial 18 months:

Territorial rebuilding	1254 M$ (275M$ in budget support)
Economic rebuilding	817 M$ (130 M$ in budget support)
Social rebuilding	2125 M$ (445 M$ in budget support)
Institutional restructuring	782 M$ (300 M$ in budget support)

Table 3: PARDH Financial plan by pillars

Each pillar was organized with a number of actions defined for the "immediate future". The time scale initially adopted by the Plan was relatively short, just 18 months, contrary to the long term vision that a holistic restructuring process would require and the 2030 target reported in the introduction of the document.

Each pillar included the following lines of intervention:

Territorial rebuilding	Reconstruction of the devastated zones and urban renovation, the road network, regional development hub and urban renovation, preparation for the hurricane

[45] Plan d'Action pour le Relévement et le développement d'Haiti

	season, regional planning and local development
Economic rebuilding	Relaunch of national production, restoration of economic and financial circuits, access to electricity
Social rebuilding	Health, food safety, nutrition, water, sanitation, creation of high intensive labour jobs, social protection, housing and recovery of the cultural sector
Institutional restructuring	Democratic institutions, restart of public administration, justice and security

Table 4: PARDH lines of interventions

The breakdown below provides the total foreseen budget for 18 months divided by field of intervention. The physical reconstruction of the devastated zones, including removal of rubble, appropriation of land for public use, basic infrastructures and reconstruction of private and public buildings require the largest slide of resources amounting to about 18% of overall budget, followed by education (12%), launching of the public administration (12%) and healthcare (10%).

Total table of costs (US$, million) for 18 months			
Project	Total investments	Budgetary support*	Other funding
Reconstruction of devastated areas	780	150	
National transport network	180	50	114
Hurricane season and disaster risk management	130	75	
Regional hubs and urban renovation	75		
National planning and local development	50		
Watershed management			
National production	260	40	
Relaunch of economic and financial channels			400
Electricity	157	90	
Housing of the population			295
Creation of high-intensity labour jobs	200	50	
Social protection	70	30	
Education: return to school and construction of schools	470	150	
Healthcare	390	120	
Food security	140	35	
Water and sanitation	160	60	
Democratic institutions	155	20	
Relaunching the administration	372	250	
Support to Parliament	20	10	
Justice and Security	255	50	
Total	3,864	1,180	809
* this total includes the $350m requested to complete the 2009 – 2010 budget year			

Table 5: PARDH budget for 18 months (PARDH 2010, p.47)

PARDH was remarkably lacking attention to that building block of the BBB paradigm which Mannakara and Wikinson (2014) defined with the term "implementation". Indeed, little was said in regards to stakeholders' consultation and management, sustainability of action, how to deal with changing regulation and legislation, particularly important in the context of housing and land property rights, which is scrutinized while treating the issues of land legacy and housing in Chapter 6. The crosscutting dimension of monitoring and evaluation was also overlooked.

The Government of Haiti, pressured by criticisms from the civil society (PAPDA, 2010 and 2011), in the course of 2011 invested in a consultation process on the Action Plan, including a communication campaign and participatory workshops spread in the country to build consensus and participation on a program, which was felt top-down imposed since the beginning. It is arguable whether the consultation was an effective mean to increase the inclusiveness of the Plan, or whether it was just a fictional tokenism to confirm the priorities set by the powerful ones.

By April 2012 the Plan featured a more long term perspective and included a focus on the implementing approach and methods. The proposed strategy focused on regional poles of development, represented in figure 5. The poles support the decentralization and decontretation processes, largely proclaimed as key to the renvisioning of Haiti.

Figure 5: Plan strategique de Development a Long Term, Haiti Pays Emergent en 2030 (GoH, 2011)

A revised name and format was also disseminated, giving rise to The Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti by 2030 and nicely printed booklets.

The original four main axes were developed into 32 programmes and about 150 sub-programmes, in a strong effort to prove that BBB, like development, is technical and requires experts[46].

The revised Plan included actions to address changes in the legal framework and to implement decentralization; furthermore, consensus, will to change, follow-up and consultation were detached as guiding principles to achieve the BBB endeavour (GoH 2012).

The next section provides a brief account of the disconnection between the BBB policies and the practices of the reconstruction of Haiti eight years since the disaster. Nevertheless, this dissertation covers the period 2010-2012, and a comprehensive assessment of the progress in the reconstruction up to 2018 exceeds the scope of this study.

3.5 Where the reconstruction of Haiti is heading to?

Limited data collected and analysed showed little progress in the reconstruction progress and major critical issues. BBB, with its one size-fits-all tendency, seems to fail into a hollow concept.

Fatton (2011) argued that the earthquake in its immediate aftermath became a relative equalizer of what, later, did not succeed to prevent, namely the assertion of old divisions and social inequalities. According to him, it became evident that the small, well-off minority was finding their way out from the crisis far more quickly and easily than the poor majority (Fatton 2011).

Saint-Macary and Zanuso provided, through their quantitative analysis, a strong evidence of the negative impact of the 2010 earthquake on households' wealth, three years after the quake (Saint-Macary and Zanuso, 2016). Based on the first socioeconomic survey taken in Haiti at the national level since the earthquake, the researchers demonstrated that "people living in 2010 in areas affected by the extreme event experienced a long-lasting decrease of their means to generate income" (op.cit p.4).

A respondent interviewed at the end of 2012 summarized how the initial hope for a better Haiti was lost: "I had this feeling *[referring to the hope to re-envision a better Haiti]*, because it was a question that everybody saw, that we could not continue in the same situation, so we need to change. In most of the thoughts the change would have come from outside, it was a fact that the situation could not be worse as it was. ..or actually it could. You think that we are in level zero and there is no way you can go below, so automatically we are going to arise back but it's

[46] See Chapter 1 for an introduction to post-development discourse.

not like this normally, because we didn't put any process, any strategy, nothing…and people think the situation would get better by itself, but it's not like that" (Interview #32).

According to another respondent, not only nothing has changed two years after the disaster, but things worsened in terms of cleavage between poor and rich. The impact of cash for work programme was extremely negative on the long term, because it hindered people's capacity to take initiative in support of the community. As reported, when people hear the word "cash for work", it seems as if they have seen pearls (Interview #1).

As Khasalamwa already highlighted in the post-tsunami context in Sri Lanka the provision of cash grants to affected households can be harmful: "such cash transfers, without stipulation on the ways in which such money should be spent, mark a new and fashionable trend in the aid circle" (Khasalamwa 2009 p.83).

One common element central to the majority of programs and visions to Build Back Better Haiti was the promotion of decentralization and de-concentration from the area of Port-au-Prince. The idea was to give resources, financial and political, to the local authorities in order for them to operate at the local level as foreseen in the 1987 Constitution. However, also on this aspect, little progress was made, as the United Nations Common Report Haiti 2017 (Bilan Commun Pais Haiti, BCP 2017), argued. The Report, prepared between January and August 2016 by the joint United Nations country team in the context of the definition of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the period 2017-2021, described the amount of financial resources allocated to the local authorities (ASEC and CASEC[47]) as inadequate. Limited budget and the incapacity to attract and retain skilled professionals at the municipal level explain the weakness of the local administration in providing adequate services to the population throughout the provinces. The Report included within the underlying factors that undermine good governance in Haiti the weak political willingness to progress in the decentralization process and the absence of a comprehensive legal framework fixing the competences of the local authorities and organizing their functioning. Local authorities remain substantially halted by the lack of qualified human resources and funding, in addition from being affected by political instability; thus, administrative and political decentralization remains far from being achieved (BCP, 2017).

The election of local representatives in all 571 communal sections of the country was completed only in early 2017 under the interim Presidency of Jocelerme Privert, given the failure of former President Martelly to complete the

[47] CASEC is the acronym for the French Conseil d'administration de la Section Communale; ASEC is the acronym for the French Assemblées des Sections Communales

electoral process during its mandate. On 29 March 2017, the current President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, presented the new Cabinet with a roadmap for the Government focused on the security, justice, energy, education, health and agriculture sectors. The roadmap is based on decentralization as a strategy for transforming and modernizing the State to better meet the needs of the people and key national sectors (UNSC, 2017). Initiatives have been taken by Moïse in his first year in office to maintain his program, including the allocation of resources at the local administrative level; however, no reliable data is available at this stage to affirm whether the roadmap for decentralization is reaching any significant results.

3.6 Concluding remarks

Build-Back-Better gained popularity in the humanitarian and relief sector following the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and was again broadly proclaimed in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The tendency showed by the policy documents is to develop a BBB framework that offers technical and ready-to-use solutions to respond to highly complex, context depended and intrinsically political conditions. This approach risks embracing an *interventionist logic of governmentality*, as Tania Li calls it, where relief and reconstruction turn into purely technical rather than political problems (Li 2007). As argued by the post-development scholars (see Chapter 1), post-disaster recovery is hardly a linear process, which responds to a standardized approach: development is rather messy and requires deep knowledge of the local context and openness to contestation (Mosse 2013).

BBB, if understood purely technical and not inclusive, as the case of Haiti showed, risks to become a hollow concept, confirming what other disasters have already proved, that the BBB discourse promises more than what delivers.

The claim for spaces of consultations and resistance to the dominant top-down approach, evident in the way the PDNA and PARDH were prepared, has been recurrent in the Haitian scenario: however it is not clear what role these consultations might have. Are they really the source of further inputs and change of "roadmap" (deliberative politics) or tokenism that rather confirms and consolidates the powerful ones and their agenda? As argued by Jauhola (2013), whether or not deliberative democracy is taken seriously, the recognition that there will never be just one understanding of BBB but that is open for negotiation, offers also some hope for the future.

Chapter 4

Who holds power: the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC)

> *"*We Haitians, we have that desire of sovereignty that is often badly expressed. (…) whatever form the IHRC would have taken, since we accept that the international community gives us some money and keep a word on what to do, we will always criticize. Without knowing why we criticize. It's a form of bad nationalism, because if we were true nationalists, we should work to stop begging. When we stretch our hand to ask alms, we know that we are losing a part of our rights*"* (Interview #7).

4.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the main institutional mechanism for the governance of aid established in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake, that is the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC). The notion of governance at a distance developed by Mark Duffield (2001), and its critique, such as Chandler (2007, 2009), are useful to locate the Commission, and the watchdog initiatives of the next chapter, into a larger theoretical framework built up four theoretical concepts (power, disaster, aid governance, post-development) presented in section 1.5 of this thesis.

The chapter starts providing an account of the establishment and functioning of the IHRC, analyzing the diversified perspectives of internal members and external opinions on the role played by the Commission in the reconstruction process; in the following section, strengths and weakness in the light of the debate on aid governance in post disaster and in relation to the characteristics of the Haitian context are discussed. The conclusion, elaborating on the lessons learnt from the period of operation of the IHRC, and looking into the new institutional framework that followed, provides some recommendations on how the

establishment of similar coordinating tools in fragile states can be improved in order to promote the good governance of aid and, at the same time, avoiding the weakening of the local institutions.

This chapter largely relys on primary data collected during the fieldwork in Haiti: the data included semi structured interviews conducted with members of the IHRC, representative of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and multilateral organizations, intellectuals and member of the business community, who discussed the establishment and the role played by the Commission in Haiti and documents issued by the Commission itself (e.g. internal reports, minutes of meetings, bylaw).

4.2 The establishment of the IHRC

Following the January 12, 2010 earthquake a Presidential Decree on the 21st of April 2010 was issued to establish the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, better known in Haiti as Commission Intérimaire pour la Reconstruction de Haiti. The decree was grounded in the Emergency Law[48] issued on April 15, 2010 that extended the state of emergency to the whole territory of Haiti for eighteen months. As a consequence, also the mandate of the IHRC had a duration of eighteen months. The emergency law, which was hotly debated, granted extraordinary power to the Executive branch of the Haitian state in order to face the relief and recovery of the country.

The President of Haiti, Michel Martelly, elected in the second turn of a contested electoral process in April 2011, submitted a request to extend the IHRC mandate for additional twelve months, but the request, which remained pending until the spring 2012, was not voted by the Parliament. The IHRC, at the end of its mandate, on the 21st of October 2011, ceased to exist. Also its web page has been deleted: no visible trace of the IHRC existence has been left. Many documents (i.e. the IHRC Bylaw, the minutes of the board meeting, the reports, the frequently asked questions, the organization chart) that are referenced in this chapter can't any longer being accessed to.

In the weeks after the disaster that devastated Haiti in January 2010 an evaluation of the damages was conducted, led by the international community, in collaboration with some members of the Haitian Government. This evaluation produced a report, issued on the 17th of March 2010. This report was named Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and it constituted the basis for the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development (PARDN) that was presented at the

[48] Loi portant amendement de la loi sur l'état d'urgence du 9 septembre 2008, Le Moniteur: Port-au-Prince, 19.4.2010 .

donors' conference in New York at the end of March 2010. The PARDN designed the institutional structure that was to be responsible for the coordination of the reconstruction efforts and it's in this document that the establishment of the IHRC and of the Fund for the Reconstruction of Haiti (FRH) took shape.

Already during this initial phase dedicated to the needs assessment and planning, the Haitian civil society strongly criticized the lack of participation and ownership of the Haitian stakeholders, blaming the United States to direct the scene bypassing the national authorities. Following the meeting in New York, the Haitian Parliament voted the emergency law to endorse the PARDN; and with the subsequent Presidential Decree of April 21st the IHRC was legally established.

According to the articles 9 and 10 of the Presidential Decree (2010), as well as according to the IHRC Bylaw (IHRC 2010a), the mandate of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was to conduct strategic planning and coordination and implement resources from bilateral and multilateral donors, non-governmental organizations, and the business sector, with all necessary transparency and accountability. The IHRC had to work also to optimize the investments and contributions of these entities. The IHRC was responsible for continuously developing and refining development plans for Haiti, assessing needs and gaps and establishing investment priorities. It had to approve project proposals based on their consistency and coordination with the Haiti Action Plan. While it should draw up and solicit projects that fit within the priorities of the Haiti Action Plan, it decided on the eligibility of external submissions. The IHRC had to ensure the fast implementation of the projects and the development priorities, including the facilitation of the delivery of permits, licenses and certificates of land property necessary for the projects (IHRC 2010a).

4.3 Structure and functioning of the IHRC

The structure of the IHRC was largely designed by a private American consulting company that had little knowledge of the public administration culture in Haiti: "The project concept of the Commission was fashioned by McKinsey" (Lundahl 2013, p.255). It included an Executive Committee, an Executive Director, an Executive Secretariat and a Board. The two co-chairs constituted the Executive Committee, and were the prime minister of Haiti, Jean-Max Bellerive at the time of the establishment of the IHRC, and the former United States President Bill Clinton. The Executive Director, appointed by the co-chairs, was responsible for the daily management, supported by the work of the Executive Secretariat[49].

[49] There was often confusion among interviewees regarding the role of the Executive Director and the Secretary, who is another manager of the IHRC and also a member of the Executive Secretariat.

The Board consisted of twenty-eight voting members with a balance of Haitian and foreign representatives; the Haitian members were designated by the Executive Branch of the Haitian Government, the Judicial Branch, the local authorities, the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, the Labor Unions, the business community.

The foreign members represented the bilateral or multilateral donors that pledged to contribute to Haiti's reconstruction with more than 100 million USD in the next two years following the disaster or with 200 million USD in debt relief. These were Brazil, France, Spain, USA, Venezuela, Canada, Norway, Japan, the European Union, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. One member was designated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and one on a rotating basis by other donors.

The power in the Board's membership was hierarchically structured: indeed, there were also four non-voting members in the Board designated by the Organization of American States (OAS), the Haitian civil society organizations, the foreign NGOs and the Haitian Diaspora. The members of the Board, as established in art. 15 of the Bylaw, did not receive any remuneration from the IHRC. They could receive a reimbursement for their work and travel related expenses only in case the designating authority was not in the position to reimburse these costs.

In line with its mission to foster aid coordination, the IHRC requested all projects that were initiated after the 17 of June 2010 to be submitted to the IHRC for review and approval. The constitution of the IHRC conceived different levels of power in relation to the budget of the project to be approved. Up to 1 million USD, the Executive Director had the right to decide; for project with a budget between 1 and 10 million USD, the power to decide was conferred to the Executive Committee; and then, only for projects greater than 10 million USD the approval need to meet the majority of the votes of the Board. However, the Board always owned the power to approve and dismiss all decisions of the other organs and the President of Haiti maintained the right to veto.

An additional element of the IHRC structure was the Performance and Anti-corruption Office (PAO),[50] which was meant to guarantee that all projects for the reconstruction approved by the Commission, as well as the activities of the IHRC itself, comply with the highest standards of transparency, accountability, performance and good governance. The PAO however, was established very late trough a blurred tendering process where the contract was awarded to the same private American company which wrote the Term of Reference of the tender.

[50] The French acronym is BPLC, standing for Bureau pour la Performance et la Lutte contre la Corruption.

The IHRC was not involved in direct implementation of any project and did not manage directly the funding for the projects that had been approved. The IHRC approved or rejected three different categories of projects: projects already fully funded, projects partially funded or unfunded not to be submitted to the FRH and projects partially funded or unfunded to be submitted to the FRH for funding. However, the notion of project approval was hotly debated internally both by the Commission and by the interested stakeholders, and it lacked clarity. Which were the consequences for an approved project? What about the rejected proposals? Could they still be implemented in Haiti? (IHRC 2011b)

For those projects submitted to the IHRC partially funded or unfunded, the IHRC could recommend to allocate resources from the Fund for the Reconstruction of Haiti, which is a financial intermediary fund administered by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank. A big challenge was that the total value of the projects approved by the IHRC largely bypassed the funds directly managed by the FRH; the IHRC basically approved projects for an amount[51] exceeding the available funding. An interesting data showed that no less than 64% of the overall funds disbursed to projects that started after the earthquake had been channeled to projects that had not been approved by the IHRC[52].

The fact that the IHRC did not manage funding directly was largely misunderstood by the Haitian population and by the international community. The confusion was fostered by the unclear communication strategy of the IHRC.[53]

- "The IHRC is nothing more than an instrument created by the Haitian Government to enable a better coordination of aid." (Interview #11)
- "The idea behind the IHRC is excellent. It is a platform of coordination." (Interview #7)
- "The IHRC was a cell that tried to help the Prime Minister of Haiti to have better visibility on aid, on funding and to better plan the reconstruction. It was nothing more than this, all the rest is a myth." (Interview #3)
- "The IHRC represented an opportunity to be decision maker around the same table." (Interview #1)

[51] The latest available data refers to 87 project approved by June 2011, valued at 3.3 bn. Before the end of the mandate of the Commission, 15 news projects were approved and 37 were pending. Approximately 400 project's proposals were submitted to the IHRC in the duration of its mandate (IHRC 2011a, 2011b).
[52] Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2011.
[53] Frequently Asked Question of the IHRC webpage: "Will funds pledged at the 31 March donor conference in New York run through the IHRC?" "Yes. The IHRC will be responsible for strategic planning, coordination, approval and support of the implementation of projects funded by bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs, the private sector and other entities" (IHRC 2010, Frequently Asked Questions #6).

