

“Fear Is the Path to the Dark Side”. Electoral Results and the Workplace Safety of Immigrants

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Safety of Immigrants**

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ABSTRACT

“Fear Is the Path to the Dark Side”. Electoral Results and the Workplace Safety of Immigrants*

Populist parties’ propaganda portrays immigrants as a threat to native workers’ jobs. When propaganda materializes as an electoral success, it may drive changes in natives’ attitudes towards immigrants. As shown experimentally by Bursztyn et al. (2020), electoral results may signal a change in social preferences about immigration and make individuals more likely to express anti-immigrant resentment that they were previously hiding. We employ Italian administrative data to explore whether this mechanism implies actual differences in native and foreign workers’ labor market outcomes. We estimate the impact of the electoral results of an Italian populist party, the *Lega Nord*, on natives and foreigners’ workplace injuries and wages. We show that, on average, a 1% increase in the votes for the *Lega Nord* increases within-job-spell injury rates of foreign workers by 0.9%. Firms below fifteen employees benefiting from less employment protection drive the result. We argue that this is due to a reallocation of hazardous tasks to immigrant workers only in contexts characterized by higher job insecurity. The evidence is weaker for wage reductions, arguably due to labor market rigidity.

JEL Classification: D72, J28, J71

Keywords: social norms, discrimination, workplace injuries

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1 Introduction

A growing literature investigates the origins and implications of the populist backlash that is investing many countries in the world (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020). A common feature of populist parties lies in their marked anti-immigration rhetoric. For instance, former US president Trump's stated on Twitter that "Democrats have chosen illegal immigrants over the American people for too long!" and protested against providing free healthcare for immigrants¹. In 2010, current UK prime minister David Cameron had committed himself to "reduce immigration to 1990s levels"². The UKIP campaign for the Brexit referendum was largely based on anti-immigrant arguments that promoted the view of an overcrowding of public services, and was associated with a spike in hate crimes towards immigrants (Meleady et al., 2017). In Italy, the leader of the populist party *Lega Nord* called for "opening fire" on boats carrying migrants (Corriere della Sera, 16th June 2003).

Such anti-immigrant stances may actually impact on the well-being of foreign-born individuals. Indeed, Romarri (2019) recently showed that hate crime occurs significantly more often in municipalities with a far-right-wing mayor. Previous studies have addresses the effects of populism on immigrants' residential choice (Bracco et al., 2018) and on school bullying against children with a migration background (Bracco et al., 2020, Huang and Cornell, 2019, Schilter, 2019). Nonetheless, to our knowledge, no studies so far have analyzed the effects of populism on its own intended target, i.e., the labour market conditions of immigrants. This seems particularly unfortunate given the vast literature on anti-immigrant attitudes that focused on the labor market competition hypothesis, i.e., whether native workers perceive immigrants as a threat to their labor outcomes (Mayda, 2006, Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). If immigrants are held responsible for "stealing jobs" or "driving wages down" in the public discourse, this is likely to bear implications about

¹<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-immigration-insight/trump-pushes-anti-immigrant-message-even-as-coronavirus-dominates-campaign-idUSKCN25A18W>

²<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2979135/I-11-cut-immigration-kick-Cameron-told-voters.html>

their treatment at the workplace. In this paper, we address this issue by investigating the implications of the electoral success of *Lega Nord*, an Italian populist party, on immigrants' labor outcomes.

Specifically, using administrative data for the 1994-2005 period, we investigate whether the electoral success of *Lega Nord* has a differential impact on the job quality of native and foreign-born workers, measured as injury rates. In line with previous literature (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020, Inglehart and Norris, 2016), we focus on right-wing populism, which was far more present in Italy than left-wing populism at the time we consider. We focus on injuries, rather than on other labour market outcomes such as wages, because we recognize that the remarkable rigidity in the Italian labour market may prevent us from observing the effects of populism on this margin. Instead, an increase of workplace accidents for foreign born workers may be explained by a rise in the workload of immigrants workers or by a reallocation of hazardous tasks within the firm. Both explanations could indicate a change in the behaviour and in the social norms regulating the production activity.

This interpretation is consistent with the theoretical model and the experimental findings by Bursztyn et al. (2020). Not knowing the social preferences about immigration, individuals may hide anti-immigrant attitudes and refrain from anti-immigrant behaviours because they expect their views not to be considered as socially acceptable. Reallocating dangerous tasks to immigrants may benefit employers and native co-workers in that it allows decreasing the costs of safety investments and individual workers' injury risk. Given that discriminatory behaviour is forbidden by law, however, social non-acceptance in regulatory uncertain contexts increases the risk of sanctions. This may change as an electoral outcome signals and reveals a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes, and may lead the same individuals to become more likely to express publicly their views and undertake concrete actions against immigrants. This is even more likely given that an anti-immigrant behaviour is incentive-compatible for both employers and native employees within the same firm, which further decreases the risk that sanctioning mechanisms are undertaken.

In this sense, changes in social norms may bear implications for the deployment of anti-immigrant behaviours. In turn, the expectation of individual benefits from anti-immigrant behaviour may increase the demand for populism, and drive the arguments by populist parties to further strengthen their anti-immigrant rhetoric. This interpretation seems accurate in the light of the vast political sciences literature highlighting the role of cultural and identity factors for the propagation of populism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016, Margalit, 2019, Oesch, 2008).³ Notice that we apply these arguments to the case of immigrants, given that they happen to be the group targeted by the populist propaganda, but these mechanisms could apply to any subgroups of workers with comparatively lower bargaining power.

We argue that this effect should be stronger in contexts where jobs are less protected and where they are most strongly threatened by globalization and import competition from low-wage countries, as this presumably tightens the budget constraints for firms to undertake safety investments⁴. To verify whether job insecurity affects the working conditions offered to foreign-born workers, we exploit the change in employment protection regimes occurring at the threshold of 15 employees. According to the Italian legislation, the firing restrictions and the costs for dismissing a worker in the period that we consider were much lower for firms with less than 15 employees. Above the same threshold, workers can more easily constitute their representative bodies in firms, hence we expect that trade unions have more negotiating power and employees to have “safer” occupations in large companies.

Results show that a 1 percentage points increase in the votes for *Lega Nord* leads to a 0.9% increase in workplace injuries for foreign-born workers within the same job spell. The effect is entirely driven by firms with less than 15 employees. Native workers in any firm size, as well as immigrant workers in large firms, do not exhibit any worsening

³See Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) for a comprehensive survey on economic and cultural drivers of populism.

⁴See among others (Algan et al., 2017, Barone and Kreuter, 2019, Caselli et al., 2020, Colantone and Stanig, 2018b,a, Dippel et al., 2017, Guiso et al., 2017, 2020, Malgouyres, 2017)

in pecuniary and non pecuniary conditions. Our findings contribute to the emerging literature on the consequences of the rise of populism.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 4 presents our data and the empirical approach. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes. A set of robustness checks is presented in Appendix A.

2 Background

2.1 Theoretical framework

We investigate the relationship between the electoral success of populism and the labour market outcomes of immigrants. So far, to our knowledge, most studies have focused on the opposite direction of causality, i.e., whether migration directly affects electoral outcomes. Indeed, the effect of the inflow of immigrants and refugees on the support for far-right and populist parties is well documented (see among others Otto and Steinhardt, 2014, Halla et al., 2012). The empirical investigation conducted on Italy by Barone et al. (2016) indicates that the perceived threat to cultural identity may represent, together with labor market competition, an important driver of voting decisions.

In turn, economic insecurity may amplify the natives' perception of migrants as a threat to cultural identity. According to the labor market competition hypothesis, immigrants pose a threat to natives' jobs (Mayda, 2006, Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). This perception may be exacerbated when labor market conditions worsen. Indeed, a number of studies have argued that, when the reasons for increasing economic insecurity are difficult to grasp, the resentment of those who bear the cost of such insecurity is more likely to be targeted towards out-groups, such as immigrants and other minorities (Cerrato et al., 2018, Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, Inglehart and Norris, 2017, Inglehart, 2018, Rho and Tomz, 2017, 2015). Moreover, several studies have established the causal

effect of trade shocks on the electoral success of populist parties (Colantone and Stanig, 2018b, Dippel et al., 2017, Malgouyres, 2017), which is confirmed in the Italian context by Barone and Kreuter (2019) and Caselli et al. (2020). Barone and Kreuter (2019) suggest that increase in unemployment, and reductions in income and durable consumption are potential mechanisms behind the causal effect of trade shocks on the success of populist parties.

