

The dark side of solidarity: ambivalences and double standards in the Ukrainian refugee crisis in Italy

*Original*

The dark side of solidarity: ambivalences and double standards in the Ukrainian refugee crisis in Italy / Bolzoni, Magda; Donatiello, Davide; Giannetto, Leila. - In: PARTECIPAZIONE E CONFLITTO. - ISSN 2035-6609. - 16:3(2023), pp. 451-469. [10.1285/i20356609v16i3p451]

*Availability:*

This version is available at: 11583/2984738 since: 2023-12-27T08:59:16Z

*Publisher:*

University of Salento, SIBA

*Published*

DOI:10.1285/i20356609v16i3p451

*Terms of use:*

This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the corresponding bibliographic description in the repository

*Publisher copyright*

(Article begins on next page)



**Partecipazione e Conflitto**  
<http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco>  
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)  
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version)  
PACO, Issue 16(3) 2023: 451-469  
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v16i3p451

Published 15 November, 2023

Work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 Italian License

## RESEARCH ARTICLE

---

# The dark side of solidarity: ambivalences and double standards in the Ukrainian refugee crisis in Italy

**Magda Bolzoni**

*Politecnico di Torino*

**Davide Donatiello**

*University of Turin*

**Leila Giannetto**

*European University Institute*

---

### ABSTRACT

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent arrival of people fleeing the war prompted remarkable mobilizations and responses throughout the EU. By focusing on the Italian context and, more specifically, on the case of the Piedmont Region, this paper conducts critical reflection on the different forms and expressions of solidarity that emerged at both the institutional and civic society levels. The paper builds on qualitative interviews carried out between February 2022 and March 2023 with representatives of public institutions, third-sector organisations, and associations, and it intends to: I) frame the different expressions of solidarity in light of recent changes in the regulatory arrangements of the institutional asylum system; II) explore the relationship between formal and informal reception with respect to equity in terms of conditions, opportunities, and quality of the services provided; III) discuss the implications of the double standards and the ambivalent role of solidarity towards a specific category of refugees, especially as regards its sustainability over time and the growing fragmentation of the refugee reception systems.

### KEYWORDS:

asylum reception system, civic society, Italy, refugees, solidarity, Ukraine

### CORRESPONDING AUTHOR(S):

magda.bolzoni@polito.it; davide.donatiello@unito.it; leila.giannetto@eui.eu

---

## 1. Introduction

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022, more than 16 million border crossings from Ukraine to Europe have been recorded, and as of April 2023 more than 8 million Ukrainians fleeing their home country were present in Europe.<sup>1</sup> This sudden and unprecedented arrival has prompted a variety of responses throughout Europe.

The EU has activated for the first time the Temporary Protection Directive (EC/2001/55 of 7 August 2001), granting for one year (renewable) significant rights only to those fleeing Ukraine. These rights include safe passage across EU borders, as well as temporary access to healthcare and to the jobs market, housing, education, social security, and more. Forced migrants protected under this directive can choose where to live in the EU, potentially joining their network of family members and acquaintances already living in EU member states, while benefiting from refugee-like protection rights.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, a remarkable wave of solidarity has been shown by civil society since the very beginning of the invasion. It consisted of material and financial support to associations working either in Ukraine or on its borders, as well as directly to those fleeing Ukraine. Solidarity movements and individual actions of solidarity have spread across the EU in a rapid but uncoordinated manner, often with the involvement of impromptu volunteers without any previous participation in civic society initiatives, experience or training on how to deal with vulnerable people, and without language and/or cultural mediation (Schulpen and Huyse 2017; Ambrosini 2022; Campomori 2022). However, this remarkable and largely unprecedented response, at both the institutional and civic society levels, reveals, in a particularly evident way, the existence of a “hierarchy of victims” based on troubling binaries: “global North/global South; white/coloured; deserving/underserving; and civilised/uncivilised” (McCloskey 2022: 139). There are two specificities of the Ukrainian case that may aid understanding of the exceptional nature of institutional and civic society responses (Carrera and Ineli-Ciger 2023; McCloskey 2022; Morrice 2022): geographic location, and refugees’ features. On the one hand, the crisis unfolded on the borders of Europe (if not at its heart), compared with situations that, for the previous 70 years, had been seen and managed in the so-called ‘Global South’. On the other hand, those fleeing Ukraine appear very similar to the ideal-typical figure of refugee that the Geneva Refugee Convention was established to protect: white, European, educated, fleeing from the communist block to embrace the European Western values and way of life. However, attention to the implications of refugee representations and perceptions must also take into account the fact that Eastern Europeans appear to be ambiguously racialised: “despite being positioned as inferior within Europe, the East is often included in global racialised categories of ‘Europeanness’”, reflecting and reproducing the longstanding peripheralisation of the region (Lewicki 2023: 1483). Assuming a perspective based on the concept of intersectionality is therefore relevant (Collins and Bilge 2020) and these dimensions meaningfully intersect with the fact that the refugee flow has consisted mostly of women and children.

While most of the displaced Ukrainians have fled to Poland, Germany and other neighbouring countries, Italy has been a significant destination too, most likely because of the high presence of Ukrainian citizens already in the country before 2022. In 2021, Italy was the second EU country in terms of the presence of

---

<sup>1</sup> UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

<sup>2</sup> As explained in Section 3, this protection overrides the Dublin Regulation, which remains valid for everyone else seeking asylum in the EU.

Ukrainian citizens, with 223,489 of them at the beginning of 2021, closely following Poland<sup>3</sup> The remarkable solidarity shown by Italian citizens and institutions towards the Ukrainian population in a time of strong politicisation of the issues of migration and asylum (a populist, far-right and anti-migration government was elected in September 2022 in Italy) is indicative of the fact that Ukrainians have been perceived better than refugees fleeing other conflicts and persecutions (De Coninck 2022; Dražanová and Geddes 2022). The only previous episode that could be considered as resembling the present one for the extent of activation and participation by Italian civic society is the one that occurred in the early 1990s in response to ex-Yugoslavia war and the Balkan crisis. Some similarities with the current situation can indeed be recognized in terms of geographical proximity and refugees' features. Interestingly, the solidaristic responses to that crisis triggered the subsequent development of the Italian asylum system.<sup>4</sup>

Against this background, the paper reflects upon the different forms and expressions of solidarity emerging in response to the invasion of Ukraine and, more particularly, to the flow of people escaping the country. Arguing for the importance of observing how these dynamics concretely unfold, the study focuses on the case of Piedmont, in the North-West of Italy, a region with a long history of refugee reception, advocacy, and integration initiatives. The paper analyses the responses and the forms of activation and solidarity that emerged at both the institutional and the civic society level, reflecting on the 'exceptionality' and the differential treatment which have been accorded to Ukrainian refugees.

The paper develops as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework, focusing on the concept of solidarity, which is discussed with particular regard to migrants and refugees. The concepts of 'institutional solidarity' and 'civic solidarity', which will frame the empirical analysis, are introduced and discussed. Section 3 illustrates the choice of the case study and the methodology adopted, while section 4 develops an analysis of how institutional actors at the European, national and regional levels have addressed the 'Ukraine emergency', discussing the exceptionality of the institutional response with a specific focus on the case study. The fifth section concentrates instead on the activation 'from below' of civil society organisations, volunteers, and families that mobilised, especially in the first months, by offering material resources, services and hospitality in the Piedmont region to those fleeing Ukraine. Finally, Section 6 discusses the ambiguities and ambivalences of solidarity highlighting implications for the Italian refugee reception system: on the one hand, it may be considered as an engine of experimentation and institutional change, but, on the other hand, it may institutionalise double standards and exacerbate inequalities.