- “In a country where the public institutions are recognized to undertake their responsibilities and operate for the common interest, a supranational organism like the IHRC would have been, without any doubts, useless and unthinkable.” (Interview #7)

- “At the beginning I believed in the IHRC. If I accepted to be part of the Board, it’s because I believed in it. (…) I thought at that moment that the Haitian Government was having the opportunity to repatriate the development aid. (…) There was good will but we did not achieve our mission.” (Interview #2)

- “The IHRC is anti-Constitutional, it’s a substitute of the Haitian Executive power. (…) It is something directed by Bill Clinton in a vertical manner, and all decisions are taken without taking into consideration the Haitian actors.” (Interview #16)

- “Even if it was pushed by Clinton, we needed somebody to tell us what to do. It was their money, it was the money of the international community and we did not know what to do, I can’t criticize them. But they did insult us, at one point it was just not working.” (Interview #10)

- “The IHRC was an organ almost above the State and it never had a foundation in the people. It worked with few Haitians and many foreigners.” (Interview #15)

- “In the IHRC there was nobody ready to protect the Haitian people. (…) We haven’t been consulted; it was not a human rights approach they followed. (…) It was a body created only to satisfy the donors’ interest.” (Interview #5)

- “For me the Commission and the Government are both guilty, they were similar to the *mafia*. Nothing has been accomplished”. (Interview #9)

- “It’s a scandal, you see, and Clinton, who we believed would do plenty of things, neither he had a real leadership on the process. Maybe he was not even interested in having it.” (Interview #12)

As the extracts above illustrated, the interviewees expressed opposite opinions on the Commission, when asked to describe its mandate, function, effectiveness and their own role within the Commission. On one hand, some Board members representing the Haitian Government, the business community and the United Nations bodies saw its role positively, especially in its conception. On the other hand, members of the civil society organizations but also members of the economic elites and NGOs, condemned its establishment. The extracts also show some of the weakness and strengths of the Commission as an aid governance mechanism in the specific context of Haiti, which are analysed in the following section.

4.4 Aid governance: weakness and strengths of the Commission

Governance has become a popular concept in the context of both aid humanitarianism and the research that focuses on humanitarianism as a aid praxis; for development actors working in the field of development aid in the Global South, aid governance is often used with celebratory tones, focusing on practices of partnership and inclusion of civil society actors (Thörn, 2011). With a different opinion, Mark Duffield critically argued that the extent of thicker public and private actors' interconnections in the aid network is part of an emerging system of global liberal governance (Duffield, 2001). Findings of the field research in Haiti proved that aid governance is more complex and nuanced than the picture of international liberal governance offered by Duffield.

In this work I adopt a definition of aid governance "as the way in which aid is managed to ensure that the level and quality of assistance reach the recipient country's development needs" (Brassard 2009, p. 640). Underpinning criteria to this concept can be found in the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. According to the OECD the five basic principles to ensure the good governance and effectiveness of external aid are ownership, alignment, harmonization, management for development results and mutual accountability (OECD 2005).

In a country like Haiti, often labeled a *Republic* of NGOs due to the incredibly high number of organizations deployed,[54] as part of the process of governing at distance, different actors attempted to negotiate the focus of their work through varying efforts of willing and unwilling coordination.

The establishment of the IHRC tried to address this need: improving coordination, accountability and transparency among actors involved in the recovery. However, an assessment of the Commission achievement against its expected objectives during its operations is rather negative.

This section analyses the major shortcomings and the limited strengths of the Commission in relation to its objective of enhancing the effectiveness of aid. Using the interviews as a primary data source on the Commission's work is a methodological choice, in line with Brassard assumption on the limitations of the Paris Declaration monitoring framework for aid's effectiveness. Brassard, who conducted her research on Aceh Indonesia, argued that "a clear definition and

[54] The number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Haiti is a blurred issue, as the majority of organizations are not officially registered in the local Minister of Planning and External Cooperation. The estimated number of NGOs operating in Haiti prior to the earthquake ranges from 3,000 to as many as 10,000 (Kristoff and Panarelli 2010)

method of measurement of aid governance has yet to emerge in the literature. Simply collecting evidence on aid governance will be insufficient to provide incentives for ensuring that aid governance is an intrinsic part of the mind-sets and practices of development partners" (Brassard 2009, p.642). Brassard suggested local aid governance frameworks were formulated prioritizing participatory monitoring processes, integrating bottom up approaches with service user's feedback and stakeholders' suggestions and not using merely quantitative data imprinted to donors and aid practitioners processes.

The analysis starts with the weakness that affected the IHRC; they are organized into three groups: weakness deriving by its legal establishment, weakness due to its communication strategies, and finally, organizational and procedural setting related weakness.

4.4.1 The shaking legitimacy of a blurred establishment

There were two aspect that undermined the establishment of the HIRC: one was the product of the political scenario in Haiti in the months after the disaster. The other was linked to the opacity of the process behind the conception of the Commission, conducted under the strong leadership of the Unites States.

As previously mentioned, the legal basis of the IHRC stood in article 14 of the emergency law issued on April 15, 2010 under the Government of President Préval, who was reaching the end of his mandate. Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held within the end of the same year. When the emergency law was passed, the Parliament was composed by Deputies whose mandate had already expired in February 2010 and by an incomplete Senate, as one third of the Senators had to be reelected. The law established the state of emergency on the entire territory of Haiti, granting extraordinary power to the Executive branch in order to take decisions faster and to face the recovery of the country; the Government become authorized, among other things, to use accelerated procedures for public procurement and budget allocation. Under the chapter on special provisions, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was legally established. As a consequence of its contested legal establishment, from the very beginning, the Commission's legitimacy was shaky.

One Board member affirmed: "Already before the emergency law that gave birth to the IHRC, there was discontent, discontent on the way the law had been discussed and voted by the Parliament. So we knew already that the IHRC started to operate without a consensual foundation" (interview #2).

The plan to establish the IHRC was lead strongly by the United States, with little involvement of other donors or Haitian stakeholders.

"Nobody was implicated. It was the thing of some representatives of the Haitian Government with some representatives of the United States. Today, it would be unacceptable the way the IHRC was conceived. At the time, it was not. It was reasonable that something would be done, even if it was done top down and in a blurred scenario" (Interview #5).

Therefore, the IHRC initially did not receive the support of important players, such as the European Union, and stirred up the opposition of various civil society organizations, which repeatedly denounced its establishment as an attempt to the sovereignty of Haiti. Already in February 2010 a note signed by a number of representatives of the civil society accused the Haitian authorities to be incapable of providing a prompt response to the catastrophe and to address the needs of the people. The note continued by denouncing the modalities of the aid machine, initially supported by the deployment of the American marines and characterized by the exclusion of the Haitian people from the decision making process (PAPDA 2010a). A similar group of social organizations and movements expressed strong regret for the way the Post Disaster Needs Assessment was conducted, with little involvement of the Civil Society Organizations and under a strong foreign leadership (PAPDA 2010b).

Once the IHRC was established the opposition from the left wing social movements continued, marked by the anti-imperialist flagship.

The IHRC, after its first Board's meeting, was described as a regrettable and inappropriate instrument (PAPDA 2010c) and, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the New York conference, its extinction was demanded. "Through the IHRC a double exclusion takes place, affecting the State's institutions and the social movements. The existence of the IHRC contributes to the destruction of the Haitian institutions and economy" (GARR 2011, p.1).

4.4.2 Failing internal and external communication

One major limitation of the IHRC was related to communication; especially in the beginning of its operation, the Commission was not able to develop an effective communication strategy to share information, both internally and externally. Much of the responsibility was attributed to the personality of the first Executive Director, Gabriel Verret, but it was also part of a lacking structural approach that underestimated the importance of disseminating material, data and news in a systematic way to the Board members, to the media and to national and international stakeholders. Because of the already shaking establishment, the lack of communication reduced the already fragile legitimacy of the Commission, and fostered the spread of misinformation around the IHRC.

Many myths were created on the functions and power of the Commission and there were high expectations from its work. One of the trends characterizing the hollow hegemonies described by Chandler was thus observable: the tendency to focus on problems beyond the capacity of the particular agent, so to be easily authorized to pass blame or justify failure (Chandler 2007). For all problems of Haiti, rooted far beyond the earthquake, there was the Commission to blame. Chandler, who challenges Duffield's notion of liberal agenda of governing at distance, claims that there is a disconnection between policy rhetoric and political interests (Chandler 2009, p.29). The Commission was an easy target of criticism; such criticism, however, is not just about Haiti but it is more descriptive of the desires of the outsiders to "govern" the process.

Internally, the lack of an appropriate system of communication contributed to foster the frustration of some Board members, especially Haitians, who felt delegitimized of their role within the institution. The resentment was expressed openly during the Board meeting on December 14, 2010 in Santo Domingo, when twelve Haitian members signed an official declaration that was presented denouncing the lack of internal transparency and information. According to some of the adherents, this declaration was the product of their frustration of not being able to exercise the role they were nominated for. Because they were not sufficiently informed by the Executive Committee and by the Secretariat on the on-going processes, they perceived their role solely to endorse decisions already taken, and they denounced the lack of ownership and accountability of the Commission. Also some foreign members of the Board were concerned about the deficit of internal communication. The Declaration was not annexed to the minutes of the Board meeting but it was widely circulated by the media (IHRC 2010c).

4.4.3 Institutional and procedural constraints

This section offers an analysis of the major institutional and procedural critical elements that negatively affected the role played by the Commission. The composition of the Board was an innovative aspect because of the diversified interests that were represented in the Board itself. As described above, it consisted in a formally balanced representation of local and foreign delegates. However, in the Haitian component, important layers of the society were missing: the farmers, the youth, the women, the small medium enterprises, the scholars and the religious authorities. The only member representing the CSOs was a second-class delegate, with limited power, given she had no voting right. In addition, the perfect balance between Haitian and foreign representatives might be considered an excessive attribution of power to the international community for a recovery that concerned the Haitians.

Taking into consideration the long history of foreigner domination suffered by Haiti, and the widespread criticisms to the aid's practice of governing at a distance (Duffield 2001), it was clear that the pride of the people of Haiti would have been hurt.

According to art. 8 of the IHRC Bylaw, the Board's members were designated by the different designating authorities and then nominated with presidential decree. It was a top-down designation process, defective because the representatives had no clear relation to the groups at the base, as there was no obligation to report to their designating authorities. For instance, interviewees from various CSOs claimed the Board member representing the local NGOs was not representative of their diversified set of interests. They did not recognize her as a legitimate delegate because they had not been invited to nominate her. The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) appointed her, without consultation with the base.

In other rare cases the designating process was more inclusive and ensured a better support to the delegate and a more accountable reporting process: a positive example was the representative of the local authorities at the Municipal level, the CASEC[55]. He was elected by the Council of the Municipal Sections, which was composed by representatives from the ten Departments of the country, to whom he was reporting.

The composition and the nomination process of the Board undermined the credibility of the Commission: it was like a heavy building standing on fragile foundations.

An additional constraint affecting the good functioning of the Board derived by the different financial and technical means available to the Board members in order to operate. In fact, the Board members, in addition to not being remunerated, were not supported by any resources and technical staff to conduct their work. While the foreign representatives were reinforced by the staff of their designating authorities, the majority of the Haitian delegates had to deal with their little knowledge of the matter and with scarce resources. This institutional shortcoming created a hierarchy among Board's members, based on unequal degrees of power to contribute to the decision making process and to influence the agenda. Interviews with Board members revealed their frustration: flooded on a last minute base by piles of project proposals, written in *aidlish*, in addition to English, they were not able to inform their decisions, feeling dispossessed of their right to participate.

This practice is a clear example of the rhetoric of participatory development (Mosse, Cooke and Kothari) and of how spaces for participation, contrary to being neutral, are shaped by power relations (Cornwall 2002).

[55] CASEC is the lowest level of public administration (Commune level); it stands for Conseill Administrative des Sections Communales

In addition to the previous issues related to its functioning, the Board had little power in the institutional setting of the IHRC: in fact, according to the Commission bylaws, the Board was only implicated for the approval of projects above 10 million USD. The Executive Director and the Executive Committee were responsible for all proposals below the threshold of, respectively, 1 and 10 million USD, which constitute the large majority of proposals.

Additional challenges faced by the Commission concerned human resources: the start-up phase was very slow, and the recruitment of staff for the Secretariat was difficult and blurred. Initially there was a high concentration of foreign experts, seconded by multilateral or bilateral organizations or hired through consulting companies. "The foreign consulting companies recruited to support the IHRC in program management should had been selected for their expertise in recovery project's management and local institutional development. Nevertheless, the solutions they adopted missed sharpness and adaptation to the Haitian context. None of the processes developed by McKinsey or Accenture in the program area could be implemented, because either too complex or not-relevant" (IHRC 2011b, p.12).

Only in March 2011 the Secretariat was properly staffed, including a functioning Department in charge of programs that took on the heavy legacy left by the consulting firms.

The political context too fostered discontinuity: following the elections of President Michel Martelly, the Board's members designated by the Government were soon replaced by new ones for the last quarter of the mandate.

The institution of the PAO (Performance and Anti-corruption Office) was also delayed and not transparent. The tendering process for the establishment of the PAO was highly contested, especially by the French representative. The private US based company Pricewaterhouse Coopers, which wrote the term of reference for the tender, was allowed to bid and was awarded the contract. The role itself played by the PAO was not clear: if the IHRC did not manage directly the funding and neither was involved in direct implementation, then it was questionable how the PAO could guarantee the accountability of funds and the monitoring of the projects. Implementing organizations, either NGOs or international organizations have already their monitoring and reporting system in place (Interviews #3, #13).

The relationship between the IHRC and the National Ministries was a further major deficiency in terms of procedures. According to art. 24 of the Bylaws: "To ensure coordination with the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, Ministries and other offices of the Government of Haiti shall notify the IHRC in writing of planned or proposed activities or sets of activities related to the post-earthquake recovery or associated development needs of Haiti". The IHRC

was set above the local Ministries, even if one of the guiding principles of the Commission was to enhance Haitian capacities (IHRC 2010a).

The IHRC tried to readjust this one-way relationship, highly criticized, in the last period of its mandate, by establishing contact points at the Ministries, in charge of a technical revision of the project proposals. But this change took place at a very late stage. The Unit in charge of programs in the Commission explained that the heritage left by the consultants who worked in the initial period of operation of the HIRC caused a major challenge in establishing productive working relationship with the national authorities. "Bypassing governmental mechanisms and a weak consultation with the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Program Unit and to a true relational deficiency with the Government in general. The main challenge from February 2011 was to adopt a radical change of attitude vis-à-vis the Government" (IHRC 2011b, p. 8).

Certainly the functionality of the national institutions soon after the earthquake was highly affected, both in terms of loss of civil officers and collapsed infrastructures. The practice of the Commission fostered their weakness; it led to disempower the local authorities, bypassing their role, wasting their expertise and creating new procedures.

The Emergency Law (2010) also stated that at the end of the IHRC mandate its function would have been transferred to a national authority, composed only by Haitian people; however there was little discussion on the phasing out and passage of responsibility during the period of operation of the Commission. As a consequence, at the end of its mandate there was a gap, only filled in late 2012 with the establishment of the Framework for the cooperation of external assistance for development[56].

Finally, a last challenging aspect was the leadership of the Commission. Bill Clinton, former President of the United States acted as co-chair for the entire duration of the IHRC operation. The former President of Haiti, on the base of art. 8 of the IHRC Bylaws, nominated him: "The President of Haiti will appoint a prominent non-Haitian official to serve, along with the Prime Minister, as a Co-Chair of the IHRC and a Voting Board Member" (IHRC 2010a). Bill Clinton was an obvious choice (Lundahl 2013) because of his commitment to Haiti and his work in Asia after the tsunami. However, the presence of such a charismatic foreign representative, also strongly involved in the recovery with his own foundation, The Clinton Foundation, led to identify the Commission with a one-person institution. Key informants often stated the IHRC was the *Clinton's thing.*

[56] See next section.

4.4.4 Limited strengths

Looking into the limited strengths of the Commission, the first aspect to be mentioned is that the idea to centralize aid governance after the disaster represented an innovative approach. At least in its general theoretical conception, the IHRC represented an opportunity for Haiti to gain more control over the foreign aid, to increase transparency and coordination. For the first time, the Haitians could sit together with the major stakeholders at the same table, and everybody could inform each other of their programs, priority and strategy. It also offered the opportunity to the Haitian Government to dialogue with more actors simultaneously, and not, as it used to do before, in a bilateral and individual way.

As a platform and a forum to share information multilaterally, it was a progressive initiative; the diversified, even if partial, set of interests represented in the institution was also a constructive element. Indeed, the donors, the Government, local authorities, different sectors of the civil society were all represented in the Commission, even if with different power and resources. Another strength of the IHRC was to bring attention on Haiti and to draw funds; this *ad hoc* established institution acted in front of the international donors as a guarantee against the bad reputation of Haiti and the high level of corruption, increasing the confidence of donors, especially minor donors, willing to contribute to the Fund for the Reconstruction of Haiti.

"The Commission was seen as a moral entity: if a project has been approved by the IHRC, it means for the donors that Haiti and the international community agreed on that project to be funded" (interview #8).

In spite of all its weakness and poor results, the IHRC showed it was possible to work jointly and it promoted a reflection on the ways the Haitian Government relates with the international community on aid's matter.

"The IHRC showed it was possible to work together, but of course, this does not eliminate the fact that everybody wanted to push for their small babies. But this is part of the international aid system" a Board member affirmed (Interview #1).

4.5 The evolution of the IHRC into a new framework

The mandate of the HIRC expired on 21 October 2011; former President Michel Martelly submitted a request for its renewal to the Parliament, but it was never voted and the Commission vanished. As mentioned earlier, originally the HIRC had to hand over its functions to a national entity; however, during its period of operation no debate was seriously built on the phasing out and it was

only at a later stage, in November 2012, that a new permanent setting, inserted within the national institutional framework, was created. It is called in French *Cadre de Coordination de l'Aide Externe au Development* (CAED)[57] and it was introduced by the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) to support its strategy for the good governance of external aid and for the national development (CAED 2012a).

The new setting responded to the latest recommendations of the Organizations for Security and Cooperation (OECD 2011) to support the principles for aid's effectiveness in fragile states and it worked fostering coordination at three levels: strategic, sectorial and territorial. The CAED was composed by a Technical Secretariat for Coordination, a Committee of Aid's Effectiveness and Sectorial and Thematic Tables. The Committee of Aid's Effectiveness aimed to be a forum for strategic dialogue between Haiti and its main partners in terms of financial and technical aid. Meetings are held twice a year at the international level and every quarter at the national level.

The composition of the Committee included local and foreign representatives in equal number: the structure is very similar to the Board of the IHRC but with few innovative elements that addresses some of the constraints faced by the Commission outlined above. Indeed, on the Haitian side, there are now representatives of the different national Ministries involved and the civil society is more largely represented, with four to five members.

