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An extended model to support detailed GPGPU reliability analysis

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Abstract[1]—**General Purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPGPUs) have been used in the last decades as accelerators in high demanding data processing applications, such as multimedia processing and high-performance computing. Nowadays, these devices are becoming popular even in safety-critical applications, such as autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles. However, these devices can suffer from the effects of transient faults, such as those produced by radiation effects. These effects can be represented in the system as Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and are able to generate intolerable application misbehaviors in safety-critical environments. In this work, we extended the capabilities of an open-source VHDL GPGPU model (FlexGrip) in order to study and analyze in a much more detailed manner the effects of SEUs in some critical modules within a GPGPU. Simulation results showed that scheduler controller has different levels of SEU sensibility depending on the affected location. Moreover, a reduced number of execution units, in the GPGPU can decrease the system reliability.**

Keywords—***GPGPUs, functional safety, transient faults, SEUs, fault simulation.***

I. INTRODUCTION

In the last decades, GPGPUs have been used as accelerators in high demanding data processing applications including multimedia processing and high-performance computing. Nowadays, these devices are increasingly adopted in several data-intensive safety-critical applications, such as autonomous and semi-autonomous cars [1]. These devices are manufactured employing aggressive technology scaling techniques in order to satisfy performance and energy requirements. Nevertheless, some studies have shown that these advanced semiconductor technologies are prone to suffer from external transient radiation effects [2-5]. These effects can be represented as Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and may generate intolerable misbehaviors in safety-critical environments.

In real devices, the impact of SEU effects is analyzed through radiation experiments in special facilities using expensive and complex equipment. Other methods include compiler instrumentation tools adding the behavior of soft-errors in the application code [6]. However, in both cases, detailed structural information about the device architecture and implementation are commonly unknown and detailed analysis of the fault effects is complex to be performed. Moreover, the injection tools are helpful in targeting data-path modules, but these cannot inject faults in most control-path units.

The results are employed to assess the device reliability or to identify structural or application weaknesses in GPGPU devices in order to design mitigation strategies [7]. Potential solutions may include acting on the program coding style and on the adopted algorithm [8].

A detailed analysis could be crucial to choose the most suitable countermeasures to achieve given reliability and can provide some guidelines in the application development. Moreover, it contributes to identifying critical modules and the incidence of faults on the application failure rate.

Solutions to perform these analyses are based on fault injection via simulation on representative device models at various abstraction levels. In the GPGPUs field, there are relatively few available models and fault injectors. Moreover, most of them are described using a high abstraction level [9-14] or a mix of them [15], thus foiling a complete and detailed analysis of SEU effects on complex units such as control-path modules. On the other hand, there are a few RTL behavioral GPGPU models, such as FlexGrip [16], which can be used to analyze the SEU effects in these special-purpose modules. Unfortunately, the FlexGrip model presents some restrictions related to technology dependency and instructions format support, thus limiting the development of new applications and its flexibility, which could support the detailed analysis mentioned above.

In the work reported in this paper, we first performed a detailed analysis of the FlexGrip model in order to remove some of these limitations and bugs. Moreover, we developed a new release of the FlexGrip model which has no direct dependency on a technology platform and is able to execute an increased set of instruction formats compatible with commercial compilers.

Some representative applications were designed for the new model and were used as benchmarks for SEU fault injection campaigns. Finally, some results are presented about the SEU effects on some data-path and control-path modules using such applications and multiple application parameters and GPGPU configuration modes.

The paper is organized as follows: Section II summarizes the FlexGrip model and the improvements introduced in its new version. Section III presents the fault injection methodology, the targeted modules, and the selected benchmarks. Section IV reports some experimental results, and Section V finally draws some conclusions and future works.

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II. FLEXGRIP GPGPU MODEL

A. FlexGrip architecture

FlexGrip is an open source soft-GPGPU model described in VHDL developed by the University of Massachusetts [16] employing the Nvidia's G80 microarchitecture. This model is compatible with the CUDA programming environment under the 1.0 architecture. 27 instructions are supported by the model. The model was originally designed for Xilinx FPGAs platforms.