## 2. Solidarity and (forced) migrants: an overview

The concept of solidarity has a long-standing tradition in the sociological debate, and it has been present since the very first development of the discipline. The rise of modern societies, characterised by growing individualism, differentiation, and the weakening of traditional social ties, prompted classical sociologists to reflect on these significant transformations as processes inextricably bound up with the problem of integration and the emergence of new forms of solidarity (Tönnies 1887; Durkheim 1893; 1912). They also referred to something rooted in a joint struggle centred on common interests and against a shared enemy (Marx 1867; Weber 1922). Surprisingly, this topic then long remained on the margins of the main research streams of the

---

<sup>3</sup> Eurostat [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Ukrainian\\_citizens\\_in\\_the\\_EU&oldid=584263](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Ukrainian_citizens_in_the_EU&oldid=584263).

<sup>4</sup> The Italian Consortium of Solidarity (ICS), for example, developed in Trieste in 1993 and coordinated a national network for the reception of refugees from the ex-Yugoslavia, an experience that then flowed into the creation of SPRAR.

discipline, despite the many fields in which it was applied and the recent attempts to resume a critical discussion of solidarity, especially in order to address changes introduced by neoliberal economics and global capitalism (Crespi and Moscovici 2001; Bruni 2021).

Today, the notion of solidarity is once again at the centre of the debate. It assumes a variety of meanings and evades a single definition, although there is a certain agreement that this concept is complex, multi-dimensional and normative (Kapeller and Wolkenstein 2013; Oosterlynck et al. 2016).

As Bauder and Juffs (2020) pointed out, migration studies are a field in which the concept of solidarity has received considerable and long-lasting scholarly attention: indeed, Giliberti and Potot (2021) talk about a new emerging field of “solidarity studies” related to both the dissemination of practices promoting the reception and integration of migrants into the local societies and the support for transit and border crossing. Within this general framework, a well-established area of study on the so-called ‘bonds of solidarity’ is related to the inner functioning of migratory networks, the forms of mutual support among compatriots, and membership of ethnic communities settled in the host societies (see for example Nielsen 1985; Portes and Zhou 1992; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). At the same time, and especially in Europe, the concept of solidarity has also been at the centre of animated debate on the limits of multiculturalism policies (Kymlicka 2015; Banting and Kymlicka 2017) and on the inclusion of non-nationals or migrants in welfare services (Van Oorschot 2007; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Bauböck and Scholten 2016) as well as some critical perspectives on the ongoing legacies of imperialism (among others see Chamberlain 2020).

More recently, in the wake of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and of the increasing number of asylum applications to EU States, the political will to provide protection and practical support to forced migrants has become a salient issue. Together with the emergence of many and variegated expressions of solidarity, hostility and fear about the supposed number of people entering the continent have appeared as well (Koos and Seibel 2019; Vandevordt and Verschraegen 2019).

We may identify three main ways in which the concept of solidarity has been used in this more specific frame. Firstly, it is often used at the EU level when referring to the problem of solidarity itself among member states in sharing the responsibility for, or ‘burden’ of, receiving and hosting asylum seekers and refugees, especially with respect to financial resources, norms and expertise (De Bruycker and Tsourdi 2016; Karageorgiu 2016; Thielemann 2018). The relocation system, for example, which has been overall deemed a failure, was imagined to mitigate the problems connected with the Dublin Regulation, which allocates the responsibility to process asylum applications to the first country of entry of asylum seekers in the EU. Secondly, reference to the concept of solidarity also emerges when discussing countries and localities as welcoming spaces (or their opposite) for refugees, opening or closing their borders and creating opportunities for asylum seekers and refugees (Koos and Seibel 2019; Driel 2020; Cinalli et al. 2021). Finally, solidarity is also used to refer to the initiatives and actions put in place by a variety of actors, mostly connected to civil society and grass-roots organisations, their role, forms, as well as their relationship with the more structured and institutional asylum system (Ambrosini 2023; Agustín and Jørgensen 2019; Zamponi 2017; Della Porta 2018; Cantat and Feischmidt 2019; Fleischmann 2020; Dimitriadis and Ambrosini 2021; Bazurli, Caponio, de Graw 2022). Ambrosini (2022) identifies four possible types of actors performing ‘humanitarian solidarity’, namely NGOs, civil society organisations, social movements, and common citizens. He refers to various forms of support – from the more organized to the spontaneous and less structured ones – provided by activists and volunteers, through which they contest policies of asylum and borders or make up for the lack of practical responses to the urgent needs of displaced people. In fact, these different expressions of solidarity that emerged in response to all the previous ‘refugee crises’ have always involved a conflictual and contentious dimension

(Della Porta, 2018), provoking a debate on the politicisation of solidarity in times of crisis (Castelli Gattinara and Zamponi 2020; Fleischmann 2020) and the spread of attitudes based on distrust, stigmatisation or criminalization regarding volunteers, NGOs and third-sector organizations (Fekete 2018; Tazzioli 2018; Reggiardo 2019; Lampredi 2023).

Agustín and Jørgensen (2019) elaborate on the concept by distinguishing among ‘autonomous solidarity’, ‘civic solidarity’ and ‘institutional solidarity’, these being characterised by different degrees of contentiousness and institutionalisation. The first represents relations and practices produced autonomously from below and in self-organised spaces by activists and volunteers as concrete responses to the needs of refugees and asylum seekers. The second kind of solidarity concerns civil society initiatives to include refugees and involves a vast number of non-state actors, such as NGOs, local communities, and individuals. The third relies on rights and formal obligations according to a system based on anonymous or contractual solidarity that produces a permanent tension between potential political actions of solidarity and their effective regularisation/application by institutions.

In order to discuss the ambivalence of solidarity towards Ukrainians, in this paper we simplify the analytical frame defined by Agustín and Jørgensen (2019) by limiting the distinctions to ‘civic solidarity’, which we conceive as comprising both the ‘civic’ and the ‘autonomous’ kinds of solidarity, on the one hand, and ‘institutional solidarity’ on the other. We understand these categories as ideal-types that summarize a phenomenological variety of solidarity: concrete expressions and practices may cross these boundaries, making these distinctions blurred and overlapping. From a general point of view, this interpretation of Agustín and Jørgensen’s typology allows us to critically frame the different kinds of solidarity performed by common citizens, organized and non-organized civil society, and institutions in light of recent regulatory arrangements introduced to cope with the ‘Ukraine emergency’. More specifically, as regards ‘institutional solidarity’ (Section 4), we intend to observe the contingent evolution of the regulatory framework, taking into consideration the ad hoc institutional measures that have formally defined favourable access (albeit emergency-driven) to various kinds of services and support for Ukrainian people, and its implementation through concrete practical solutions. We consider ‘institutional solidarity’ as creating a sort of opportunities and constraints frame within which non-institutional actors and their support take shape and interact with each other. As regards ‘civic solidarity’ (Section 5), our attention centres on the sympathetic, emotional, informal activation of individual citizens, associations, groups, local communities and NGOs. The mobilisation of organized and non-organized civil society requires reflection on problematic aspects of such an impressive humanitarian expression of solidarity, starting with the controversial relationship between formal and informal reception (in particular with respect to families hosting refugees and their lack of professional skills) and the ambivalence of a public opinion largely in favour of refugees of a specific type (i.e., women with children and families with a cultural background similar to that of the hosting community), especially in terms of sustainability over time and unintentional effects such as the growing fragmentation within reception systems.