The functions of the Committee are very close too to the one of the previous IHRC: promote harmonization of interventions, define funding priorities, mobilize recourses and monitor its utilization (CAED 2012a). The first meeting was held on 10 of May 2013 under the leadership of the President of Haiti. Bill Clinton was also participating, as part of the foreign delegation of the major partner countries.

The additional novelty of the new-born framework was the Sectorial and Thematic Tables: coordinated by the different Ministries, they offer a platform to allow the Government, its technical and financial partners and the civil society to work jointly on thematic sectors, such as employ, energy, environment, health, agriculture, rule of law.

In terms of mission and composition the CAED did not differ much from the largely debated IHRC; the substantial difference laid in the way it has been presented and framed to the Haitian public. This time the process was initiated by the national authorities, which are responsible and in control of the establishment and functioning of the new institution; the direct involvement of foreign decision makers, at least on paper, appeared reduced.

[57] Coordination of External Aid for the Development

The CAED was an integrating part of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, which was largely bypassed by the IHRC; its strategy and operational procedures are aligned with the ones of the Ministry. This approach was assessed successful, meeting a general consensus and avoiding the harsh criticisms reserved to the IHRC.

Technically, the CAED is a sort of ring-fenced entity, a body whose activities, budget and functioning are segregated by the incorporating structure, which, as a national institution, remains the legitimizing framework. A ring-fencing tool has its origin in the private sector but it has been largely adopted in public management; generating more accurate financial information and monitoring of the performance, it can be used for making decisions about resources allocation, management, operational changes and improvements.

In terms of aid effectiveness, Collier (Collier 2012) explained that with ring-fenced entities, donors can better contribute financially, technically and politically: "by creating a public agency outside the regular civil service with a narrowly-specified function, there is a better chance of achieving adequate standards than through the incremental reform of an entire civil service" (ibid p. 12).

4.6 Conclusion

The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation in its report on international engagement in fragile states, Haiti (OECD 2011) expressed strong concerns about the role played by the IHRC in improving the good governance of aid. Under the eighth Principle of the Paris Declaration of Aid's Effectiveness (Creating concrete mechanisms to coordinate the actions of international actors) the IHRC was assessed an innovative institution, but its usefulness to mobilize resources, support the capacity of local institutions and promote the coordination of the recovery of the country was problematic. The Commission maybe played a political role, but it terms of coordination at the sectorial level it was not successful (OECD 2011).

The analysis conducted in this chapter discussed in details the main factors behind the unsuccessfulness of the IHRC. Summarizing, these factors were: the weak legitimacy behind the establishment of the Commission, in legal terms due to the contested emergency law and in political terms, due to a blurred and top-down process strongly directed by the United States; the failing communication strategy, internally and for the public; the disconnection with the national institutions and the occultation of governmental procedures; the de-facto unbalanced power relation between Haitians representatives and foreigners; the Commission prevailing consulting, rather than implementing, role.

These factors, all together, inserted in the Haitian context, naturally provoked the condemning reactions of many civil society organizations and movements, which called for the nationalistic discourse. Their attitude is characterized by the rejection of any sort of foreign hegemony or intervention, considered a violation of the state's sovereignty and it is rooted in Haiti's long history of foreign domination, dictatorship and deprivation (see Chapter 2). The Commission became the cause of all evil and an affair of public domain.

However, a comprehensive assessment of the IHRC has to take in consideration complementary features of the aid system in Haiti: only 21% of the total contributions disbursed by December 2011 for the recovery of Haiti was channelled through the Fund for the Reconstruction of Haiti, which managed approximately 380 million USD of pledges (Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti 2011). The majority of funding was managed through project grants to NGOs, private contractors and UN agencies; the amount of relief aid provided directly to the Government of Haiti was a mere 1% (ibid).

Not only the FRH managed little money, but those funds were also clearly earmarked: "Only projects wanted by the United States went to the fund". (Lundahl 2013:263). This was contrary to the original idea behind the FRH of being a Trust Fund, with unattached funds, and reduced its usefulness as resources' provider available for the Governmental priorities (OECD 2011).

The slowness of the disbursement's rate of the funds was also significant: by mid June 2011 over half (2.84 billion USD) of the pledges for the recovery efforts allocated to the period 2010-2011 was still in donors' hands (Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti 2011). Finally, the IHRC approved projects for a total value exceeding the secured funds and a large majority of funding was disbursed to projects that were not approved by the IHRC.

These data supports Chandler's argument that, even if it is true that nowadays power has been increasingly projected internationally, this is nothing more than the production of hollow hegemony (Chandler 2007 and 2009). International actors, besides their attempts of governing at distance, have limited capacity to actually follow their principles and liberal agenda. They are also reluctant to take responsibility in the international sphere for the policy outcomes. As a consequence, "western hegemony is increasingly a hollow one, lacking the content and purpose reflected in and reproduced through a cohering framework of values and interest " (Chandler 2007 p. 722).

In this extremely complicated aid architecture, the Commission was an imperfect aid governance instrument, but it is a legitimate question to ask what it would have been without it. In the aftermath of the disaster, the need of a coordinating body was urgent in Haiti, a context characterized by weak national

institutions, high level of corruption[58] and the cacophony of international aid. "International strategies of state building that privileged NGOs against the Haitian state as the recipient of funds ended up eroding the state's administrative capacity and creating a cacophony of aid that has been by and large detrimental to fostering institutional capacity, stability, security, economic development and basic service for the Haitian population" (Zanotti 2010, p. 761).

After the end of the IHRC mandate there has been a long gap of over one year, only filled in November 2012 with the establishment of a new framework, the Coordination of External Aid for the Development, which addresses the lessons learnt during the Commission's experience. The Haitian Government has formal ownership of the process, there is full alignment with Ministerial policies and practices and the use of local expertize and in depth knowledge of the local context are enhanced. Even though the effectiveness of CAED on the long term still needs to be assessed, the revised institutional mechanism incorporates some winning elements to promote better aid governance in a fragile state.

[58] According to Transparency International in 2012 Haiti ranked 165th out 176 countries in the corruptions perception index.

Chapter 5

Who resists power: an account of aid watchdog initiatives in the aftermath of the disaster.

> "Those actors (ref. NGOs) do what they want and they don't have to be accountable. (…) The State mechanisms are not sufficiently effective to ensure control and to regulate them" (Interview # 8).

> "We see lots of mistrust on the international actors side, they want to control, they control the money as if the money was for them, sometimes with those money they reinforce their own organizations and sometimes they take decisions without the Haitian people" (Interview # 11).

> "I think it has something to do with Haiti wanting to be independent, you know the slavery, the American occupation…now we are talking about neo-colonialism. So I think there is this sort of conflict relation having to do with Haiti wanted to be independent but not being quite ready to be at the level, I mean I don't think it's necessary an external tutorship, but I think there is a role for the international community to play, to make Haiti's capacity stronger" (Interview # 33).

5.1 Introducing watchdog

Watchdog is the process of oversight, which entails watching to catch and correct bungling and error, thus seeking greater accountability in terms of performance, results and compliance with rules; the "misdeeds" that the watchdogs monitor and expose are often described using the words fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption (Feldman and Eichenthal, 2013).

Watchdogs are commonly defined as bodies entrusted to perform supervision on possible violation of the public trust; therefore, the commonly accepted target

of watchdog is the State and the public administration, at all levels. Oversight can be performed by Government bodies, such as auditors, inspectors, special committees or commissions, but also investigative reporters, private and no-profit organizations can play an important watchdog role.

Finally, individual citizens have been called to play a growing role as watchdog, also thanks to the diffusion of Internet and social media, which allow collecting and sharing information more easily.

This chapter, largely based on interviews and secondary data, offers an overview of the watchdog phenomena in the humanitarian context, looking at initiatives operating in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake. The focus is on the process of supervision of the use of aid resources in the aftermath of the disaster when a proliferation of watchdog tools arose in the country. Four watchdogs are presented in section 5.2. The large majority of initiatives presented ceased to exist within one to three years from their establishment. Next, the role of the watchdog is scrutinized in connection with the IHRC and within the larger context of aid-accountability. The conclusion highlights how and why the emergence of local watchdogs can be seen as a positive step to resist the asymmetrical power relations dominating development aid.

Whereas the previous chapter focused on the institutional governing structure of the Haitian government and international donors, this chapter focuses on the role of the watchdogs formed locally, with the help of international partners. These two analytical focuses on the different forms of governance can be both seen as part of what Duffield (2001) defines governance at distance.

5.2 Aid watchdog and its proliferation in Haiti

Watchdog in the context of international aid is more problematic if compared to the overlook of the use of national budget. This complexity depends by the fact that watchdogs in the international arena need to address a mixed flow of private and public funding channelled through different aid modalities to a diversified set of agents operating abroad. Furthermore, in international development the feedback between beneficiaries of aid programmes and the taxpayers in the donor countries is broken because of the geographical separation and the lack of appropriate ways to transmit information.

As pointed out by Martens (Martens and al. 2001), one of the a unique characteristic of foreign aid is that the people for whose benefit aid agencies work are not the same as those from whom their revenues are obtained (the taxpayers). In the complex aid system, beneficiaries and donors (including private and state funds, charities, religious organizations, business communities) live in different countries and in different political constituencies.

In order to address the complex accountability issue that characterizes development aid, a number of initiatives dedicated to foster aid's accountability, such as The Active Leaning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), have emerged at the international level.

Some countries have also started to establish aid watchdogs with the purpose of monitoring the way national aid budgets are spent. The United Kingdom launched in 2011 the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, which is responsible to "scrutinises UK aid spending and to ensure UK aid is spent effectively, for those who need it most and delivers value for UK tax payers" (ICAI 2015). Sweden, following the introduction of a transparency guarantee to the Swedish development assistance in 2010, created a web-base information system, called opendata, built on open government data that allows public monitoring on how aid funds have been disbursed and with what results.

The phenomenon of aid watchdog initiatives rising in recipients' countries is less known and, therefore, the available literature on the subject is limited. I consider that further research on the topic is key in order to understand the role of watchdogs in the broader development framework.

The next section provides an analysis of the objectives, structures and way of operating of four aid watchdog initiatives established in Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. The rise of local watchdogs was quite new in the Haitian context previous to the 2010 disaster. The allocation and use of funding channelled to the reconstruction of Haiti, was the central concern of the Haitian watchdogs. The targets of the watchdogs monitoring included a variety of aid actors involved in the country, such as NGOs, international organizations, public authorities and private actors.

5.2.1 OCAPH: citizens' observatory of public sector actions in Haiti

"OCAP is an initiative created by several actors of the Haitian civil society, who saw that after the earthquake there was a surge of NGOs and international contractors coming from abroad to *help to rebuild.* But what we also noticed was that those NGOs were collecting funds, such as the American Red Cross, which seems to have raised more than 600 million US dollars from US citizens, but in fact, no one had a clue of what was done with that money. We even learned that a great part of the money raised to help Haiti after the earthquake was used to pay the debts of the American Red Cross. They had nothing to do with Haiti. So, me with this group of people, who are representatives of the civil society, have decided to create a structure that could monitor and follow up on aid. For instance we had seen what had happened in Indonesia, even if some

reconstruction was achieved, it's well known the corruption linked to the post disaster interventions. So, the idea was to stop that" (Interviewer #8, italics by the author).

OCAPH was founded in 2009 with a broader mandate to advocate for the right of the Haitian people to receive adequate response to their needs by public authorities and aimed to conduct monitoring of the State activities and services delivery. It works with international partners, which are supporting the projects of the organization. After the 2010 quake OCAPH decided to enlarge its oversight function to the NGOs' work and to target those organizations which had received funds for the reconstruction above the 200 millions USD threshold (e.g. Red Cross, Doctor without borders, World Vision, Caritas).

The adopted methodology combined the review of activity and financial reports requested to the NGOs, or made publicly available, with field survey and monitoring conducted by university students who received specific training. OCAPH monitoring on the use and impact of development aid was ad hoc developed during the immediate post-disaster period and lasted for a limited amount of time (less than two years) due to the lack of resources.

As of 2017, OCAPH continued carrying on its main role of State watchdog; a guide to promote citizens' engagement in the public budgeting process was developed and various activities were implemented to mobilize citizens in the electoral process.

5.2.2 CERFAS Observatory of public policies and the International Cooperation

Figure 6: Cerfas logo

CERFAS is the Centre for Research, Reflection, Training and Social Action established in June 2011 by the Jesuits congregation in Haiti. Among the activities carried out by the Centre, an observatory of the public policies and of the international cooperation was established and still functioning.

The mandate of the observatory is to monitor how international aid allocated to Haiti after the quake is used and how public institutions operate in the reconstruction of the country.

According to the director of CERFAS the objective of the Observatory is to rise awareness on what is international aid, how much funds have been pledged and allocated to Haiti for the reconstruction, which are the main donors, the channels of disbursement, the different institutional mechanisms to manage the resources (e.g. bilateral, multilateral funds, private donations, NGOs) (Interview #22).

Given that a large majority of the national budget is funded by foreign donors, the Observatory considers important to combine the monitoring of international aid with the monitoring of the definition and implementation of public politics, such as education, health, transport, communication. (interview #25)

The Observatory publishes a bulletin, translated in French, Creole, English and Spanish, which provides quantitative and qualitative information on specific topics related to the reconstruction. The main sources of information are publicly available data. For instance, one issue addressed the theme of housing and discussed the different strategies and funds used for temporary shelters, support to rental, support for the rehabilitation of damaged houses or construction of permanent buildings.

In addition the Observatory releases a monthly compilation covering the principal events and issues discussed by the Haitian press during the month, including the links to the sources. The compilation is structured around thematic areas: public politics, judiciary, security, international aid, environment, education and gender. Both publications are disseminated widely and they are used as background documents during workshops and seminars organized by CERFAS to promote public debate and social dialogue.

5.2.3 The observatory of the reconstruction

The first issue of the Observatory was launched in May 2012 thanks to the collaboration of a group of Haitian intellectuals and academics who gathered together with the idea to discuss the challenges observed in the first two years of reconstruction of the country, provide informed opinion, shed light on topical issues and provoke public debate. Around ten issues were published in French, and in the majority of cases they were launched in a public event. The revue interrupted its publication during 2013, due to lack of funding.

Figure 7: Issue #7 of the Observatoire de la Rrconstruction

Each issue of the observatory focused on a thematic area relevant for the reconstruction; the topic is addressed by Haitian intellectuals, architects, and researchers through diversified perspectives of analysis.

The journal, whose logo is a lighthouse, offered a well-edited layout, with insightful pictures; it addressed a high-educated public and it was marked by a tendency to debate structural issues and societal problems stemming from the reconstruction. Example of topics included impunity and reconstruction, Dominican Republic companies in Haiti, vulnerability, the pillar of culture in the reconstruction. The publication was available on-line and printed in limited copies, which were distributed free of charge during public venues.

"It's not easy; we realized immediately that lots of work to investigate was needed. Because, there are so many things going on, so much money…but at the same time, nothing is accomplished. Actually, what it's happening is that we are rebuilding our country worse as before". (Interview #28)

5.2.4 Ayiti Kale Je: Haiti grassroots watch

"If you know the history of Haiti and if you read of any post disaster or post conflict situation, it's a crazy time where nobody is in control of anything. In

terms of all these NGOs coming in, all these agencies are coming in, all these individual people are coming in, gentlemen, John Travolta come, with all a bunch of people, from whatever church they are members of. You know what I mean? Nobody asks anybody permission, because it's a poor country, people just do what they want. And we know the tradition of having a very weak government. There is gonna be billions of dollars coming in here and nobody is watching, because we don't have, what you can call it, real journalism in Haiti. There is especially no tradition of investigative journalism and watchdogging. There are not a lot of journalists that are ready to stand up because they are supposed to don't have an opinion. But if you look in any book that UNESCO has written about investigative journalism, it's absolutely fine to have an opinion, based on the facts. That's what is called advocacy journalism." (Interview #31)

Figure 8 Ayiti Kale Je logo

Haiti Grassroots watch was established approximately six months after the 2010 earthquake and consisted in a collaboration of two Haitian media organizations, Groupe Medialternatif/Alterpresse and the Society for the Animation of Social Communication (SAKS), along with students from the Faculty of Human Sciences at the State University of Haiti and members of two networks – the network of women community radio broadcasters (REFRAKA) and the Association of Haitian Community Media (AMEKA).

The objective of Haiti Grassroots Watch was to produce text, audio and video content in Haitian Creole, French and English for audiences in Haiti and in the Haitian diaspora.

The effort focused on "watchdogging" the aid and reconstruction from the point of view of Haiti's majority; Haiti Grassroots Watch provided historical and political context, examined structural causes and challenges, and sought out Haitian academics, technicians and specialists who can add their voices to the voices of the Haitian people and their associations and organizations[59].

In the period 2010-2013 Haiti Grassroots Watch conducted 39 investigations and published their respective reports addressing issues related to the post-disaster and the reconstruction process, spacing from housing, shelters, industrial park, seeds' distribution, waste management, cholera. Particularly, efforts were dedicated to gather information and opinions on some aspects considered crucial

[59] http://haitigrassrootswatch.squarespace.com/about-us/

in relation to the reconstruction of the country, namely aid, dependence and sovereignty; the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC); the question of vision, leadership and coordination.

The focus of this watchdog was on investigative journalism, which can be defined as the unveiling of matters that are concealed either deliberately by someone in a position of power, or accidentally, behind a chaotic mass of facts and circumstances - and the analysis and exposure of all relevant facts to the public (Hunter 2011). In this way investigative journalism crucially contributes to freedom of expression and media development.

Haiti Grassroots Watch allowed local citizens to denounce through public media the misuse of resources, the delay in the delivery of services, different scandals pertinent the management of aid. It ensured broad dissemination of the reports through communities radio and supported the capacity building of young students. The organization ended its operation in 2013 due the lack of resources.

The four watchdogs presented above shared, even though adopting different approaches and tools, a main common feature: they all aimed to monitor the use of funding and to disseminate information on the reconstruction of the country, broadly interpreted. They were called to perform this monitoring function because the post disaster context was perceived as a complex and confused scenario, where a multitude of actors committed to the reconstruction efforts and little information about their work, activities, resources was shared openly with the population. Sometimes, in addition to gather and disseminate information, the watchdogs denounced cases of waste of resources or corruption.

However, none of the initiatives examined stepped further in the accountability process by asking the duty bearers to redress failing interventions or to comply with their commitments to ensure the needs of the people are met.

5.3 The circle: aid watchdogs can advance mutual accountability?

The IHRC analysed in Chapter 4 and the watchdogs are both underpinned by the idea of governing at distance, which materializes through development aid in the context of advanced liberalism, as proposed by Miller and Rose (2008) and Duffield (2001). In this framework, under the auspices of the New Public Management (see note 4), aid requires new forms of governments, made of technicalities, projects, templates, quantifiable activities, performance auditing (Duffield 2001).

The result is a circle where the donors tend to govern the locals through different institutional mechanisms of corporate accountability that allow maintaining control over the decision-making, while the locals react exposing the

aid stakeholders to greater downwards accountability, through the establishment of grassroots watchdogs that attempt to watch-over the use of aid.