This GPGPU model is based on a Streaming Multiprocessor (SM) including a memory system and two schedulers (*Block* and *Warp*). The Block scheduler is employed to manage and distribute the block tasks among the SMs. The Warp scheduler is used to control the execution of the group of 32 threads tasks denoted as *warp*. Both schedulers employ a round-robin algorithm. The SM is composed of five pipeline stages (*Fetch*, *Decode*, *Read*, *Execute* and *Write-back)* to process warp instructions. The total number of execution units (Scalar Processors, or SPs) in the *execution* stage is selectable before synthesis and can be used to select the best performance in terms of area and power consumption of the GPGPU. The SP programmability can be selected among 8, 16 and 32 cores.

A warp instruction is executed on the SM when the warp scheduler selects one available warp and dispatch the instruction address to *Fetch* stage. This stage processes the address and finds the equivalent instruction. The *Decode* stage interprets the instruction formats and selects the execution units and memory operands. *Read* stage loads from the memory system the required operands. Then, the *Execution* stage processes the warp instructions employing parallel execution units and temporary registers for each thread. The *Write-back* stage stores the results in registers or memory locations. Finally, a new instruction is dispatched by the warp scheduler.

The model includes a custom branch management unit for thread (*intra-warp*) divergence. This module is composed of a control unit and a divergence stack memory to store the addresses of warp convergence points. This model supports up to 32 levels of divergence. Fig 1 represents the general architecture of the SM in the FlexGrip model.




Fig 1. The general architecture of the SM in the FlexGrip model. Adapted from [16].

B. Improvements in the FlexGrip GPGPU model

A detailed analysis of each internal module showed some operational limitations. Thus, we introduced a set of improvements which allow us to analyze transient fault effects on internal modules. Moreover, those simplify and increase the flexibility of the model for applications development. The improvements can be divided into three groups:

- Technology dependency.
- Instruction format support.
- Compilation restrictions.

1) Technology dependency

FlexGrip was originally designed to be implemented on specific FPGAs technologies. Moreover, some internal modules were automatically described employing high-level compilation tools, such as Matlab. However, these codes are not easily understandable and cannot be analyzed in an easy manner.

We modified each module by removing any reference or dependency to specific technology libraries and compilation tools and replacing them with equivalent generic descriptions. Moreover, the name of signals and interconnections was clarified in order to simplify the analysis during the fault campaigns. In the end, 38.8% of the modules were corrected or modified for this purpose. The model can now be imported in model simulation environments, such as ModelSim. Moreover, this can be synthesized employing other technology libraries, such as the ASIC OpenCell [17] library.

2) Instruction format support

FlexGrip was designed to be compatible with the CUDA programming environment and execute SASS instructions. Nevertheless, the use of high-level Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools during design and its optimizations seems to be one of the factors for some missing instruction formats. Moreover, some internal parts in modules, such as intermediate registers, decoding logic, and interconnections were not removed by the optimization.

The previous behavior was checked during the development of custom applications employing the CUDA environment. In these applications, some instructions failed during execution. Exhaustive analysis and revisions were performed on the simulation traces. However, in some cases, the analyzed signals behavior showed that some supported instructions were only partially implemented. This restriction limits the transient fault analysis and its incidence under different applications. Moreover, it reduces the model flexibility and its employability.

The improvement reported here required a methodical revision of all supported assembly instructions (SASS) in the model and the addition or correction of the missing description to implement the instructions under the expected format. As a result, we identified a minimal subset of instructions required to implement basic application codes, and focused our work on fixing existing bugs, thus allowing complete support of these instructions.

As the SASS op-code, i.e., the instruction formats for the GPGPU, has not been released by Nvidia, the op-code format of some instructions was decoded employing the CUDA compilation tools (*NVCC* and *CUOBJDUMP*). Multiple applications were designed targeting selected instructions in order to force the compiler to generate the instruction op-code. Then, all the required changes (e.g., missing registers, connections or incomplete modules) were introduced in order to fully support the selected minimal set of instructions with all the potential instruction format variations. After this process, the set included 27 instructions and 74 formats. Table 1 shows the supported instructions.

4.8% of the whole model description required an addition or modification in its description in order to be able to execute the expected instruction formats and its variation. Finally, some bugs and unused interconnections were removed from the project hierarchy in order to clean the modules and remove any redundant logic which may create problems during the fault campaigns.