In turn, economic reasons may explain the link between the support for anti-immigrant statements by populist parties and the actual anti-immigrant behaviour in regions where the populist propaganda is stronger. In times of economic uncertainty, budget constraints become more binding and the pressure to reduce costs increases. On the other hand, having less outside options, the labour supply of workers becomes more rigid. As shown by Hirsch and Jahn (2015), if migrants' labour supply is less elastic than natives', firms can exploit immigration by imposing larger mark-downs. Similarly, they may exploit immigrants' supply rigidity to reduce the costs of safety investments, ultimately imposing higher risk to immigrant workers (DAmbrosio et al., 2020). Faced with the urgency to cut costs, employers may see a strong incentive to reduce safety costs by engaging in asymmetric treatment of workers with more rigid labour supply functions. However, this behaviour would be at odds with the law and labour regulations, and it may risk facing sanctions—not only social, but pecuniary—if discriminatory behaviour is considered as socially unacceptable. Hence, in absence of public information about the xenophobic preferences in the social environment, employers are likely not to engage in openly discriminatory behaviours.

Bursztyn et al. (2020) seminal paper shows that social norms, usually persistent, can change quickly with changes in public information. They show that Donald Trumps electoral success increased individuals willingness to publicly express xenophobic views and decreased the social sanctioning of xenophobic statements. In our context, this implies that the electoral success of a populist party may act as an update on the information regarding the xenophobic preferences and increase the probability that anti-immigrant

attitudes are expressed within firms. In turn, if the social sanctioning around these views decreases, it becomes more likely that actual actions are taken against the targets of these statements, as suggested by the literature that studies the effects of hate speech (Romarri, 2019, Bracco et al., 2020, 2018). In firms, this may materialize in an asymmetric treatment of foreign workers in terms of their allocation to riskier tasks. Expressing a xenophobic view or behaviour in an environment where such views are accepted may face less social sanctioning, and imply a lower probability of actual pecuniary sanctions.

Moreover, such dynamics can be expected to be self-reinforcing. The employer may find it profitable to avoid safety investments by exploiting immigrants' supply rigidity, but employees, too, may have an advantage from this. Indeed, a native worker's risk of injury decreases if dangerous tasks are disproportionately transferred to the foreign co-workers. As social sanctioning against xenophobic statements decreases, native workers may claim that specific dangerous tasks be reserved to foreign workers. Hence, overall, we posit that the electoral success of populist parties may worsen the labour market outcomes of immigrants. Furthermore, we expect this mechanism to be stronger where employment protection legislation and trade union activity are weaker. Stronger trade union activity may hamper the ability of employers to enact discriminatory behaviours. Moreover, the political studies literature has highlighted the fact that populist rhetoric tends to oppose the role of trade unions, and that firms where unions are stronger tend to be less permeable to populist votes (e.g. Mosimann and Rennwald, 2018, Sanz de Miguel et al., 2019).

We take the electoral success of the right-wing populist party Lega Nord as a proxy for the public information about the social acceptance of xenophobic statements. Following Bracco et al. (2020), we focus on Lega Nord only, although this is not the unique Italian populist party, according for instance to the definition by Inglehart and Norris (2016). This choice is motivated by the distinctive features of this party and the geographic distribution of its electoral constituencies.

The Lega platform combines both reasons related to cultural identity and economic in-

security. Since its foundation, the Lega party has been characterized both by regionalism (and later turned to nationalist policies) and anti-immigrant platforms. The propaganda in 80s and early 90s was based on the defence of the economic interests of Northern regions opposed to the ones of Southern regions. The initial claim for regional autonomy and federalism, at the peak, turned into an appeal for secession. In the last decades, to gain electoral consensus at the national level, the Lega platform abandoned the request of secession and the resentments against internal immigrants, moving into the direction of anti-EU and anti globalisation policy and directing the hostility only against foreign immigrants. In the 90s, Italy was just starting to be an immigration country and immigrants did not seem to represent an actual threat to natives' jobs (Venturini and Villosio, 2006). Nonetheless, the Lega propaganda has portrayed immigrants as a threat to local community values and collective identity and has targeted foreign workers as competitors stealing the jobs of natives. The increasing import competition from low-wage countries may have exacerbated fears of economic insecurity and strengthened anti-immigrant sentiments.

Economic aspects may be particularly important in explaining the electoral success of Lega and its geographic distribution. The electoral consensus of Lega has always been higher in small-medium centers and in the small entrepreneurial areas in the North that have experienced fast growth in the past. These areas have also the higher number of small firms which are the most exposed to increased globalization.

2.2 Difference in employment protection regimes

The Italian legislation in force before the 2013 reform (Law no. 300 of 1970, *Statuto dei Lavoratori*, i.e. Workers' Statute) provided for a marked difference in the employment protection regime for firms above and below 15 employees.⁵ These differences concern the conditions for dismissing workers and the rights for workers to form unions.

Workers were entitled to appeal to the court if their permanent contract was terminated without a "justified reason" (*giusta causa*), i.e., serious worker's misconduct or

⁵The 2012 labor market reform reduced part of these differences.

economic difficulties of the firm).⁶ If the court judged the dismissal as unfair, the consequences for the worker were quite different depending on firm size. In firms with more than 15 employees, a worker dismissed without a just cause had to be compensated for unpaid salaries during the period between dismissal and the court’s decision. In addition, the judge may impose the workers’ reinstatement or a severance payment (15 months of salary). In firms below 15 employees, employers faced a less strict regulation and lower mandated severance payments in case of unfair dismissal, and the judge could not impose reinstating the unfairly dismissed worker. Moreover, the employee was not compensated for the foregone wages in the period between the dismissal and the court’s decision.

According to the same legislation, in firms with more than 15 employees, workers had more rights in terms of the formation of representative bodies, and of the power granted to trade unions in negotiations. The right of workers to establish representative bodies to negotiate on wage levels is guaranteed in firms with more than 15 employees. The threshold of 15 employees is also relevant for the establishment of the so called “Rappresentanze Sindacali Aziendali” (RSA). Workers of firms with more than 15 employees can elect trade union representatives at firm level (RSA), who are allowed to be absent from work for trade union activities and can call general meetings, affix posters on union activities and call referendums.

Empirical studies, indeed, indicate that workers’ turnover is higher in firms with more than 15 employees (Schivardi and Torrini, 2008, Hijzen et al., 2017), suggesting that trade unions increase the labour supply elasticity, consistent with a reduction in firm’s monopsonistic power (Belloc and D’Antoni, 2020).

3 Data

The empirical analysis is conducted using a random sample of workers from the WHIP-Salute Dataset. This sample combines information on working histories from the Italian

⁶This reason could be subjective as in the case of workers’ misbehaviour, or objective if downsizing is motivated by economics reason.

Social Security Archive (INPS) with confidential information on workplace injuries occurred to the same workers from the National Work Injuries Insurance Administration (INAIL). We had access to a random sample of male workers in the 1994-2005 period. The sampling probability is one out of 15 for foreign born individuals and one out of 100 for native workers.

The dataset contains information on individual characteristics such as age and region of birth (including foreign nations) and job/firm characteristics such as number of worked weeks, earnings, professional qualification (apprentice, blue collar), two digit NACE sector, province of work, number of employees, and the initial and final day of each job spell.⁷ Weekly wages are obtained by dividing the deflated earnings in the annual job spell by the number of weeks worked, with all variables measured on a full time equivalent scale. As regards injured workers, we know the date of the accident, the days of injury leave, and the type of injury. We label as “severe” injury a workplace accident requiring immediate care (Leombruni et al., 2019) or leading to more than 20 days of injury leave.

Our definition of immigrant is based on the information of the nation of birth. In our sample, most of the foreign-born workers come from non-high income countries. We include in the sample only male workers in the manufacturing sector, mining and construction. NACE sectors CA,D, F, E have been dropped because of few injuries and/or immigrants. NACE sectors A, B have not been included because in this sectors the sample of workers can not be considered representative. This bears some implications for our estimates. Indeed, in the North, most immigrants are employed in Manufacturing and services, while in the South they are mostly employed in agriculture. Excluding agricultural workers due to data limitations, we are effectively neglecting the vast majority of immigrants employed in the South. Hence, our results will be more representative for the Northern regions. A minority of anomalous observations, namely jobs spells with zero duration, have also been excluded from the dataset.

⁷Provinces are the finest level of disaggregation at which we were allowed to use information on individual injuries. The unavailability of data at the municipality level prevent us from conducting an analysis on labour outcomes in Local Labor Markets.