Watchdogs emerging in Haiti did not target only foreign aid actors but also the public authorities, both considered service providers to the population and drivers of the reconstruction process.

Mark Duffield explains that international development is a technology of government – a way of ordering the relationship between people and things to produce a desired outcome (Duffield, 2001:312) - and that the extent of thicker public and private actors' interconnections in the aid network is part of an emerging system of global liberal governance; within this framework, aid becomes a tool to govern borderlands at a distance (Duffield, 2001). The tool in order to function needs to reproduce technicalities typical of the new public management, which is strictly associated with ideas and practices of accountability. The fulcrum of governance within the new public management is financial (Duffield, 2001, p.317). Needs and problems of the local population in the South are translated into logic of intervention, strategies, projects, activity based management and budgeting, which require monitoring and performance auditing.

The neo-liberal discourse of governing the South through development aid applies well to the case of Haiti, characterized by high dependence on foreign assistance and by a long legacy of foreign intervention (Pierre-Louis 2011).

According to the Report of the Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti (OSE, 2011), aid to Haiti tripled between 2009 and 2010 reaching an estimated $3.27 billion; aid from bilateral and multilateral donors largely overpassed the government's own revenue and the majority of the donors funding are channelled directly through multilateral agencies, international non-state service providers, including NGOs and private contractors. The report explained that, even though following the earthquake donors manifested increased willingness to improve their accountability in regards to disbursement of pledges and to provide budget support directly to the State of Haiti, unfortunately no major changes in who received funding and how aid was channelled was observed (OSE, 2011).



Figure 9: The circle of aid (E.Martini)

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission and the watchdogs were two types of mechanisms both attempting to exercise control and supervision over the funding pledged for the reconstruction of Haiti; they used narratives of transparency, accountability and aid-effectiveness in the context of neoliberal aid governance. In both cases, the discourse was rooted in the risk of misdeeds and misuse of aid resources; the risk was considered particularly high because of the complex emergency, which characterized post-disaster Haiti, the high level of corruption and the weakness of the national institutions.

As shown in figure 9, this exercise of control over the same object stem from, and is directed to, opposite poles, simplistically represented by the dichotomy foreigners-locals. The Haitian state does not appear to be an actor in the scheme; on the contrary, neither the Commission, which rather than being built within the existing national institutions, it was established as a side structure, neither the watchdogs, which do not operate as Government oversight mechanisms, contemplate or urge the national State to have a role.

The control, the monitoring, the oversight for the development of the country is conceived outside the State, in line with the self-government idea promoted by neoliberal international aid policies which aim at rendering development aid technical rather than political[60].

[60] See Duffield (2001), Li (2007), Mosse (2005).

Both the Commission and the watchdog aimed, in principle, to promote greater aid's accountability: however, the analysis showed how the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was far from being successful in strengthening transparency, flow of information, coordination of stakeholders and to support the capacities of local institutions. Even though a proper impact analysis of the watchdogs discussed in this chapter is not available, the proliferation of this kind of initiatives in Haiti post-disaster context allows arguing in their favour.

Local aid watchdogs have the potential to engender increased domestic accountability and thus to support the principle of mutual accountability listed in the OCED Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. According to the Busan Outcome Document (OECD 2011), mutual accountability and accountability to the intended aid beneficiaries, as well as to citizens, organizations, constituents and shareholders, is critical to delivering development results. The principle of mutual accountability, in theory, signifies a "shift from vertical to horizontal forms of accountability, where collaborative enforceability replaces corporate enforceability, as a way of rebalancing power asymmetries in the aid relationship" (SADEV 2012:ii).

In countries like Haiti, where experiences of foreign domination, exclusion, cleavages, impunity and corruption are deeply rooted in the lives of the majority of the people, the rise of watchdogs monitoring foreign aid actors, as well as the Government, shows a positive tendency in building up a culture of answerability. Answerability is the primary foundation of accountability, which is broadly understood as the responsibility to answer for the performance expectation to specific stakeholders (Eyben 2008). A precondition for answerability to work is increased flow of information and transparency.

5.4 Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter showed the innovative role played by aid watchdogs within the discourse of governing at distance (Duffield, 2001) in a post disaster context like Haiti. By gathering and disseminating information at the grassroots level and by promoting critical thinking, watchdogs nourished citizens' demand for answers, which is the first step to develop any mechanism of domestic accountability. According to OECD, domestic accountability is directly linked to mutual accountability, based on representative enforceability, between citizens and the state, ensuring that donors and partner countries join together to become accountable to their constituents.

On a global scale, limited progress in implementing functional mechanisms to strengthen mutual accountability have been accomplished; issues of power imbalance between donors and partner countries are still underpinning an "uneven

system of sanctions according to which donors are unwilling to discuss or face sanctions for poor performance, whereas partner countries are faced with sanctions for lack of performance" (SADEV 2012:18). Furthermore, donors seem more driven to report to their taxpayers rather than to be driven by mutual accountability.

Within this scenario of aid governance, and zooming on the particularly complex case of Haiti, the rise of local aid watchdogs represents a small innovative step to conceive new ways for the locals to express their voice, to resist to asymmetrical power relations dominating the aid system, and to demand accountability for the development process more broadly. Addressing directly international donors and NGOs, they introduce an innovative perspective of accountability, which overpasses domestic and mutual accountability schemes and look more into a political project where voice and justice of the people become the goal (Eyben 2008). Next, it will be key to reinforce their ability to ensure that entities stick to the commitments they made and to establish redressing mechanisms.

This research demonstrated that the study of aid watchdogs in post-disaster contexts deserves further attention, both from the scholars and the policy makers; understanding their role in the larger post-development framework and in the liberal peace debate is strongly encouraged.

Chapter 6

Land tenure, Canaan and the housing project of father Joseph

6.1 Introduction

With the epicentre of the seism close to Port-au-Prince, the capital city which, including the entire metropolitan area, counts for about 20% of the entire population, the 2010 earthquake hit the most highly densely populated area of Haiti[61]. The lawlessness and uncontrolled process of urbanization of the past half century that characterized the fast growth of Port-au-Prince fostered the creation of slums in different suburbs of the city. Precarious housing and the absence of a proper construction code increased the vulnerability of the population to natural disaster and contributed to explain the devastation of the disaster.

In the aftermath of the earthquake the displaced population was first lodged in provisional camps established mainly in public spaces like squares and gathering points, where the homeless population naturally got-together after the first shock. Next, in an effort to empty the camps, they were moved to Temporary Shelters (T-Shelters), that in many cases became long term housing. In all cases, one of the major obstacles to properly address the housing needs of the displaced population was the land tenure puzzle characterizing Haiti. Since June 2010 thousands of families started to move to a piece of land declared of public utility northeast of Port-au-Prince, which was identified by the Executive as the destination site for a major housing project, Camp Corail-Cesselesse.

This chapter discusses the issue of land tenure in Haiti while looking at the process of creation of a new slum in the Canaan area, showing the failure of participatory urban planning and to implement the "build-back-better" widely proclaimed leitmotiv. As an alternative and more successful example, the small-scale housing project of Father Joseph, is scrutinized.

[61] The population of Haiti is around 11 millions people; 2.3 millions Haitians are estimated to live in Port-up-Prince metropolitan area, which includes Port-au-Prince as well as Tabarre, Cite Soleil, Petion-Ville, and Carrefour; the density reaches 25,000 people per square kilometer.

6.2 The complex Haiti's land tenure puzzle

6.2.1 Ungoverned urbanization leading to major disaster vulnerability

There are little reliable studies on the history of urbanization in Haiti; the census of 1950 conducted by the State authorities estimated a population between 3 and 3.4 million inhabitants, of which more than half aging less than nineteen years old. However, the census was criticized for its inadequate surveying techniques and the margin of error was ranging 8-15% (Tobin 2013).

Internal migration, combined with natural increase of the population, due to reduced mortality and increased birth rate, led Port-au-Prince to grow at a pace of about two thousand per year between 1950 and 1960; half of the new-borns were born outside the city (Moral 1959). In line with Latin American demographic trends, Haiti went through a major wave of urbanization after 1960; people left the rural areas in masses, attracted by the centralization of the government and services in Port-au-Prince, by biased job opportunities in the commerce and the factories, as well as pushed by the deterioration of the rural economy in the countryside. In two decades the population of Haiti grew of over 12%, reaching by 1971 4.3 million, with 20.4% living in urban areas (Tobin 2013). By 1991 the congestion of Port-au-Prince was a fact, with more than half of the country's urban population living mainly downtown in slums conditions areas, including Cite Soleil, Carrefour and Cite Simone. The wealthiest elites, instead, settled mainly in the uphill neighbourhood of Petiònville (Preeg, 2006).

In the absence of any urban planning and enforced building regulations, the flood of people migrating to Port-au-Prince had no other option than establishing their makeshift dwellings in the total informality, building fragile constructions often by squatters on illegally claimed land (Manigat 1997). While the steep hills of Port-au-Prince added to severe irregularities in the layout of buildings, the downtown flat area of the city was easy subject to watershed and flooding, exposing inhabitants to all types of natural hazards.

In Haiti, building regulations, when existing, were constantly disregarded blessed by a general carelessness of the state authorities; inspections were rarely conducted and no proper monitoring of settlement took place in the capital area. According to Kats (2013) 60% of the buildings of Port-au-Prince were poorly constructed and unsafe, exposing the dwellers to a very high risk of collapse in case of natural hazards. Clermont, prior to the earthquake, argued that 86% of inhabitants of the capital area were living in slums conditions (Clermont et al. 2011). It is evident that even before January 2010 Haiti was facing a massive shortage of adequate housing solutions, with a national housing deficit of approximately 700.000 units and with around 70% of people being tenants (Amnesty International 2015).

Uncertain property claims and the general lack of clarity in land titles have plagued Haiti for decades and contributed significantly to its vulnerability and inability to respond in post-disaster circumstances (Farmer 2011).

It has been observed in other post-disaster contexts (e.g. 2001 Kutch earthquake, India) how often the emphasis of interventions on housing reconstruction is to Build-Back-Better for the homeowners. This creates hierarchies of priority and inequalities between the owners, squatters, and renters, or anyone who is not able to proof their ownership or lack the material and social resources to bargain their position (Mukherji A 2010 and 2015; Tafti M.T and Tomlison R. 2013).

6.2.2 Who owns the land? And who owns the house on the land?

The issue of land property rights in Haiti, similarly to other post-colonial disaster settings, is rooted in the country historical formation, with its long strive for independence from slavery and foreign domination. Freedom, in the forging of the Haitian identity, meant also land distribution and possession (Beauchamps and Smyths 2010). The situation got further complicated with the uncontrolled urbanization witnessed by the main urban centres, and in particular Port-au-Prince, in the course of the twentieth century.

Land tenure has been defined an elephant in the room, a crosscutting issue nobody wanted to address because of its complexity; land tenure involves not only political aspects, but also economic, social and environmental issues (Coates 2010). The 2010 earthquake brought suddenly and violently the issue on the top of the table, with its multiples links to problems for the identification of land ownerships and available state land for relocation; however, because of there were so many compelling urging needs to be addressed, the land tenure issue still remains to be solved in its complexity[62].

Former Haitian president René Preval, following the earthquake, clearly explained that the question of land tenure dates back two centuries in the history of the country. It is common to have people, sometimes all displaying official property documents, claiming their ownership on the same plot: putting together all available land property titles Haiti will result bigger than the United States (Lundahl 2013 p. 241, quoting Preval in Mozingo 2010).

[62] It's currently under implementation the seven years project "Foncier Haiti: modernization of cadastre and land rights infrastructure in Haiti. A comprehensive approach 2010-2017". The project is jointly managed by the Organization of American States and the Government of Haiti.

The land tenure system in Haiti is complex and dysfunctional: it involves more administrative authorities and lacks a comprehensive and functional registration process. In addition, it involves customary practice and informal arrangement which all contribute to a chaotic puzzle pictured below by the words of a Haitian landowner (Levine et al. 2012).

> "Where there is a tree, it belongs to the person who planted it, but the fruit can belong to tenants, while the land can belong to another person who has the title deed or his descendants, even if they are unknown, even if they are dead and even if they have no longer been around for generations" (Levine at al. 2012, p.1).

Public actors involved in this complex system are the ONACA (National Office of Cadaster), established in 1984 with the support of the German Agency for Development and Cooperation (GTZ), the DGI (General Directorate of Taxation), the INARA (National Institute for the Agrarian Reform), which entered into function in 1995, and the CIAT (Inter-ministerial Committee for the Land Management), with a coordinating role at the national level. Also decentralized authorities, such as Mayors and CASECS (Management Board of the Commune Section), on paper only, are responsible of the State land assets within the precinct of the Commune (USAID 2010, IFRC 2015). While the ONACA is responsible for organizing the national cadastre, the DGI is tasked to title all public land parcels issuing the *Certificat d'Immatricolation Cadastrale* and to collect taxes on real estate transactions, including on revenues generated by the lease or sale of state private land (USAID 2010, IFRC 2015). Professional private figures integrate the land administration scenario: they are notaries, estimated in about five hundreds in the country, and surveyors[63] (OAS 2010). "In the absence of an autonomous Cadastre office that can provide modern cadastral maps with solid and proven spatial references and that can intervene directly in an inter-institutional administrative mechanism for land management the surveyors and notaries, whose job is to validate property information and certify land titles do so as best as they can with the tools and information available to them" (OAS 2010 p. 15).

The Organization of American States estimated that since its establishment ONACA, partly due to limited resources, managed to register only 5% of the national territory, with major gaps in the Port-au-Prince and Artibonite areas. The large majority of land transactions in Haiti is managed informally, through a variety of tenure arrangements made outside the formal legal system (OAS 2010; Levine et al. 2012). A traditional and common arrangement is called *affermage*, which implies that the landlord allows renters to build their own houses on the rented plot (Levine et al. 2012).

[63] Surveyors are known in Haiti as *arpenteurs* (IFRC 2015)

During the earthquake the Central Tax Office (DGI) collapsed and all existing 2500 registry books got missing in the rubbles (Kats 2013); furthermore, people who lost their houses often lost also copies of their property deeds and any other documents attesting their ownership. For tenants the situation was not easier: the Haitian law is not clear whether the lease, in the circumstance of a earthquake, ceases to exist due to force majeure. Nevertheless, in many cases, tenants in addition to a place for living and their belongings, lost also their deposit, given the practice in Haiti to pay six months' rent in advance at the beginning of the year (Levine et al. 2012).

The Government of Haiti, in its National Policy for housing, habitat and urban development (April 2012), acknowledged the complexity of the land tenure system to be a major challenge to address housing and reconstruction needs and promised actions to strengthen people rights in regards to all forms of tenure (GoH-UCLBP 2012). When written deeds exist, they are often disputed among those who claim ownership, causing conflicts that delay real-estate transactions and access to credit. According to the International Monetary Found the legal process in Haiti required, before the earthquake, average five years to reach a resolution on a land title dispute, increasing people's lack of confidence in the formal and legal land administration system (IMF 2015).

The landownership situation turned more chaotic after the earthquake, with disruption of pre-existent informal land agreements, difficulties for those with legitimate ownership rights to prove them and thus opening the door to widespread phenomenon of land grabbing and speculations, particularly in the area of Canaan that is analysed next (IFRC 2015).

6.3 "Canaan": urban planning or a new-born slum?

6.3.1 The origin of Camp Corail and Canaan

The dysfunctional Haiti's land registry affected also state public and private lands[64], leaving major uncertainty as far as the extent of state domain. In this already complicated land tenure puzzle, in the aftermath of the disaster, the Presidential Decree n.21 of 22 March 2010 declared an area of 5000 hectares, situated eighteen kilometres north-east of Port-au-Prince, of public utility, with the expressed aim to use this land for the needs of those who lost their houses in the earthquake (GoH 2010).

The presidential decree was then published on the official journal on 15 April 2010, and the news widespread by the media, turning into a push factor for an uncontrolled land occupation process (Noel 2012).

[64] State private land can be rented or sold by the Government.

The area declared of public utility forms a polygon in the region of Corail-Cesselesse, bounded east by Onaville, south by National Road 3, West by New Jerusalem and Modern Village and North by the Trou d'Eau Mountains; it's reachable both by National Road 1 and National Road 4 (see figure 10).



Figure 10: Canaan area, Camp Corail and Lilavoir 58, Haiti. (Google earth 2018, elaborated by E.Martini)

The Executive identified this area as the site to relocate about 10.000 displaced people who lost their houses during the earthquake and were living in overcrowded camps in different public spaces of the capital city. The proposal was highly contested by the local civil society and international stakeholders, including UN-Habitat, that stressed the criticalities of the site's location (Baram 2011). The area, in fact, because of its geomorphologic conformation, is made of extremely dry soil and is in a hurricane and flood prone zone, highly affected by deforestation and exposed to landslides, particularly in the perimeter towards the Trou d'Eau Mountains. Additionally, it's not well connected to the rest of Port-au-Prince and offers very limited services and income-generation activities (Shelley et al. 2015).

Another significant issue affecting the site is of administrative nature: the wider area of Corail-Cessellesse was declared of public utility earlier, with a presidential decree in 1971. At that time, the Government had sown the idea of developing an integrated economic zone with industrial parks and tourist attractions, with the direct involvement of the Haitian company NABATEC, which owned a significant portion of the land (Senat and Belvert 2017). The plan to build this massive project within fifteen years was worth 2 billion USD, but it never saw the light and NABATEC claims the indemnification for the

expropriation of its plots (Alterpresse 2013). Because the 2010 Presidential decree made ineffective the previous decree from 1971, the legal aspects of an already chaotic land tenure framework became even more complex.

This land situation described is not isolated to Haiti only; rather it is part of the political economy of post disaster. Mukherji studied the reconstruction dynamics in India, in the region hit by Kutch earthquake in 2001 and explained that value of land increased as the investments and infrastructure were being developed, thus fostering conflict of interest on the uses of land, originally allocated to relocation sites. (Mukherji A. 2010 and 2015)

In a portion of Corail-Cesselesse, since April 2010, a formal camp for displaced people victims of the disaster was established with the support of different international organizations and NGOs[65]. Camp-Corail, as it was labelled, was divided into more sectors and offered to 10.000 people pre-fabricated tents, which were later replaced by Temporary-Shelter, more stable structure meant to last around three years (Senat and Belvert 2017).

Picture 3: T-Shelters in Camp Corails (March 2012, E.Martini)

[65] Camp-Corail was mainly managed by the American Refugee Committee with the support of Oxfam, World Vision, IOM, MINUSTAH and other minor organizations (Senat and Belvert 2017).

Picture 4: a sign showing World Vision project of 1162 T-Shelter in Camp-Corail (March 2012, E.Martini)

The formal jurisdiction on Camp-Corail was assigned to the municipality of Croix des Bouquets and a Court Decision prohibited any unauthorized construction on the camp area; only IOM and World Vision were authorized to build on site (ibid p.8).