3) Compilation restrictions

FlexGrip is able to execute applications compiled employing the CUDA-toolkit by NVIDIA. Moreover, an SM 1.0 micro-architectural compatibility must be selected. However, the

CUDA compiler is protected and, as commented below, the op-code of the instructions is not released.

In multiple attempts to design new applications for FlexGrip we discovered several SASS instructions not supported by the model, so in order to maintain the compatibility with the CUDA-toolkit, a SASS checker tool was developed to check the supported SASS instruction formats. This tool is able to identify and notify the user of those unsupported instructions formats in FlexGrip. Additionally, a SASS parser tool was designed to directly write SASS assembly instructions and replace the unsupported ones. Using both tools, a new application can be designed, verified and corrected without the necessity of executing the instructions in the model, thus reducing the application time development. Sub-section III.C introduces two benchmarks developed for FlexGrip employing these tools.

TABLE 1 SUPPORTED INSTRUCTIONS IN FLEXGRIP MODEL.

Mnemonic	Description
I2I	Integer to integer conversion
IMUL / IMUL32 /I MUL32I	Integer multiplication
SHL	Shift left
SHR	Shift right
IADD / IADD32 / IADD32I	Integer add
IMAD / IMAD32 / IMAD32I	Integer multiply and Add
LOP	Bitwise logical Operation
ISET	Integer comparison
MVC	Load from constant memory
GLD	Load from global memory
GST	Store to global memory
MOV / MOV32	Move register to register/load from shared memory
MVI	Move immediate to destination
R2G	Store to Shared Memory
R2A	Move general purpose register to address register
A2R	Move address register to general purpose register
BRA	Branch
BAR	barrier synchronization
RET	Return from kernel
SSY	Set synchronization point
NOP	No operation

III. FAULT INJECTION METHODOLOGY

In order to evaluate the effect of SEUs in the improved version of the FlexGrip model, we developed a fault injection tool employing the ModelSim simulator. The injector tool was designed following the guidelines introduced in [18] regarding transient fault injection using simulator commands. Additionally, the tool implements techniques to reduce the fault simulation time (multi-thread fault simulation and module de-rating factor (UDR) usage). Details about these techniques can be found in [19, 20].

The fault injector was developed employing a high-level language (*Python*) and is composed of a fault controller, a fault injector and a fault checker and classifier. The fault controller manages the fault campaign execution and it is able to start and finish the tool execution. The fault injector decodes and applies a fault command in the selected fault location. Finally, the fault checker and classifier checks the simulations termination and classifies the faults.

Initially, the fault controller configures the program kernel parameters, loads the FlexGrip model into the ModelSim environment and the program instructions to be executed. The kernel parameters include the number of SP-Cores presented in the SM, the total number of blocks and threads in the task, the total number of blocks per SM and the file register size.

Once the model is loaded in the simulator, the fault controller starts the fault injector and this loads and decodes the fault to be injected into the GPGPU model. The fault injector reads, from a fault list, the location and the injection time of the fault. Then, the injector translates those parameters into the equivalent commands for ModelSim. The tool is able to handle permanent and transient faults. For the purpose of this work, we employed the transient fault capabilities of the designed tool. One fault simulation is performed for each element in the fault list, once the fault is injected in the model.

Finally, the fault checker and classifier waits for simulation termination and checks memory results and simulation time parameters in order to classify the effects of the fault in the system. This unit classifies the faults in four categories: *Silent Data Corruption* (SDC) when the SEU affects the memory results, *Detected Unrecoverable Error* (DUE) when the model is hanged by the SEU effect, *Timeout* when the SEU produces performance degradation in simulation time and *Silent* when the SEU does not generates any effect.

A. Fault campaign description

In SEU fault injection campaigns, two elements are considered: the SEU location and the SEU injection time. The SEU location depends on the fault universe and spans over the registers and memory elements employed by a benchmark during execution time on each targeted module. The fault universe was carefully checked and selected through a golden execution. The injection time for each fault is randomly chosen.

A fault campaign starts with a golden simulation to define the reference execution time and the reference memory results. Then, the fault controller starts a loop in which this unit loads the fault list and the fault injector applies the equivalent command in the simulation model. The simulation time is selected as twice the reference execution time in order to allow the tool to detect timeout effects. Moreover, the model is instrumented with a memory generator which stores the memory results into a file for each simulation. The fault checker checks the presence of this file and performs the classification phase. Finally, a new fault is loaded for the fault list and the simulation loop starts again. The fault injection campaign finishes when the fault list is empty.