In our empirical analysis, we restrict the sample to workers aged 18-55 with at least 3 years of potential labor market experience. This sample selection is motivated by several reasons. First, this criterion allows us to compare native and immigrants workers with more comparable communication skills. Moreover, foreign-born workers in the first years of their working career may be offered worse and more hazardous occupations, since difficulties with the language may reduce their productivity. Our sample restriction to workers observed three years after entry should reduce the impact of unobserved heterogeneity in productivity on the native-immigrant differences in labour outcomes. Indeed, immigrants' hazard rates in the first three years of their labor market career are much steeper than those of natives, as shown in figure 1.

< Include Fig. 1 about here >

An additional reason supports the choice of studying the injury rates of relatively more experienced workers. Typically, indeed, in the period under observation workers were extremely likely to get injured during their first day of work. This phenomenon was related to the spread of "black" work in the Italian economy: the job of the worker would remain irregular and undeclared until the event of an injury forced the regularization, so as to grant the worker access to health assistance and injury benefits.⁸ Furthermore, immigrants are more likely to be employed in undeclared jobs, hence the length of their job spells are more likely to be under-reported in the administrative data. The sample selection aims at reducing this problem both for immigrant and native workers, to reduce the error in the measurement of exposure to injury risk in the empirical analysis. Moreover, more experienced workers are in general more tenured and more settled: they are less sensitive to macroeconomic conditions and less likely to change firms and/or provinces. This increases the probability of observing the same worker before and after an election, and helps our identification strategy (described in the next section) based on within-job-spell variation.

One obvious limitation of our work is that it focuses on legal immigrants. In the

⁸This phenomenon, used as an indicator of the informal economy, was tackled by ad hoc interventions by the Italian government in 2006 and 2007.

period under observation, the ratio between illegal immigrants and legal immigrants was estimated to be quite stable over time (Bianchi et al., 2012). Since the sample selection criteria presumably yield a group of positively selected workers, our results should provide a lower bound for the true effect of the increase of votes for Lega Nord on the labor market outcomes of the entire population of immigrants.

Data at municipality level on Italian elections in 1994, 1996 and 2001 have been provided by Italian Ministry of the Interior.⁹ Although these elections use different electoral rules, it was always possible to recover the percentage of votes for each party (the "proportional" vote) to the Chamber of Deputies. We aggregate these percentages at the provincial level since this is also the highest level of disaggregation provided, for confidentiality reasons, by the WHIP-SALUTE dataset.¹⁰ We split job spells crossing the day of an election into two, so that the measure of exposure in the empirical analysis can account for the different amount of days spent in the job before and after the changes in the electoral results.

As we mentioned in the introduction, the remarkable rigidity in the Italian labour market supports the choice of employing injuries as our outcome of interest along with wages. Moreover, this choice may bring insights as to the effects of economic shocks on firm's behaviour towards immigrants. Indeed, if downturns affect both anti-immigrant resentment and labour market outcomes, it may be difficult to disentangle the effect of a negative economic conjuncture from those of the electoral success of the populist party if we only focused on wages. Instead, workplace safety is counter-cyclical, i.e., injury rates tend to decrease during downturns because, when the pace of economic growth slows down, the intensity of work activity diminishes.¹¹ Hence, a priori, the effects of economic insecurity and anti-immigrant resentment could be opposite. Economic insecurity will

⁹Before the national election of 1994 there were several regional League parties (i.e. Lega Lombarda, Lega Veneto etc). For a comparison with post 1994 elections, we considered the votes obtained by these parties in 1994 as part of a unique League party.)

¹⁰This unfortunately prevents us from conducting an analysis at the local labor market level.

¹¹Boone and Van Ours (2006) also find that, during downturns, accidents tend to be under-reported when the risk of unemployment is higher

only affect injury rates if it goes through a reduction in the safety investments at the firm level. In turn, if this reduction disproportionately affects foreign workers, it would support our arguments. As mentioned, this mechanism could be reinforced if other workers try to shifting their own injury risk onto immigrants.

4 Empirical analysis

The main outcomes of interest in our analysis are the number of injuries and (log) weekly wages. For both outcomes, we assume that the labour market outcome y_{it} depends on a individual, job characteristics and fixed effects as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{it} = & f(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Share Lega}_{pt} + \beta_2 D_{\text{Size}<15} + \beta_3 \text{Share Lega}_{pt} \times D_{\text{Size}<15} + \\
& + \beta_4 \text{Foreign} - \text{born}_i \times D_{\text{Size}<15} + \beta_5 \text{Foreign} - \text{born}_i \times \text{Share Lega}_{pt} + \\
& + \beta_6 \text{Foreign} - \text{born}_i \times \text{Share Lega}_{pt} \times D_{\text{Size}<15} + \\
& + \gamma_1 X_{pt} + \gamma_2 W_{ijt} + \gamma_3 \text{Import_comp}_{pst} + \psi_t + \mu_j + \delta_p + \theta_s) + \varepsilon_{it} = \\
& = f(\mathbf{X}_{ijpt}\boldsymbol{\beta}) + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where Share Lega_{pt} is the share of votes of Lega Nord in province p at time t , $\text{Foreign} - \text{born}_i$ is dummy equal to one for foreign born, $D_{\text{Size}<15}$ is a dummy indicating firms with less than 15 employees, X_{pt} are controls measured at the province level such as unemployment rate and immigration rate, W_{ijt} are individual- or job-specific characteristics such as a quadratic polynomial in tenure, professional qualification (apprentice, blue collar), intensity, and log firm employees. δ_p is a vector of province specific fixed effects, ψ_t of time effects (double in the year of elections), δ_s sector specific fixed effects, and μ_j job-spell fixed effects.¹² The regression on the number of injuries also includes among the regressors

¹²Although we include job-specific fixed effects we also control for province-specific fixed effect and sector specific fixed effect since there are a minority of individuals that, within the same job spell, change province of work and core activity of the firm. We have inserted these controls in our specification to follow a panel approach and to compare wages and injuries of immigrants and natives while controlling for all relevant workplace characteristics.

the (log) exposure measured as full time equivalent (FTE) number of weeks worked, and a measure of intensity (i.e. ratio of FTE weeks worked and number of paid weeks).

Since the number of injuries is a count variable, we employ the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood regression with multi-way fixed effects as our main specification.¹³ When studying injuries, we augment the set of controls with exposure. We estimate the following equation:

$$y_{it} = \exp\left(\mathbf{X}_{ijpt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \rho \log(exposure_{it})\right) + \nu_{it} \quad (2)$$

The exposure is included without the offset option (i.e without imposing its coefficient equal to one), since this assumption is clearly rejected in the data. We also estimated the corresponding linear model, whose results are shown as a robustness check in the Appendix.

The Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood seems a natural choice for regressions on count dependent variables. Furthermore, according to Blackburn (2007) and Manning and Mullahy (2001) it should be preferred to log-linear specifications even for the wage regression, in case the data exhibit heteroskedasticity. A linear regression may lead to biased estimates since, with heteroskedasticity, the higher-order moments of the log wage distribution may depend on the regressors. Blackburn (2007) indicates that the estimation of union wage differential with the dependent variable measure in logarithm is likely to violate the assumption of independence between the distribution of the error term and the regressors. This is because the variance in the data of the unionized and non-unionized groups is different. A similar problem may affect our application, too, as we compare native and foreign born workers in small and large firms. To check this issue, along with the wage estimates, in section 5 we study how heteroskedasticity affects our estimates.

The panel approach in equations 1 and 2 compares natives and immigrants exposed to different increases in the electoral performance of Lega Nord checking whether the

¹³This model is estimated using the `ppmlhdfe` Stata package developed by Correia et al. (2020).

differential impact of Lega Nord on natives and immigrants is affected by the two EPL regimes in small and big firms. The main coefficient of interest is the triple interaction $\beta_6 Foreign_i \times Share_L_{pt} \times D_{Size < 15}$ in equations 1 and 2. A positive and significant coefficient of this triple interaction indicates that increases in the votes of Lega Nord have a differential impact on foreign-born workers in firms with less than 15 employees.

The inclusion of job-spell specific fixed effects instead of individual fixed effect follows Hummels et al. (2014). Had we included worker and firm FE only, identification would be based on the workers who switch employers, and would require the assumption that worker mobility is random. As Krishna et al. (2014) show, on the contrary, worker mobility is often systematically correlated with time-invariant but worker-firm match-specific factors (i.e., job-spell fixed effects). Our approach only requires the weaker identification assumption that worker mobility is random conditional on job-spell fixed effects. Moreover, job-spell fixed effects are likely to mitigate the effects of the unobserved heterogeneity in tasks among workers.