### **3. Research question and methods**

Building on the theoretical framework outlined in the previous section, the paper discusses the forms of activation and solidarity that emerged in Italy in response to the arrival of Ukrainian refugees, at both the ‘institutional’ and the ‘civic society’ level. More specifically, it questions the emergence of ambivalences and double standards, comparing the opportunities and constraints that refugees fleeing from other countries face

instead. The paper draws on qualitative research conducted between April and October 2022 and January and March 2023 in Piedmont, North-Western Italy, by means of semi-structured interviews with key informants, participation in events related to training activities and debates on how to develop a ‘good’ reception for Ukrainians, analysis of reports and official documents issued by the Piedmont Region, municipalities, associations, and other institutions involved. In particular, semi-structured interviews were carried out with representatives of local public offices, third-sector associations, and NGOs active at the local level in the field of asylum rights advocacy, reception, and migrants’ inclusion that were involved either directly or as mediators in organization of the Ukrainians’ reception (see the Methodological Appendix).

The regional framework appears particularly relevant, given the centrality formally assigned to the Civil Protection Service, a national office with a regional governance, in the management of refugees from Ukraine. Moreover, the Piedmont Region has a long history of refugee reception and of effective integration policies, especially in its capital city, Turin (Caponio and Ponzo 2022). It also has a strong and well-established network of NGOs that have been working in support of and with asylum seekers and refugees, becoming active protagonists of national and international advocacy networks as well (e.g., EuropAsilo, ECRE, UNIRE). Over the past ten years, reflection on the asylum system has also considered connections among associations, NGOs, local authorities, and public universities (Sacchi and Sorgoni 2020). Moreover, a significant role in the promotion of migrants’ social inclusion at the local level is performed by bank foundations and confessional associations (Caponio and Donatiello 2017). Considering all the foreign residents in the Piedmont Region at the beginning of 2021, 51% of them were living in the province of Turin, followed by the provinces of Cuneo (15%), Alessandria (11%), Novara (9%), Asti (6%), and the other provinces (Vercelli, Biella and Verbano Cusio Ossola) with less than 2%. Those areas that had historically welcomed more migrants were also the ones that developed a more comprehensive system of services and initiatives in their support (Bolzoni and Ponzo 2022). As regards the Ukrainian citizens living in the Piedmont Region at the beginning of 2021, however, only 18% of them were resident in the province of Turin, while 35% were resident in the province of Novara, followed by Verbano Cusio Ossola (VCO) with 16%, Alessandria with 12%, Vercelli (7%), and Cuneo (4%). In Piedmont, as of March 2023, 11,735 newly-arrived Ukrainian citizens with a temporary protection permit were present (12,000 had been recorded in the area from the end of February 2022). Considering that 10,383 Ukrainian citizens were living in the Piedmont Region in 2021,<sup>5</sup> the outbreak of the war doubled their presence in the space of just a few weeks. The distribution of the arrivals partly followed the already-existing distribution of Ukrainian citizens. As of March 2023, 10,498 out of the 11,735 Ukrainians in Piedmont were outside the institutional reception system, either in autonomous housing or informally hosted by Italian or Ukrainian households – a phenomenon behind which there lies a variety of living conditions that is particularly difficult to determine and map.

#### **4. Institutional solidarity: regulatory framework, support and differential treatment**

What does the reception of Ukrainians teach us? Ukrainians were hosted because there was a political message behind it, in support of it. Not only because civic society wanted to welcome them in Italy, that’s for sure. [...] Before the war in Ukraine, there was a push-back policy, a rejection policy, an outsourcing policy, a policy building

---

<sup>5</sup> Data available at [dati.istat.it](https://dati.istat.it)

walls at EU borders. A policy completely different from the one adopted in welcoming Ukrainians [...] creating first-rank and second-rank refugees (INT\_09.2023)

On March 3rd, 2022, the EU activated the long-dormant Temporary Protection Directive (EC/2001/55) for people fleeing Ukraine. Written in 2001 in response to the Yugoslav wars, the Temporary Protection establishes a supranational mechanism for a collective response and it foresees immediate protection for a group, in this case people fleeing Ukraine, streamlining the often lengthy asylum determination process. Member states did not deem it necessary to activate it in the past, for example during the Arab Spring of 2011 or the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015 (Ineli-Ciger 2016; Carrera et al. 2022). This directive grants a renewable one-year residence permit, allowing recipients to reside in the issuing EU member state and to enjoy an array of rights, some of which overlap with those obtained by refugees, including work, healthcare, education, and travel within the EU. However, it cannot be equated to, and cannot prejudice, the granting of international protection (Vitello 2022).

Crucially, Temporary Protection operates outside the Dublin Regulation, one of the pillars of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), thus enabling people fleeing Ukraine to choose where to apply for protection and to reside in the EU, differently from any other asylum seeker, and therefore facilitating to join acquaintances and families already settled in EU countries. This feature thus frames the forms of activation, as we will see in the next section, and potentially restores, after more than 20 years, the role and relevance of migratory networks and personal aspirations in forced migrations (Boyd 1989; Carling and Collins 2018; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).

The Temporary Protection Directive has been implemented with some differences by EU member states (Carrera et al. 2022). In Italy, only Ukrainian nationals, third-country nationals with long-term residence status, and international protection holders who can prove that they lived in Ukraine before 24 February 2022 have been entitled to Temporary Protection,<sup>6</sup> with the exclusion of those living in Ukraine as asylum seekers or with no long-term residence status (e.g., with a student permit). While the numbers are lower than those for Poland and Germany, Italy hosts a significant number of beneficiaries of Temporary Protection (173,213), 35% of whom are minors (61,991)<sup>7</sup>. Among the adults 84% are female and 16% are male (gender is instead balanced for minors). This composition of the flow, mostly consisting of women and children, may have given rise to a widespread representation of the entire category of Ukrainians as a group to be helped and actively supported.

In terms of reception and management, Italy has introduced two main innovations with respect to the previously established reception model (D.L. 14/2022 and D.L. 16/2022): 1) a central role given to the Civil Protection Department<sup>8</sup>, and 2) explicit recognition of the possibility for Ukrainians to be hosted by private citizens (Campomori 2022). A state of national emergency connected to the arrival of Ukrainian refugees was immediately declared (and prolonged until the end of 2023). The response was therefore based on an emergency approach which distanced the Ukrainian citizens from the asylum seekers and international protection holders arriving from other countries. This new emergency system partly overlapped with the dual-

---

<sup>6</sup>Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, March 28th 2022, [https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-06/Booklet\\_Italy\\_EN\\_v1.pdf](https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-06/Booklet_Italy_EN_v1.pdf).

<sup>7</sup>Italian government data <https://mappe.protezionecivile.gov.it/it/mappe-e-dashboards-emergenze/mappe-e-dashboards-ucraina/ricieste-di-protezione-temporanea>.

<sup>8</sup> The Civil Protection Department was established in 1982 to assist the population in case of extreme emergencies (i.e. natural disasters in general). Civil protection is a function assigned to an integrated system, the National Service of Civil Protection, composed of public and private structures, central and local: apart from the central department, each Region and Autonomous Province has its own offices of Civil Protection.

track reception system for asylum seekers already present, which comprised an ordinary public system (the Reception and Integration System - SAI) based on the active and voluntary involvement of local actors (municipalities or organized groups of them) in setting up reception facilities (co-founded by the central state and generally run by third-sector organisations), and a composite set of Extraordinary Reception Centres (CAS) activated by the Prefectures in order to make up for the lack of places in the case of substantial and sudden arrivals of applicants.<sup>9</sup> The governance of the Ukrainian reception appears very different: the Civil Protection Service, with the involvement of the Regions and Autonomous Provinces, is in charge, while the SAI system is under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and ANCI (National Association of Italian Municipalities), and the CAS system is under that of the Ministry of the Interior and Prefectures. The Central Department of Civil Protection nominated the elected Presidents of each Italian Region as its appointed Representative in charge of the territorial system of support of Ukrainian refugees at the local level.