The multi-thread fault injection approach is employed in the tool by dividing the fault list in chunks of faults. Each fault list is composed of the SEU fault location *(signal name*) and the SEU injection time.

B. Targeted modules

One Data-Path and two Control-Path modules were targeted during fault campaigns. Their characteristics are briefly described in the following.

1) Data-path module

File Registers: The 32 bit-size registers are employed as source and destination operands and addresses during a warp instruction execution. These registers are organized and distributed according to the total number of warps and blocks to be executed in an SM.

2) Control Path modules

SM Warp Scheduler: The warp scheduler manages the warp execution inside an SM. This unit is able to select an available warp, dispatch the warp instruction to the SM and check its execution. This module is composed of various memories and control logic. The internal warp memory is employed to store the status information of each warp execution. This information is updated after each instruction execution and is composed of the active thread mask (aTM), the actual program counter and some additional warp configuration parameters.

Divergence Stack memory: This unit stores the divergence addresses generated by a divergent warp. A special-purpose

memory stores the address, warp index and aTM to trace the number of executed threads on each divergence path.

C. Benchmarks

Three applications were developed for the improved version of FlexGrip to evaluate the SEU effects on the targeted modules. They are briefly described in the following.

FFT: This typical signal processing application was implemented based on the Coley-Turkey algorithm [21]. In this application, the butterfly element was described employing the CUDA-C environment. Although the model does not provide support for division operations, they were replaced by a software approach based on logarithm methods using shift and logical displacements.

Edge detection: This common image processing application is based on the Sobel algorithm and was described as a 3x3 size dimensions stencil element. The stencil describes an image filter and it is applied to a 2-dimensions input. As described below for FFT, the division operations are implemented employing the same logarithmic approach.

Vector add: This typical embarrassingly parallel application operates on two individual arrays and stores the result in a specified memory area. This program kernel is selected considering that most applications include execution segments with fully data-parallel operations. This application employs data-path modules and execution units to process the operations.

IV. Experimental Results

The fault campaigns considered two different sets of parameters, the GPGPU model configuration, and the benchmark configuration. The GPGPU model was configured employing 8, 16 and 32 SP-cores. Moreover, the benchmarks were configured with two application threads per block (TPB) distributions: *A→ 32 threads* and *B→ 64 threads*. Benchmarks under each configuration are named as follow: benchmark name, thread configuration, SP-cores configuration. For example, VectorAdd with 32 TPB and 16 SP-Cores is named as *V_32_16*.

In order to take into account the different duration of different versions of the same benchmark, the Mean Execution Between Failures (MEBF)[22] metric is calculated for the different benchmarks in the targeted modules. It is worth noting that, the DUE errors are not considered for MEBF computation. The SM warp Scheduler was divided into two parts, the warp memory, and the logic. Table 2 reports the gathered results, expressed in terms of clock cycles.

TABLE 2 MEBF RESULTS

Module	Config SP-Cores	FFT A	FFT B	EDGE A	EDGE B	Vector Add A	Vector Add B
File register	32	7.6	11.5	22.0	43.5	139.2	111.6
	16	5.6	6.8	16.4	34.3	79.7	83.9
	8	3.7	8.5	10.6	40.1	57.0	60.2
Warp memory	32	565.4	766.2	2,570.7	12,468.5	16,163.7	2,208.1
	16	1,695.9	33.6	974.1	220.7	2,165.9	585.0
	8	570.3	7.5	174.5	81.8	361.1	194.7
Warp logic	32	102.2	140.1	210.4	780.5	1,766.9	1,985.3
	16	34.3	85.6	285.4	186.9	970.7	1,083.9
	8	20.0	25.4	104.7	84.8	615.7	640.7
Divergence Stack memory	32	399.8	259.9	2,688.4	2,158.0	-	-
	16	269.1	155.7	1,903.3	1,084.2	-	-
	8	207.6	63.7	1,338.1	390.6	-	-

The SEU sensitivity in the modules depends on the SP-cores configuration. Dropping the number of SP-cores reduces the reliability of the system. This behavior is constant for each module and kernel configuration. The file register is more reliable to SDC and timeout errors by increasing the TPB. In contrast, the divergence stack, the warp logic, and the warp memory seem to be more reliable with kernels configured with a lower number of TPB. A detailed analysis for each module is provided in the following sub-sections.