Hence, in our specification, the impact of regressors is identified using within-spells time variations in the dependent and independent variables, including changes occurred in the electoral outcomes within the same job contract. This approach cannot be considered as a pure Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff design, with a continuous treatment $Share_Lega_{pt}$, since we are including post-treatment controls (province, sector, firms' size). These attributes are not predetermined and individuals may decide where to work. However, due the inclusion of job-spell fixed effects, our estimations rely on weaker identification assumptions and focus on a selected group of more experienced and settled workers. In a series of robustness checks (Table A.10 in Appendix) we study how changes in the votes for Lega Nord affect foreign-born workers' transitions between jobs, big and small firms, provinces and sectors. If anything, the effect of Lega Nord seems to be in the direction of increasing the rigidity of foreigners' labour supply (Hirsch and Jahn, 2015). Overall, then, we believe that any biases due to time varying selection mechanisms should have a minor effect on our estimates.

While our outcome is individual-level, our variable of interest varies at the province level. Hence, it is important to include control variables that capture alternative channels through which the province-level time-varying variables that correlate with the Lega votes share may affect injury rates. Specifically, we include province-level unemployment rates, immigration rate, and import competition from China, in addition to time-invariant province fixed effects. Furthermore, to control for the role of sector-specific import competition from low-wage countries, we also include sector-specific import competition.

Table 1 reports our summary statistics. The table indicates that the average number of workplace injuries occurring in a job spell is 0.24 and the one of severe injuries is 0.09. The average exposure for the worker in our sample is 37 weeks. 22.4% of the workers in our sample are employed in small firms, they have an average tenure of 6 years in their jobs, they are overwhelmingly working full time (intensity is 99.8% on average), and about 3% of them are apprentices. The average log-transformed firm size is 4.4, corresponding to an average firm size of 81 employees. This relatively large firm size is a consequence of our 1:15 sampling, which covers most large firms but tends to undersample small firms. This selection should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. The share of foreign-born in our sample is higher than in the general population and it amounts to 25%, consistent with the fact that most foreign-born residents are employed and with the oversampling of foreign workers in our data.

As regards province characteristics, the average unemployment rates in the considered period was about 7.8%, and the share of votes in favour of the Lega Nord was 10.5%. The province-level immigration rate over the considered period was 4.2%. We also include the exposure of Italian provinces to the import competition from China, calculated similarly to Caselli et al. (2020) and Barone and Kreuter (2019) as:

$$IC_{pt} = \sum_k \frac{L_{pkt_0}}{L_{pt_0}} \frac{M^{ITA}}{L_{kt_0}}$$

where p denotes provinces; t denotes election years (1994, 1996, 2001); k indicates

tradable sectors; M^{ITA} is the yearly imports (in real terms) from China to Italy observed in sector k over the length of a legislature ; L_{pkt_0} is the employment in province p and sector k measured on the basis of Census data in 1991; L_{kt_0} is the 1991 Italian employment in sector k ; and L_{pt_0} is the 1991 total employment in province p . On the basis of this calculation, the average exposure to import competition was 50 thousand Euro per worker; the variable displays remarkable variation.

5 Results

In Table 2 we report the results of our baseline estimates. In column (1) we report the results of our basic model without interaction effects. The coefficient of *Log Exposure* is, as expected, positive and significant, indicating that longer exposure to the risk of injury increases the probability to get injured. Yet, as anticipated, the coefficient is significantly smaller than one, confirming our choice not to include the variable with a coefficient constrained to 1. Nonetheless, as shown in Appendix Table A.3, the results are confirmed when *Log Exposure* is constrained to have a coefficient of 1. In line with the literature, *Tenure* turns out negative and significant, confirming the expectation that on-the-job experience acts as a protective factor against injuries. The continuous firm size variable *Log(Employees)* is positive and significant, and the dummy *Firm size* is insignificant, not indicating a direct relationship between job protection and injury risk within a given job spell. An increasing immigration rate in the province is found to increase the within-spell injury risk. Taking all workers together, the share of votes for Lega Nord, *Share Lega*, does not turn out to significantly affect workers' injury risk. We cannot include a dummy for foreign-born alone as its effects are absorbed by the job-spell fixed effects that overlap with individual fixed effects.

< Include Tab. 2 about here >

In column (2), we augment our model with an interaction effect between *Share Lega* and a *Foreign-Born* dummy equal to 1 if the individual is foreign-born and zero other-

wise. In line with our theoretical arguments, we find a positive and significant effect of this variable on injury rates, while the main effect remains insignificant. This suggests that higher shares of votes for Lega Nord imply a significantly higher risk of injury for foreign workers only. As we include province dummies and control for the province-level unemployment rate, these effects can be considered to add up to the effects of economic conditions of the province or the economic cycle.

In column (3), we add the triple interaction between *Foreign-born*, *Size<15*, and *Share Lega*, as well as all the dyadic interactions between these variables. The results clearly indicate that, conditional on all covariates and fixed effects, the excess risk of injury of immigrants in provinces with higher shares of *Lega Nord* is driven by those employed in small firms. Interestingly, there seems to be no effect of the Lega Nord on natives' injury rates, nor a differential injury risk for foreign workers in small firms as a whole.

In Table 3, we complement our baseline estimates with measures of import competition, i.e., other potential confounding factors that may simultaneously lead to an increase in the votes for *Lega Nord* and to a worsening of labor market conditions. As shown by Barone and Kreuter (2019) and Caselli et al. (2020), import competition in Italy is associated with an increase in the votes for populist parties. The main mechanism fueling this discontent is represented by the worsening of labor market conditions (Barone and Kreuter, 2019).

< *Include Tab. 3 about here* >

In columns (1) and (2), we thus augment our model with the aggregate and sector-specific *Import Competition* measures, respectively. In this way, we aim to control for the effect of increased import competition from low-wage countries, and specifically from China, that may affect the local economy (column 1) or the specific industry where the worker is operating (column 2). Indeed, increased competition from low wage countries may determine significant transformations in the supply chains in a local production system. Firms may be compelled to modify their production processes; this implies that old routine tasks and thus also well-established job security procedures may be abandoned.

Such modifications, together with increased economic distress caused by foreign competition, may induce manufacturers to decrease investments in workplace safety. These modifications are more likely to alter production decision of small firms as well as the tasks performed by foreign workers. In turn, we expect this to affect the working conditions, thus simultaneously increasing economic distress or discontent in a working environment.

Including these variables does not alter the main results. Conditional on the other covariates, aggregate import competition does not turn out to significantly affect injuries and leaves the other coefficients unaffected. Instead, we detect a small and mildly significant positive effect of sector-specific import competition on injury risk, suggesting that some firms may address import competition by reducing safety expenditures. The latter result is confirmed and becomes more precise in column (3), where we include both measures of import competition jointly.

In columns (4)-(6), we study whether the economic uncertainty brought about by import competition affects foreign workers' injury rates differently than natives', by inserting triple interactions of import competition, either industry-specific or aggregate, with *Foreign-born* and *Size<15*.¹⁴ The main result holds throughout specifications: foreign-born workers in small firms located where the Lega gets higher shares face a significantly higher injury risk. Moreover, some additional facts emerge. In column (4), we add the triple interaction of *Foreign-born* and *Size<15* with the aggregate measure of import competition. Import competition seems to shift the burden of risk to specific groups of workers. Indeed, the effect of aggregate import competition on natives' injuries is negative for workers in large firms, consistently with the pro-cyclical nature of injuries—the working pace decreases and so do the injury rates. Instead, foreign-born workers and small firms' employees turn out to be disproportionately more at risk of injury than other workers. Controlling for the risk-increasing role of the Lega Nord, foreign-born workers in small firms are not differently affected by import competition. In column (5), we perform

¹⁴Changes in firms production may be induced not only by the direct import competition in their own sector, but also by changes in the amount of foreign input adopted upstream or downstream in the supply chain.

a similar exercise using the triple interaction with the sector-specific import competition. Similarly, sectors that are most severely threatened by import competition tend to shift the risk to foreign workers and to workers in small firms. The triple interaction is negative and significant, but the net effect on the immigrants' injury risk remains positive. Finally, in column (6), we include the three triple interactions, where we subtract the sector-specific import competition from the aggregate one to mitigate collinearity issues. The results confirm that, in addition to the role of the Lega Nord, there is indeed a risk-increasing role of province-level uncertainty that disproportionately affects immigrant workers and workers in small firms. None of these results, yet, affect the inference regarding our core variable of interest.