In parallel to the establishment of the formal relocation camp, the surrounding area witnessed, since early 2010, a massive mixed migratory flow accompanied by an uncontrolled land grabbing process. People refer to this large area, which is becoming an informal overpopulated neighbourhood, as Canaan. The name, which derives from a local worship site, evokes the biblical promised land of Moses, and indeed, it became, for many, the symbol of salvation (Noel 2012).

According to Noel, the main distinction between Canaan and Camp-Corail is that the last one has been artificially established, built with the support of the international community and formally recognized by the local authorities of Croix des Bouquets. On the other hand, Canaan is the product of a spontaneous occupation of the territory that, thanks to the self-organization of its squatters, turned rapidly into an informal and fast growing new neighbourhood/slum (Noel 2012, p. 13).

Figure 11: The area of Canaan as of 12 January 2010 (Google Earth)

Today, approximately 250.000 Haitians live in the Canaan area, including Camp Corail, and this number might reach 446.500 people by 2035 (ONU-Habitat 2016). Figure 11 shows the area as it was on 12 January 2010 and offers an immediate and striking mean of comparison with the image of the land use in the same area as of 2018 (Figure 10).

6.3.2 Canaan and the premise for a future disaster

"This emerging city is the earthquake's most visible legacy: an enormous expanse of winding dirty roads lined with houses, scattered among which are thousands of shops and markets. Into this labyrinth, an army of NGOs, charities and international agencies have arrived to infuse Canaan with public parks and plazas, drinking water and money for schools—things the Haitian government has neglected to provide. But with these gifts come tension: suddenly there are resources to compete for, and an incentive to be the one in charge of allocating them" (Kushner 2017, p.4).

The fast and uncontrolled growing of Canaan into an informal overpopulated neighbourhood as described by Kushner (2017), and by the picture above, is symptomatic of a reconstruction process that goes in the opposite direction of the highly proclaimed "Build-back-better" slogan. People living in this area are exposed to major risks in terms of land tenure insecurity, dangerous housing, environmental degradation and lack of access to basic services, increasing their vulnerability towards natural hazards (Noel 2012).

State authorities were not able to fulfil the right for safe housing for the urban population of Canaan: through an informal occupation of the area, land has been grabbed and different sort of constructions have been built.

Picture 5: A view of Canaan taken from Route Nationale 1, Haiti (May 2012, E. Martini)

A major study report on the development of Port-au-Prince metropolitan area issued in June 2018 defines Canaan "an important informal human settlement" and analyses the different representations of the phenomenon produced by the civil society, including the media, Canaan inhabitants, the Government and NGOs operating in the area. Findings point out that emphasizing a negative image of Canaan as a dangerous and lawless hyper *bidonville* might promote its further marginalization and denies the right credit to the self-organization efforts of its residents (Petter, Lizarralde and Labbé 2018).

Noel (2012) explains that the site attracted people with different motivations and resources, and their settlements are reflected also in the diversity of constructions visible in the landscape. Since April 2010 many displaced people occupied the land moved by a real relocation need following their loss during the earthquake.

A new wave of displaced occupants was recorded since 2011 and continued during the entire 2012 when the IDPs camps in the city were closed under former President Martelly ambitious Project 6/16, aiming to implement an integrated return approach to 16 neighbourhood of the displaced population of 6 major IDPs camps (IFRC 2015).

In parallel to this category of desperate persons in real need, also people pushed by their own business and speculative interest got deeply involved in Canaan land grabbing process. In many cases these persons had major resources and occupied more profitable portions of land near the access roads to establish warehouse, shops or houses to enter the real estate market (Noel 2012). In this lawless scenario, cases of fraudulent sales with false property titles are common; less educated and poor people, by condition already more vulnerable, eager to become owners of a plot, turn into victims of individuals who want to make profit through illegal speculation (IFRC 2015). However, according to the Haitian law, the land declared of public utility cannot be subject of construction work, division in parcels, sale or any other speculative transactions (Haiti Presidential Decree N.28-2010).

The result is the promotion of land tenure insecurity for all those who hoped that the occupation of the land would translate into ownership rights as well as for those who believed to have acquired real title deeds (Levine et al. 2012, IFRC 2015).

A second consequence of the uncontrolled urban development of Canaan is the proliferation of unsafe constructions, built without formal projects and disregarding any building code or safety requirements. Houses are generally built by the dwellers themselves, and their resources dictate the choice of the materials and the layout. People building houses in Canaan consider the site their place of permanent residency and not a temporary solution before returning to the neighbourhood of origin (Noel 2012).

This practice of self-construction was promoted at the policy level by the national Government: the National Policy for housing, habitat and urban development listed at the top of its guiding principles that the construction of houses is the responsibilities of families themselves (GoH-UCLBP 2012).

> "In the two years since the earthquake, Haitian families are repairing, reconstructing and constructing their homes. This is evidence of the energy of the Haitian people, their capacity for initiative and the strength of their resilience. The key to our success will be to capitalize on these strengths.
>
> Haiti faces the challenge to build 500,000 new homes, to address the current housing deficit and need over the next 10 years. This will be achieved through the production capacity of Haitian families and the private sector.
>
> Our role, as the State, is above all, to enable those families and the private sector to build affordable, better and safer housing, including through promoting a concerted effort in awareness, training and compliance." (Ibid p.11)

According to Kushner (2017), people in Canaan invested more than 90 million USD of their own money to build about 20.000 houses, without bulldozers or architects, just relying on their capacity, and often helping each other showing a great sense of solidarity within the community. Strong community organization, together with the absence of public authorities, were peculiar characteristics of the formation of informal neighbourhood and slums in other zones of Port-au-Prince (Noel 2012). What distinguishes Canaan is the origin of its population, that originates mainly from the metropolitan area, while other main informal neighbourhoods were established by masses of people migrating from the rural areas toward the city, attracted by the hope for better life conditions (Petter, Lizarralde and Labbé 2018).

Picture 6: Constructions on the slopes of Canaan, Haiti (November 2012, E. Martini)

One more concern, in terms of disaster vulnerability, of the ungoverned formation of Canaan is related to the increased exposure of its inhabitants to natural hazards. The increasing soil erosion on the slopes of the bordering mountains (Levine et al.) adds up to the existing criticalities connected to the geomorphology of the area, discussed above. Because of the progressive filling of the land in the plain, more recent waves of occupants started to dig terracing on the sides of the steep basins, highly exposed to landslides in case of rain, with risky impact also for the construction downhill, as picture 6 shows (IFRC 2015).

Additional negative environmental impacts are connected to the lack of a proper waste management system and of a water and sanitation system.

As a final positive remark it is worth to be mentioned that Canaan's inhabitants self-reliance and their strong community organization has had a positive impact in terms of reforestation of the area. Spontaneous initiatives, often supported by civil society associations and projects, have promoted good practices of planting trees and creating small vegetable gardens, and the results in terms of increased green coverage are perceivable (Noel 2012).

6.4 The housing project of Father Joseph[66]

Father Giuseppe Durante belongs to the Scalabrini congregation, whose members have been operating in Haiti since more than fifteen years. Their missionary settlement is located in the southeast area of Port-au-Prince, in the plain of Cul-de-Sac, where they host around three hundreds Catholic seminarians and, since the earthquake, the bishop of Port-au-Prince. The congregation, in addition to its church services, has been actively involved in the local community providing education and health-care services. After the earthquake, the housing needs emerged strongly and Father Joseph, listening to the requests of the surrounding community, decided, late 2010, to establish a local Foundation (The Haitian Foundation for Recovery and Development- FHRD). The Foundation aims to promote the integrated development of the surrounding area affected by the earthquake. Nine representatives of the local parish, in addition to father Joseph, form the Directorate of the Foundation.

The Foundation started its initiatives with the creation of a pilot housing project concerning permanent family homes. This first group of thirteen houses of about 50 square meters each was built and completed by the spring 2012 at Lilavois Road 58, in Croix-de-Bouquets. The group of houses was called "Village Colomb", it was inaugurated and widely praised as a successful example of permanent and integrated housing project. The site of the housing project is about 2km from the Canaan area, as displayed in figure 10. The beneficiaries were selected according to a number of criteria that included membership to the local community, having lost the house during the quake and additional vulnerabilities (e.g. low income, single parents). Affiliation to the Catholic Church did not constitute a selection criterion. Over 200 requests were analysed in the first phase of the project. The project was funded by external donors[67], together with the congregation; the Foundation, locally registered, is the legal representative and final decision maker for the housing and production activities. The Congregation, because of its long lasting presence in the neighbourhood and good reputation,

[66] Registered interview #35 with Father Giuseppe Durante in the housing project site (Port-au-Prince, 3.3.2012)

[67] The pilot project was founded by Caritas Italy. Additional funds were provided by Croce Rossa Italiana and Socours Catholique for the expansion of the housing project and the water system. Integrating services (soccer field, multiservice centre..) were supported by different minor donors, including nuns and private sponsors.

maintains an important role of guarantor and reference point towards donors, external stakeholders and the local authorities.

Father Joseph explained that he had to insist, initially, to have the group of houses built in a dedicated space because the majority of the families, whose houses had been damaged or destroyed, wanted their house to be rebuilt in the same place. However, major challenges would have hindered the feasibility and sustainability of the project: firstly, the uncertainty of the land property rights. Many dwellers do not hold the land where their house was built and the congregation would not be able to ensure the acquisition of dispersed small plots of land; as we observed above, the land property issue is crucial to increase the vulnerability of poor families who can often be victims of abuse or extortions by declared land owners. Father Joseph himself and the Foundation had to deal with the chaotic land tenure system presented in section 6.2 to secure the land for the housing site. It happened that after concluding the sale agreement, a new vendor appeared claiming the ownership of the same parcel and showing an official property title. "The only viable solution was to find a mediation and refund the claiming owners a reasonable prices, always with the support of a notary we trust" (Interview # 35).

Secondly, the building process itself would have been more challenging and slow because of the multiple building sites, with issues concerning quality control and safety. Thirdly, the household sustainability in terms of services provision would have resulted more difficult. Indeed, one innovative aspect of the group housing project is the commonality of the management of the structure, including common services. The village's community, with the support of the Foundation, holds the responsibility to ensure proper management of the water and electricity systems, security and general maintenance of the "urban village", as Father Joseph labelled it. In addition, the inhabitants of the village can access education and healthcare services provided by the nearby congregation, while some integrating services, such as sports field, internet centre, community vegetables gardens and income generation activities were planned to be provided by other minor donors.

The housing project aims to create an integrated and solidary community starting from the house: Father Joseph motto is "from a home to a community".

Picture 7: Father Joseph in the construction site

The cost of each house unit is approximately 10.000 USD; it includes only the construction's cost. The value amounts to 12.000 - 13.000 USD including the cost of the land. Each beneficiary commits to re-pay to the Foundation 4.000 USD within ten years in order to obtain full ownership of the house. The loan, approximately 400 USD a year, is reasonable according to the local income level[68].

The beneficiary will own the house while the land will remain property of the Foundation. This arrangement was decided to avoid the abusive construction of extension of the houses, small warehouses or shelters, not properly built and possible sources of danger or community conflict. Each house has its own meter and the dweller pays its utilities according to consumption. The Foundation supports the management of the village, monitoring the respect of the regulation by its inhabitants, the payment of bills and the settlement of any possible conflict. All these aspects, in addition to topics related to the respect of the environment, social responsibility, maintenance of the infrastructures and management of the common areas have been addressed during ten training and awareness workshops that each family receives before moving into their house (FHRD internal document).

Another significant aspect of the project is the job creation side effect. The construction is entirely managed by the Foundation, which employs about 80 workers in the building project, including in the production of bricks; other

[68] To give an indication of reference, the Gross National Income pro-capita is 1830 US$ (WorldBankd 2017); a schoolteacher earns between 215 USD and 300 USD a month (Haiti Libre, 5.1.2015).

workers are employed in an industrial bakery, a recently established income generation activity. Furthermore, teachers and other staff works for the Congregation to run the school and the health centre.

Technical supervision to the housing project is ensured by local senior staff, retired engineers and builders from Italy volunteering with the Congregation and by members of the association Architect without Borders. This system promotes local employment, train local staff and allows keeping construction's cost low (Interview #35).

Picture 8 : Interior of one house of the Village Colomb

The pilot housing project has attracted the attention of international donors, being praised for its integrated and sustainable approach; Italian Red Cross, Development and Peace Canada and Caritas France have agreed to finance a second phase of the project, extending the number of units progressively to 200 houses. In September 2014 the Foundation inaugurated the fourth community village, named "Scalabrini Village", since the beginning of the housing project; it provides a home, and a community, to 40 families (Haiti Libre 2014). The scale of the housing project remains, however, relatively small, compared to the displaced population residing in Canaan.

Picture 9: Houses of the Village Colomb

Deep knowledge of the context by living and working with the local community, financial independence and local accountability constitute key elements to implement sustainable and successful projects, without hindering the capacity of the state institution (Zanotti 2011). Working in a country with the characteristics of Haiti[69], being freed by the stigma of negativity usually associated to foreign actors, including NGOs, is a remarkable added value when dealing with development projects. In the case of the Scalabrini congregation, they have been progressively accepted by the local community by becoming part of the community itself; their long-term presence, contrary to organizations which come and go due to lack of resources, helped to gain confidence and support of the Haitian people they work with and for.

The housing project of Father Joseph, with its limitation[70], and with the needed caution due to data limits, represents a tangible example of reconstruction following an alternative and more integrated approach, which interprets at the micro-scale level the *Build-Back-Better* leitmotiv widely promoted in the post-disaster talk[71] but often not materialized, as the development of Canaan demonstrates.

[69] See Chapter 2
[70] Limitations of the project includes its small-scale, particularly if looked in the light of the high number of displaced people with housing needs and the limited dialogue with the local authorities. According to Father Joseph, the state authorities have been neither supportive neither obstructive towards the project, leaving to the Foundation full autonomy to develop its housing initiative.
[71] See Chapter 5

6.5 Concluding remarks

As discussed in this chapter, the issue of land tenure in Haiti is symptomatic of the historical formation of the country and it constitutes a crosscutting problem, affecting the economic, social and environmental spheres. Access to land reflects the deep social inequalities characterizing Haiti, and the management of the reconstruction process after the earthquake has shown, so far, to be incapable to re-address these deeply rooted issues.

The Action Plan for the National Recovery of Haiti[72] listed within its axes of intervention the renewal of the urban planning, aiming to rebuild the affected areas and improving life conditions, with a focus on rebalancing the distribution of the population reducing demographic pressure on the capital area (GoH 2010). However, the development of a new informal shanty town (Norwegian Refugee Council 2012), Canaan, in the outskirt of Port-au-Prince has demonstrated the incapacity of the public authorities and the international community to prevent the repetition of processes that foster inequalities and promote people's insecurity. The lack of a functioning land administration system makes it very difficult to ensure land rights, which instead become largely linked to financial means and education. Completing a property registration process is, as we discussed above, extremely complicated and expensive; in case of any land disputes, the judicial system is lengthy, and again, it requires financial resources and the capacity to address services mainly located in the capital city and in French.

In a context like Canaan, ungoverned by the State authorities, poor and not well-educated people can more easily become victims of real-estate speculation; families relocated in Canaan, including in the formal camps, own no property rights because of the unclear status of the land, partly declared of public utility but with former owners still claiming compensation (Etienne 2012). Poor sanitation, unsafe constructions and lack of proper infrastructures, finally, increase the exposure of the inhabitants to natural hazards and social exclusion.

The micro-scale housing project developed by Father Joseph and the Haitian Foundation for Recovery and Development has shown that an alternative approach to the ungoverned reconstruction process is possible, an approach able to ensure people's rights and promote forms of integrated development. Nevertheless, projects like this address a minimum share of the housing needs of the displaced population and remain isolated in the post-earthquake Haiti landscape, dominated by a reproduction of already made mistakes.

[72] See section 5.3

Chapter 7

The rhetoric of doing-good: a self-reflective insight of power in development aid

> "Impresa sociale, naturalmente, nel rispetto della dignità di ciascuno e secondo il principio del primato della persona. Un'azienda che produce socialità, coscienza. Ma un'azienda. Che non allontana nessuno, accompagna. Ma un'azienda. Perchè per avere risultati bisogna sporcarsi le mani."[73] (L.Rastello, 2014, p.137)

> "Saying it was shocked at the highest level," the government of Haiti has suspended the aid group Oxfam Great Britain for two months while it investigates allegations of sexual misconduct by charity employees in the aftermath of the devastating 2010 earthquake." (New York Times, 22.2.2018)

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter I discuss power in development aid by scrutinizing into the micro-level of the international aid workers' community. Rituals and lifestyle within this community were not distinctive of the context of Haiti only; they are characteristic of the network of relations governing the global aid system.

Because of the nature of the content of this chapter, its analysis is characterized, compared to the rest of the dissertation, by a more empirical and experimental approach, marked by an ethnographic and socio-anthropological orientation. Reflexive memory, life-history methods, creative writing and auto-ethnography have been combined and shape the narrative style; conventional sources of data have been integrated by visual data.

[73] "A social enterprise, naturally respecting human dignity, putting people first. A company that produces social good, and consciences. But a company. That does not fire anyone, but accompanies them. But a company. Because to get results you have to get your hands dirty". Translation by the author.

After introducing the concept 'Aidland', I retrace my auto-ethnographic story of what I call "the rhetoric of doing good", discussing the emotional labour of the humanitarian aid practice in post disaster contexts[74]. Next I present the data of a survey administered to aid workers who were working in Haiti in the period 2010-2012. The analytical focus is on the perceptions, within the aid workers community, of the sexual violence scandals and related organizational misconducts during Oxfam GB's relief operation in Haiti, which were made news in 2018.

The conclusions open up to a reflection on the display of power imbalance in the practices of development aid, looking in what Ferguson has critically referred to as the development discourse fantasy (Ferguson 1997).

7.2 *Aidland* and its inhabitants

By Aidland I refer to the world of international development and humanitarianism, which is concretized in policy-making realms, aid project sites, and the virtual world of aid professionals. The term was discussed in David Mosse's masterpiece "Adventures in Aidland: the Anthropology of Professionals in International Development" (Mosse ed. 2011), where it was introduced by Raymond Apthorpe in "Coda: With Alice in Aidland: A Seriously Satirical Allegory" (in Mosse ed. 2011). The purpose of the book was to scrutinize into the collective representations by which Aidmen and Aidwomen understand their world and work.

The concept of spatial mobility and *travelling rationalities* - sets of ideas, right theories, and good policies produced in international institutions and transferred to countries around the world with the aim of solving the problems generated by humanitarian disasters- are key elements to sustain and promote the existence of Aidland (Mosse, 2013 p.4). There are social rituals to entry and exit the expatriate community in each given country, which include parties, picnics and similar activities; learning from those already in residence is common. Aid workers tend to appear rootless, in the sense that wherever they are, it is home; home is where one happens to live and it is not rooted in family or personal relationships of engagement. Those spaces are often shaped by Western and European modes of household furnishing, utensils, and even cooking methods, in order to help practitioners to recreate their similar social worlds in the different countries of deployment, and, in the end, to copy with feelings of isolation and disconnection (Ritu, 2011). Interactions with locals are regularly limited to certain categories of locals, that include servants, employees or local elites (Dinah and Stirrat 2013, pp.164;168). Aid practitioners find themselves distantiated by several degrees of separation from the people they are meant to help (Ritu 2011).