A. Data-Path module results

1) Register File Results

A total of 27 fault injection campaigns were performed injecting 34,816 faults for the FFT and Edge programs. For VectorAdd, 10,240 faults were injected in 32-SP cores and 8,192 faults in the 16- and 8-SP cores configurations. In the multi-thread fault simulation campaigns, the fault list was divided into ten parts and the simulations were performed in parallel helping to reduce the fault simulation time from about 150 hours to less than 16 hours and the total amount of faults to inject in up to 95% by the UDR factor.

Results in Fig. 2 shows that the FFT and Edge benchmarks present a similar behavior. In both cases, the error rate reduces by increasing the number of SP-cores and by increasing the number of TPB. In FFT, a slight increment in the SDC error-rate is generated by increasing the TPB. This behavior can be explained through the relation of the model execution time and kernel configuration. In principle, data stored in active registers for long periods are more prone to SEU effects (case B) than registers with periodical write and read activity (case A).




Fig. 2. Register File results for FFT (a), VectorAdd (b) and Edge (c) kernels. Each axis represents one SP-core configuration and parallelism level in TPB. Discriminated results of faults detected, expressed in percentage, are presented on each axis.

In simulations, the *A* configuration models required longer execution time. However, the individual block execution time is lower than the time required by *B* configurations. Moreover, FFT in *A* configuration uses half of the registers of those employed in *B* configuration and employs them to process threads data, in different interval times, belonging to different blocks. In this case, the increment in TPB increases the SDC error rate, as it happens in the 32 and 16-SP cores configurations.

Another factor affecting the error rate is the instruction type. The FFT includes control-flow instructions depending on predicate conditions, which are generated evaluating register operands. In this way, some registers are included in control-

flow operations. Those registers can be considered as control-flow critical registers (CFRs). If an SEU fault affects one of these CFRs, the effect is DUE.

According to results, a higher number of CFRs is generated by decreasing the TPB. This can be explained considering the registers employed in the *A* configuration and the CFRs mapped among threads with the same address locations. During kernel execution, one register location will store, in different time intervals, data belonging to two CFRs, increasing the probability to generate a DUE.

A different behavior is shown by the Vector_Add benchmark. An increment in the TPB corresponds to an increase in the SDC error rate. This trend is visible for all SP-cores configurations and depends on the increased SEU sensibility due to the additional time required by the SM to dispatch other warps belonging to the same block. Moreover, the execution time to process an instruction under a large number of threads (*B* configuration) is the double of a block with fewer threads (*A* configuration). Additionally, SEU effects slightly increase by reducing the SP-core configuration. This behavior can be explained by the additional time employed by the scheduler to process one instruction of each thread with the limited number of SP cores. The number of SEU faults generating DUE and Time-Out effects is zero as this application does not use any control-flow instruction.

In the Edge Detection application, we can observe an inverse relationship between the SDC error rate and the TPB. This behavior is visible in each SP-Core configuration. It can be explained noting that this kernel includes a large number of control-flow, divergence generation, and arithmetic-intense instructions. Regarding the DUE error rate, results also show an inverse relation between TPB and the error rate. This can be explained due to the SEU sensibility of CFRs. Results (*Edge Detection* and *FFT*) are similar to those shown in [18] for control-flow applications.

B. Control-Path results

1) Warp Scheduler results

36 fault campaigns were performed targeting this module. The model flexibility allows us to divide the module into two parts for analysis purposes: the internal memories (*Warp*, *State* and *Predicate*) and the sequential logic components in the module. Results are presented in Fig 3. At first glance, results contradict the criticality of this module in the GPGPU operation. Nevertheless, a deep analysis of its architectural organization and the role employed by the scheduler helps to clarify.

The error rate in the sequential logic is caused by the SEU sensibility and criticality of the internal registers employed in processing and storing the warp information. Although the sequential logic corresponds to 14.3% of the elements in the scheduler controller, the percentage of DUE effects lies in a range between 85% and 92% in all kernels. It means that errors in those registers directly compromise kernel termination.