Overall, our results indicate that foreign-born workers employed in small firms face greater injury risks in provinces where higher shares of residents voted for *Lega Nord*. Such reduction in job quality does not appear to be the effect of confounding factors or differences between large and small firms. Economic shocks that may simultaneously affect labor outcomes and voting decisions, indeed, may affect injury rates differently in small and large firms, but this does not seem to confound our relationship of interest. Furthermore, Hijzen et al. (2017) in their analysis in the 2008-2009 period, show that the firm-size density and other control variables and performance indicators do not display jumps around the threshold, not suggesting that major unobservables may affect our results. The increased injury risk, thus, would not seem to be the result of economic difficulties but rather of a different attitude towards immigrants in firms below 15 employees.

In this regard, one may wonder about the share of votes that are needed to trigger an effect on the workplace safety of immigrants. Indeed, in the period under consideration, Lega represented a relatively small share in the national Parliament, i.e., between 4% and 10 %. We study this effect by constructing a dummy variable equal to 1 if the share of votes for Lega is greater than x and zero otherwise. We run a set of models similar to the one in column (7) where we replace *Share Lega* with the dummy *Lega High* and

plot the coefficient of the triple interaction obtained for different values of x . Figure 2 reports the results of this exercise and show that the effect of Lega is insignificant until the share reaches 4.5%, and that it becomes positive and significant for vote shares that range between 4.5% and 16.5%. For even greater values, the effect becomes insignificant. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Figure 3, where we plot the total effect of Lega on foreign-born that we obtained from this exercise instead of the coefficient of the interaction term.

< *Include Fig. 2 about here* >

< *Include Fig. 3 about here* >

In Table A.1, we show that the other coefficients remain remarkably similar at the estimated switching point of the effect of the Share Lega, i.e. when we replace Share Lega in the specification of column (7) in Table 2 with a dummy *Lega High* that is equal to 1 if the share of Lega exceeds 4.5% in the province and zero otherwise.

We now turn to the analysis of the effects of Lega Nord on wages. As anticipated, the choice of the estimator is non trivial when there is heteroskedasticity. In Appendix Table A.8, we implement a standard Park test for heteroskedasticity. The residuals from the linear regressions of log wages are clearly heteroskedastic. Workers in small and large firms exhibit different variances, as do blue collars and apprentices. Moreover, variance in log wages varies with tenure and with the log of firm size. Overall, then, we should expect the log-linear OLS estimates to be biased. Hence, as recommended by Manning and Mullahy (2001) and Blackburn (2007), we study the relationship between the squared residuals and the conditional mean based on a set of Park-type tests to draw insights on the underlying distributions of the errors. Neither of the Park-type tests in Table A.9 unambiguously indicate a preferred estimator, but given that the estimated coefficient for the conditional mean is significantly above 2, the distribution of the errors appears more compatible with a log-normal than with a Poisson distribution. Yet, we should remark that, according to Wooldridge (2001), the PPML is consistent at fairly general conditions, including over-dispersion, while OLS is certainly biased due to heteroskedasticity. Hence,

we report both the OLS and the PPML estimates in what follows.

Table 4 displays the results of our wage regressions, with columns (1)-(2) reporting the results of the OLS estimates and columns (3)-(4) those of the PPML estimates. Irrespective of the estimation methods, the results clearly indicate that higher unemployment rates decrease wages, and that wages tend to be higher in provinces with greater immigration rates. The OLS estimates also show that smaller and less protected firms, and firms more heavily affected by import competition in their sector of operation tend to pay significantly lower wages. As to our variable of interest, the sign of the triple interaction effect would suggest a negative effect of Lega Nord on the wages of foreign workers in small firms, but the estimated coefficients are far from being significant, not indicating a significantly different treatment for foreign workers in small firms where the votes for the Lega Nord are higher. Remarkably, when estimated by PPML, the net effect on the wages of these workers is of very similar magnitude, yet less precise, as the effect on injuries.

6 Robustness checks

As a robustness check, in Table A.5, we report the results of our baseline specifications restricting the analysis to severe injuries. Indeed, in principle, injury rates for all injuries may be affected by under-reporting, especially when workers fear that denouncing injuries may increase the risk of losing their jobs. According to Boone and Van Ours (2006), severe injuries, such as those requiring immediate care, are less subject to under-reporting. On the other hand, severe injuries represent a relatively small share of overall injuries, which implies lower statistical power. Accordingly, the coefficient of the triple interaction in column (2) is very similar to the ones displayed in Table 2 but is less precisely estimated.

In table A.6, we also report the OLS estimates of our baseline specification for all injuries and for severe injuries only. While the estimated coefficient of the triple interaction is smaller in magnitude, the results are remarkably similar to our baseline results and the net effects on immigrants are confirmed to be positive and significant.

Furthermore, in tables A.7 and A.10, we study possible sources of self-selection into risky jobs. In table A.7, we employ the province-sector specific injury rate as a dependent variable to see whether there is a tendency by foreign workers to self-select into more risky province-sector combinations. The coefficient of the triple interaction term is insignificant, suggesting that our results are not due to self-selection at this level. In table A.10 we report the results of a set of specifications similar to the one in equation 1 where we study the probability that the worker ends up in non-employment, changes job spell, province, sector, and firm size category. We also study whether foreign workers have different tenure compared to natives. The results show that the triple interaction of *Foreign-born* with *Size<15* and *Share Lega* is insignificant, suggesting that foreign workers in small firms are not significantly more or less likely to be in non-employment after the end of their job spell, not more or less likely than other workers to change province, sector or firm size, nor differently attached to their current job. Rather, the coefficient of the interaction between *Share Lega* and *Foreign-born* indicates that foreign workers as a whole (and not only those employed in small firms) are less likely to change province, sector or firm size within a given job spell, and they are less likely to end up in non-employment even if they have on average a smaller tenure whenever they are located in a province where the share of Lega is greater. In line with the findings Hirsch and Jahn (2015), this suggests that immigrants' have a more rigid labour supply function than natives. The authors show that immigrants' greater labour supply rigidity leads to wage discrimination and increases employer's profits. In our setting, employers could exploit this rigidity to shift the burden of workplace risk. Interestingly, though, this only appears to be effective in small firms, where labour market protection is lower, trade union activity is more limited and task allocation is more fluid.

Recognizing that the Lega Nord was not the only right-wing populist party in Italy, even if it was the one with the most clear anti-immigrant stance at the time, in table A.12 we study the robustness of our results to using the electoral shares of a wider set of far-right-wing parties, i.e., including the share of votes gained by *Alleanza Nazionale* along

with Lega Nord. The results are smaller in magnitude but still positive and significant, supporting our interpretation that the effect is driven by the votes for the Lega Nord.

Finally, we address the possible endogeneity of the immigration shares by implementing a control function approach. Following Lin and Wooldridge (2019), we implement a first stage where we run a fixed effects regression of the province-level immigration rate on a shift-share instrument of immigration (e.g. Altonji and Card, 1991, Card, 2007), based on the 1991 shares of immigrants from each origin country in each province. We then include the residuals in our baseline estimate. The significance of this term provides an endogeneity test (Lin and Wooldridge, 2019). The results of this exercise are reported in Table A.13. Reassuringly, the coefficient of the first stage residual is far from statistical significance and the coefficient of the triple interaction of interest is remarkably similar to the one in our baseline estimates, although it becomes less precise.

7 Discussion and conclusions

Although the literature has explored in depth the economic and cultural drivers of populism, few studies have focused on what happens when the message of populist parties materializes as an electoral success. The findings of this paper show that the electoral success of a populist party may concretely affect the groups that were targeted by the electoral propaganda. Indeed, we show that the electoral success of Lega Nord impacts on the working conditions of foreign workers in firms below fifteen employees. This evidence suggests that some changes in the behaviour either of employers or employees occur in contexts characterized by lower employment protection.

Why should we expect a post-election variation in injury hazards within a job contract?

The pressing need to cut costs for employers may be a strong incentive for monopsonistic employers to reallocate workers with lower bargaining power towards more hazardous tasks to avoid costly investments in safety. As long as this is considered as socially unacceptable, it will not occur. Consistently with Bursztyn et al. (2020), however, the electoral

results may transmit a public signal, thus propagating information on the general attitudes towards immigrants. This may represent a triggering factor both for employers and employees: individuals, after an election, may update their beliefs on general discontent towards immigrants and may decide to express an individual resentment that was previously hidden because considered not socially acceptable. This externalisation may have practical implications at the workplace, leading, for instance, to assign hazardous tasks to foreign workers.

Why this happens only in firms where employment protection is lower?