Three-thousand places were added to SAI and five-thousand to CAS in order to accommodate Ukrainian refugees while Civil Protection activated additional ad hoc facilities. However, the numbers were insufficient and their activation generally suffered from delays (Rossi, 2022): only 15,000 temporary protection holders have been hosted either in SAI/CAS or in Civic Protection reception centres nationwide, i.e., less than 10% of the total arrivals (IDOS, 2022). Moreover, in April 2022 the Civil Protection published a notice of expression of interest addressed to organisations operating in the third sector and the private social sector to find suitable facilities to provide dispersed reception, even through co-housing arrangements with families (D.L. 21/2022). The co-housing reception based on the local families' model had in fact been developed within some SAI projects in the past, thanks to the interest of the associations involved (Campomori 2022; Marchetti 2018), but it had never become structurally part of the national reception system. Finally, a further measure managed by the Civil Protection has been the direct assignment (upon application) of €300/month for 3 months maximum to each temporary protection holder (€150 for minors) who found autonomous accommodation outside the system (no contribution is envisaged for those hosting them). This form of direct contribution has never been considered for asylum seekers and international protection holders – and reducing the cost of the asylum system was a central concern of the Italian reform of 2018 (Bolzoni et al. 2022).

As in the rest of the country, also in Piedmont the institutional response developed emergency measures in parallel with the established refugee reception system, and with a central role of the Civil Protection Service. The Piedmont Region set up a Regional Coordination Committee, with the involvement of Regional Government offices, Civil Protection Service, Prefectures (territorial expression of the national government) and Local Authorities. As regards institutional reception, together with the enlargement of SAI/CAS and the identification of structures to be used as Civil Protection reception centres, a survey of families willing to host Ukrainians was conducted. More than 5,000 declarations of willingness were collected (Regione Piemonte 2023). As emerged from the interviews, the time and resources needed to screen the families in order to ensure a proper fit were to be shared between the Civil Protection Services and the Municipalities, and they were generally lacking, creating setbacks in the process. No data are available on how many of these declarations of willingness translated into actual receptions. The Civil Protection data on autonomous receptions by families (i.e., developed outside the institutional framework) recorded 478 cases (Regione Piemonte 2023). The reception structures identified and managed by the Civic Protection hosted 1,466 people between March 2022 and March 2023 (for a total of 140,000 overnight stays) and as of March 2023 were hosting 314 people in 5

---

<sup>9</sup> As for the asylum system in Italy and its transformations see Marchetti (2016); Campesi (2018); Campomori and Ambrosini (2020); Signorini (2021).

reception facilities (Regione Piemonte 2023). A further 772 people were hosted in CAS/SAI reception facilities in March 2023 and 151 in dispersed reception centres established by DL 21/2022. The remaining 10,498 people were outside the institutional reception system, being either informally hosted in Italian or Ukrainian households or with autonomous accommodation (see Table 1). This implies a variety of living and housing arrangements, and therefore different experiences for hosted Ukrainians (Malvicini 2022).

**Table 1. Presence of Ukrainian Temporary Protection Permit holders in the Piedmont Region (06/03/2023)**

<i>Province</i>	<i>SAI/CAS</i>	<i>Civil Protection</i>	<i>DL 21/2022</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Alessandria	103	0	0	1484	1587
Asti	114	0	0	348	462
Biella	14	0	33	757	804
Cuneo	123	70	57	2004	2254
Novara	56	0	0	2346	2402
Torino	220	244	61	1616	2141
VCO	142	0	0	1128	1270
Vercelli	0	0	0	815	815
Total	772	314	151	10498	11735

**Source:** Regione Piemonte, Dipartimento Protezione Civile, 2023

The local Civil Protection found itself assigned a major role because of its capacity to respond with rapidity and to activate voluntary workers that make themselves available in situations of national emergency, taking paid job leave (as of March 2023, more than 17,000 days/man had been employed in Piedmont). However, as emerged in the interviews, it also found itself operating outside its usual field of competence and having to create new, ad hoc networks and relationships of collaboration and trust. A situation leaving both the actors of the existing system and the Civil Protection disoriented and with difficulties in ensuring a timely response. This led to an increasingly crucial role acquired by the spontaneous and informal activation of civil society.

Despite the shortcomings in terms of reception and accommodation, the institutional activation has been described as “incredible” and as “never seen before” (INT\_02.2023). A ‘Regional Plan for the Ukrainian emergency’ was drawn and it appointed those within the Regional Government, Civil Protection Service, and Health Service (ASL) who could serve as coordinators not only to manage accommodation, but also to facilitate access to the other services that were envisioned for Ukrainian refugees. These services included: access to the National Health Care System; enrolment in public schools (supported by an investment of € 150,000 by the Region, to be used for socio-cultural and linguistic mediation and inclusion); the possibility for minors to spend free holidays in the countryside or mountains; the right to work immediately after the application for protection; the possibility to use public transport without charge during the first 5 days after entry into the national territory; and the provision of a free shuttle between Turin and the Ukrainian General Consulate in Milan (co-funded by the Honorary Ukrainian Consulate of Turin and the Rotary Club). A dedicated call centre, promoted and funded by the Piedmont Region, the Civil Protection Service, the Honorary Ukrainian Consulate of Turin and the NPO Danish Refugee Council, was activated to provide information and support. Funds were also allocated by the bank foundations present in the Region. In particular, the Compagnia di San Paolo, a private bank foundation based in Turin which has historically played a crucial role in sustaining local development and social policies, promoted a call for tenders – in coordination with the Piedmont Region – with the aim of funding civil society initiatives complementary to the actions already implemented by the

institutions and supporting situations of fragility and vulnerability related to the conflict in Ukraine (max €20,000 per project, total availability €700,000).

This institutional, regulatory frame, and the actual practices implementing it, allowed for a specific and differential access and enjoyment of rights by Ukrainians compared to other asylum seekers and refugees. The interviews underlined that the local offices and the public/private actors involved were clearly aware of the entitlement of Ukrainian refugees and keen to comply with and facilitate the process – something that has been rarely recorded for other asylum seekers and refugees.

Some differences were obvious to those who had been working with refugees for years. From the dedicated access to the police headquarters for the temporary protection permit and residence permit application [...] to the fact of receiving the actual material document, the residence permit, in just a couple of months, when for anyone else the waiting time is much longer, like 6 months for a permit renewal [...] and when you asked for the residence permit plus the temporary protection you received not only the fiscal identification code, but also enrolment in the national healthcare service, without the need to apply to the Fiscal Home Office like everybody else [...] directly, with a complete exemption, and then a Civil Protection directive granted them permission to work immediately after presenting the permit application, without waiting 60 days like all the other asylum seekers (INT\_02.2023).