[74] Section 7.3 is based on the article Martini E. and Jauhola M. 2014.

I fully agree with Apthrope who argues that Aidland's trick is of "being something both there and not there", something that makes feel suspended its inhabitants, a sort of place-that-is-not-a-place (Apthrope, 2011, p. 201). Fetcher and Hindman in their analysis of the day-to-day experiences of those doing aid suggest that the structure of the work itself influences the outcome of development: the social basis of Aidland, unavoidably influences the aid product (Fetcher and Hindman 2011, p.2-3) and forms an essential component of harmonizing aid policies (Mosse, 2013).

I argue that it is possible to identify in the substratum of organizations composing Aidland common elements characterizing the clan structures[75]. A clan reveals and improves the efficiency of relational networks and supports the process for individuals to identify into a group; differently from a normal group, a clan is highly adaptable to the context and is more keen to respond to the needs of its members to reduce their incertitude and foster their feeling of social distinction (Armao, forthcoming). As a clan, NGOs share the capacity to mobilize resources to fill a perceived gap in the relationship between citizens and state authority. They tend to use practices of franchising; for instance, it's common the growing branding strategy of larger NGOs, such as Oxfam, which come to incorporate under the same brand national branches of NGOs previously named differently. The promotion of the membership to a common imaginary family is typical of clans; the identification with this "family" is built upon a subculture which can include different form of expression, spanning from language, rituals, clothing etc.. Similarly can be seen the subculture of Aidland. Aid workers often feel the loyalty to the aid circle stronger than to the single NGO, as they can easily switch from one organization to another, once inserted in the humanitarian labour circle.

Civil clans transform solidarity into an economic asset, to be capitalized in form of financial resources or labour, often provided by affiliated volunteers free of charge.

There are scholars who argue that NGOs can reduce volunteers' turnover by inducing an informal clan control in their organization. Clan control can positively influence the volunteer job satisfaction and the satisfaction of relatedness of needs, increasing consequently the likelihood volunteers will remain engaged in the organization (Kretuzer M. and K., 2017).

With the narration of my self-journey to Aidand I testify that the everyday problems of doing aid work exist in tension with the persistent demands for benevolence and altruism that dominate aid rhetoric (Hindman and Fechter 2011, p.2); furthermore I sustain, together with Jauhola, that the concept of Aidland is not monolithic and that distinctions and distances among aid workers exist,

[75] For a comprehensive overview of the clan issue see Armao (forthcoming)

creating arena for interplay of resistance and dominance, for feelings of being insider or outsider to the bubble (Martini and Jauhola, 2014).

To locate Aidland in the broader context I like to refer to the complex system of Aid described by Hinton and Groves (2004) and reproduced in the diagram in Figure 12. The authors argue that to move beyond the ambitious rhetoric of aid it is necessary to have a clearer understanding of the uncertainty, complexity and dynamics of the aid system, and therefore they suggest focusing on the relationships among actors present in the development arena (Hinton and Groves 2004, p.5). The diagram shows an example of power dynamics influencing the development players through a network of interdependent, diversified and fluid relationships.



Figure 12: a complex systems illustration of power and relationship (Hinton and Groves, 2004:8)

The number of NGOs operating in Haiti, before and after the 2010 earthquake has been always blurred and unconfirmed by reliable data. The estimated number of NGOs operating in Haiti prior to the 2010 earthquake ranges from 3000 to as many as 10.000 (Kristoff and Panarelli, 2010). The Minister for Planning and External Aid (MPCE) issued in October 2016 a list comprising 605 recognized organizations for the fiscal year 2015-2016. However, the list is highly incomplete as the main challenge in defining this number is connected to the lack of an efficient registration system at the national level, which ultimately, leave many organizations free to operate without being formally registered.

According to the national legislation, every foreign organization which decides to implement activities in Haiti needs to submit a request to obtain a license, which at the end allows to comply with all requirements to employ local staff, pay taxes, open bank accounts, purchase assets and properties. The license is basically necessary to operate fully legally in the country. However, as many representatives of organizations have reported, the registration process is unclear, slow, cumbersome, and inefficient.

As an example, an Italian NGO that started the registration process in March 2012 and followed all required steps, by June 2018, more than six years after, has not yet obtained the license. Organizations can feel the pressure of their mandates and promises to deliver; they might fear budget to be dispersed; and they can worry about the insecurities connected to the non-legal status. As a consequence, often organizations find alternative ways to operate in the country. For instance, they liaise with local associations and use their legal status to overpass the practical arrangements mentioned above, or they make partnership with other foreign organizations which have luckily ended the registration process.

In the Fall 2017 the Haitian government announced banning the operations of 257 NGOs in Haiti because they were disconnected from the priorities and needs of the Haitian people, according to the announcement (The Sentinel, 6.9.2017).

7.3 My emotional labour

In the article "Journeys in Aidland: An Autobiographic Exploration of Resistance to Development Aid" (Martini and Jauhola, 2014*),* in a dialogue with Jauhola, inspired by the autobiographical and auto-ethnographic approaches to studying international relations, development and humanitarian aid (Inayatullah 2011, Mosse 2013), I narrate my autobiographical journey as an aid worker. While referring to the abovementioned article for a more comprehensive analysis, in this section, I retrace the main stages of this journey into Aidland, adding up visual data taken from my stay in the country in 2010 and 2012. The aim is to highlight those more self-reflective elements of the everyday lives of development workers, which Hindman and Fetcher (2011) argue is part and parcel of the theory of development.

My journey to Haiti is made of two parts: part one is when I picture myself *a rat in the pool*, an outsider to the aid-circle (2010); while part two, 2012, it's a failing attempt to enter the locals sub-circle. The following section is based on extracts from the already mentioned article (Martini and Jauhola, 2014).

"It was the summer of 2010 when I decided to accept a job offer in Port-au-Prince. I considered the offer appealing for the same reasons I would now hesitate to accept it: a good salary and benefits package; the novelty of the context of deployment; and the amplitude of the relief efforts involving actors from all over the world. Upon my arrival I was fetched from the airport and driven in a big vehicle of the organization to the upper side of the city, to the rich neighbourhood of Pétionville. I was thrilled because I was parachuted into one of the poorest and badly affected countries in the world and I was so naïve to think I could do something good for its immediate recovery. Besides my excitement at being there, I only remember the traffic jam and the kindness of the driver. I was taken to the NGO's rented guesthouse and asked to choose a bedroom. Soon, I was in shock: not by the tents of the displaced Haitians or the collapsed buildings, as at that stage I had not seen any of them. I was shocked by the luxury of the villa where I was lodged. A two stores house, with six bedrooms, five bathrooms, huge living room, kitchen, three terraces, one with a gym, swimming pool, and with everything fully furnished and decorated. I could see the incredible view over Port-au-Prince, including the harbor and the airport in the distance. I could hear the noise of that broken city, rising up to the hillside area where the houses of the rich were better built and remained standing when the ground shook underneath, killing thousands of people. The owner of our house was a Haitian *grimo*[76], who decided after the earthquake to leave the country and move to Miami, the most popular nearby destination of the Haitian diaspora. Indeed, renting his property to an International NGO was great business because, thanks to the arrival of many humanitarian organizations, the local rents increased tremendously. In the guesthouse I was welcomed by two lovely old black ladies, sisters, who were in charge of the property: Brigitte and Zed. The owner asked the NGO to keep them, as they had lived in the house and worked for his family for a very long time. I never understood if they had any other proper place to go. I was also told that one of the ladies specialized in cooking and the other in cleaning. At the beginning I could hardly communicate with them as they only spoke Haitian Creole, and I spoke French. I later realized that they were probably the closest I came to the life of the local poor during the months of my first stay in Haiti. They were living in some back rooms of the house, where the kitchen and laundry were located and they were sharing the space with the guards. There was a door separating our side of the guest-house from their side. When I crossed that door in order to check the washing machine, I saw the conditions in which they were living: small, shabby rooms, with one shared latrine in the yard where our clothes were dried and ironed and our meals were prepared.

That door meant the segregation of two worlds with opposite levels of power. Previously that door separated two different layers of the Haitian society, the mestizo economic elites and the marginalized African descendants - moun

[76] In Haitian Creole slang, it identifies a light skinned black man, usually belonging to the upper class.

andeyo [77]In Haitian Creole there is an interesting term people use to indicate these layers; instead of using social class they prefer the word *kouch*, which comes from the French couches, meaning a deep stratification of groups belonging to different levels of the social ladder. With the earthquake, a new layer was added (actually it already previously existed) in the local context: the foreign aid workers, to which I belonged. My experience during those months consisted of living on one side of that door, in the NGO's little world, made of cluster meetings, reports, and project proposals. I committed to work as hard as I could to help the people on the other side, the final beneficiaries of our projects. But increasingly, I realized that even if I was an expert in filling templates, monitoring budgets and managing resources, I knew almost nothing of the culture, the history, the social structure of Haiti.

And even worse, I started realizing that little help was going to come from our side of the door to support or change the life of the people on that other side: only a small percentage of the funds pledged for the recovery was translated into the implementation of activities. All the rest was absorbed by the complex aid machine – a black hole – with spillover effects on service providers owned by the local elites and foreign companies.

I don't remember the moment when I started to feel like an outsider in the aid circle of which I was supposed to be member. But I remember some symptoms of my malaise, of my resistance in accepting the boundaries of the circle. One day I was looking out from my bedroom window of the guesthouse and I saw a mouse as big as a rat trapped in the empty swimming pool, searching for an exit.

That's how I felt in my daily routine: I was becoming more and more isolated in my working and living environment. My way of resisting combined two strategies.

First, I tried to escape the circle, Secondly, I engaged in tiny private battles, like the one in defence of the housekeepers' rights.

[77] From Creole, literally meaning "people from outside"; the concept is used to identify those who are taxed and marginalized and without representation. Moun andeyo largely coincides with the peasant community, settled in rural areas, in contrast with governors and elites who are based in the city.

Picture 10: The pool of the guesthouse seen from the bedroom (E.Martini, 2010)

In my first short stay I experienced many events in the country, from the cholera epidemics, to Hurricane Tomas, to the local political elections and the ensuing disorder. Yet, I felt I knew so little about Haiti by the time I left. I worked extremely hard and with the sincere intention of doing good; however, I ended my assignment exhausted by my internal conflict. I was extremely angry and disappointed by the aid system I observed and of which I was part; I felt that we aid workers reproduced the "inequitable power relations that international aid is meant to challenge" (Shutt 2006, p.81). Nevertheless, I was not sure if I betrayed my beliefs or if my beliefs – my idealistic principles of development and cooperation – betrayed me. I only remember feeling guilty looking at my bank account and realizing my savings increased thanks to the months I worked in Haiti.

Late 2011, an old friend who works for a small NGO based in my hometown contacted me. I volunteered for that organization when I was at the university and then, soon after graduating, I worked as a civil servant with the same organization in Burkina Faso. This organization has few resources that it uses with great care.

I knew they followed an approach focused on people and long-term partnership. They never really worked in the emergency field. Their decision to operate in Haiti was meant to offset the short-term approach that is typical of relief efforts. After two years of preparatory work, including field missions and desk study for project proposals, they received a European Union project grant. It was a two-year program to promote and defend the rights of Haitian women victims of violence, providing them psychological, medical, and legal assistance

and raising awareness through information dissemination. The project was to be implemented with two local partner organizations, which were deeply rooted in the civil society movements and that were recognized for their fight to defend human rights. When my old friend contacted me, who knew of my interest in Haiti, asked me if I would go to Haiti and start up their first project. I told myself that maybe it was a good occasion to see development with new eyes, to get to know the real Haiti, to stand with the people and for them. The salary was not appealing at all, but it was enough; they had no office there, no vehicle, nothing apart from motivations. I agreed and I strongly believed it was going to be my 'redemption' for my past artless enthusiasm and adherence to top-down approaches to development aid. This time I was entering the aid circle from the grass-roots level and I was going to work more closely with the Haitians.

At my arrival in Port-au-Prince, I was accompanied by my old friend who was acting as desk officer of the organization. He was one of the charity workers or missionaries that Arvidson (2008) describes as professional altruists, whose commitment is moral rather than purely technical. I don't know whether the altruist might be better than the professional, but I know that I somehow hoped to be more like him, because he was able to ignore a tension which had worn me out – that tension of existing between the everyday problems of doing aid work and the constant demands for benevolence and altruism that dominate aid rhetoric (Fechter and Hindman, 2011, p.2). Maybe it was because, unlike him, I was trained to be an aid worker and working in humanitarian aid was my career path. Or maybe it was because he had a religious faith, which I never cultivated. We waited a while outside the crowded airport before a driver arrived; some friends sent him to fetch us. Stacked in the traffic jam, suddenly the car broke down. It was dark already, and we knew it was not the best situation for two foreigners and their luggage to be in the middle of downtown. One hour later our friends arrived with a second vehicle, the car was tied up with a rope and we were towed in the dirt roads towards the neighbourhood of Croix des Bouquers, one of the popular suburbs of the city, where we were lodged at the site of a missionary congregation.

My role in the project was meant to be smooth: I was to facilitate the start-up phase, establishing partnership agreements with the local associations, working with them on activities plans, holding monthly steering meetings, supporting the financial and administration management, which had to comply with the donor procedures, and getting to know better the work of our partners. The last aim was actually the main goal of my assignment. But it was never smooth. Our two local partner organizations developed different attitudes; the women's association regarded me with suspicion from day one. The two women at the head of the organization were unfriendly. They wanted to keep me at a distance, not answering my phone calls or my mail, not taking part in the meetings, behaving with superiority and constantly showing a haughty attitude. It took almost three

months to get an agreement signed and even more for a draft work plan and for their request of the first instalment of the grant. They used tiny pretexts to contest every single proposal or communication coming from me or from my organization. I was keen to know their work, to understand their challenges and how they operated on the ground. They perceived my efforts as an attempt to infiltrate their arena and they had little time to share information with me; I was also told not to go to their office without making an appointment with one of the two leaders and to talk only through them. I finally realized that they could not look at me without the prejudice dictated by their experience of past foreign domination, and I thought it was reasonable. However, the logic of foreign aid implies certain rules, like transparency and accountability, which they were free not to comply with because they knew many other foreign organizations and donors were in search for local partners. If my organization had left, it would not have impacted them.

The project did not advance, and we were largely behind the schedule dictated by our donor. They often told me they had no time for my small NGO; they had other donors to deal with of higher priority.

The second project's partner had a different approach. It was a local association of journalists and educators engaged in disseminating information through alternative media and raising awareness for people's rights. They were more outgoing and willing to work together, even if their share of the project's activities was minor. They perceived my presence as an opportunity to get more funding, and they exploited it. I was feeling confident and comfortable with the situation, teaching 'aid-speak' and helping them to prepare new project proposals. Weeks passed, and my security started to shake: I knew I was not going to getting any closer to my local colleagues. And, I knew the final beneficiaries of our projects were completely abstract to my eyes. I was gathering information on the target recipients to fill the project's templates, numbers, descriptions of their needs, and explanation of their vulnerabilities, but who were these people? What were their feelings, their fears? How was their daily life? I could never enter in such an intimate relationship with them to fully comprehend it and I was vexed by this failure. Increasingly, I also understood there were inner fractures in the local civil society, and I could not make sense of them.

The leaders of both partner organizations had salaries much higher than mine; they lived in nice houses, with all the comforts and hired-help at their disposal; their kids were in boarding schools in Dominican Republic or France; they were driving nice cars, going to nice restaurants and shopping in posh supermarkets. Their privileges were similar to those of the majority of expatriates working in Haiti. Like them, there were many others: in Haiti there is a proliferation of leftist civil society organizations and they form a circle within the aid circle. They condemn the past and current foreign domination, with international donors dictating what to do, but they are an integral part of the

system. While experiencing this other side of the circle, my anguish and frustration were growing. I felt powerless. Besides the inefficiency and lack of commitment of the implementing partners, it was in my NGO's interest to continue with the project but not really in the name of the poor women victims of violence we had initially aimed to help.

My NGO was deeply reliant on EU funding, and not only in Haiti. Stopping an ongoing project funded by this donor implied admitting that the adopted implementation strategy was not efficient and the organization could not afford this loss of credibility. In addition, for small NGOs inserted in the highly competitive aid system, losing the little percentage of the grant that is allocated to cover running cost could have severe budgetary implications. No redemption took place during my second stay in the country. On the contrary, I felt constantly inadequate working and living in Haiti. I could not find a way to fit into any circle, especially the local one. Maybe my experience of poverty, abuse, and marginalization in Haiti was thus more grounded, but development and aid became blurred and meaningless to me." (Martini and Jauhola, 2014, pp.82-86; 89-92)

According to Fetcher and Hindman, only through investigating the structural impingements and seemingly mundane aspects of the lives of aid work the effective dimensions of Aidland are revealed. In the account of my micropolitcs of aid-worker practice in Haiti, reflexive memory and life history methods are combined and emotions become the data set (Lewis, in Mosse eds. 2013).

Visual data in this recollecting process have been key, as well as field diaries; they integrated the research data-set and offered the opportunity to visualize images of the material practices of Aidland. My personal field work supports Rajak and Stirrat (2013) argument that development personnel come into an existing expatriate world and learn from those already in residence, where to do shopping, where to find art crafts, entertainments etc. and thus entering a shared world of understanding of the local context and creating a sort of ghettoized existence (Rajak and Stirrat, 2013, p.169).

In the following selections of pictures I choose to analyse visual examples of the Italian-expatriates ghetto I belonged to while working in Haiti. Indeed, development workers not only tend to reproduce differences between the expatriates and the host community, but also national differences amongst the expatriates. Those of the same nationality are often drawn together by shared history, language and cultural and geographical reference-points at social occasions (Crewe and Priyanthi, 2006).

Picture 11: listening to a local popular band, Port-au-Prince, November 2010 (E. Martini)

Picture 12 : Kingskoff sunday afternoon walk, September 2010 (E.Martini)

Picture 13: A long week end in Dominican Republic, October 2010 (E. Martini)

Picture 14: Italian lunch in the guest-house, December 2010 (E.Martini)

Pictures 11 to 14 were taken during my first stay in 2010; in picture 11 I went to listen to a local band playing in downtown Port-au-Prince with friends from a different organization. I was in breach of the curfew rules that my NGO imposed and that night, in the concert hall, a drunken fan started shooting in the air causing a panic reaction and one injured. I remember that episode as a proof of my resistance to the circle of the Scandinavian aid workers I was working with, and to a naïve attempt to explore the local context by my own.