In smaller firms, where the employment protection is lower and trade union activity faces more limited guarantees, two mechanisms may be related to the increased injury risk for immigrants. First, whenever the externalization of resentment becomes more socially acceptable (Bursztyn et al., 2020), cost-saving strategies, and a related reduction in workplace safety, may be easier to implement, especially if this involves tasks performed by foreign workers. A second channel, related to the previous one, concerns the level of solidarity between natives and foreign workers. Native employees, after an election, may externalize their resentment towards immigrants and may decide to push (or not to oppose to) a reallocation of hazardous task to their foreign colleagues. It is also worth noting that task reallocation is more difficult to implement in large firms where the assignment of duties is more rigorous and specialization in single operations is more frequent. Conversely, production in smaller firms is usually more flexible and workers are requested to perform different tasks.

This means that the institutional setting and improved protection of workers in larger firms may help to prevent the populist backlash, either because greater job protection increases bargaining power over pecuniary and non-pecuniary job characteristics or because higher unionization in larger firms yields greater solidarity among employees and reduces discrimination at work.

Greater economic insecurity, beyond being one of the drivers of populism, may further amplify the negative effects of populism when its propagation is ascertained by an election.

Policies aimed at increasing job guarantees and security of workers may mitigate the negative effects from natives reaction to the electoral signal. On the other hand, reactions to public signals may occur also when the pre-election level of resentment is higher and/or workers' discontent is more repressed in these in small firms. A increase in the level of employment protection in small firms may thus reduce the initial perception of immigrants as a threat for the job of native workers.

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Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Sum injuries	0.238	0.464	0	4
Sum severe injuries	0.086	0.288	0	3
Exposure (weeks)	37.504	15.314	0.022	53
Size < 15	0.224	0.417	0	1
Tenure (years)	6.732	5.007	0	20
Intensity	0.998	0.028	0.019	1
Apprentice	0.030	0.171	0	1
Foreign-born	0.248	0.432	0	1
(Log) Employees	4.394	2.130	0	11.331
Unempl. rate	7.812	6.046	1.3	33.2
Share Lega	10.493	11.719	0	41.974
Immigration rate	0.042	0.216	0.002	3.349
Import competition	50.594	109.458	0	1952.578

Observations: 129,485.

Table 2: Baseline estimates

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log exposure	0.3276*** (0.0148)	0.3275*** (0.0147)	0.3273*** (0.0147)
Tenure	-0.0711*** (0.0077)	-0.0710*** (0.0077)	-0.0710*** (0.0077)
Tenure ²	-0.0013*** (0.0004)	-0.0013*** (0.0004)	-0.0013*** (0.0004)
Log(Employees)	0.0867*** (0.0234)	0.0867*** (0.0234)	0.0866*** (0.0234)
Firm size < 15	0.0303 (0.0548)	0.0305 (0.0548)	0.0098 (0.0610)
Unemployment rate	-0.0087 (0.0074)	-0.0087 (0.0074)	-0.0087 (0.0074)
Immigration rate	0.0702*** (0.0082)	0.0708*** (0.0083)	0.0706*** (0.0082)
Share Lega	0.0016 (0.0016)	0.0005 (0.0018)	0.0006 (0.0018)
Foreign-born × Share Lega		0.0028** (0.0012)	0.0010 (0.0012)
Foreign-born × size < 15			-0.0319 (0.0986)
Size < 15 × Share Lega			-0.0003 (0.0026)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega			0.0077** (0.0034)
N	129,485	129,485	129,485
Log-pseudolikelihood	-67825.0377	-67824.023	-67821.348
Pseudo R ²	0.1131	0.1131	0.1132
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms		0.0033	0.0089
se		0.0017	0.0025
p-value		0.0577	0.0004

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table 3: Estimates with import competition

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share Lega	0.0004 (0.0017)	0.0006 (0.0018)	0.0002 (0.0017)	-0.0000 (0.0017)	0.0000 (0.0017)	0.0000 (0.0017)
Foreign-born× Share Lega	0.0010 (0.0012)	0.0010 (0.0012)	0.0010 (0.0012)	0.0015 (0.0013)	0.0012 (0.0012)	0.0015 (0.0013)
Foreign-born× size< 15	-0.0319 (0.0986)	-0.0329 (0.0985)	-0.0332 (0.0984)	0.0475 (0.1131)	0.0050 (0.0996)	0.0426 (0.1136)
Size< 15× Share Lega	-0.0003 (0.0026)	-0.0003 (0.0026)	-0.0003 (0.0026)	-0.0004 (0.0026)	-0.0002 (0.0026)	-0.0004 (0.0026)
Foreign-born×size< 15× Share Lega	0.0077** (0.0034)	0.0077** (0.0034)	0.0077** (0.0034)	0.0078** (0.0033)	0.0075** (0.0033)	0.0076** (0.0033)
IC (all sectors)	-0.0000 (0.0001)		-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	
IC (sector-specific)		0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)
IC (all other sectors)						-0.0003** (0.0001)
Foreign-born× IC (all sectors)				0.0002*** (0.0001)		
Size< 15× IC (all sectors)				0.0002** (0.0001)		
Foreign-born× Size< 15× IC (all sectors)				-0.0002 (0.0001)		
Foreign-born× IC (sector-specific)					0.0006** (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Size< 15× IC (sector-specific)					0.0005** (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)
Foreign-born× Size< 15× IC (sector-specific)					-0.0008** (0.0003)	-0.0005 (0.0004)
Foreign-born× IC (all other sectors)						0.0002*** (0.0001)
Size< 15× IC (all other sectors)						0.0002* (0.0001)
Foreign-born× Size< 15× IC (all other sectors)						-0.0001 (0.0001)
N	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,485
Log-pseudolikelihood	-67821.291	-67820.630	-67820.339	-67811.678	-67817.943	-67811.289
Pseudo R ²	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.113
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0088	0.0090	0.0086	0.0088	0.0085	0.0088
se	0.0024	0.0025	0.0024	0.0024	0.0024	0.0025
p-value	0.0002	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003	0.0004

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.


Table 4: Wage estimates

Dep. var.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS ln(Wage)	OLS ln(Wage)	PPML Wage	PPML Wage
Firm size < 15	-0.0252*** (0.0069)	-0.0208** (0.0099)	-0.0229 (0.0335)	0.0097 (0.0494)
Unemployment rate	-0.0025*** (0.0009)	-0.0025*** (0.0009)	-0.0080** (0.0034)	-0.0080** (0.0034)
Immigration rate	0.0049*** (0.0008)	0.0049*** (0.0008)	0.0168*** (0.0054)	0.0168*** (0.0055)
Share Lega	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0000 (0.0003)	-0.0013 (0.0025)	-0.0012 (0.0025)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Import competition (sector-specific)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0030 (0.0031)	-0.0019 (0.0029)
Foreign-born × size < 15		0.0033 (0.0151)		-0.0216 (0.0859)
Size < 15 × Share Lega		-0.0005 (0.0004)		-0.0011 (0.0020)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega		-0.0001 (0.0006)		-0.0049 (0.0055)
N	129,467	129,467	129,467	129,467
Log-likelihood			-280393.232	-280355.668
Adjusted R ²	0.7929	0.7929	0.396 ^a	0.3961 ^a
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0000	-0.0004	-0.0043	-0.0092
se	0.0004	0.0006	0.0031	0.0054
p-value	0.9261	0.4907	0.1661	0.0903

Columns (1)-(2): OLS estimates. Columns (3)-(4): PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Figures

Figure 1: Injury hazard rates by potential experience and tenure



Note: Panel a shows the Kaplan Meier hazard compute with time equal to days of potential labor market experience, i.e. days since the first entry. The vertical red line is at three years of potential labor market experience. Panel b shows the Kaplan Meier hazard compute with time equal to days of tenure

Figure 2: Differential effect on injury rates by share of votes of Lega Nord





Figure 3: Net effect on injury rates by share of votes of Lega Nord



A Robustness checks

< *Include Tab. A.1 about here* >

< *Include Tab. A.2 about here* >

< *Include Tab. A.3 about here* >

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< *Include Tab. A.7 about here* >

Table A.1: Baseline estimates with Lega dummy

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)
Log exposure	0.3277*** (0.0147)	0.3277*** (0.0147)
Tenure	-0.0659*** (0.0127)	-0.0661*** (0.0126)
Tenure ²	-0.0013*** (0.0004)	-0.0013*** (0.0004)
Unemployment rate	-0.0083 (0.0076)	-0.0082 (0.0076)
Log(Employees)	0.0866*** (0.0235)	0.0868*** (0.0235)
Firm size < 15	0.0298 (0.0548)	0.0047 (0.0628)
Immigration rate	0.0705*** (0.0088)	0.0700*** (0.0087)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Lega-high	-0.0184 (0.0358)	-0.0181 (0.0370)
Foreign-born × Lega-high	0.0869** (0.0340)	0.0219 (0.0363)
Foreign-born × size < 15		-0.1102 (0.1000)
Size < 15 × Lega High		0.0060 (0.0528)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Lega High		0.2711*** (0.0774)
N	129,485	129,485
Log-pseudolikelihood	-67822.727	-67817.720
Pseudo R ²	0.1132	0.1132
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms se		
p-value	0.0003	0.0003