The unexpectedly low error rate for faults in the warp memory is caused by a loop existing between the scheduler and the SM pipelines stages, which contributes to masking and reducing the SEU effects in the memory. In this way, the information is presented in the pipeline registers and in memory. After each instruction execution, this memory is written refreshing the information and correcting any SEU. Moreover, this special memory allows performing the write and read process in a few clock cycles, during a new instruction load, reducing the error propagation. The SEU effect on the state and predicate memories is zero for the selected benchmarks.

Results show that increasing the TPB raises the SDC and DUE error rate. The program, under *B* Configuration, uses more memory locations and requires the execution of two warps to process one instruction including warp line exchange. This exchange generates a temporary short in the loop and the memory location cannot correct any SEU.




Fig. 3. Warp Scheduler results in memory (a, c and e) and sequential logic (b, d and f) for the FFT (a, c), VectorAdd (b, d) and Edge (e, f) kernels.

A reduction in SP-Cores produces a direct increment in the error rate. It can be explained by the additional work performed by the scheduler (twice and four times) for thread execution in the 16 and 8 SP-Cores configurations.

2) Divergence Stack memory

Vector_Add program was not considered in the fault campaigns because this kernel does not use the Divergence Stack memory. Multi-thread fault campaigns with 50,688 faults were performed for the FFT and Edge benchmarks. Results are presented in Fig. 4. These show that the divergence stack memory does not generate a relevant contribution to error rate by SEU effects. This low error rate is explained by the partial usage during kernel execution. Each memory location (*line*) is employed for the time fraction of a divergence generation. This means that each line has a different SEU sensibility. A detailed inspection to this unit, for both kernels, revealed that its usage is limited to less than two-thirds of the total simulation time. Moreover, each additional pushed line presents fewer activities generating a low SEU sensibility in this unit.

The difference in terms of error rate between the two

benchmarks is explained analyzing the instructions, its description, and the divergence paths length. Moreover, the number of synchronization point instructions (SSY) determines the usage of each memory location. The Edge kernel uses seven independent SSY instructions with a short path length and seems to be reliable to SEU effects. In contrast, FFT includes two SSY instructions and long divergence paths. The long interval time between writing and reading seems to increase the SEU sensitivity for this program.




Fig. 4. Divergence stack result for FFT (left) and Edge (right) benchmarks.

Regarding the DUE and SDC error rates, they depend on the affected location. The difference, for both applications, is mainly caused by the ability of the program counter and mask fields to generate hang conditions. An SEU in the program counter may generate Timeout or DUE errors. Similarly, an SEU affecting the aTM may generate SDC, by inactive threads, or DUE effects, by threads missing the taken path. Finally, an SEU in the warp ID field generates Timeout effects.

The model with *A* Configuration uses the same lines in the divergence stack, but these lines are employed in different time slots and the execution time per block is lower than that required in *B* Configuration. The additional time in *B* Configuration seems to be responsible for the increasing SEU sensitivity. A decrement in TPB could help to reduce, in more than twice, the SDC error rate.

V. CONCLUSIONS

We introduced an improved version of the open source GPGPU model FlexGrip. This detailed model description was crucial to explain the behavior observable in the control unit modules when affected by transient faults. Although the FlexGrip model does not completely match the architecture of the most recent GPGPU devices, we still claim that the performed analysis may be valid for some of them as well. The new model version is technology independent. Moreover, each instruction was checked and listed. Additionally, further tools have been implemented to provide assistance in the development of new applications employing the CUDA environment.

SP-cores customization in the model could be useful for area and energy optimization. However, according to Table 2, a lower number of SP-cores increases the SEU sensibility and reduces system reliability. We performed several fault injection campaigns to analyze the effects of SEUs in different modules within the GPGPU with different applications. The results showed that the behavior of the error rate (measured via the MEBF metric) when changing the configuration parameters depends on the application. Thanks to the availability of the FlexGrip model, we provided explanations about the observed phenomena.

VI. FUTURE WORKS

We are currently working to extend the analysis of the SEU effects to other modules within the GPGPU architecture employing different program kernel characteristics. We also plan to extend the instruction and hardware support of the GPGPU model following the SM 1.0 microarchitecture compatibility. Moreover, new execution units, such as floating point units or other hardware accelerators are also potential extensions for the model. The inclusions of different warp scheduler controller algorithms are also planned as future work.

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