Picture 12 was taken during my first weekend in Port-au-Prince, when on a Sunday morning with the other aid workers of the guesthouse we took the vehicles and drove towards the upper-hill location of Kingskoff, usually fresher than Port-au-Prince. I remember having lunch in a restaurant well-known for

expats and rich Haitians, I was still shocked at that time of the price level for services suitable for the needs and the resources of the elites of Haiti, foreigner or local. After lunch we went for a walk in the surrounding villages, where people were returning from church celebrations and kids were playing in the streets. Looking back at the picture I feel completely out-of place, me, white woman in her thirties, wearing hiking shorts and running shoes and smiling at a camera in the middle of the Haitian countryside to satisfy my desire to later show that picture to my boyfriend or my friends as a vestige of my local exploration.

In picture 13 I was with a group of aid workers I hardly knew, but with whom, for a number of coincidences, I ended up spending a weekend on the Dominican Republic coastline, which was considered as an "Eldorado" for those expats living in Haiti. We crossed the chaotic border at Jimani, managing to get the passports stamped and we drove towards Santa Cruz de Baraona. We spent two days walking on Caribbean beaches, swimming into fresh water creeks, eating fish and drinking. We spent two day in a sort of euphoric state of mind, before returning to the deep hall of Port-au-Prince.

I choose picture 14 because I can still remember very well that lunch which I prepared for my Italian friends, one Saturday that I was alone in the guesthouse. I cooked pasta with fresh pesto made with the basil I was growing and we open a bottle of red wine. Rituals, like preparing traditional dishes, and trying to maintain the same lifestyle and habits, are part of the aid-workers practices to focus on place (physical locality) rather than space (engagement and relationship with the local) (Marston, 2000).

The following set of images (pictures 15-16-17) was taken during my second assignment in the country in 2012. They narrate gatherings and beach-trips which were often the way to spend time on weekends together with my aid-workers friends, all Italians. The sites we were usually going out were few, largely frequented by foreign customers belonging to the aid community.

White (2002) warns that in such development rituals, as the ones narrated with these images, there is a danger of reconfirming notions of racial difference. Crewe and Priyanthi explain that the expatriates position of power relies in part on a degree of separation between nationals and themselves, which is grounded in the history of racial segregation, when during the British colonial rule, residential areas, transport, sports and social life kept whites and "natives" separate (Crewe and Priyanthi, 2006, p.48)

Picture 15: Lunch on a beach with the Italian expats, November 2012 (E.Martini)

Picture 16: Sunady beach trip with a friend, April 2012 (E.Martini)

Picture 17: 11 June 2012

The images of the aid workers lifestyle become even more striking if seen next to images of Haitians everyday life, taken at the same time in Haiti. A selection is included in the following section.

Picture 18: local house in the hillside near Kingskoff, September 2010 (E.Martini)

Picture 19: Debris of a collapsed building in Port-au-Prince, October 2010 (E.Martini)

Picture 20: street vendors in Port-au-Prince, October 2010 (E.Martini)

Picture 21: unformal displaced camps in downtown Port-au-Prince, October 2010 (E.Martini)

Picture 22: flooded roas near Leogane, October 2010 (E.Martini)

Picture 23: Collecting water from the well, Port-au-Prince, April 2012 (E.Martini

Picture 24: A resident of a displaced camp on election day in November 2010, she was denied the right to vote because not registered in the voters' list (E.Martini)

7.4 2018: Oxfam GB misconducts in Haiti are made public

On 13 June 2018, the Haitian Government, announced the withdrawal of the status as a non-governmental organization to Oxfam Great Britain "for violation of Haitian law and serious violation of the principle of the dignity of the human beings" (Reuters, 13.6.2018). Oxfam was permanently banned from operating in Haiti. Claims first emerged in the Times that Oxfam GB staff, including a former country director, used prostitutes while based in Haiti after the earthquake. Four employees were fired for "gross misconduct" and three others, including the country director Roland Van Hauwermeiren, were allowed to leave the charity. In February, Oxfam offered its humblest apologies to Haiti.

Oxfam has been in Haiti since 1978, and increased its presence after the earthquake. The organization said the behaviour of some former Oxfam staff working in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake was completely unacceptable and informed strong measures to prevent harassment and abuse have been in place since 2011 and a safeguarding plan was introduced after the scandal broke. It also appointed an independent commission to review its culture and practices.

The aid-community in Haiti, and in the headquarters, knew about the widespread misconducts committed not only by Oxfam GB personnel; in 2008, Save the Children published a report based on field research conducted in Haiti, Ivory Coast and South Sudan denouncing children sex exploitation and abuse by aid workers and peacekeepers (Save the Children 2008). Khan (2018) defines the apparent failure of Oxfam to take appropriate actions against on-going sexual predation by its aid workers as tragic, infuriating and concerning. However, he continues, Oxfam GB scandal is not surprising: "anybody working in humanitarian settings will testify that moral boundaries are routinely blurred, and evidence of sexual exploitation by humanitarian workers, including UN peacekeepers, has been well documented for decades[78]" (Khan 2018, p. 1020). The issue is larger than Oxfam GB sexual scandals, and has to do with dysfunction of a system of accountability and governance to bring in surface inappropriate actions of individuals or organizations working in the aid system.

7.5 Post-disaster Haiti in the recollections of the aid-workers: a survey.

When I worked in Haiti in 2010 and 2012 I was astonished by the number of personnel of the countless organizations operating in the country. The majority

[78] See Naik A. (2002) "Protecting children from the protectors: lessons from West Africa", in Forced Migr Rev 15:16–19.

of aid workers were *whites in the middle of their twenties*. Some organizations which were running also operations in French speaking countries in Africa, particularly in the Great Lake Region (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda), given the difficulties to recruit French speaking staff ready to be posted in a place like Haiti, used to second staff members from those countries, who in turn, were usually black-Africans and over forty.

Aiming to capture a more accurate picture of the aid-workers' population who was present in Haiti in the timeframe targeted by my research (2010-2012), I developed and administered in May 2018 a survey composed of twenty questions (see Annex 2 for the survey grid) to 100 respondents. The group of respondents derived by the contact lists of cluster meetings and thematic working groups that I attended between 2010 and 2012. The response rate to the survey reached 21% with one-month time to answer[79]. The questionnaire was structured with a first section of questions to better identify the sample of respondents, including information on their background, type of occupation and length of work in Haiti. Next, respondents were asked to answer questions on recollections and emotions linked to their experience in Haiti, including questions related to their perception of Oxfam UK scandals.

Participants to the survey belonged to eight nationalities, with a large majority of French and Italians. Gender distribution resulted balanced (43% male and 57% female) and besides the widespread high and fast turnover, 85% of the respondents reported to have worked in Haiti for longer than one year. The data concerning the age showed the majority of aid workers were in their early thirties, with 77% of them having less than thirty-five years old and 52% not even being older than thirty years old. The sample of respondents was quite diversified, with persons working for small, large NGOs, consultancies, bilateral cooperation (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs or international cooperation) and 10% working for the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. Also in terms of fields of work, the sample was highly diversified covering WASH, health, education, livelihood, rural development, budget support and human rights.

The responses to the initial question of stating up to three words to describe their experience in Haiti were visualized in the word cloud below. A word cloud, also called tag cloud, is a visual representation of text data; significance or frequency of words is shown with the font or color.

[79] The response rate has been influenced by multiple factors including: respondents might have changed organizations/job since their time in Haiti and lost interest in the topic of the survey; some email addresses were no longer active; sensitivity of the topic; two reminders were sent during the thirty days time-frame to answer the survey.

Figure 13: world cloud using survey data, source E. Martini

The most used word was intense, followed by challenging and enriching. The choice of words was particularly significant as it reflected the spectrum of emotions experienced by aid workers in the context of post-disaster Haiti. They are examples of lived realities, spanning from positive to more negative connotations, including shock, puzzle, disappointment, and feelings of frustration and insufficiency.

The following part of the survey focused on the aid-workers recollection of their presence and work in Haiti. More than half of the respondents felt satisfied of the work done in Haiti during their stay but only 47% believed to have done something useful; they all reported to have encountered situations that made them feeling frustrated and disappointed. Causes of frustration were embedded into some emblematic issues often affecting the aid system in complex emergencies, including flow of funding behind the absorption capacity of the country, difficulties to work with the local Government, lack of transparency, logistic challenges, excessive workload. The quotes below from the raw data of the survey provide a direct account of sources of disappointment:

> "Work with the state is extremely complex, slow…Realize anything is complicated and slow..You always have to ask the question: "where is the swindle?"

> "I felt there was no common direction or effective coordination on aid activities and development projects, and it seemed like a huge waste of time and money."

> "Challenging environmental and human vulnerability and inequalities and lack of public organized and continuous action and a lot of small projects (including ours); Difficult cooperation (between

Haïtian, between foreigners, between Haïtian and foreigners). All that resulting in a lot of inefficiency, not only for the rebuilding programs after earthquake."

"Inertia and self-satisfaction of humanitarian and political spheres."

"If they really needed to do something for helping rural areas and farmers, they had to deal and face liberalization products (most American) which invade the country market and kill all local possibilities. But the government financed by rich family - importers - has fear to get in this process! Some people in the government try to face that but it is even dangerous....And donors that I had to meet often - even ambassadors: say "no we do not interfere in economy". All projects can be made but without regulation - it will never really help. As well, l was witness donor "interference" about local decisions."

"The Haitian government seems to be actively working against the wellbeing of the Haitian citizens."

"Too much money wasted, high level of corruption, too much curfews and limits for NGOs to work well."

Two sections of the survey invited the aid workers to mention their best and worst memories experienced during their stay in the country. The purpose was to picture fragments of what Fechter and Hindman (2011) have referred to as the neglected day-to-day experience of those doing aid (op.cit. p.2) and to recollect images and stories that aid-worker pay attention to. A *white-traveller* narrative shapes the responses in this section, where feelings of excitement to explore the remote exotic Haiti tend to prevail over professional memories.

"The feeling of freedom and euphoria exploring the remote parts of the islands with excellent friends."

"Discovering the villages lost in the countryside."

"Friendship with some colleagues in a challenging place."

"Walking around the country visiting lost paradise, dancing on drums, friendship that I made in the local team (after working for the donors I have worked for a local decentralized direction, people much more close to people and real life - beautiful heart)."

“In Haiti I met some friends I worked with somewhere else, some three or four years before; I also met some new people I'm still in contact with. That was good...”

The worst memories are intimately tied to the climate of violence and insecurity that directly affected the majority of aid workers, and include witnessing cases of ambush, kidnap, car accidents, seeing dead bodies. Some respondents however reported memories related to poorly managed resources, including “seeing money wasted by incompetent humanitarian workers” or “bad feeling about the real effectiveness of the international aid, the way it was implemented”. Finally, feelings of frustration, particularly towards the locals, were also mentioned as worst memory:

“The difficulty in introducing changes in mentality.”

“Frustration with the government.”

“Because people didn't get the opportunity to receive education, they put themselves in danger.”

Critical views on development aid policies and practices emerged also in a different section of the survey, when participants were asked to mention if, looking back at their experience in Haiti, there would be anything they would do differently. Some admitted they would have more strongly complained about internal things they did not agree with, or suspicions of staff behaving inappropriately and that they wouldn't be accommodating about some issues related to the transparency of the NGO they worked for. Also “do less but do better”, spend less time in coordination meetings and push local actors more in the front were reported among the lessons learned. An interesting finding was the consideration that working in Haiti demands time and experience to understand Haitian people and how the country works. When in Haiti, in more occasions, I was told by locals that they felt Haiti was considered a “laboratory” to test new projects, train young staff and let them learn by doing. One respondent when asked to compare Haiti with other duty stations reported the same statement:

“Unfortunately, Haiti is a big experimental laboratory for humanitarian aid and longer-term development aid”.

White expats can enter the aid circle through volunteerism, particularly in contexts with high demand of staff and harsh living condition, and they can develop their expertise. The discourse of whiteness becomes therefore centric to the power distribution in the aid system, even within the aid workers community. For someone non-white the need to prove his expertise is double. As I argued elsewhere, “social interactions in aid are affected by race, class, gender and economic status and are conceptualized in questions like: whose voice matters, who is taken seriously, and what drives the development machine?” (Martini and Jauhola, 2014, p.94).

The final part of the survey was drawn in relation to the scandals of Oxfam UK, which were made public in the spring 2018, eight years after the events occurred. The purpose was to investigate the reaction of the aid-workers community to the report of those inappropriate behaviours by other members of the aid circle.

The large majority of respondents stated they were not surprised of reading the news regarding Oxfam UK, and confirmed that it was already known in the circle but had not reached the public opinion yet. Feelings to apprehend the news spammed from disgust, sadness, disappointment, shamefulness, and anger. Few stressed the need to "don't put everyone in the same basket" and the need to increase vigilance over code of conduct. One aid worker reported "it made me think about the issues related to NGOs personnel, human resources management in expat communities and about how things look different from within the expats and how disconnected expat life is from real life both from development countries everyday life and home countries reality."

It is documented that aid workers tend to create islands within shifting contexts; indeed, as they carry out their assignments, they recreate social worlds that are similar to one context to the next, From Haiti to South Sudan. These artificial bubbles are characterized by particular bounded social spaces, networks, events and rites of passage, which are interrelated to working lives in the development industry (Ritu 2011).

When asked to compare Haiti with other missions, a number of respondents said Haiti was stronger or harder, but more interesting and offering much to learn; few compared Haiti to North Kivu, particularly for the level of insecurity and the plethora of NGOs present. One aid worker highlighted that his experience in Haiti was marked by excessive polarization between expats and locals, mistrust even in simple interpersonal relationships and excessive limitations of the minimum possibility for movement.

Lastly, the results of the survey showed that aid workers even if they did not go back to Haiti, tended to maintain contact with locals (85%) and continued to follow the events of the country (66%). A sort of affection and bound with the country, or with the image aid workers kept of their experience in the country, was maintained.

7.6 The Pandora's Box and development criticism

Returning to my PhD dissertation and the thesis write-up phase after few years of break, brought me back countless emotions, memories, images. I could no longer remember where I took some of the pictures I was looking at or where I

got this paper or that piece of secondary data from. I almost did not recall the voices of my interviewees. I made confusion between years, moments, persons. I was a privileged observer of a micro-account of the history of Haiti, and only through this study I was able to keep track and disseminate the small piece of knowledge I collected.

To open the Pandora box of Haiti was fascinating, scary and moving at the same time. New ideas and thoughts came to my mind; I felt the desire to visit the country again, after almost six years since last time I was in Haiti. I myself changed so much in those years that I would probably see things, live things differently.

While digging into my research data I found the picture of four children, with their Sunday dresses (Picture 25). They were the children of Zachet, the housekeeper who used to work in the guesthouse I stayed in 2012. One day I asked him, in my modest creole, about his family and he pulled out from his pocket a folded picture wrapped in a plastic cover. I believe I took a picture of it with the purpose of printing some larger copies. I must have thought it could have been a nice gift for him.

Picture 25: the children of Zachet, June 2012 (E.Martini)

In 2010 I took pictures of Brigitte and Zed, the sisters in charge of the villa-guesthouse where I stayed; and I gave some copies to them (see picture 26).

And now I look at those pictures, next to the images of me and other aid workers drinking cocktails on Caribbean beaches and I cannot reconcile with all that emotional labour. I wonder what the four children of Zachet are nowadays doing. Are they alive? Is their father still alive? Did they finish school? Do they work? Did they migrate to the United States? Did the girls get married? Those questions will pile up with the many other unanswered questions concerning Haitian encounters which touched me, softly, or deeply, but whose track is lost from my possibility to know and to interfere.

Picture 26: Zed and Brigitte in the guesthouse, October 2010 (E. Martini)

Haiti was my deepest life and working experience. I open the boxes of my research data, together with my emotions, and I cannot figure out what to do with these pieces.

Concluding this chapter is rather difficult; my account of Aidland is not isolated in the literature and it fits well in the post-development framework, which was developed in the 1980s and 1990s through the works of scholars like Arturo Escobar, Serge Latouche, James Ferguson, Wolfang Sachs, Gilbert Rist, David Mosse (see Chapter 1).

Post-development school argues that development and its practice is based on an unequal power distribution between the west and the rest of the world, following an eurocentrinc and universalistic discourse. Ferguson (1994) in his ethnographic analysis of the development arena in Lesotho from 1975 to 1984, showed not only the failure of the development projects disconnected by the local historical and political context, but the many side effects generate. In particular he pointed out that development has transformed political problems of poverty and powerless into technical problems, awaiting solutions by development experts.

And as a consequence, the development industry and aid workers bubble that I observed in Haiti, was generated and nourished.

As argued in Journeys in Aidland (Martini and Jauhola 2014), I was convinced I had to go to Haiti to recognize and deal with the injustice of the world (Zehfuss, 2008), with that naïve and eurocentric presumption of the "white woman saving the brown woman from the brown man" (Abu-Lughod 1998, p.14). Nevertheless, as bell hooks suggested, it's not sufficient to "eat a bit of the other" to erase race or class dividers (hooks 1992, p.28). The account of Aidland presented in this chapter showed that most often the encounter between aid workers and locals is based on denial or fantasy. Denial, which emerging in the aid workers' community in the reproduction of rituals of separation and a western lifestyle, leads to refuse mutual recognition. Fantasy provokes an idealization of the indigenous culture and traditions, perceived as something exotic, simple and deserving further "technical" development.

Individuals or society might react with afterwards feelings of guilt, like in the case of the reaction to Oxfam UK scandals or in my confession of resistance to the dominant aid circle. But that *white guilt* isn't also one forms of white privilege?

Chapter 8

Conclusions

8.1 General considerations

This thesis investigated post-earthquake governance in Haiti. It was a highly complex, but also fascinating, case study: the combination of a country like Haiti, with its unique history, and a post-disaster scenario, offered multiple opportunities of analysis.

Liberal peace and humanitarian governance literature tends to focus on state/peace-building context of South-Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Much less attention is reserved to such contexts that are a combination of post-disaster and peace-building dynamics, like Haiti, or Aceh. For this reason, the scientific literature available on Haiti, before and after 2010, is scarce. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2013, authors, more or less eager to capitalize on the news value of the catastrophe, published a number of works sometimes characterized by bias and superficiality.

The choice of Haiti as a case study was prompted by this clear need for further sound investigation.

The decision to conduct a PhD research on Haiti was also largely determined by my personal experience of the country in the last quarter of 2010, working for an international NGO engaged in the relief operations that followed the earthquake. The front-line exposure to the complexity of post-disaster dynamics in Haiti inspired my interest to deepen the understanding of the case.

In this concluding chapter I show how the different chapters of the dissertation relate to each other and highlight how they coherently combine within the whole research framework. I then summarize the main findings of the research, before pointing at some openings for future investigation.

8.2 Placing the different chapters within a single framework

In order to place the chapters presented in this thesis within a single coherent framework, it is important to recall the main objective of this research, which, investigated the significance and the features of the governance of aid in a

post-disaster context, looking at the patterns of power distribution among the actors involved.

Four theoretical guiding concepts were identified: governance of aid, disaster, power and post-development (see Chapter 1).