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.2: All sectors

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All injuries	All injuries	Severe injuries	Severe injuries
Log Exposure	0.3431*** (0.0120)	0.3429*** (0.0120)	0.1399*** (0.0151)	0.1392*** (0.0151)
Tenure	-0.0584*** (0.0109)	-0.0582*** (0.0109)	-0.0199 (0.0162)	-0.0198 (0.0161)
Tenure ²	-0.0017*** (0.0003)	-0.0017*** (0.0003)	-0.0017*** (0.0004)	-0.0017*** (0.0004)
Log(Employees)	0.1092*** (0.0220)	0.1094*** (0.0220)	0.1629*** (0.0349)	0.1635*** (0.0349)
Firm size < 15	0.0444 (0.0477)	0.0362 (0.0498)	0.0641 (0.0569)	0.0691 (0.0641)
Unemployment rate	-0.0087 (0.0055)	-0.0087 (0.0055)	-0.0092 (0.0110)	-0.0093 (0.0110)
Immigration rate	0.0515*** (0.0075)	0.0513*** (0.0074)	0.0377*** (0.0119)	0.0378*** (0.0120)
Share Lega	0.0006 (0.0017)	0.0008 (0.0017)	0.0039 (0.0024)	0.0043* (0.0025)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.0022** (0.0010)	-0.0000 (0.0012)	0.0002 (0.0020)	-0.0039* (0.0023)
Foreign-born × size < 15		-0.0385 (0.0933)		-0.1048 (0.1154)
Size < 15 × Share Lega		-0.0008 (0.0018)		-0.0016 (0.0029)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega		0.0072*** (0.0026)		0.0123*** (0.0040)
N	165,161	165,161	79,758	79,758
Log-likelihood	-88205.774	-88202.963	-36871.306	-36868.433
Pseudo R ²	0.113	0.113	0.0970	0.0971
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0027	0.0071	0.0041	0.0111
se	0.0015	0.0020	0.0027	0.0033
p-value	0.0624	0.0004	0.1271	0.0009

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.3: Log exposure coefficient constrained to 1

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log exposure	1 (.)	1 (.)	1 (.)	1 (.)
Log(Employees)	0.0530** (0.0237)	0.0529** (0.0237)	0.0533** (0.0238)	0.0534** (0.0238)
Firm size < 15	0.0700 (0.0578)	0.0452 (0.0645)	0.0699 (0.0580)	0.0378 (0.0669)
Tenure	-0.1498*** (0.0135)	-0.1498*** (0.0135)	-0.1499*** (0.0134)	-0.1501*** (0.0134)
Tenure ²	-0.0011*** (0.0004)	-0.0011*** (0.0004)	-0.0011*** (0.0004)	-0.0011*** (0.0004)
Unemployment rate	-0.0089 (0.0079)	-0.0089 (0.0079)	-0.0094 (0.0078)	-0.0093 (0.0078)
Immigration rate	0.0687*** (0.0084)	0.0685*** (0.0083)	0.0685*** (0.0092)	0.0679*** (0.0092)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.0003** (0.0001)	0.0003** (0.0001)	0.0003** (0.0001)	0.0003** (0.0001)
Foreign-born×size< 15		-0.0121 (0.0993)		-0.0941 (0.1019)
Share Lega	0.0006 (0.0018)	0.0007 (0.0019)		
Foreign-born× Share Lega	0.0026** (0.0013)	0.0009 (0.0014)		
Size< 15× Share Lega		-0.0004 (0.0027)		
Foreign-born×size< 15× Share Lega		0.0072** (0.0035)		
Lega high			-0.0188 (0.0435)	-0.0191 (0.0450)
Foreign-born× Lega high			0.0912** (0.0357)	0.0269 (0.0384)
Size< 15× Lega high				0.0091 (0.0564)
Foreign-born× size< 15 ×Lega high				0.2679*** (0.0819)
N	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,485
Log-likelihood	-68475.805	-68473.507	-68475.347	-68470.408
Pseudo R^2	0.1046	0.1046	0.1046	0.1047
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0032	0.0084		
se	0.0018	0.0026		
p-value	0.0817	0.0013	0.0013	0.0013

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.4: No spells < 31 days

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All sectors	All sectors	Manufacturing	Manufacturing
Log Exposure	0.3435*** (0.0120)	0.3432*** (0.0120)	0.3278*** (0.0148)	0.3275*** (0.0147)
Tenure	-0.0584*** (0.0109)	-0.0582*** (0.0109)	-0.0659*** (0.0128)	-0.0658*** (0.0127)
Tenure ²	-0.0017*** (0.0003)	-0.0017*** (0.0003)	-0.0013*** (0.0004)	-0.0013*** (0.0004)
Log(Employees)	0.1096*** (0.0220)	0.1097*** (0.0220)	0.0869*** (0.0234)	0.0868*** (0.0234)
Firm size < 15	0.0441 (0.0476)	0.0357 (0.0498)	0.0303 (0.0548)	0.0099 (0.0610)
Unemployment rate	-0.0087 (0.0055)	-0.0087 (0.0055)	-0.0080 (0.0076)	-0.0080 (0.0076)
Immigration rate	0.0516*** (0.0075)	0.0514*** (0.0074)	0.0707*** (0.0083)	0.0705*** (0.0082)
Share Lega	0.0005 (0.0017)	0.0008 (0.0017)	0.0002 (0.0017)	0.0002 (0.0017)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.0022** (0.0010)	0.0000 (0.0012)	0.0028** (0.0012)	0.0010 (0.0012)
Foreign-born × size < 15		-0.0387 (0.0935)		-0.0348 (0.0985)
Size < 15 × Share Lega		-0.0008 (0.0018)		-0.0003 (0.0026)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega		0.0073*** (0.0027)		0.0078** (0.0034)
N	165,145	165,145	129,477	129,477
Log-likelihood	-88191.182	-88188.294	-67816.115	-67813.343
Pseudo R ²	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.113
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0028	0.0072	0.0030	0.0088
se	0.0015	0.0020	0.0016	0.0024
p-value	0.0611	0.0003	0.0705	0.0002

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.5: Severe injuries

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)
Log exposure	0.0913*** (0.0181)	0.0907*** (0.0182)
Log(Employees)	0.1286*** (0.0336)	0.1287*** (0.0337)
Firm size < 15	-0.0042 (0.0817)	-0.0337 (0.0913)
Tenure	-0.0300 (0.0191)	-0.0299 (0.0191)
Tenure ²	-0.0013*** (0.0005)	-0.0013*** (0.0005)
Unemployment rate	-0.0062 (0.0147)	-0.0062 (0.0147)
Immigration rate	0.0436*** (0.0146)	0.0438*** (0.0147)
Share Lega	0.0042* (0.0025)	0.0038 (0.0025)
Import competition (all sectors)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)
Import competition (sector-specific)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0002)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.0001 (0.0025)	-0.0024 (0.0024)
Foreign-born × size < 15		-0.0606 (0.1348)
Size < 15 × Share Lega		0.0018 (0.0036)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega		0.0085* (0.0048)
N	61,601	61,601
Log-likelihood	-27600.987	-27599.073
Pseudo R ²	0.0933	0.0933
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0043	0.0117
se	0.0029	0.0038
p-values	0.1355	0.0020

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.6: OLS estimates

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All injuries	All injuries	Severe Injuries	Severe Injuries
Log Exposure	0.0845*** (0.0038)	0.0845*** (0.0038)	0.0104*** (0.0022)	0.0104*** (0.0022)
Tenure	-0.0190*** (0.0025)	-0.0190*** (0.0025)	-0.0037** (0.0015)	-0.0036** (0.0015)
Tenure ²	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0000)	-0.0001 (0.0000)
Log(Employees)	0.0159*** (0.0050)	0.0159*** (0.0050)	0.0086*** (0.0024)	0.0086*** (0.0024)
Firm size < 15	0.0064 (0.0120)	0.0050 (0.0121)	-0.0011 (0.0072)	-0.0024 (0.0075)
Unemployment rate	-0.0018 (0.0017)	-0.0018 (0.0017)	-0.0004 (0.0012)	-0.0004 (0.0012)
Immigration rate	0.0148*** (0.0019)	0.0148*** (0.0019)	0.0028** (0.0012)	0.0028** (0.0012)
Share Lega	0.0000 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0003* (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.0001** (0.0000)	0.0001** (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.0008*** (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)
Foreign-born × size < 15		-0.0146 (0.0246)		-0.0098 (0.0130)
Size < 15 × Share Lega		-0.0001 (0.0005)		0.0001 (0.0003)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega		0.0019** (0.0008)		0.0009** (0.0004)
N	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,485
Adjusted R ²	0.0652	0.0652	0.1062	0.1062
Within R ²	0.0102	0.0103	0.0023	0.0023
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0008	0.0021	0.0004	0.0012
se	0.0004	0.0006	0.0003	0.0004
p-value	0.0338	0.0003	0.1501	0.0035

OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.7: Self-selection into risky jobs: province/sector-specific injury rates

<i>Dep. var.: province-sector specific injury rate</i>	(1)	(2)
Tenure	-0.0012 (0.0015)	-0.0012 (0.0015)
Tenure ²	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Log(Employees)	0.0034 (0.0052)	0.0034 (0.0052)
Firm size < 15	0.0016 (0.0061)	0.0037 (0.0085)
Unemployment rate	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0005 (0.0004)
Immigration rate	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.0003)
Share Lega	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0002)
Import competition (all sectors)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Import competition (sector-specific)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0004)
Foreign-born × size < 15		-0.0026 (0.0117)
Size < 15 × Share Lega		-0.0003 (0.0004)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega		0.0006 (0.0006)
N	127,865	127,865
Log-likelihood	-19720.904	-19720.902
Pseudo R ²	0.0225	0.0225
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0000	0.0002
se	0.0002	0.0003
p-value	0.9084	0.5269

OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include individual fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.8: Park test on OLS residuals

	(1)
<i>Dep. var.: Squared OLS residuals</i>	
Blue collar	-0.436*** (0.066)
Firm size < 15	0.169*** (0.062)
Tenure	-0.438*** (0.013)
Tenure ²	0.006*** (0.000)
Unempl. rate	0.004 (0.007)
Share Lega	0.000 (0.002)
ln(Employees)	-0.095*** (0.018)
Immigration rate	0.015 (0.014)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.000 (0.000)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.000 (0.000)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.003 (0.003)
Foreign-born × Firm size < 15	-0.084 (0.115)
Firm size < 15 × Share Lega	-0.003 (0.003)
Foreign-born × Firm size < 15 × Share Lega	0.002 (0.004)
Constant	1.885*** (0.553)
] N	129,467
Adjusted R ²	0.4223

OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.9: Manning-Mullahy Park-type test

	(1)	(2)
<i>Dep. var:</i>	Squared OLS residuals	Squared PPML residuals
$\ln(\hat{\mu})$	2.521*** (0.016)	2.480*** (0.013)
Constant	-6.597*** (0.024)	-5.674*** (0.019)
N	129,467	129,467
r ²	0.188	

Manning-Mullahy Park-type tests. Regressions of the squared residuals on the predicted value of the conditional mean. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.10: Probability to turn into non-employment, to change job spell, province, sector, firm size, tenure

<i>Dep. var.: Change</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Nonemployment	Change job spell	Change prov	Change sector	Change firm size	Tenure
Firm size < 15	-0.0092 (0.0057)	0.0169** (0.0072)	-0.0069 (0.0055)	0.0073 (0.0071)	0.0135** (0.0057)	-0.0143 (0.0136)
Unemployment rate	0.0007 (0.0007)	0.0000 (0.0008)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	-0.0001 (0.0007)	-0.0000 (0.0008)	0.0018 (0.0013)
Immigration rate	0.0029 (0.0024)	0.0060* (0.0033)	0.0028 (0.0024)	0.0017 (0.0027)	0.0033 (0.0025)	0.0050*** (0.0019)
Share Lega	0.0004* (0.0002)	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0007** (0.0003)	0.0005* (0.0003)	0.0005 (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.0005)
Import competition (all sectors)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	-0.0005*** (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0005** (0.0002)	-0.0004** (0.0002)	-0.0006*** (0.0002)	-0.0034** (0.0016)
Foreign-born × size < 15	0.0101 (0.0104)	-0.0129 (0.0124)	-0.0119 (0.0077)	-0.0196* (0.0113)	-0.0178* (0.0105)	0.0496** (0.0242)
Size < 15 × Share Lega	0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0008 (0.0005)
Foreign-born × size < 15 × Share Lega	-0.0006 (0.0004)	-0.0006 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0011)
N	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,485	129,347
Adjusted R ²	0.235	0.603	0.627	0.612	0.627	0.480 ^a
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	-0.0006	-0.0001	0.0007	0.0002	0.0004	-0.0035
se	0.0004	0.0006	0.0003	0.0005	0.0005	0.0013
p-value	0.1479	0.8156	0.0327	0.7280	0.4512	0.0103

Columns (1)-(5): OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include individual fixed effects, province, time and industry fixed effects, and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate. ^a: Pseudo R² S

Table A.11: Interactions with import competition without Lega

<i>Dep. var: Sum injuries</i>			
Firm size < 15	-0.0155 (0.0627)	-0.0759 (0.0717)	-0.0752 (0.0719)
Share Lega	0.0012 (0.0016)	0.0012 (0.0015)	0.0012 (0.0016)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)
Import competition (sector-specific)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0002)
Foreign-born × IC (all sectors)		0.0002*** (0.0001)	0.0002*** (0.0001)
Foreign-born × IC (sector-specific)	0.0006** (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.0003)
Foreign-born × Firm size < 15	0.0980 (0.0899)	0.1467 (0.1039)	0.1396 (0.1041)
Firm size < 15 × IC (all sectors)		0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)
Firm size < 15 × IC (sector-specific)	0.0005** (0.0003)		0.0001 (0.0004)
Foreign-born × Firm size < 15 × IC (all sectors)		-0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Foreign-born × Firm size < 15 × IC (sector-specific)	-0.0008*** (0.0003)		-0.0004 (0.0004)
N	129,485	129,485	129,485
Net effect Lega on foreign-born in small firms	0.0003	-0.0000	0.0000
Se	0.0003	0.0001	0.0001
p-value	0.2902	0.9190	0.8021

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.12: Effect of all right-wing parties

<i>Dep.var.: Count injuries</i>	(1)	(2)
	All injuries	All injuries
Log Exposure	0.3276*** (0.0147)	0.3274*** (0.0147)
Tenure	-0.0660*** (0.0127)	-0.0660*** (0.0127)
Tenure ²	-0.0013*** (0.0004)	-0.0013*** (0.0004)
Log(Employees)	0.0863*** (0.0235)	0.0862*** (0.0234)
Size < 15	0.0300 (0.0547)	0.0313 (0.0672)
Unemployment rate	-0.0079 (0.0076)	-0.0079 (0.0076)
Immigration rate	0.0707*** (0.0083)	0.0703*** (0.0082)
Share Right	0.0001 (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0008)
IC (all sectors)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
IC (sector-specific)	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0002* (0.0001)
Foreign-born × Share Right	0.0016** (0.0006)	0.0005 (0.0006)
Foreign-born × Size < 15		-0.0948 (0.1087)
Size < 15 × Share Right		-0.0008 (0.0014)
Foreign-born × Size < 15 × Share Right		0.0045** (0.0018)
N	129485.0000	129485.0000
teff	0.0017	0.0045
tse	0.0008	0.0012
tp	0.0354	0.0001

PPML estimates. Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All estimates include job spell, province, time and industry fixed effects and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.

Table A.13: Control function approach

<i>Dep. var: Sum injuries</i>	
ln(exposure)	0.3402*** (0.0176)
ln(Employees)	0.0886*** (0.0260)
Firm size < 15	0.0803 (0.1229)
Blue collar	0.0075 (0.0570)
Tenure ²	-0.0012*** (0.0004)
Unempl. rate	-0.0003 (0.0097)
Share Lega	0.0009 (0.0020)
Import competition (all sectors)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Import competition (sector-specific)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Immigration rate	-0.0551 (0.3544)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	0.0002 (0.0022)
Foreign-born × Firm size < 15	-0.1035 (0.0979)
Foreign-born × Share Lega	-0.0001 (0.0029)
Foreign-born × Firm size < 15 × Share Lega	0.0079* (0.0045)
First stage regression coefficient	0.1218 (0.3571)
N	129,485
Cluster	16,846

PPML estimates. First-stage Residual from regression of the immigration rate on immigration rate imputed based on 1991 country-province shares. Bootstrap standard errors based on 360 replications in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. First and second stage estimates include the indicated fixed effects, province, time and industry fixed effects, and the following control variables: intensity, apprenticeship dummy, tenure, tenure squared, province unemployment rate, log employees, province immigration rate.