What emerges is therefore a strong activation by the institutions – an ‘institutional solidarity’ in terms of regulatory frame, services and practices – to try to respond to the arrival of Ukrainian citizens. Rather than working to expand and improve the existing asylum system and to promote wider rights, services and their accessibility for all, a special and distinctive system, catering to Ukrainians only, was created: different permits, management, actors involved, reception opportunities, services offered. On the one hand, this means that the professional skills of those already working with asylum seekers and refugees and the existing system built over the years to cater to the needs of people fleeing their countries could not be put to work in support of those fleeing Ukraine. On the other, a differential treatment emerged, possibly creating forms of exclusion and opposing first-rank and second-rank refugees, Ukrainians and all the others. This double standard has been already underlined by various scholars (Carrera and Ineli-Ciger, 2023; Ineli-Ciger, 2023; McCloskey, 2022), and it appears to express and reproduce a hierarchical ordering and a different racialization of Eastern European refugees in comparison to other refugees coming from the Global South (De Conink 2022). Indeed, it was called a “racist, neo-colonial policy” by one of the interviewees, an NGO member and refugees’ rights activist:

This [experience] teaches us that it’s not true we cannot host refugees, it’s not true we haven’t enough places, it’s not true we haven’t enough resources. It teaches us that there’s a racist, neo-colonial policy against those coming from outside Europe, and from Africa in particular [...]. And we can see this any morning at the Turin police headquarters. It is something evident, it’s not hidden. An Ukrainian arrives: “Special guest”, the policeman says in English. Someone else arrives: “Move!”, with shouting and shoving. (INT\_09.2023)

## **5. Civic solidarity from below: the risks of an emotional, segmented, non-organized response**

The activation of civil society and common citizens has been remarkable, becoming a crucial part of the supply of accommodation and services. By focusing on the Piedmont case, in this section we will discuss the solidarity activated by Italian citizens and civil society, after briefly touching upon that developed by Ukrainian citizens already present in Italy. Overall, civil society activation and solidarity will be addressed by examining

some features emerging from the empirical data collected during the research, namely its individual, interpersonal, emotional, segmented, and informal character.

While it would require research on its own to be properly addressed, what emerged from the interviews allows us to briefly touch upon Ukrainian activation first. As said, the Temporary Protection, by enabling Ukrainians to choose the EU country in which to find refuge, potentially re-introduces dynamics typical of migratory chains and networks in forced migration as well. The presence of Ukrainian citizens in the Region had been stable in the past few years, amounting to more or less 10,000 people at the beginning of 2022. With the outburst of the war, their presence doubled in the space of a few weeks and, according to the data and the interviews, a large number of Ukrainians have been supported, or directly hosted, by fellow compatriots. Individual, interpersonal responses, with the activation of familial networks and local resources, often merged with more organised ones: for instance, Orthodox churches emerged, in the cases observed, as a reference point for organising and managing offers of solidarity. Also in this case, self-organisation outside the institutional sphere has been of key importance, even if examples of collaboration with local institutions have emerged locally.

Several key informants underlined the immediate offer of accommodation made by Ukrainians to compatriots and family members fleeing the war. Many of the Ukrainians present in Italy and Piedmont were working as caregivers, living in the homes of the Italian elderly people they were taking care of: the first homes that were opened to those fleeing the war were those of Ukrainian families, but also the Italian ones where Ukrainians were working. This is especially remarkable considering that the outburst of the Ukrainian crisis took place in a period still marked by Covid pandemic.

In those very first days, those arriving were staying in the homes where their contacts, friends or family, were working. For example, in the homes of [Italian] elderly people – as you know, in-home caregivers here are mostly Ukrainian. These homes of elderly people are often houses with space in which one or more people can be hosted, and so they found refuge there. This is something that really impressed me. It is important to remember we were still in the midst of the pandemic. And yet, the Italian welcomed Ukrainian refugees. Their parents, their grandparents, our elderly people opened their homes, their houses, giving a room for close cohabitation with those fleeing the war. Despite the pandemic. Without any requests of swabs or medical checks. (INT\_01.2023)

This signals a marked difference in terms of perception and reception with respect to the general population of migrants and refugees, who were depicted as potentially dangerous and virus carriers during the entire pandemic crisis. While the pandemic did not appear to obstruct the immediate acceptance in Italy of Ukrainians, at the same time ‘quarantine ships’ were moored off the Italian shores to isolate (forced) migrants arriving by sea until the summer of 2022 (Denaro and Boccagni 2022; Montagna 2023).

When looking at the responses, activation and solidarity by Italian civil society, there are different examples to take into account: the accommodation made available, the amount and variety of goods, resources and services offered as well as the action put in place in Ukraine or at its borders, either to provide food, medicines, clothes and goods and/or to pick up and drive refugees to Italy (which will not be discussed here). As said, the research underlined that this remarkable solidarity expressed itself mostly in self-/non-organized and informal initiatives, as emotion-driven and individual responses to the crisis.

The first aspect to highlight is the *magnitude* of the solidarity itself. More than one interviewee used the expression ‘solidarity race’ when discussing the accommodation made available by common citizens or private actors or the number and kinds of goods and services that were offered in a very short period, as if a competition to provide some kind of support was in place and everyone wanted to take part in it. Refugees Welcome Italia,

an independent organisation which since 2014 had promoted citizens' mobilisation and activation to support the social inclusion of refugees and migrants, for example, declared that it had activated more family hosting during 2022 than in the previous five years.

While in the past collective and established associations had been at the centre of mobilizations in support of newly-arrived refugees and asylum seekers, these offers emerged first and foremost as spontaneous expressions of private citizens and households, as well as big and small private businesses (see also Ambrosini, 2022). The interviewees underlined the novelty of this interest: those offering solidarity had not previously been active in the support of refugees or migrants or, more generally, involved in social associations or structured civil-society initiatives (see also Carlsen and Toubøl, 2023; Fleischmann, 2020).

Private citizens have been the first to contact us and declare their availability in terms of apartments, rooms, and similar, also because they did not need to ask for permission, it was more immediate [than parishes and institutions...] And I'd say that for the large majority, we didn't know the person in advance. And we also wondered a bit how... we created this email address for our network of volunteers, so they could get in touch, signal their availability in that period. But then, we received something like 350 emails in a few weeks and many of them from people we didn't know [...]. And not even from people particularly close to, I don't know, the church, the parish, the community. I'd say that 80% of them were completely unknown. (INT\_02.2023)

Along with the features of *individual* and *interpersonal* responses, the key informants underlined the *emotional* and sympathetic character of this wave of solidarity. Some of them compared the response to the one which arises after disruptive natural disasters like earthquakes. Some others instead pointed out that such emotional response was mainly directed to women and children, and that its root could be found in the fact that the war was perceived as nearby and involving people with whom it was relatively easy to identify: "there's been a strong emotional impact, for many reasons... it's sad to say, but the thought has mainly been 'they are white, they are not black people, they are neighbours'" (INT\_02.2023). This segmented solidarity, i.e., directed only at Ukrainian refugees, had already emerged in the discussion concerning institutional activation, and discriminatory practices were reported by NGO actors. This is indicative of an unexpressed and yet very present racial ordering and hierarchy of victims (De Conink 2022; McCloskey 2022), highlighting how civic solidarity can also be expressed through practices that can be discriminatory in a positive/negative manner.

So, this company called us like 15 times in one week to know if they could send us 30 pallets of stickers and sticker albums to distribute as presents. 'But only to Ukrainian children', they underlined more than once, 'not to the others'. It was disturbing. (INT\_02.2023).

These dimensions of solidarity (*individual*, *interpersonal*, *emotional*, *segmented*) tie in with what emerged as its *informal* and largely *self-/non-organised* character. The interviewees often underlined that the support of Ukrainian citizens was provided by people with no professional experience or resources in terms of refugees' reception and with no former connection with established NGOs, social movements, or organisations dealing with the matter. These experiences mostly took place outside those developed during the twenty years of the Italian asylum system. This issue had already emerged in regard to the institutional reception – when interviewees discussed the parallel system activated instead of expanding the existing asylum system – but in the case of solidarity by civil society and private citizens it was even more visible. Moreover, this sometimes resulted in a misalignment among the needs, aspirations and expectations of the parties involved. The desire of Italian families, as reported by the interviewees, to connect and develop a relationship with the people hosted

sometimes collided with the opposite interest of simply having somewhere to stay and take temporary refuge and the scant interest in learning Italian or developing a long-term project of permanence in Italy. Moving from a professional activation to a personal relationship, from a formal to an informal and self-organized response, also means moving away from rights' acknowledgement and fulfilments to a charitable humanitarian approach. In other words, it means reversing the work carried forward by advocacy groups, associations, but also institutional legal entities to establish asylum seekers and refugees as legal subjects with rights and agency rather than charitable objects (see Malkki 1995, 1996; Zetter 1991).