The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 was the event from which the post-disaster setting originated, establishing the starting point for the data collection of this research. However, as discussed in Chapter 2 and other chapters, disaster is understood as a social construction in close connection to development, in the way socio-economic development determines the level of vulnerability of a local community to a natural hazard (Cannon 1994). Disaster links up to the mechanisms and dynamics which emerged to manage the relief and reconstruction processes: the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (Chapter 4), the watchdog initiatives (Chapter 5) and the housing projects and land use for the relocation of the persons affected by the earthquake (Chapter 6). Finally disaster generates the hypothesis behind the Build-back-Better paradigm discussed in detail in Chapter 3, which holds that disaster can bring positive changes and transformation.

The governance of aid (or aid governance) was chosen as a key concept to describe the focus of this research because it connects concrete elements of post-disaster aid realities that relate to principles of aid effectiveness and aid accountability, which underpin the analysis presented in relation to the ICRH, the watchdog initiatives, the housing projects and the aid-worker community (Chapter 7).

A theme that emerges from my analysis points towards the different ways that power, and the negotiation of power relations became visible in the aftermath of the earthquake. Power, understood in multidimensional, relational and asymmetrical terms (Lukes 2005), is a thread that connects the different sections of Haiti case study presented in this dissertation: firstly, the contextual analysis of Chapter 2 examines the struggle for power and freedom undertaken by the Haitian population since colonial times, which continued up today in the form of resistance against foreign influences, rebellion against dictatorship and striving for social justice. The historical formation of the Haitian state constitutes an important legacy for us to understand (1) the predatory way in which authorities have interpreted the use of power, (2) the fragmentation of civil society and (3) the land use, with related environmental degradation and inefficient land tenure system.

The study of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (Chapter 4) and the first person account of Aidland (Chapter 7) explain the second order agenda-setting power, more hidden but capable of influencing whoever gets to the

decision making table and what goes on the agenda, and the invisible power that shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002, Lukes 2005). Ways to challenge power relations dominating the Haitian post-disaster scenario are examined within the analysis of aid-watchdog initiatives (Chapter 5), the housing project of Father Joseph (Chapter 6), the grassroots interpretation of the Build-back-Better paradigm and the resistance to the aid-workers bubble (Chapter 7). Power, also in the context of development, is strictly connected to knowledge (Foucault 1988, Mosse 2010), an assumption demonstrated by the many evidences of this research. This includes limited knowledge of the technical aspects discussed in the IHRC hindered the power of the Haitian representatives; the lack of education of the displaced people relocated to Canaan limited their capacity to fully understand the consequences of land grabbing and unsafe construction, thus limiting their power to challenge the speculators and to invoke an active role of public institutions; another example is the use of development aid project tools and jargon which can limit the power of the locals to access Aidland.

In the aftermath of the disaster in Haiti there was a legitimate and widespread expectation to canalize energy and interests towards the common goal to rebuild a more inclusive society. Post-disaster contexts are the places where developmentalist ideas of better futures are actively articulated, but also contested and negotiated, as there is no one way of imagining what "build back better" means (Jauhola 2013, p.4). It could therefore be reasonable to believe that, in the circumstances of a catastrophe like the one that affected Haiti in 2010, power would be managed in the interest of the entire affected community, in line with the idea of power as "a generalized medium of mobilizing commitments or obligation for effective collective action" (Parsons 1967, p.318) or with Arendt's interpretation of power as the human ability to act in concert (Arendt 1970). Nevertheless, power, through the enquiry conducted in this thesis, has proved to be pervasive among actors and institutions, forging asymmetrical relations, shaped by and at the same time shaping the political and social institutions (Foucault 1988). Power, in its hidden form of ideological power, contributes to the persistence of poverty, in the way poor people adapt to their status or comply to their dominators "because structural inequalities of power produce self-enforcing effects on individual behavior" (Mosse 2006, p.1170).

The fourth guiding concept of the research is post-development, which works as theoretical background to the scrutiny of the disconnection between the proclaimed Build-back-Better policies and the actual practices (Chapter 3 and 6), the understanding of the IHCR as a failing aid-governance mechanism (Chapter 4) and the rhetoric of doing good narrated in Chapter 7. Aid practices and aid apparatus, which underpin international development, are becoming constantly thicker in terms of public and private actors' interconnections; this process is part

of an emerging system of global liberal governance where development tends to be a system to govern at a distance (Duffield 2001).

Poverty, under the lens of development, becomes technical rather than politicized (Mosse 2007). This applied to the case of Haiti where the management of the post disaster relief and reconstruction was seen purely as a technical problem. Post-development challenges this very core idea: Li (2006) argued that rendering development technical "confirms expertize and constitutes the boundary between those who are positioned as trustees, with the capacity to diagnose deficiencies in others, and those who are subject to expert direction" (Li 2006, p.17).

Post-development invokes spaces of effective local participation, major local ownership in decision-making, valorisation of local knowledge and increased alternative approaches to development, exemplified in this thesis with the analysis of aid-watchdog initiatives (Chapter 5), grassroots interpretation of Build-back-Better (Chapter 3) and the micro-scale housing project of Father Joseph (Chapter 6).

8.3 Summarizing the main findings

Each chapter of this thesis has discussed a specific aspect of the research problem and provided detailed findings under a given perspective (socio-political, institutional, grassroots and autobiographical).

In this section, the focus is on the key results of the research, which can be read also as possible recommendations for post-disaster policy-making and for further investigation.

The first main outcome concerns the importance of taking into full consideration the socio-historical background of the context where the object of research is studied. As Chapter 2 shows, understanding the formation of the Haitian state is essential to explain some features of the governance of aid which emerged in the aftermath of the disaster, such as the conflicting relation between foreigners and locals, the weakness of the state authorities, the uncontrolled use of land. At the same time, local knowledge is also essential to development practices: as post-development scholars have explained, development interventions disconnected from the historical and political local context have proved to be not only unsuccessful, but also harmful (Ferguson 1994).

A second contribution of the research is to exemplify how power relations in a post-disaster setting are largely shaped by a tension between exercising power and resisting power; the result is a nuanced and textured picture of international liberal governance. The aftermath of a catastrophe leads naturally to major

external interventions in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, as happened in the case of Haiti. This foreign influence, taking the form of the aid apparatus, added to the contextual difficulties amplified by the disaster, bears asymmetrical power relations. Looking at the data of this research from a macro-perspective, the IHRC holds power to coordinate and oversee the relief effort while the grassroots watchdog initiatives oppose to power, with their demand of accountability and supervision of the use of resources. Similarly, the study of the aid worker community in Haiti showed how development practices promote an arena for the interplay of resistance and dominance. My research in Haiti showed the existence of forms of resistance, alternative approaches and mechanisms of participation. It is however clear that the overall strategy to change power relations is more effective if all faces of Gaventa's *power cube* (Gaventa 2006) are involved. This can happen by linking the levels (local/national/global) vertically, building alliances across the three spaces (closed/invited/claimed) and with specific actions oriented to each form of power (visible/hidden/invisible) (ibid).

Furthermore, my research drew a picture of the international aid system that is more articulated than what has been proposed by Duffield, who sees the convergence between development, security and international liberal governance as shaping the entire aid machinery (Duffield 2001, 2007). Findings of my investigation proved that the situation on the ground is rather complex and power dynamics influencing development players are nuanced, more or less visible, diversified and often interdependent (Hinton and Groves 2004).

A third main finding of the research is related to the Build-Back-Better principle, which is often promoted in the aftermath of major disasters. BBB has been developed in the humanitarian and development fields over fifteen years, and great attention was paid to its applicability particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

BBB has been extensively researched and promoted, but the case of Haiti proved the (limited) usefulness of the BBB paradigm; BBB has the added value of taking an holistic approach, which goes further than the simple physical reconstruction of the infrastructures damaged by a catastrophe. However, BBB tends to be adopted by policy makers and practitioners as a fits-for-all solution; the result is a hollow and failing concept. What might have worked in Aceh Indonesia cannot be directly transferred to a completely different context like Haiti; furthermore, in Haiti, the idea of re-founding the country, at the basis also of BBB, had been discussed earlier, particularly after the falling of the Duvalier regime. But little effort was made in 2010 to either understand why previous attempts of rethinking the state under a new paradigm have failed, or to try to open up the BBB concept to the Haitian situation, so to translate it into a more useful guiding tool for the reconstruction process.

The final significant outcome of the study is to highlight how the historical and unsolved land tenure issue in Haiti has important repercussions on the reproduction of disaster vulnerabilities and social exclusion. The enquiry into the fast growth of Canaan, an informal neighbourhood in the outskirt of Port-au-Prince, which hosts approximately 250,000 Haitians, including displaced persons from the 2010 earthquake, demonstrates that the lack of proper urban planning, including an efficient system of land tenure, risks recreating the conditions for future harmful disasters. The absence of a functional land property register, weak state authorities incapable of governing land grabbing and relocation flow and limited awareness of the new settlers, mainly poor and marginalized Haitians, of the hazards they will be exposed to due to land erosion, unsafe housing and poor sanitary conditions, are the major areas to be tackled in order to prevent the occurrence of new catastrophes and reiteration of inequalities.

8.4 Recommendations for future research

The large amount and rich nature of the data gathered during almost one year of fieldwork exceeded the scope of this dissertation to a certain extent. While analysing the material I had to define those aspects with major added value in relation to my research questions, adopting a level of analysis sufficient to meet the requirement of a doctoral thesis; as a consequence, I left out other elements that emerged from the collected interviews and documentation, which might deserve further scrutiny.

Two lines of investigation are recommended to be taken into consideration for future research: a microanalysis of the uncontrolled and fast development of the new informal neighbourhood of Canaan, whose foundation, dangerous premises and alternative options, were discussed in Chapter 6. Secondly, a comparative outlook could add value to the study, and the comparisons options are multiple.

Because this study is structured around different chapters dealing with specific sub-cases, all merging into a single informative framework, unpacking each single subcase into a deeper analysis was beyond its intended scope. The most promising area of the thesis for further scrutiny is the dynamics linked to the growth of the new-born informal urbanization of Canaan, which offers a significant opportunity with a potentially strong impact in terms of action research. Canaan presents a thick tangle of social processes and power dynamics in continuous evolution. These include the way the land is administered, how houses and community relationships are taking shape, how new vulnerabilities to disasters and old cleavages are fostered/mitigated, but also which opportunities of change can emerge: all aspects of future development deserving an analysis at micro-level. Similarly, observing the evolution of the alternative housing project

of Father Joseph, looking at its sustainability and studying how the local inhabitants perceive the uncontrolled urbanization of neighbouring Canaan, in relation to their experience of reconstruction and build-back-better, are other significant inputs for future enquiry.

A comparative study could address a twofold perspective: historical and geographical.

Haiti, and in particular Cap-Haitien, the major urban centre in the North of the country, was hit by another devastating earthquake in its recent history, on 5 July 1842. In that occasion the quake, of 8.1 magnitudes on the Richter scale, caused around 5000 deaths and was followed by a destructive tsunami (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 2013). The political scenario that followed the 1842 earthquake was characterized by instability, with continuous, and often violent, changes of governors, increased inflation, public debt and deterioration of infrastructures. (Dupuy1989). The 2010 earthquake was also followed by the change of political leadership with a newcomer former pop-singer elected President in 2011. Limited research has been conducted on the 1842 aftermath politics and disaster governance, which would be worthy of investigation in comparison with the post 2010 development.

In terms of geographical comparison, the Haiti case study would naturally call for a comparative investigation with the post disaster context in Banda Aceh after the Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake of 2004. More specifically, further work could look at the differences between the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission and Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) NAD-Nias, or the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias and compare the understanding of the Build-Back-Better principles in the two contexts.

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Annexes

Annex 1: List of interviews

# Interview	Name	Function/organization	Date	Main topic	Duration	Language
1	Suzy Castor	Local NGO/historian	01/03/12	Renvision/reconstruction, civil society	00:33:36	Fr
2	Pierre Esperance	Local NGO	12/04/12	Renvision/reconstruction, civil society	00:24:22	Fr
3	Father Jan Hanssens	Civil Society/faith based organization	19/04/12	Renvision/reconstruction, civil society	00:55:12	Fr
4	Filippini Suze Percy	IHRC	27/04/12	IHRC	00:39:45	Fr
5	Carmele Rose Anne Auguste	Local NGO/representative civil society IHRC	30/03/12	IHRC, renvision	00:47:10	Fr
6	Reginal Boulos	IHRC-economic elites	14/05/12	Reconstruction, role elites, IHRC	00:37:12	Fr
7	Ann Valerie Milfort	Executive Director IHRC	05/04/12	IHRC	00:23:29	Fr
8	Jude Judy	Civil society /OCHAP (aid watchdog)	26/04/12	Reconstruction and watchdog	01:29	Fr
9	Rosny Desroche	Civil society /government/economic elites	27/04/12	Reconstruction, role economical elites	00:24:36	Fr
10	William Smart	Religious and opinion leader	26/02/12	Renvision/reconstruction, civil society	01:06	Fr
11	Collette Lespinance	Civil society	24/04/12	Renvision/reconstruction, civil society	00:52:47	Fr
12	Noel Dena Jean Marie	Civil society /Comitè Initiative	30/04/12	Renvision/reconstruction, civil society	00:51:26	Fr

13	Bernard Craan	Economic elites	26/04/12	Reconstruction, role economical elites	00:21:59	Fr
14	Philippe Chichereau	UNDP aid effectivness expert	15/05/12	Renvision/reconstruction, actors	00:24:25	Fr
15	Marc Anglade	Public official/Ministere Planification	15/05/12	Renvision/reconstruction, actors	00:35	Fr
16	Claude Grand Pierre	Public official/Ministere Planification	15/05/12	Renvision/reconstruction, actors	00:29:30	Fr
17	Michel Hector	Historian/opinion leader	22/05/12	Renvision/reconstruction, actors	00:35:17	Fr
18	Yannic Etienne	Civil society/labour union	24/05/12	Renvision/reconstruction/labour union	00:49:18	Fr
19	Carl Braun	Economic Elite	25/05/12	Reconstruction, role economical elites	01:11:03	Fr
20	Jean P. Bernardini	UNDP - IHRC	28/05/12	IHRC, accountability	00:40	Fr
21	Henry George	Public official/IHRC	11/04/12	IHRC	00:25:21	Fr
22	Father Kawas Francois	CERFAS-societè civile	07/05/12	Recostruction and role of different actors	00:38:45	Fr
23	Father Joseph Philippe	Civil society/faith based organization (APF)	24/04/12	Renvision role of the church	01:01:25	Fr
24	Poulard Guy	Bishop Port-au-prince	11/05/12	Renvision role of the church	00:20:08	Fr
25	Esther Krauz	Local civil society/watchdog CERFAS	23/04/12	Reconstruction and watchdog	00:39	Fr
26	Jean Claude Le Brun	Civil society/labour union/IHRC	07/05/12	IHRC, renvision	00:54:05	Fr
27	Raoul Pierre Louis	CIRH-CASECS	11/05/12	IHRC, decentralization, renvision	01:08:29 01:07:17	Fr

28	Arnold Antonin	Local NGO/intellectual	29/02/12	Reconstruction and role of different actors	00:32	Fr
29	Camille Chalmers	Local NGO PAPDA	03/03/12	Reconstruction and role of different actors	00:39	Fr
31	Father Remy	Civil society/faith based organization	25/02/12	Renvision/role of the church	00:23:10	Fr
31	Jane Reagan	Watchdog/journalist	08.05.12	Reconstruction and watchdog	00:37:40	Eng
32	Solomon Jameson	International NGO	20/04/12	Renvision, role of different actors	00:59:49	Eng
33	Fiona Cook	International NGO	19/04/12	Renvision, role of different actors	00:23:45	Eng
34	Alice Blanchet	Former public official/economic elites	10/04/12	IHRC, renvision, role of different actors	00:47:30	Eng
35	Father Giuseppe Durante	Civil society/faith based organization	03/03/12	Housing project/Renvision	00:40	It
36	Maurizio De Matteis	Economic elites	11/04/12	Reconstruction, role economical elites	00:33:15	It
37	Fiammetta Capellini	International NGO	04/05/12	Reconstruction, role of different actors	00:45	It
38	Nunzio Bernardito Auzio	Catholic Church	25/05/12	Renvision, role of the church	01:22:31	It
39	Mark South	International NGO	28/05/12	Reconstruction/accountability	00:32	Eng

Annex 2: Survey grid

Haiti ex-post

Guideline: this questionaire aims to collect information from persons who worked in the development/humanitarian sector at large in Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 disaster. The material will be anonymised and used as part of a doctoral research on the topic Power dynamics and aid governance in a post disaster context: a case study of Haiti's recovery.

Your contribution is highly appreciated. If there is any question you don't feel answering, just skip it.

If you need more information about my research, feel free to contact me at ermina.martini@polito.it

If interested, you will be receiving the pdf of the final dissertation.

1. **Email address** *

2. **Current nationality**

3. **Gender**
   Mark only one oval.
   - ◯ Female
   - ◯ Male

4. **Are you still working in the field of development aid?**
   Mark only one oval.
   - ◯ Yes
   - ◯ No
   - ◯ I'm currently not working

5. **When were you working in Haiti?**

6. **How long did you work in Haiti for?**
   Mark only one oval.
   - ◯ less than a month
   - ◯ Between 1 month and 6 months
   - ◯ Between 6 months and 12 months
   - ◯ More than 1 year

7. **How old were you when you arrived to Haiti the first time?**

8. **For which type of organization were you working?**
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Small NGO
- ◯ Larger NGO
- ◯ Bilateral cooperation (MFA, national agencies for development etc)
- ◯ UN and other multilateral organizations
- ◯ Local organization
- ◯ private consultnt
- ◯ other

9. **In which main area of work was your organization active in Haiti?**
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ WASH
- ◯ Medical assistance
- ◯ Protection
- ◯ Housing and other phisical reconstruction projects
- ◯ Education/child protection
- ◯ Rural development
- ◯ Income generation activities
- ◯ Budget support
- ◯ other

10. **State up to 3 words to describe your experience in Haiti**

11. **Were you satisfied of the work done by the organization you worked for in Haiti?**
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No
- ◯ Partially

12. **Did you believe you have done something helpful for the country?**
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No
- ◯ Partially

13. **Was there anything that made you feel frustrated or disappointed?**
Mark only one oval.

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

14. **If yes to the previous question, please briefly explain.**

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

15. **Tell the best memory about your stay in Haiti.**

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

16. **Tell the worst memory about your stay in Haiti.**

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

17. **How did you feel about reading the news on the scandals of Oxfam and other oganizations in Haiti in 2010?**

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

18. **Looking at your life and work experience in Haiti, is there anything you would do differently now?If yes, please explain.**

19. **Do you still have contacts with locals living in Haiti?**
Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No
- I'm still lvinging in Haiti

20. **Have you been back to Haiti?**
Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No
- I'm still living in Haiti

21. **Do you still follow the events of the country?**
Mark only one oval.

- Yes
- No
- na

22. **If you have worked in other countries in the South, how would you compare your experience in Haiti with other missions?**