Finally, observing the *temporal* dimension, the wave of solidarity, as mentioned, resulted in a large number of individual offers (of goods, hospitality, services) in the immediate aftermath of the invasion: "when people mobilise, they are in a hurry to do something", one interviewee stressed (INT\_08.2023). The institutional response, on the other hand, took longer to develop, and, as seen above, the attempt to organise offers of hospitality and goods crashed with such haste. Then, after the rush of the emergency response, and with the continuation of the war, attention, activation, and involvement progressively declined. Moreover, the increasing difficulty of bearing the material and immaterial costs of prolonged hospitality also emerged, as stressed by many interviewees. In summer 2022, a number of families that had hosted Ukrainian citizens since the very beginning started to inquire about the possibility of finding different arrangements. After an initial reception in a local family, many Ukrainian citizens, it should also be noted, ended up finding new arrangements on their own or opted to move back to Ukraine.

## 6. Final remarks: the ambivalence of solidarity

This paper explored institutional and civic solidarity, by which is meant both the ad hoc institutional framework and the solidarity *from below* performed by organised and non-organised civil society in favour of Ukrainian citizens. Here, building on the empirical data collected and illustrated in the previous sections, we discuss the ambivalences and contradictory aspects of the solidarity expressed. Some points emerge as critical in relation to the specific context of the Italian asylum system and its transformation over time, while others appear so in relation to the 'double standards' that the solidarity granted to Ukrainians seems to involve because it does not apply equally to refugees of other nationalities.

It is noteworthy that the European Union conceived cooperation in receiving and protecting refugees from Ukraine in terms of solidarity<sup>10</sup>, but the unexpected combination of institutional and civic solidarity observed in different national contexts does not respond to a precise political design nor to an explicit fair distribution of asylum-related responsibilities among EU states, despite this latter being one of the most debated and controversial issues at least since the 2015 "refugee crisis" (Cinalli et al. 2021). On the one hand, as mentioned in Section 4, the "EU's preferential, differential or even discriminatory treatment afforded to those displaced from Ukraine and asylum seekers and refugees from other parts of the world" cannot be questioned "with regard to access to EU territory, secondary movements, scope of beneficiaries, asylum procedures and standards of treatment" (Kienast et al. 2023: 384). As regards EU and national institutions, their attitude of strong solidarity and open borders is surprising and represents a marked discontinuity with the previous trend of containment and deterrence of mobility and, in particular in Italy, a long period of restriction in asylum

---

<sup>10</sup> European Commission, 'Ukraine: EU steps up solidarity with those fleeing war', Strasbourg, 8 March 2022 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_1610](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1610)

seekers' reception (Bolzoni et al. 2022). On the other hand, as seen in Section 5, the pace and intensity of many grassroots initiatives of solidarity is equally surprising and remarkable, especially since they have involved not only long-standing activists but also "newly committed citizens" (Fleischmann 2020). In terms of civil society mobilisation, a fundamental aspect is that "even if engagement can respond to personal needs and reasons, it has political implications" (Ambrosini 2022: 10). One of these implications is the consolidation of a differential treatment based on a double standard which, as argued by Carlsen and Toubøl (2023) in a recent study carried out in Denmark, finds its moral justification in three main arguments: the widespread perception that the war in Ukraine is different from others (especially that in Syria); territorial proximity; the idea that Ukrainian refugees are more deserving than ones from other regions. Unlike the recent past (Ambrosini 2023; Della Porta 2018; Fekete 2018), similar reasons seem to be behind the contingent absence of any sort of criminalization of solidarity, as well as of dispute or disapproval in the Italian public and political debate. Also, as mentioned in the introduction, the prevailing representation of people fleeing Ukraine tends to correspond to the archetypal refugee imagined by the Refugee Convention in 1951 (Morrice 2022). In accordance with Fleischmann when she claims that "practices of support and help are embedded in differing and at times contrasting interpretations, with various actors and individuals competing over the 'proper' conduct of support" (2020: 10-11), we underline how in the case of Ukrainian refugees the two typically contested issues of solidarity and reception have been exceptionally placed in brackets both by institutions and by public opinion. This generosity of institutional and civil responses in favour of Ukrainian refugees is welcome and not in question; however, it seems important to discuss the ambivalent and contradictory aspects of this phenomenon. This concerns the broader issue of the right to asylum and, more specifically, the possible implications of this experience of solidarity for the functioning of an asylum system supposed to be universalistic and protective for those fleeing wars, persecutions, humanitarian, political, social and economic crises regardless of their origin. The following discussion considers three intertwined problematic points, summing up what was said in the previous sections.

A first point is the situation of generalized *positive discrimination* in favour of Ukrainian refugees, which concerns both the ad hoc standards and measures adopted by the institutions – really surprising in this regard is, for example, the lack of control on incoming and outgoing mobility – as well as the material support and the emotional participation of volunteers and activists. This is a situation characterized by a structure of opportunities so favourable as to define the treatment as not only 'differential' but even 'preferential' (Kienast et al. 2023), to the point of raising a second and correlated issue, that of *equity*. As Carrera and colleagues (2023) recently pointed out, this kind of solidarity is 'unequal' and in contrast with the value of universalism at the basis of the right to asylum in terms of both treatment (specific protection, dedicated access to services, free mobility) and expected standards (fast material responses, simplified and accelerated bureaucratic procedures, higher quality of services). This has produced a new hierarchy of victims as well as beneficiaries already in the reception system, in which refugees of colour or from the Global South are the most penalized (McCloskey, 2022). From a sociological point of view, it is interesting to observe if and how this process is accompanied by forms of justification and legitimization: the generous combination of institutional and civil solidarity has undoubtedly introduced a conditionality of who deserves a certain type of help and protection which also has moral assumptions (Carlsen and Toubøl 2023). Finally, a third point concerns the coexistence of this uncontested solidarity with processes of criminalisation and stigmatization of humanitarianism towards other migrants, taking the form of highly *contested expressions of solidarity*. This is the case of the rescues of immigrants in the Mediterranean Sea carried out by NGOs, whose rescue operations the Italian Government has recently disciplined by imposing a series of restrictions (impossibility to carry out more than one rescue,

need to request authorization to proceed, docking in the indicated port) which risk making urgent interventions ineffective and lengthening the times of operations, thus introducing another significant contradiction. Therefore, we cannot help but noticing and underlining a dark side of solidarity, in which ambivalences and double standards emerge, requiring for further analysis and, overall, serious reflection.

## References

- Agustìn, O. G., Jørgensen, M. B. (2019), *Solidarity and the 'Refugee Crisis' in Europe*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ambrosini, M. (2022), "Humanitarian Help and Refugees: De-Bordering Solidarity as Contentious Issue", *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*.
- Ambrosini, M. (ed. 2023), *Rifugiati e solidali. L'accoglienza dei richiedenti asilo in Italia*, Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Banting, K., Kymlicka W. (2017), "The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies", in K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (Eds.), *The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bauböck, R., Scholten, P. (2016), "Introduction to the special issue: "Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism". Coping with 'the progressive's dilemma'; nationhood, immigration and the welfare state", *Comparative Migration Studies*, 4(4): 1-7.
- Bauder, H., Juffs, L. (2019), "Solidarity in the Migration and Refugee Literature: Analysis of a Concept", *Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies*, 46(1): 46-65.
- Bazurli R., Caponio T., de Graauw E. (2022), "Between a rock and a hard place: mayors, migration challenges and multilevel political dynamics", *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 10(3): 297-305.
- Bolzoni, M., Donatiello, D., Giannetto, L. (2022), "Sailing against the law tides. Implications of the 2018 refugees' reception reform in small towns and rural areas in Italy", *Comparative Population Studies*, 47(2022): 233-262.
- Bolzoni, M., Donatiello, D. Giannetto, L. (2020), "(Dis)fare accoglienza. Attori e contesti alla prova dei Decreti Sicurezza", in Marchetti, C. and M. Molfetta (eds.), *Il diritto d'asilo. Report 2020*. Todi: Editrice Tau, pp. 165-200.
- Bolzoni, M., Ponzio, I. (2022), "Guardare oltre. Sfide e servizi per l'integrazione al di fuori dei grandi centri urbani", in Marconi G., Cancellieri A., *Immigrazione e welfare locale nelle città metropolitane*. Milano: FrancoAngeli, pp. 203-214.
- Boyd, M. (1989), Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agenda, *The International Migration Review*, 23(3): 638-670.
- Bruni L. (2021), *Solidarietà critica. Patologie neoliberali e nuove forme di socialità*, Milano: Meltemi.
- Camposi G. (2018), "Between containment, confinement and dispersal: the evolution of the Italian reception system before and after the 'refugee crisis'", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 23(4): 490-506.
- Campomori, F. (2022), "La crisi ucraina e la (ri)organizzazione del sistema di accoglienza: tra lodevoli aperture e preoccupanti disparità di trattamento dei profughi", *Social Policies*, 2: 325-332.
- Cantat C., Feischmidt M. (2019), "Conclusion: Civil Involvement in Refugee Protection-Reconfiguring Humanitarianism and Solidarity in Europe", in M. Feischmidt, L. Pries, C. Cantat (Eds.), *Refugee Protection and Civil Society in Europe*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Caponio T., Donatiello D. (2017), "Intercultural policy in times of crisis: theory and practice in the case of Turin, Italy", *Comparative Migration Studies*, 5, 13 (2017): 1-16.
- Caponio, T., I. Ponzio (2022), *Coping with migrants and refugees: Multilevel governance across the EU*, New York: Routledge.
- Carling, J., Collins, F. (2018), "Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(6): 909-926.

- Carlsen, H.B., Toubøl, J. (2023), "Some Refugees Welcome? Frame Disputes between Micro-Cohorts in the Refugee Solidarity Movement", preprint.
- Carrera S., Ineli-Ciger M. (eds., 2023), *EU responses to the large-scale refugee displacement from Ukraine*, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.
- Carrera S., Ineli-Ciger M., Vosyliute L., Brumat L. (2023), "The EU grants temporary protection for people fleeing war in Ukraine: time to rethink unequal solidarity in EU asylum policy", in S. Carrera, M. Ineli-Ciger (eds.), *EU responses to the large-scale refugees displacement form Ukraine*, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, pp.2-58.
- Castelli Gattinara P., Zamponi L. (2020), Castelli Gattinara, Zamponi L. (2020) "Politicizing support and opposition to migration in France: the EU asylum policy crisis and direct social activism", *Journal of European Integration*, 42(5): 625-641.
- Chamberlain J.A. (2020), "Responsibility for Migrants: From Hospitality to Solidarity", *Political Theory*, 48(1): 57–83.
- Cinalli M., Trenz H-J., Brändle V.K., Eisele O. and Lahusen C. (2021), *Solidarity in the Media and Public Contention over Refugees in Europe*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Collins P.H., Bilge S. (2020), *Intersectionality*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Crespi F. (1994), *Imparare ad esistere: nuovi fondamenti della solidarietà sociale*, Roma: Donzelli.
- Crespi F., Moscovici S. (2001), *Solidarietà in questione. Contributi teorici e analisi empiriche*, Roma: Meltemi.
- De Bruycker P., Tsourdi E. (2016), "Building the common European asylum system beyond legislative harmonisation: practical cooperation, solidarity and external dimension", in V. Chetail, P. De Bruycker and F. Maiani (Eds.) *Reforming the common European asylum system: the New European refugee law*, Bonston: Brill Nijhoff, pp. 471-538.
- Denaro C., Boccagni P. (2022), "Migration, Borders and “De-Bordering” in Pandemic Times: Voices as Interlocutions from Quarantine Ships in Italy", *Journal of Borderland Studies*, online first.
- De Conink D. (2022), "The Refugee Paradox During Wartime in Europe: How Ukrainian and Afghan Refugees are (not) Alike", *International Migration Review*, 1-9.
- Dimitriadis I., Ambrosini M. (2021), "De-Bordering Solidarity: Civil Society Actors Assisting Refused Asylum Seekers in Small Cities", *Journal of Refugee Studies*.
- Dražanová, L. and A. Geddes (2022), *Attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees and governmental responses in 8 European countries*, ASILE forum on the EU Temporary Protection Responses to the Ukraine War, available at: <https://www.asileproject.eu/attitudes-towards-ukrainian-refugees-and-governmental-responses-in-8-european-countries/> (last updated 6 September 2022).
- Driel E. (2020), "Refugee Settlement and the Revival of Local Communities: Lessons from the Riace Model", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 25 (2): 149–173.
- Durkheim E. (1893), *De la division du travail social*, Paris: Alcan.
- Durkheim E. (1912), *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris: Alcan.
- Fekete L. (2018), "Migrants, borders and the criminalisation of solidarity in the EU", *Race&Class*, 59(4): 65-83.
- Fleischmann L. (2020), *Contested solidarity. Practices of refugees support between humanitarian help and political activism*, Bielefeld: Verlag.
- Gilberti L., Potot S. (2021), “Verso i *solidarity studies*. Nuove prospettive di ricerca su migrazioni e frontiere”, *Mondi Migranti*, 3: 25-41.
- IDOS (2022), *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2022*, Roma, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS.
- Ineli-Ciger, M. (2016), "Time to Activate the Temporary Protection Directive. Why the Directive can Play a Key Role in Solving the Migration Crisis in Europe", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 18 (2016): 1–33.
- Kapeller, J., Wolkenstein. F. (2013), "The Grounds of Solidarity: From Liberty to Loyalty", *European Journal of Social Theory*, 16 (4): 476–491.

- Karageorgiu, E. and G. Noll (2023), "Receiving Ukrainian Refugees in the EU: A Case of Solidarity?", in S. Carrera, M. Ineli-Ciger (eds.) *EU responses to the large-scale refugees displacement from Ukraine*, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 400-418.
- Kienast J., Feith Tan N., Vedsted-Hansen J. (2023), "Preferential, Differential or Discriminatory? EU Protection Arrangements for Persons Displaced from Ukraine" in S. Carrera, M. Ineli-Ciger (eds.) *EU responses to the large-scale refugees displacement form Ukraine*. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 383-399.
- Koos S., Seibel V. (2019), "Solidarity with refugees across Europe. A comparative analysis of public support for helping forced migrants", *European Societies*, 21(5): 704-728.
- Kymlicka W. (2015), "Solidarity in diverse societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism", *Comparative Migration Studies*, 3(4): 1-19
- Karageorgiou, E. (2016) Solidarity and sharing in the Common European Asylum System: the case of Syrian refugees, *European Politics and Society*, 17(2): 196-214.
- Lampredi, G. (2023), "The intimate life of criminalization. Affective governance in contentious migrant solidarity". *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1-21.
- Lewicki, A. (2023) East–west inequalities and the ambiguous racialisation of ‘Eastern Europeans’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 49(6): 1481-1499.
- Malkki, L. (1995), Refugees and Exile: from “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24: 495-523.
- Malkki, L. (1996), Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization, *Cultural Anthropology*, 11(3): 377-404.
- Malvicini, M. (2022), Le misure di assistenza dei rifugiati e degli sfollati provenienti dall’Ucraina: l’esperienza della Regione Piemonte, *Le Regioni*, 3(2022): 608-621.
- Marchetti, C. (2016), Le sfide dell’accoglienza: passato e presente dei sistemi istituzionali di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati in Italia, *Meridiana*, 86: 121-143.
- Marchetti, C. (2018), L’accoglienza dei rifugiati in famiglia. Prove di comunità interculturali, in C. Marchetti and C. Molfetta (eds.) *Il diritto d’asilo, report 2018.*, Todi, Editrice Tau: 179-214.
- Marx K. (1867), *Das Kapital*, Hamburg.
- Mau S., Burkhardt C. (2009), "Migration and welfare state solidarity in Western Europe", *Journal of European Social Policy*, 19(3): 213–229.
- McCloskey S. (2022), "The War in Ukraine Has Revealed a Hierarchy of Victims", *Policy & Practice. A Development Education Review*, 138-149.
- Montagna, N. (2023), "Quarantine Ships as Spaces of Bordering: the Securitization of Migration Policy in Italy during the Covid-19 Pandemic", *International Migration Review*, online first.
- Morrice, L. (2022), "Will the war in Ukraine be a pivotal moment for refugee education in Europe?", *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 41(3): 251-256.
- Nielsen F. (1985) "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies", *American Sociological Review*, 1985, 50 (2): 133- 149.
- Oosterlynck S., Loopmans M., Schuermans N., Vandenabeele J., Zemni S. (2016) "Putting Flesh to the Bone: Looking for Solidarity in Diversity, Here and Now", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 39 (5): 764–782.
- Ponzo, I., Giannetto, L. and Roman, E. (2022), *The variance in multilevel governance of asylum seekers’ reception in Italy: the key roles of policy legacy, politics and civil society*, in Caponio T. and I. Ponzo (eds), *Coping with migrants and refugees: multilevel governance across the EU*, London; New York: Routledge, pp. 49-79.
- Portes A., Zhou M. (1992) "Gaining the upper hand: Economic mobility among immigrant and domestic minorities", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15(4): 491-522.
- Portes A., Sensenbrenner J. (1993) "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action", *American Journal of Sociology*, 98: 1320-1350.
- Reggiardo A. (2019), "Distrust and Stigmatization of NGOs and Volunteers at the Time of European Migrant "Crisis". Conflict and Implication on Social Solidarity", *Partecipazione&Conflitto*, 12(2): 460-486.

- Regione Piemonte (2023) *Il Piemonte per l'Ucraina. Relazione 9 marzo 2023*, Dipartimento Protezione Civile.
- Rossi, M. (2022), "Il sistema di accoglienza in Italia dopo vent'anni. Poche cose da celebrare e molte su cui intervenire", in C. Marchetti and C. Molfetta (eds.) *Il diritto d'asilo, report 2022. Costruire il futuro con i migranti e i rifugiati*, Todi, Editrice Tau: 267-285.
- Schulpen L., Huyse H. (2017), "Editorial: Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity. The New Face of European Solidarity", *Forum for Development Studies*, 44(2): 163-169.
- Signorini, V. (2021), *Il diritto d'asilo sta morendo? Storia dell'accoglienza in Italia*, Milano, FrancoAngeli.
- Tazzioli M. (2018), "Crimes of solidarity: migration and containment through rescue", *Radical Philosophy*, 2(01).
- Thielemann E. (2018), "Why refugee burden-sharing initiatives fail: public goods, freeriding and symbolic solidarity in the EU", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56: 63–82.
- Tönnies F. (1887), *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Lipsia: Verlag di Fues.
- Vandevoordt R., Verschraegen G. (2019), The European Refugee Controversy: Civil Solidarity, Cultural Imaginaries and Political Change, *Social Inclusion*, 7(2): 48–52.
- Van Oorschot W. (2008), Solidarity towards immigrants in European welfare states, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 17(1): 3-14.
- Vitello, D. (2022), The Nansen Passport and the EU Temporary Protection Directive: Reflections on Solidarity, Mobility Rights and the Future of Asylum in Europe, *European Papers*, 7(1): 15-30.
- Weber M. (1922), *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen: Mohr.
- Zamponi L. (2017), "Practices of Solidarity: Direct Social Action, Politicisation and Refugee Solidarity Activism in Italy", *Mondi Migranti*, 3: 97-117.
- Zetter R. (1991), Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming Bureaucratic Identity, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 4(1): 39-62.

### Methodological Appendix

Code	Role	Date(s)	Setting
INT_01.2022	Local Third Sector representative	15.04.2022	recorded public speech
INT_02.2022	Project manager Bank Foundation	26.04.2022	recorded interview
INT_03.2022	Local Third Sector representative	31.05.2022	recorded interview
INT_04.2022	Local Third Sector representative	13.06.2022	recorded interview
INT_01.2023	NGO representative	13.02.2023	recorded interview
INT_02.2023	local representative of national NGO	14.02.2023 31.03.2023	recorded interview and public speech
INT_03.2023	NGO representative	14.02.2023	recorded interview
INT_04.2023	NGO representative	14.02.2023	recorded interview
INT_05.2023	Ukrainian church local representative	21.02.2023	recorded interview
INT_06.2023	public institution representative	21.02.2023	recorded interview

INT_07.2023	public institution representative	24.02.2023	non-recorded interview
INT_08.2023	national NGO representative	08.03.2023	recorded interview
INT_09.2023	representative of local and national NGO	31.03.2023	recorded public speech
INT_10.2023	national NGO representative	31.03.2023	recorded public speech

#### **AUTHORS' INFORMATION:**

**Magda Bolzoni** is Assistant Professor (RtdA) at the Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning of Politecnico di Torino (Turin, Italy), where she teaches Urban Sociology. She holds a PhD in Sociology and she has spent periods of study and research at the University of the Western Cape (South Africa), University of Amsterdam (Netherlands) and Ryukoku University (Japan), where in 2017 she was a JSPS Fellow with a project on migrants and urban transformations. Her researches focus on issues of urban change and gentrification, socio-spatial stratification and inequalities, and she has worked extensively on migration and forced migration, with a qualitative and multilevel approach, also collaborating with FIERI and Fondazione Migrantes.

**Davide Donatiello** is a researcher and professor at the University of Turin. He holds a PhD in Comparative Social Research and has researched Romanian migration in Italy, publishing a book (*Farsi una reputazione*, Rome 2013) on the ways in which migrants establish a reputation for themselves in the labor market. He has also published on migrants as part of the middle class and on the self-employed, and worked on projects concerning local development and practices and policies of parenthood.

**Leila Giannetto** is Research Fellow at the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute, where she works on the Horizon project “Protecting Irregular Migrants in Europe (PRIME)”. Previously she has worked with Fieri and Euricse as research fellow and with IOM, CPMR and CIDOB as consultant and integration expert. She obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Trento in 2018 with a thesis titled “More than consultation. Civil society organizations mainstreaming fundamental rights in EU border management policies: the case of Frontex and its Consultative Forum”. Her research interests are on borders and fundamental rights, on civil society organizations’ role in the governance of migration, EU border management and asylum, and on the reception and integration of refugees and asylum seekers in EU member states and in remote areas.